Post #37

2024 Baseball Hall of Fame Election

January 21, 2024

Happiness Is Making Your Dreams Come True. Jourdan Dunn

1. Introduction

It’s that time of year, once again. On January 23rd of 2024, the Baseball Writers Association of America [BBWAA] will announce the results of their annual vote to let some more retired Baseball players into the Baseball Hall of Fame [BHOF]. These lucky players will be going in through the front door [the back door being the various shady committees where the dirty work of the BHOF is done]. In this post, I will look at each candidate’s worthiness through the lens of the: 1) Wins Above Replacement [WAR] and 2) Win Shares [WS] player evaluation systems. To determine whether any candidate is actually worthy under either of these two systems, I will be using the Lowest Common Denominator Method [LCDM] to evaluate each player’s WAR and WS scores. The LCDM tries to ensure that no player is elected to the BHOF who does not already have a better WAR or WS score than the worst player who should have been elected. After evaluating a player’s WAR and WS numbers by the LCDM, a discussion will be had for each player on the ballot about whether they are worthy, whether they could have been worthy with better luck, or whether they were never really good enough for election to the BHOF. We will also mention where each player is on the Ryan Thibodaux “Baseball Hall of Fame Vote Tracker” [BHFVT]. The BHFVT compiles already published votes ahead of the actual announcement and is invaluable in taking almost 100% of the fun out of the actual BHOF announcement of who is going to be inducted.

2. Player Evaluation Methods

What is the difference between the two player evaluation systems that will be used in this post? Bill James’ Win Shares [WS] method measures the bulk of a player’s career. Under this system, good hitting players with long careers are rewarded. In other words, it favors a long workman career offensively over a shorter but more spectacular career. Defensively, Win Shares favors the other eight men in the field over the pitcher. In fact, pitchers are so undervalued by WS that this system may have to be disregarded when considering if a pitcher is worthy of election to the BHOF. Although WS increases the defensive value of every positional player across the board by devaluing pitcher contributions, the defensive metrics used by the WS system are conservative. On the other hand, Wins Above Replacement [WAR] does not reward the bulk of a player’s career. It removes any credit for that part of a player’s value that falls below Replacement Value [RV].* By removing RV from a player’s career, WAR is able to more highly reward the short spectacular career while downgrading long bulk careers. Defensively, WAR does not seem to favor the hitters over their pitching brethren or vice versa. However, WAR seems to greatly reward what it measures as defensive excellence while heavily penalizing any inept fielding players. WAR, of course, has become the pre-eminent player evaluation tool. On the other hand, Win Shares is all but obsolete. But it is interesting to note the differences between the methods. If the Baseball Reference website had adopted WS rather than WAR as their main player evaluation tool, it is quite obvious that there would be some differences in the marginal players that get inducted into the BHOF.

*Replacement Value is a pre-determined value of WAR which could easily be produced by any fungible player grabbed off the Major League bench or out of the minor leagues.

3. The Lazy Man’s BBHOF Lowest Common Denominator Method

In past posts, I liked to use what I called the “Lowest Common Denominator Method” [LCDM] for analyzing whether a player was qualified for the BHOF by the WAR [Wins Above Replacement] system of player evaluation. The LCDM simply assumed that the BHOF had used career WAR to choose its members. In other words, the LCDM assumed that, if there are 300 Baseball players in the Hall of Fame, those players ranked from 1st thru 300th in career WAR. If a newly eligible player for the BHOF has a better WAR than that player ranked 300th, then that player deserves to also be inducted. In my “original” LCDM system, I found the lowest ranking BHOF member by ignoring Negro League players [as their career WARs are not fully realized], removing those players who were banned [for steroids, gambling, idiocy], and also disregarding the ineligible [still active or too recently retired]. After all this, I discovered that the LCDM player at that time was ranked 276th on the career WAR list. But this time, I am just going to be lazy. There are currently 343 men in the Hall of Fame and 270 of them have been elected as players. For the 2024 BBHOF election, the LCDM will simply be set at 270 with 271 to 343 constituting the grey area. The 270th best player by WAR is Jimmy Collins with a score of 53.3; and the 270th best by Win Shares is four guys tied at 279.7 [Ryan Braun, Lave Cross, Steve Garvey, and Fred Lynn]. If a player has more than 53.3 WAR and 279.7 WS, then he should be elected to the BHOF. If the player cannot meet either of these thresholds, he should not. If a player meets one but not the other, that is where things get interesting.

1) Adrian Beltre: 93.5 WAR [40th All Time]; 375.5 WS or so [79th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 99.0% of 179 votes [approximately 49.7% of the Ballots counted]. His 1st year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Beltre is well above the bottom lines for both WAR [40th vs. 270] and WS [79th vs. 270]. It is obvious that Beltre will be elected to the BHOF in 2024, almost unanimously, as he should be. At this point, only some type of ballot catastrophe could keep him out [“100 senile baseball writers forget to include Adrain Beltre on their ballots”…or something similar].

Comment: So far above the WAR and WS bottom lines for the BHOF that only some steroid abusing, wife beating, and/or nasty gambling allegations could have kept him out…but there are none. Adrian Beltre has one of the oddest career paths of any Hall of Famer. He debuted at 19 years old. At age 20, he had a very good first full year [Beltre would have easily been the Rookie of the Year if he not lost his rookie status the year before]. At the age of 21, he had an even better second full year. From 22 to 24, he struggled through injuries that would have derailed a lesser player. Then, at 25, he had his peak season, slugging as he never would again and leading the League in home runs, all in a free agent walk year.* From 26 to 30, Beltre played in a pitching-friendly park that seemed to bank the fire in his bat down from an inferno to just a campfire. From 31 to 38, he was Hall of Fame caliber player, year after year, with very little degradation of his skills until leg injuries derailed that 38-year-old season. At 39, Beltre returned to the game but was diminished to simply an average player and promptly retired after the season ended.

*In 2004, Adrian Beltre [48 HRs-121 RBIs-.334 BA-.629 SA] finished second in the National League MVP voting behind peak steroid Barry Bonds [45-101-.362 -.812] and ahead of monster seasons by Albert Pujols [46-123-.331-.657], Scott Rolen [34-124-.314-.598], and Jim Edmunds [42-111-.301-.643]. Does this count for Beltre as a steroid stolen MVP? Fate took both a Rookie of the Year award and an MVP award away from Beltre.

2) Joe Mauer: 55.2 WAR [250th All Time]; 305.0 WS [197th or so All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 83.2% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 1st year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Mauer qualifies for the BHOF under both the WAR [250/270] and the WS [197/270] systems. Given extra credit for catching, it makes perfect sense that he is a making a strong showing in his very first year. The BHOFT currently shows him with enough support to withstand the usual erosion of support contained in unpublished ballots. With half of the votes counted by the HOF Tracker, it will be an total upset if he is not elected in 2024.

Comment: It is almost a certainty that Joe Mauer will be elected to the BHOF on his first year on the ballot. Oddly, this result seems to have caught some sportswriters by surprise. However, Mauer is a catcher and, traditionally, that position gets extra credit for the brutal toll it takes on its practitioners. Mauer was on his way to being one of the most unique and very best catchers of all time (a too tall and lanky catcher who also won multiple batting titles) when a series of concussions forced him to play first base instead and shortened his career significantly. It probably also doesn’t hurt that Mauer spent his whole career playing for his hometown team while being a singularly wholesome & handsome looking man.

3) Todd Helton: 61.8 WAR [171th All Time]; 316.5 WS or so [167th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 82.2% of 179 votes [~49.7% of the Ballots counted]. His 6th year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Helton qualifies under both WAR and WS. After barely missing election in 2023, it looks like he is finally in this year. Like Mauer, he is high enough above the 75% line that the inevitable erosion of support from the voters who do not reveal their ballots will not be able to bring him down.

Comment: Todd Helton, after six long years of waiting, will finally be getting elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame. The only real question now is: why did it take so long? There are three usual options given: 1) some unproven steroid allegations during his career, 2) some post career DUI arrests, and 3) the fact that he played his whole career in Colorado. It may have helped Helton if he had played a few seasons out of Colorado’s thin air and proven that he could also hit at sea level. Many players have left Colorado and proven that there is a significant “bounce back” in their batting statistics. In other words, players in Colorado have trouble adjusting to other parks after hitting at a mile high altitude. This depresses their road batting and slugging averages while they play for Colorado but goes away once they leave the Rockies. On the other hand, Todd Helton had a higher batting and slugging average at home every single year of his career. However, WAR and WS, which adjust for park, both believe that he is qualified.*

*Just for fun you can add together Todd Helton’s road totals for the 2000 and 2001 seasons. You get a first baseman who hits .319, slugs .613 with 54 2Bs, 1 3B, 37 HRs, 94 runs, 121 RBIs, 91 BB, and 88 strikeouts while playing in a home park that probably suppresses this road production. Not bad.

4) Billy Wagner: 27.7 WAR [tied for 994th All Time]; 182.1 WS or so [who knows All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 78.5% of 179 votes [49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 9th year on the ballot.

Prognosis: The only real question left now for the 2024 Baseball Hall of Fame class is whether Billy Wagner will be elected. It is going to be very close but it looks like he will not make it. Even if he doesn’t get in this year, Wagner will probably be pushed over the finish line in 2025 by a “final-year-on-the-ballot” bump.

Comment: As a relief pitcher, Billy Wagner does not come close to qualifying for the BHOF under either WAR or WS. But it is obvious that the Hall of Fame voters give a lot of extra credit to a good relief pitcher. Basically, these voters seem to think that the high leverage situations faced by ace relievers should be used to multiply the relief pitcher’s WAR by two. The BHOF candidacy of Wagner illustrates that BHOF voters are basically doubling the career WAR of these top relievers. If he had been credited with twice his career WAR [27.7 x 2 = 55.5 WAR], Billy Wagner would have finished his career tied with three other men for 243rd in WAR for all time, comfortably under the bottom line of 270th. See also the Francisco Rodriguez comment.

5) Gary Sheffield: 60.5 WAR [183rd All Time]; 428.4 WS or so [notably 38th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 74.3% of 179 votes [~49.7% of the Ballots counted]. His 10th and last year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Sheffield is quite overqualified for the BHOF by both the WAR and (especially) the WS player evaluation systems. The steroid allegations against him have kept him out of the BHOF for his full 10-year term on the writer’s ballot. Even with a substantial bump in his 10th and final year, Sheffield is finally going to time out. His fate is now in the hands of the appropriate Hall of Fame committee. God help him.

Comment: WS has Sheffield rated as the 38th greatest player of all time. WAR ranks him 183rd. Basically, WAR alleges that Sheffield played in the field like a crippled water buffalo. WR would rate him higher if he had just been a DH for his entire career. But this makes no sense at all. If he would have been more valuable as a DH, is it the player’s fault that his team required him to play in the outfield? If a player decreases his value by playing out of position for his team, who gets the discredit? The misplaced player or the team? As for the steroid allegations, the best case scenario is that Sheffield is telling the truth: he was briefly involved with BALCO (Barry Bonds’ steroid supplier), mistakenly used a steroid cream, and only knowingly bought vitamins from BALCO. The worst case scenario would be that Gary Sheffield, feeling his baseball career winding down to its end, dabbled in steroids briefly with BALCO in his waning years. Even if the worst case scenario is true, Sheffield should be elected in a landslide. Baseball owners, led by their Commissioner Bud Selig, let steroids taint the game while they tried to illegally break the Players Union. After they failed despite canceling the 1994 World Series and damn near wrecking the sport, these same men were then happy to profit off the steroid fueled home run boom while the drugs inundated Baseball. The minute that Bud Selig was inducted into the BHOF (2017), Baseball lost all moral authority to punish the players who got mixed up in steroids before their 2004 ban.

6) Andruw Jones: 62.7 WAR [163rd All Time]; 275.7 WS or so [the 283th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 70.7% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 7th year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Other than the many steroid-tainted players, Jones probably has the most currently contentious BHOF case. WAR has him very comfortably over the 270th bottom line requirement, ranking him 163rd. But WS ranks him 283rd and believes that he is a marginal candidate. Of course, WAR has won the day as the player evaluation method of choice and it looks like Jones will get elected by the writers before his eligibility runs out. Although Jones will obviously not be elected in 2024, He still has three years of eligibility left and continues to make progress. It will help even more if all four men on the top of the ballot are elected this year, clearing the way for Jones to possibly get over the hump in 2025.

Comments: Whether you believe Jones is Hall of Famer or not depends a lot on how much faith you have in WAR’s defensive ratings. WAR believes that his defense was equal to 61.3% of his offense. Meanwhile, WS figures that his defense was equal to only 49.7% of his offense. WS sees Jones as a very great CF. But WAR sees him as perhaps the greatest centerfielder of all time. Jones had some unsavory personal incidents during his career (some 2001 strip club shenanigans & a 2012 domestic abuse allegation). How much these 2 issues have impacted his candidacy is unknown; but it seems like they have probably been responsible for keeping him out of the Hall for several additional years. If he does get elected, it will not be the worst thing in the world. He is right on the margin even by WS. There’s probably 50 or so Hall of Famers worse than him already. Of course, all this also completely ignores one indisputable fact: if Jones had simply kept himself in good shape after he turned 30, there would almost surely be no argument about his induction to the BHOF at all.

7) Carlos Beltran: 70.1 WAR [tied for 102nd All Time]; 368.7 WS or so [87th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 66.5% of 179 votes [49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 2nd year on the ballot.

Prognosis: It will obviously not be Beltran’s year in 2024. But 2025 is looking good after several other players come off the ballot. Beltran is overqualified for the BHOF by both WAR and WS but is still being punished by the writers for his role in the Astro’s 2017 sign stealing scandal.

Comment: Beltran makes a very interesting comparison with his fellow center fielder, Andruw Jones. Beltran clears the bar by a country mile under both of the ranking systems while Jones is a marginal candidate unless one accepts that WAR’s evaluation of him as the greatest center fielder of all time is not inaccurate. Beltran is being punished for possibly inventing an advanced sign stealing plan for his team but has otherwise always been considered a model citizen. Jones has no cheating accusations against him (though it could be argued that he “stole” his teams’ money by not staying in shape) but a couple of nasty personal blemishes. One of the problems with the moral judgments made by the Baseball writers who vote for the Hall of Fame is proportionality. Murder and jaywalking are both crimes. But one is a far greater crime. But it seems like the writers sometimes cannot tell the difference between Baseball crimes. Beltran, who has already been punished by losing the New York Mets’ managerial job, has already been properly chastised. Time to let him in.

8) Chase Utley: 64.5 WAR [tied for 144th All Time]; 288.9 WS or so [tied for 238th of All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 41.4% of 179 votes [~49.7% of the ballots counted]. His 1st year on the Ballot.

Prognosis: Utley is qualified for the BHOF by both WAR and WS, though WAR has him considerably higher by (perhaps) overvaluing his defense. The Hall of Fame tracker indicates that Utley will not come close to being elected in 2024. However, he is making a good showing in his 1st of 10 years on the Ballot. It seems like Utley’s election to the BHOF is eventually inevitable. It will just be a question of how long it takes.

Comment: In June 1997, when he was 18-years-old, Chase Utley was drafted in the 2nd round by the LA Dodgers out of high school. Rather than sign, he went to UCLA. In June 2000, Utley was drafted in the 1st round and signed by the Phillies. Utley marinated in the minors and then on the Phillie bench until finally playing his first full Major League season in 2005 at the age of 26. In a way, Utley is being punished for going to college. If he had signed with the Dodgers in 1997, there is a chance that he may have debuted in the Majors much sooner than he did, perhaps as early as 2000 or 2001 [his competition would have been the Dodger’s middle of the diamond banjo-hitters, Cesar Izturis and Alex Cora, for the most part]. If he was given back those four or five “lost” seasons at the beginning of his career, Utley’s bulk numbers would make his BHOF case much stronger. It doesn’t seem quite right to punish a man for getting an education. WAR finds that Utley’s defense is worth 33.7% of his offense while WS measures it as 31.8% That slight difference seems to be the main reason WAR ranks Utley 94 slots higher than WS.

9) Alex Rodriguez: 117.5 WAR [16th All Time!!!!!]; 492.0 WS or so [22nd All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 39.3% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 3rd year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Despite being completely over-qualified for the BBHOF and very obviously the best player on the ballot by both WAR & WS, ARod is doomed to twist in the wind until the 10-year-limit finally ends his candidacy. The year 2024 was number 3 on his 10-year-long road-to-nowhere.

Comment: Rodriguez is the most qualified player on the 2024 HOF ballot by a significant margin, leaving even Adrian Beltre in the dust. However, he is also a convicted steroid cheat from after the enforcement curtain came down. As such, he will spend eternity in the dustbin of Baseball history with Joe Jackson and Pete Rose. In fact, I would advocate the enshrinement of either Jackson or Rose long before inducting Rodriguez. It is interesting how time is washing away just how egregious and slimy his behavior was while he tried to escape any punishment at all for his sins.

10) Manny Ramirez: 69.3 WAR [108th All Time]; 408.6 WS or so [50th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 35.1% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 8th year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Overqualified for the Hall of Fame by both WAR and WS. Pretty much admitted that he took steroids throughout his career. Would he have Hall of Fame stats without the juice? Just two more years until he falls off the ballot into whatever purgatory holds the Chicago eight, Pete Rose, Clemens, Bonds, eventually Alex Rodriguez et al.

Comment: Other than Alex Rodriguez (and perhaps Gary Sheffield), Manny Ramirez is the most qualified hitter on the ballot (though Rodriguez was way more valuable defensively, of course). Ramirez is, also like ARod, not going to elected to the BHOF because he was caught using steroids after testing and punishment began in 2004. But unlike ARod, Ramirez simply admitted that he used the juice and accepted the consequences without dispute. On the other hand, Rodriguez lied, threw people under the bus, refused to admit guilt, and generally acted like a complete dirtbag while fighting the allegations. So why is this not reflected in their BHOF vote totals? Why has Rodriguez, now in his 3rd year on the ballot consistently polled better than Manny despite the fact that Ramirez had already spent 5 years on the ballot when ARod arrived? Like many other things about Manny, it’s a mystery.

11) Bobby Abreu: 60.2 WAR [tied for 190th All Time]; 357.3 WS or so [95th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 19.4% of 179 votes [49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 5th year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Despite being well over the qualification line for the BHOF by WAR (and quite over-qualified by WS), Bobby Abreu has made almost no headway to actually being elected. Now in his 5th year on the ballot, Abreu’s eventual election by the Baseball writers does not look good. He will probably have to wait until some BHOF committee re-evaluates him, in the distant future, when his statistics begin to outweigh his lack of pizzazz.

Comment: In the 1960s and 1970s, there was a prominent American rhythm & blues singer named Bobby Bland (“That’s the Way Love is” & “I Pity the Fool”) who had a long and fruitful career. But Bland is hardly as well remembered as his contemporaries Sam Cooke, Wilson Pickett, Otis Redding (& many others). I always think of Bobby Abreu as the Bobby Bland of Baseball. He did many things consistently well but never the monster season (or number one hit in Bobby Bland’s case) that would force someone to remember him. He was just there in the background, consistently excellent, but drawing only a little bit of attention to himself. While he was playing, I never once thought of Abreu as a Hall of Fame type player. But he was.

12t) Andy Pettitte: 60.2 WAR [tied for 190th All Time]; 226.2 WS or so [not even close All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 15.2% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 6th year on the ballot.

Prognosis: In 2024, Andy Pettitte will collect the highest number of votes for any starting pitcher on the BHOF ballot. And he will not even come close to being elected. His admitted use of Human Growth Hormone [HGH] seems to have scuttled his candidacy. He is 6 years in and making no progress.

Comment: Andy Pettitte is similar to two other pitchers on the 2024 ballot, Mark Buehrle and James Shields. All were workhouse starting pitchers, but Pettitte was surely the best of the three [before even considering his post-season work]. None of the three has really gotten any real support for the Hall of Fame [despite both Pettitte and Buehrle being completely qualified by the WAR system]. Pettitte, who is far more famous than either of the other 2 pitchers because of his long service as a New York Yankee and his post-season success, seems to be paying a heavy price for admitting he used HGH. Once again, it is a question of proportionality. HGH is definitely not steroids and Pettitte admitted that he was using it to heal an injury faster so that he could return to the field and earn all the money he was being paid. This is almost honorable. That the Baseball writers seem to be excessively punishing Pettitte for that is a disgrace. However, if that is not the reason for his lack of support, then one has to wonder what the BBWAA writers are thinking.

12t) Jimmy Rollins: 47.6 WAR [tied for 358th All Time]; 305.1 WS or so [tied for 194th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 15.2.% of 179 votes [~49.7% of the Ballots counted]. His 3rd year on the ballot.

Prognosis: If WS was the preferred metric, Rollins would probably be receiving much, much stronger support. He comfortably qualifies under WS. The WAR method is much more lukewarm on Rollins, not even rating him as someone who is a marginal Hall of Famer. His lack of WAR has him spinning his wheels so far in the annual ballots.

Comment: Rollins makes a very interesting pair with his long term keystone partner, Chase Utley. WS prefers Rollins over Utley for the BHOF. But WAR, the preferred metric, prefers Utley over Rollins. Of course, WS rewards bulk or, as some have phrased it, a player’s ability to post [show up and play]. It is easier to play well if you take some days off. But there is value in playing as much as possible too. Rollins played between 154 and 162 games 10 times in his career (including 7 straight years). On the other hand, Utley played from 154 to 162 games just four times. When evaluating players for the BHOF, you have to start with what you want to reward.

14) Omar Vizquel: 45.6 WAR [tied for 398th All Time]; 282.6 WS or so [tied for 258th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 10.5% of 179 votes [~49.7% of the Ballots counted]. His 7th year on the ballot.

Prognosis: The candidacy of Vizquel has been completely torpedoed by the revelations of martial discord and allegations of homosexual harassment. He has three more years until he falls off the ballot. That he stubbornly remains on the ballot seems to indicate that some BHOF voters are not bothered by wife beating or bat boy molestation.

Comment: Before the scandals, Vizquel was obviously headed to election. It would be interesting to know what would have happened if all this godawful publicity had come out after his election. Interestingly, like Jimmy Rollins, WS (which favors bulk careers) is very much in favor of electing Vizquel. But WAR doesn’t like him anywhere near the same.

15) Mark Buehrle: 59.1 WAR [201st All Time]; 220.6 WS or so [not known All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 7.9% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 4th year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Buehrle, who is qualified by WAR but not even close by WS (like most pitchers), continues to stagnate on the annual BHOF ballot. He is, in some ways, the Bobby Abreu of pitchers.

Comment: I always think of Mark Buehrle as a pitcher who came right out of the Rick Reuschel starting pitcher mold. Reuschel [who went 214-191 during his career] was a very large pitcher who worked fast, threw strikes, and kept the game moving along, Mark Buehrle [214-160] was also a large man who worked fast, threw strikes, and kept the game moving. Interestingly, both men won exactly 214 games but Reuschel lost many more. Despite all this, Reuschel was a better pitcher than Buehrle. Reuschel just played for much worse teams over his career.

16t) Francisco Rodriguez: 24.2 WAR [somewhere around 1000th All Time]; 168.3 WS or so [also about 1000th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 6.8% of 179 votes counted [~49.7% of the Ballots counted]. His 2nd year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Rodriguez will almost surely survive to be on the ballot for a third year, staying just above the minimum 5% threshold. But his candidacy has no traction. His chances of getting into the BHOF appear slim.

Comment: The candidacy of ace reliever Francisco Rodriguez serves as a very interesting bookend for ace reliever Billy Wagner’s case. If you just double his career WAR, Wagner qualifies for the BHOF. But if you double the career WAR of Rodriguez, he does not qualify [48.2 WAR would put Rodriguez in a tie with Bob Lemon for 341st place]. In other words, the double credit reward for the high leverage of an ace reliever’s work is not enough to push Rodriguez over the line. It remains to be seen if the Wagner/Rodriguez boundary holds going forward. Interestingly, if you double the Win Share [WS] total for Rodriguez, he would qualify. WS seems to reward ace reliever bulk work more than it does a starter’s bulk innings. I’m not sure why. So far, Rodriguez’ record 62 save season in 2008 does not seem to have had any impact on his candidacy. Unless it is the one thing keeping him on the ballot.

16t) David Wright: 49.2 WAR [329th All Time]; 266.1 WS or so [320th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 6.8% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 1st year on the ballot.

Prognosis: David Wright’s career was cut short by spinal stenosis with both WAR and WS having him right on the edge of the BHOF. It looks like he will have a “Don Mattingly” type time on the writers’ ballot. Mattingly, another player who had his BHOF career path cut short by back problems, lingered on the ballot for the full 10 years before shuffling off into Baseball limbo.

Comment: There was a great wave of third baseman at the beginning of the 21st Century: Adrian Beltre [debuted 1998]; Eric Chavez [1998]; Hank Blalock [2002]; David Wright [2004]; and even Evan Longoria [2008]. Wright may have been the greatest of all these third baseman, greater even than Beltre, if fate had just let him complete his career uninjured. However, like most of these third baseman, injuries derailed him. It would be interesting to know just how good Wright could have been absent the spinal stenosis that shortened and then ended his career. Note to self, write a post about this great wave of 3B.

18) Torii Hunter: 50.7 WAR [300th All Time]; 275.0 WS or so [285th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 4.7% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 4th year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Hunter does not qualify under either WAR or WS for the BHOF, though he is well into the grey area for both evaluations. In 2024, his luck seems to have run out. After surviving for 3 years, it looks like he will not make the 5% minimum to be back for his fifth try.

Comment: Torii Hunter makes a fascinating contrast with Andruw Jones. Both were well regarded centerfielders. WS has them as basically equal [Jones has a very slight edge 275.7 to 275.0]. But WAR has Jones as the far better player [62.7 to 50.7]. Their career paths couldn’t be more different. Jones came up in 1996 at 19-years old and starred in the World Series before even playing a full season. He played his first full season in 1997 and then was a star for the Atlanta Braves from 1998 to 2006. In 2007, just 30 years old, Jones had a (for him) poor season. And that was basically it. He played part-time, dogged by weight and injury issues, from 2008 to 2012 and his career was over at just 35. Hunter took a different path. He struggled in the minors from 1993 to 1997. In 1998, the 21-year-old Hunter had a decent year at Double-A. In 1999, the Minnesota Twins gave the 22-year old Hunter the CF job. He would start in the Major Leagues from 1999 until 2015 when he was 39. Hunter maintained his value exceedingly well. By WAR, his best seasons were 2009 [33 years old] and 2012 [36]. Hunter was always in shape, durable, and kept improving. In many ways, Hunter was the opposite of Andruw Jones. Off the field, Hunter had the reputation of a man of honor, depth, and focus. Which was also quite a contrast to Jones.

19) Jose Bautista: 36.7 WAR [tied for 641st All Time]; 229.2 WS or so [not very qualified All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 1.6% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 1st year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Bautista doesn’t qualify for the BHOF under either the WAR or WS systems. His first year on the ballot will be his last year on the ballot. He will not be making any spectacular bat flips on the Cooperstown lawn.

Comment: Jose Bautista had the back half of a BHOF career. If he had been a golfer, he would have played the first nine holes of his career like an absolute amateur and then played the back nine like one of the best ball strikers on the pro tour. It’s too bad that Bautista didn’t discover the timing mechanism that unleashed his formidable power in 2003 or 2004 rather than very late in 2009. If he had, Bautista would have probably accumulated 25 to 35 more WAR and had a very interesting, if not inevitable, BHOF case. You can combine the back end of Bautista’s career to the front end of Andruw Jones’ career to make one hell of a BHOF candidate.

20) Victor Martinez: 32.0 WAR [tied for 804th All Time]; 230.9 WS or so [not close All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 1.0% of 179 votes [~49.7% of the Ballots counted]. His 1st year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Martinez is not supported by either WAR or WS for induction into the BHOF. He was a very good professional hitter. If he was a beer, he would be Bud Lite to Miguel Cabrera’s top-of-the-line Bud. The year 2024 will be his first and last on the Hall of Fame ballot.

Comment: Victor Martinez was one of those players who had a monster year, completely out of context with the rest of their career, that was worthy of a Hall of Fame player. Many players have these types of years [Kevin Mitchell in 1989, 47 HRs-125 RBIs-.291, MVP]. But very few (if any) have this type of year in their mid-30s. In 2014, the 35-year-old Martinez hit 32 HRs-103 RBIs-.335 BA for the Detroit Tigers. He set career highs in HRs, BA, on-base percentage and slugging. He also had the best WAR of his career. His OPS+ was a very sparkling 172 [meaning he was 72% better than the average hitter]. The next best OPS+ in his career was just 131 in 2011. It goes without saying that, if the rest of his career had been much more like 2014, Victor Martinez would have had a one hell of a better case for the BHOF.

21t) Matt Holliday: 44.5 WAR [tied for 431st All Time]; 266.8 WS or so [313th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 0.5% of 179 votes [approximately 49.7% of the Ballots counted]. His 1st year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Both WAR and WS together do not see Matt Holliday as a BHOF member. This will be his first and only year on the BHOF ballot. But there is a non-zero chance that he still gets to go to Cooperstown. It will just be as the father of Jackson Holliday.

Comment: In 1998, the 18-year-old Matt Holliday signed with the Rockies and began playing in their minor league system. His minor league career was, to say the least, not particularly inspiring. By 2003, he had risen only to Double A, two levels below the Major Leagues, where he hit just 12 HRs while batting .253 and slugging .395. Despite this, the Rockies gave him their left field job in 2004; and he was off and running [14 HRs-.290 BA-.488 SA]. Of course, he played in a hitter’s park but this hardly explains both a two level jump and all that increase in offense . He was even better in 2005 [19 HRs-.307-.505], and then exploded in 2006 [34 HRs-.326-.586] and 2007 [36 HRs-.340-.607]. What happened to so quickly turn around Holliday’s career from 2003 to 2007? At this point, it is a puzzle. Unlike his former teammate Todd Helton, Holliday got a chance to prove that he could hit at sea level too. From 2009 to 2014, Holliday was a pretty potent bat for the St. Louis Cardinals. Perhaps because of his reserved demeanor, Holliday always struck me as a “Kevin McReynolds” type: someone who wasn’t getting exactly 100% out of their talent.* With the insane drive of a Ty Cobb, would Matt Holiday have been an inner circle Hall of Famer? Possibly, but he probably wouldn’t have been as happy.

*Kevin McReynolds was a star outfielder for the New York Mets (among other teams). He gave the impression that he would rather be anywhere other than a Baseball field.

21t) Bartolo Colon: 46.2 WAR [tied for 387th All Time]; 204.7 WS or so [just nowhere close All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 0.5% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 1st year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Bartolo Colon does not qualify for the BHOF under either the WAR or WS system. The year 2024 will be the only year that Bartolo Colon appears on the BHOF Ballot.

Comment: Bartolo Colon will go down as a hugely fun and interesting former Baseball player but an induction into the Hall of Fame is not in his future. His career path is actually fascinating [1997 to 2018, ages 24-45]. Basically he was a fireball throwing starting pitcher from 1998 to 2005. Then he was lost in the woods for awhile from 2006 to 2009. Then, he finished his career as a control artist starter from 2009 to 2016 (with his last two years, 2017 and 2018 spent proving that he no longer had it). Few pitchers have such a clearly delineated career as first a flame thrower and then a command kingpin.

23t) James Shields: 30.7 WAR [tied for 847th All Time]; 133.8 WS or so [God only knows where All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 0.0% of 179 votes [~49.7% of the Ballots counted]. His 1st year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Neither the WAR nor WS systems see Shields as a qualified Hall of Famer. He will have to settle for having the totally cool modern nickname of “Big Game James” [so few modern baseball nicknames are as good as the old school ones from 100 years ago].

Comment: During his career, James Shields did a partial “Don Sutton.” From 2007 to 2015, he was a good to very good workhouse starter. He was never really great (peak years of 16-12 and 15-10 in 2011 and 2012) but still very reliable. But pitchers like this get into the BHOF only if they do the full “Don Sutton” (over 20 years as a dependable Clydesdale). Neither WAR nor WS see Shields as a BHOF inductee on even his best day [or year].

23t) Jose Reyes: 37.4 WAR [tied for 620th All Time]; 255.5 WS or so [378th or so All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 0.0% of 179 votes [approximately 49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 1st year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Jose Reyes does not qualify under WAR or WS. His BHOF dream will die with this year’s ballot. In other words, this will be his only year on the BHOF ballot.

Comment: Jose Reyes, like many other players, started his career like he was on the highway to the BHOF. Between 2006 to 2008 when he was 23 to 25 years old, Reyes looked like a superstar in incubation. But then it just didn’t happen. Injuries sapped his speed and health, his power and plate discipline never developed, and his career petered out in his early 30s. But there was a BHOF dream there at one time.

23t) Brandon Phillips: 28.4 WAR [tied for 953rd All Time]; 209.0 WS or so [God only knows All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 0.0% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 1st and last year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Brandon Phillips is a Hall of Fame ballot consolation prize player. In other words, he is on the Hall of ballot simply so he can take pride in that fact. But 2024 will be his only year on the ballot.

Comment: Brandon Phillips was a very good second baseman. But neither WS nor WAR sees him as a viable Hall of Famer. A viable candidate for the BHOF under WAR should accumulate close to 50 Wins Above Replacement. In other words, ten seasons of 5.0 WAR would make the player viable. But realistically, the player should have some peak seasons of 7.5 or so WAR. Did Phillips ever come close to 7.5 WAR in a single season? No, his best year was just 4.9 WAR in 2011 and his career total of 28.4 WAR is only slightly more than half way to an actually viable BHOF case.

23t) Adrian Gonzalez: 43.5 WAR [tied for 456th All Time]; 286.4 WS or so [tied for 249th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 0.0% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 1st and last year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Gonzalez would have had a much better chance under the WS system (in which he qualifies) rather than the WAR system (where he is not close). With WAR ascendent, the HOF tracker has him currently voteless. He will not be on the 2025 ballot.

Comment: Absent injuries, Gonzalez could have certainly had a BHOF career. After his October 2010 shoulder surgery for a torn labrum, he was never the same hitter. He had one last great season [2011] by changing his swing from a pretty power hitting uppercut to a formidable line drive stroke before the continuing degradation of his shoulder sapped his might. Despite that 2010 surgery, Gonzalez was extremely durable, playing 156 or more games every season from 2006 to 2016. But then a herniated disk in his back crippled him during the 2017 and 2018 seasons and forced him into retirement. Gonzalez displays very interestingly the differences between the WAR and WS player evaluation systems. WAR, which values defense and peak highly, has Adrian Gonzalez [rated 456th] not even close to the LCDM line of 270th to qualify for the BHOF. But WS, which values offense and bulk, rates Gonzalez as one of 249th best players of all time, comfortably over the LCDM boundary. If WS rather than WAR was the chosen method of evaluation, it is likely that Adrian Gonzalez’s candidacy for the BHOF would have not been so quickly dismissed.

Conclusion

The 2024 Baseball Hall of Fame class will consist of: 1. Jim Leyland [already voted in as a field manager]; 2) Adrian Beltre [3B], 3. Joe Mauer [C]; 4. Todd Helton [1B]; and possibly 5. Billy Wager [relief pitcher]. For the Baseball Hall of Fame’s sake, it will be nice to see a nice big 2024 class. But it will be even nicer to just see a bunch of the worthy players cleared off the ballot, all at once, to make room for some other worthy players now buried on the ballot.

Breaking the 2024 BHOF Ballot Down by Categories:

1) Qualified by WAR & WS and being elected [3]: Adrian Beltre, Todd Helton, and Joe Mauer;

2) Not qualified by WAR or WS and possibly being elected [1]: Billy Wagner;

3) Qualified by WAR and WS and NOT being elected or removed from the ballot: [6] Bobby Abreu, Carlos Beltran, Manny Ramirez, Alex Rodriguez, Gary Sheffield, and Chase Utley;

4) Qualified by only WAR and NOT being elected or removed from the ballot: [3]: Mark Buehrle, Andruw Jones, and Andy Pettitte;

5) Qualified by only WS and NOT being elected or removed from the ballot [2]: Jimmy Rollins and Omar Vizquel;

6) Qualified by only WS but NOT being selected and dropped from the ballot: [1] Adrian Gonzalez;

6) Not qualified by either WAR or WS and NOT being dropped from the ballot [2]: Francisco Rodriguez and David Wright;

7) Not qualified by either WAR or WS and being dropped from the ballot [8]: Jose Bautista, Bartolo Colon, Matt Holliday, Torii Hunter, Victor Martinez, Brandon Phillips, Jose Reyes and James Shelds,.

My personal ballot [in order if only I had a vote]: 1) Adrian Beltre, 2) Gary Sheffield, 3) Carlos Beltran, 4) Joe Mauer, 5) Andy Pettitte, 6) Bobby Abreu, 7) Chase Utley. Arod and Manny Kept out by steroids.

Post #36

Intrinsic Value [Rethinking Player valuation systems]

January 17, 2024

Baseball is 90 percent mental.  The other half is physical.  Yogi Berra

1. Introduction

On January 23, 2024, the Baseball Hall of Fame [HOF] will announce which players are being inducted into the 2024 HOF class [manager Jim Leyland has already been selected].  Until the announcement, most of the discussion about these inductions will concern two subjects: 1) how are the eligible players doing on Ryan Thibodaux’s Hall of Fame Tracker and 2) how do these eligible players measure up using the Wins Above Replacement [WAR] evaluation system.  While writing this blog, I have used the WAR method myself to evaluate players; even though I could not figure out a player’s WAR to save my life.*  This is, to say the very least, sub-optimal.  In this essay, I will look at the history of how WAR became: 1) so widely disseminated and 2) the pre-eminent Baseball player evaluation system, especially over Bill James Win Shares [WS] system.  Every Baseball player evaluation system has shortcomings.  If you are going to use such a method, an understanding of the system’s weak spots should be required.  As far as WAR goes, there are definitely some ghosts in the machine.  The flaws inherent in the WAR system may even be large enough to deny the qualified and elect the unworthy to the Baseball Hall of Fame.  Thus, knowledge of WAR’s defects should be a pre-requisite before using it to evaluate any player for any reason.

*Figuring Slugging Percentage: basic Baseball math.  Figuring WAR: Baseball physics.

2. A Brief History of Win Shares and WAR

In 2003, the baseball writer Bill James, the godfather of Sabrmetrics [applying the scientific method to Baseball], published a book titled Win Shares.  The Win Shares system was an all-encompassing player evaluation system.  In his book, James explained his system and then got to the fun part: ranking all the players.  Meanwhile in the 1990s, there was a Baseball annual published called the Baseball Prospectus [which was inspired by Bill James’ own annual Baseball Abstracts of the 1980s].  In these Baseball Prospectus books, Keith Woolner developed his own player evaluation system which he called VORP [Value Over Replacement Player].  In subsequent Baseball Prospectus annuals, the VORP system mutated into WARP [Wins Above Replacement Player] and then into WAR itself.  In the realm of ideas, these two player evaluation methods, Win Shares and WAR, competed in the early 2000s.  And WAR won this competition rather easily.  One of the main reasons that WAR became the preferred method for evaluating Baseball players had a lot to do with simple accessibility.  In 2009, the WAR system results were adopted by and included with every player’s statistical profile on the Baseball Reference website [baseballreference.com].  Baseball Reference had been founded in 2000 and, by 2005, had made all the printed Baseball Encyclopedias [BE] obsolete.*  From 2009 on, WAR was right there on the source where virtually every Baseball fan goes to get their statistical fix.  Meanwhile, the results of the Win Shares system were not readily accessible [though they could eventually be accessed on billjames.online].  Perhaps the first question to ask is: Did WAR win out because it was a better system than Win Shares or just because it was right there at your fingertips?

* The last MacMillan BE was published in 1996 and last Total Baseball BE in 2004.

3. Explaining Win Shares

Bill James believed any system for player evaluation needed to be grounded in actual results.  If the Boston Red Sox won 105 games in 1912, the players on that 1912 Red Sox team needed to each be credited with an individual share of those 105 wins.  For reasons that escape me, James then decided to triple those 105 wins so that the 1912 Red Sox players had 315 partial Win Shares to be split amongst themselves.  Using statistical formulas to measure each player’s defensive and offensive contributions, James then did precisely that: he credited each player on the 1912 Red Sox with their share of the 315 partial wins.*  Critics of the Win Shares system immediately pointed out that the players should have also gotten some discredit for the 47 losses suffered by the 1912 Boston Red Sox too.  James would later explain that the players did receive won-loss records, but these records were then simplified into a single number.  After all, a single number to rank players was the objective.  Bill James did his WS calculations for every Major League team throughout history.  By far the most important thing about this system was that you couldn’t see the sausage being made [which, of course, is also even more true of the WAR system].  When evaluating Baseball players, the offensive side is the much easier task.  For the most part, each batter hits and produces runs without any help [disregarding the small gray areas of driving runners in, sacrifice outs, intentional walks and so forth].  In Baseball, batting or offensive contributions are easy to measure.  But the defensive side is quite a bit harder.  How much of pitching is just team defense?  How much of defense is just good (or bad) pitching?  How much defense is simply illusions of the park, defensive schemes of the team, whether the pitcher is left-handed or right-handed, player positioning, catcher framing, elective plays, etc?  Perhaps the best recommendation of them all for the Win Shares system was Bill James apparently life-long obsession with quantifying Baseball defense.

*Tris Speaker led the 1912 BoSox with 51 Win Shares [or 17.0 full Wins].  Smokey Joe Wood was second with 44 [or 14.67 full wins].  But the WAR evaluation methods disagrees and lists Smokey Joe first with 11.1 WAR followed by his good friend Speaker at 10.4.

4. Win Shares Evaluated: The Problem of Luck

However, the Win Shares method had a very large problem buried in its calculations.  The basic flaw of Win Shares as a Baseball player evaluation tool can be demonstrated with a hypothetical.  Imagine that the exact same player performs for two different teams.  Just for fun, imagine that this player is the star of each of these teams [bats .300, hits 30 homers, drives in 100 runs].  Both teams score 700 runs but also give up 700 runs during a 162-game season.  The Pythagorean theorem tells us that each of these teams should have finished with a record of exactly 81 wins and 81 losses.  But what if one of these teams gets lucky?  Despite scoring exactly as many runs as they gave up, the team finishes with a record of 90-72.  Meanwhile, the other team is unlucky and ends the season at 72-90.  Random variations like these happen during Major League seasons all the time.  Win Shares, which ties player value to the exact number of wins that his team gets, will conclude that the exact same player on these two teams is worth a completely different amount.  In fact, the player on the lucky team will be judged to have been 25% better than the exact same player on the unlucky team.*  This is nonsensical on both a player evaluation and/or single season level.  It is the exact same player and his value is only fluctuating by chance.  But the accuracy of the Win Shares system obviously improves over multiple seasons and longer careers.  Over time, luck washes out and Win Shares should become more and more accurate.  Basically, Win Shares is a player evaluation system which is not very good at evaluating single seasons or short careers; but improves steadily over time with more seasons and longer careers.  Strangely enough, I would have more faith in Win Shares evaluation of Willie Mays entire career rather than any single season.

*In other words, the same exact player such as our 30HR/100 RBI/.300 star, would be given different Win Share amounts depending on the team’s finish: 24 WS with the 72-90 team, 30 WS with the 81-81 team; 37.5 WS with the 90-72 club.  But, in each case, he is exactly the same player.

5. Another problem with Win Shares

And there is another major problem with Win Shares.  Unlike the problem of random luck explained above, there have been (as far as I know) no articles addressing this flaw anywhere.  Win Shares seems to underrate pitchers badly.  This doesn’t necessarily mean that Win Shares is wrong in its evaluation of pitchers.  But Win Shares evidently believes that pitchers are worth far less than the WAR system or the most basic Baseball player evaluation system of them all, the Hall of Fame.  In the Baseball Hall of Fame right now, 343 people have been elected.*  This breaks down as 84 pitchers, 186 position players, 40 executives, 23 managers, and 10 umpires.  In other words, the Hall of Fame believes that 84 of the 270 best Baseball players of all time were pitchers [31.1%].  Of the top 270 players rated by WAR, 88 are pitchers [32.6%].  By WAR standards, the Hall of Fame seems to have a very slight bias towards hitters over pitchers.  But it is also within any reasonable standard of random variation.  Then we have Win Shares.  Of the top 270 players rated by Win Shares, only 49 players are pitchers [a meagre 18.1%].*  The question of whether WS is correct in downgrading all pitchers is beyond my mathematical capability.  But, to say the least, it certainly feels completely wrong.  On top of that, WS also seems to heavily favor pitchers from long ago and far away over their modern brethren.  So, the question becomes: Why does the Win Shares system underestimate pitchers so badly and penalize modern pitchers even worse?

*It would be 50 pitchers if you counted John Ward, but Ward is not counted as a pitcher by either the Hall of Fame or WAR system.  Of course, there is no easily accessible list of the current career WS leaders, so I may have missed a pitcher (or two at most).  But, even if I did, the poor showing of pitchers in the WS system would still be remarkable.

6. Win Shares and the Question of Defense

The only way Win Shares can underestimate Pitcher Value [PV] would be to minimize the pitcher’s share of defensive credit.  On the most basic level, the game of Baseball is 50% offense and 50% defense.  One is the ying to the other’s yang.  Offensive credit is easy to give.  The production of offense in Baseball is easily broken down into individual units.  But defense in Baseball is always a team effort that begins with the pitcher.  Defensive credit is almost always shared.  For an example, a pitcher throws a good pitch in on a batter’s hands, breaks his bat, and induces a weak pop-up.  The pop-up could be easily caught by the second baseman.  But the shortstop runs over, calls for it instead, and elects to make an easy catch himself.  Who gets credit?  Obviously, the pitcher should get the lion’s share for this play.  But what about the shortstop and second baseman?  In many cases, defensive plays are elective plays.  How do you cut up defensive credit for elective plays?  In another example, the pitcher gives up an absolute rocket and the centerfielder makes an outstanding play running it down.  Who gets credit on this play?  In this case, it’s the center fielder, not the pitcher, that should get the lion’s share of the credit.  Every Baseball player evaluation system must decide how to apportion defensive credit, especially between pitchers and all other defensive players.  Justin Verlander, the most accomplished of all the currently active pitchers, ranks exactly 63rd by WAR right now, but just 306th (more or less) by Win Shares.*  WAR credits Verlander with being an inner circle Hall of Famer.  Win Shares believes Verlander to be a very marginal HOF candidate.  Does that WS result feel correct?  It certainly feels wrong to me.  If it is incorrect, there is very obviously a defensive apportionment problem with the WS system.  WS may have shifted too much credit for the defense from the pitchers to the other players.  It also means that all the other players, except for the pitchers, have had their defensive value increased across the board.  It is also not the only problem with the WS defensive evaluation scheme.  Every Baseball player evaluation system has to also address the Timeline problem.

*The source for career Win Shares is the Bill James website.  To put it bluntly, the Win Shares finder there is a mess.  Everything from rampant mathematical mistakes to more serious errors like the two different Elmer Smiths having their careers combined.  Verlander may actually be 307th or even 308th (I compiled the career WS list as carefully as I could but who knows).

7. The Pitching Timeline Problem

Throughout the history of Baseball, starting pitchers have thrown harder and harder and, because of this fact, have also hurled less and less innings.  In the 19th Century [1871-1899], starting pitchers threw hard but probably almost never threw all out.  Some pitchers would throw over 500 (even 600) innings in a season.  But they still needed to save their arms.  It would be fascinating to know how hard they threw.  Were they consistently over 80 miles per hour [mph]?  They were obviously throwing hard enough that the distance from the pitching box [later mound] was twice moved back by about 5 feet.  In 1893, the traditional distance of 60 feet and 6 inches from pitching rubber to home plate was established.  Innings pitched [IP] fell below 400 and continued to drop.  In the early 20th century, there were obviously starting pitchers who threw above 90 mph.  But they paced themselves, throwing hard in a pinch.  However, as innings continued to drop, these pitchers threw harder more consistently.  By the end of the 20th century, pitchers could lead the league with only 250 IP or so.  In the 21st century, the League leading totals of IP dropped even further to just over 200 IP.  Now, virtually every pitcher (starting or relieving) is throwing the ball as hard as humanly possible all the time, even over 100 mph.  Were the “Old-Innings-Eating” pitchers of yesterday more valuable than the “Better-to-Burn-Out-than-Fade-Away” flamethrowers of today?  By WAR and Win Shares, the ancient pitchers are evaluated as much more valuable than any modern pitcher.  But the fact is that those ancient pitchers relied much more on their defense than today’s hurlers.  A modern ace, such as Jason Verlander, deserves a much greater percentage of the defensive credit for his pitching than a 19th Century Hall of Famer like Charles Radbourn.  In other words, modern pitchers are most surely getting shortchanged because the pitcher’s percentage of the defensive credit should not be constant over time.  Of course, in evaluating any large group of Baseball players, there will always be timeline issues    .

8. Explaining WAR

WAR is a complex statistical calculation that assigns each player a value after making determinations of that player’s contributions on Offense [batting] and Defense [pitching and fielding] and then subtracting the Replacement Value [RV] both offensively and defensively.  The replacement value is yet another determined number and represents how much value a completely fungible or replaceable player would have.  Once all these calculations are made, WAR adds up the player’s offense and defense for a season or a career, subtracts the replacement value, and gives the player his seasonal or overall score.  In WAR, unlike Win Shares, it is possible to get a negative score (the player is worse than some random minor league players that could replace him).  Of course, all this needs to be taken on faith.  The inventors of this system are not even letting anyone how what is in the sausage much less how it is being made.  In fact, WAR is separated into offensive and defensive WAR on Baseball Reference.  But you cannot just add these two figures up to get the overall WAR.  Each figure includes a duplicated RV.  It is almost like they don’t want anyone to check their work.  The calculations underlying WAR are based on formulas that make the assumption that certain truths are unchangeable [such as replacement value and the value of the defensive spectrum, i.e. which positions are more or less valuable].  However, there is a problem with codifying your formulas about Baseball.  Baseball mutates over time.  The Replacement Value and the defensive spectrum valuations are not applicable throughout the ages and eras of Baseball.  This can be a major problem with the system.

*Third Base is the position usually used to illustrate how positional RV changes over time.  In the early days of Baseball, third baseman needed to be quick and agile to field the numerous bunts of the time.  Basically, they were good fielding players with the arm but not the range to play shortstop.  But as home run hitting took over the game, bunting went all but extinct.  Third basemen became players with the arm to play right field but athletic enough to also play the infield.  The Replacement Values for these two sets of talents are completely different.

9. WAR Evaluated: The Problem of Compounding Errors

Basically, the main problem with WAR is the problem of Compounding Errors [CE].  WAR has so many calculations that, if the inherent errors do not cancel each other out, these flaws can compound each other and arrive at a truly odd result.  The problem of these Compounding Errors is pretty much entirely on the Defensive side.  The Designated Hitter penalty is a good example of one of these CEs.  Of course, Designated Hitters [DH] hit for the Pitcher and do not play the field.  They have no defensive value at all.  Because of this, WAR gives the DH position a massive penalty, assuming DHs need to hit a ton to justify their value.  But, in real life, the DH is a much harder job than it looks.  Players with the proper focus to be DHs are hard to find.  Usually, First Basemen [1B] hit better than DHs.  But 1Bs are not penalized by WAR as badly as DHs.  Over a career, this penalty compounds and a career long DH would be completely undervalued next to an equivalent 1B.  WAR also seems to overvalue the top of the defensive spectrum (CF, SS and 2B, ignoring catchers).  WAR’s undervaluing of poor defensive players and overvaluing of good defensive players can be demonstrated by two outfielders of this year’s HOF ballot.  Gary Sheffield was admittedly not the best outfielder.  But WAR compounds his poor defense until arriving at the odd conclusion that he is twice as bad as a normal DH.  Meanwhile, Andruw Jones, a great centerfielder [CF] who got fat and lost his range mid-career, rates as the best CF of all time.  Although personal opinions make for bad arguments, I watched both men play often.  I don’t remember Sheffield as the equivalent of a cripple in a wheelchair playing Baseball.  I also don’t remember Andruw Jones, even at his peak, as the Baryshnikov of the outfield.  He was very good until he gained the weight.  But I never thought that he was incredibly better (or even better) than other CFs that I watched such as Paul Blair, Garry Maddox, Jim Edmunds, or Kevin Kiermaier.  But WAR has, for better or for worse, adopted calculations that will excessively penalize poor defense and unreasonably overvalue good defense.  Over a long career, this difference can compound and lead to some truly odd player evaluations.

10. WAR and another Defensive Problem

Other than Compounding Errors, there is another problem with Defense that needs to be addressed.  Defensive value is often credited to a player although the player himself basically does not deserve it.  An example would be the recently banned (or curtailed) shift.  In the classic shift, an infielder is shifted onto the other side of the infield or into the opposite-side outfield between the outfielders and the infield.  Basically, the shift is designed to thwart pull happy hitters.  A shifted infielder will generally make far more plays than an unshifted infielder.  Player evaluation systems will then credit this infielder with all these extra plays; and he will seem to be a much more valuable player.  But is it an individual or a team value?  If the same exact player plays for a team that refuses to shift, does the player lose value?  Is he a worse player?  The answer would seem to be No.  His “intrinsic value” as a Baseball player has not changed but his team value has risen.  Another example would be the art of “pitch framing” by catchers.  Some catchers, by the way they receive the ball, can trick the umpire into calling borderline balls as strikes.  Is this valuable to the team?  Absolutely.  But is it an “intrinsic value” for catchers?  No, it is an umpire weakness.  Relatively soon, the art of pitch framing will probably be all but extinct after the Major Leagues adopt video reviews of strike calls.  An “Intrinsic Value” cannot simply be erased.  And then there is the problem of “elective defense.”  Imagine your team has a great center fielder [CF].  This CF gets great jumps on the ball.  He glides over to catch the ball.  Many of these balls could be caught by either the right [RF] or left fielder [LF].  But, because this CF is the best outfielder on the team and is also considered the “captain” of the outfield, the CF consistently calls off the RF and/or LF and “elects” to catch the ball.  Under Player Evaluation Systems, the CF gets all the extra credit for this “elective defense.”  But does the CF deserve credit for these plays?  On a team with a bad CF, these plays still get made, just by the RF or LF.  In other words, a lot of defensive credit needs to be taken with a grain of salt.

11. Intrinsic Value

A decent Baseball Player Evaluation system should take these types of Defensive Value caveats under consideration.  Defense is a team, not an individual value.  Teams can even make choices that directly “devalue” their players under these evaluation systems.  Last season [2023], there was a classic example of this type of situation.  The St. Louis Cardinals promoted their prize rookie, Jordan Walker, to the Major Leagues.  Walker had been a third baseman for his entire career but was blocked in St. Louis by Nolan Arenado, a probable future Hall of Famer.  The Cardinals decided to move Walker to the outfield and let him play right [RF].  A decent hitter, WAR credits Jordan with 1.6 WAR on offense.  But, with very little experience in the outfield, Walker was brutal out there in the sun field.  On defense, WAR gives Walker a negative 2.1 WAR.  In other words, a team decision made Walker a below average player according to WAR.  If the Cardinals had posted Walker at third base [3B], it is very likely that Walker would have had a positive defensive WAR and been, by the Player Evaluation system’s estimation, a much more valuable player.  Walker’s WAR system rating definitely devalued hum but his “intrinsic value” as a Baseball player remains.  The great Pete Rose is another player whose value is underrated in this way.  Rose began his career as a 2B [1963-1966].  Then he played LF [1967, 1972-1974] and RF [1968-1971].  He moved to 3B [1975-1978] before finishing out his career as a 1B [1979-1986].  By WAR, Rose was about average at 2B, poor in RF, good in LF, brutal at 3B, and then washed up at 1B.  In each case, Rose switched positions to help his team.  But WAR gives him no credit for this.  According to WAR, the versatility of Rose is not an asset.  It is obvious that WAR would consider Rose a more valuable player if he had just played 2B or LF for most of his career.  Perhaps someday a Player Evaluation system will be designed that can measure a Baseball Player’s Intrinsic Value and the credit Pete Rose for his versatility.  But, until the supercomputer capable of making these calculations is invented (and programmed), Intrinsic Value will just remain the ideal.

12. Conclusions

Every Baseball player evaluation system has its flaws.  Win Shares bases its evaluation method on games won during the season.  Because simple luck can play a large part in this annual total, individual player Win Share totals for each single season can contain large errors.  However, the Win Shares system improves its accuracy as more and more seasons of any player are included, and luck washes out.  Win Shares also has the problem of devaluing pitcher’s contributions to the team across the board.  Every pitcher, but especially modern pitchers, are not credited with their full value.  This missing defensive value is spread out among the rest of the team’s players.  In other words, the defensive value given to every player, except the pitchers, by the Win Shares system should be reduced.  On the other hand, the WAR system for evaluating Baseball Players is almost surely better at judging individual seasons.  But WAR uses set formulas to generate its player evaluations and some of these formulas are off by a degree or two.  In some cases, the errors in these various formulas compound with each other and the player career evaluations can get completely out of whack.  It is also apparent that WAR over zealously rewards good to great defensive players while punishing poor to bad defensive players like they stole WAR’s wallet.  Someday, a properly programmed computer will be able to correctly value Baseball players.  Until that time, it is probably best to simply use every available tool to look at each player.  But it may already be too late.  The WAR system is ascendent and the Win Shares system is about to be throw on the ash heap of history.*  On January 23, 2024, several Baseball players may be elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame because their WAR score is good although their “Intrinsic Value” is not quite as high.  It’s a damn shame.

*The Win Shares system seems to be going the way of the dodo bird.  Bill James just published his last “Bill James handbook” annual [the 2024 Walk-Off Edition].  His Bill James Online site, the only place, as far as I know, to get updated Win Share information, is shutting down (James seems to be retiring).  Win Shares has conceded the field to WAR.

NEXT POST: Evaluating the 2024 Baseball Hall of Fame Candidates by using a combination of the WAR and Win Shares Player Evaluation Systems while trying to also consider the Player’s actual “Intrinsic Value.”

FUTURE POSTS: Exploring the concept of Intrinsic Value: 1) Who was a better player, Joe DiMaggio or Stan Musial, and 2) Who was best player out of David Ortiz, Manny Ramirez, and Gary Sheffield?

Post #35

Showtime Baseball Style

January 7, 2024

Glory lies in the attempt to reach one’s goal and not in reaching it.  Mahatma Gandhi

1. Introduction

A literal ton of articles have discussed pitcher and designated hitter Shohei Ohtani’s move from the Los Angeles Angels of the American League [AL] to the Los Angeles Dodgers of the National League [NL].  This will be yet another one.  However, almost a month has passed since he signed on December 11, 2023, and that may be enough time to gain a little perspective.  To start, this article will discuss the Ohtani transaction from the viewpoint of the Dodgers themselves.  Next, the article will discuss what the financial aspects of Ohtani’s new contract reveal about him.  Finally, the article will speculate on the future implications of the Dodgers’ acquisition of Ohtani, who is currently the best Baseball player in the world .  Hopefully, this article will give the reader a fresh viewpoint.  Regardless, much of this article will still probably just being going over the same ground that so many other articles have already covered.  But angry people need to vent, happy people need to laugh, and most Baseball fans need to talk about Shohei Ohtani.

2. The Los Angeles Dodgers trample the Angels

One aspect of the LA Dodgers’ signing of Shohei Ohtani that has not really been discussed is the ramifications on the Los Angeles Baseball economy.  The Dodgers and the Los Angeles Angels share the same metropolitan area and fight each other for market share.  Every potential Dodger fan is also a potential Angel fan.  While having a winning team is surely the single most important factor in a team’s portion of their local Baseball market chunk, the next most important factor is probably having superstar players that fans can identify with, root for, and most importantly buy branded merchandise from the teams that bears the player’s names.  As far as simply winning goes, the Dodgers are currently wildly successful [13 straight winning seasons lasting from 2011 to 2023 with no end in sight].  The Angels?  Not so much.  But the lackluster Angels have had two superstars that the Dodgers could not match, Ohtani and Mike Trout.  It has been apparent for several years [since 2019, at least] that the Dodgers have been thinking about, coveting, and planning to sign Ohtani when he became a free agent after the 2023 season.  Literally, the Dodgers have been salivating over getting a share of the merchandising and marketing bonanza if they could sign Ohtani. Hopefully, ten years from now, some enterprising journalist or financial analyst will write an interesting piece on just how the Dodgers were able to capitalize on the Ohtani brand.

During this time, every Dodger personnel move [free agent decisions, luxury tax considerations, and rookie usage] has been evaluated as possibly being related to their eventual acquisition of Ohtani.  Of course, this could have just been normal sportswriter hyperventilation.  But good sportswriters are usually tied into the zeitgeist of the teams that they cover.  There was so much smoke about the Dodgers’ desire to sign Shohei from the Dodger writers that there had to be a raging fire somewhere in the Dodger organization.  But it can’t be emphasized enough that the Dodgers knew that signing Ohtani would also be a metaphorical stake into the LA Angels’ heart.  Like Van Helsing hunting Dracula, the Dodgers knew how they wanted their pursuit of Ohtani to end [with a stick through the Angels’ heart].  The LA Dodgers also appear to be aware that Major League Baseball [MLB] is evolving into 3 different classes of teams: 1) some clubs that are perennial winners, 2) other clubs that alternate between winning and losing cycles, and 3) a few clubs that are the perennial losers.  In this probable future, the perennial losers will grow the superstars for the perennial winners to eventually acquire.*  It is in the LA Dodger’s best interest for the LA Angels never to be a perennial winner.  By taking Shohei Ohtani away from them, the Dodgers took a large step towards making the Angels a permanent second class citizen in their own home city.

*If the Players Union can get the Major League service time requirement down from six years to five or less years, this process will be accelerated.

3. The Pacific Rim of Baseball

Of course. the Dodgers were reportedly interested in signing Shohei Ohtani both when he signed in 2013 with the Nippon Ham Fighters of the Japanese Pacific League [JPL]; and in 2018 with the Los Angeles Angels of the AL.  But each time, Ohtani made his decision to sign on which team would allow him to pursue his double duty dreams [pitching and hitting].  To do that, Ohtani needed to a team that could use a designated hitter [DH].  Since the National League did not adopt the designated hitter rule until 2022, the Dodgers were out of luck both times.  But it was apparent for years that the DH was coming to the NL.  Major League Baseball [MLB] was just holding the implementation of it hostage as a negotiating chip against the Players Union.  After the Covid pandemic forced the NL to temporarily adopt the DH in 2020, the permanent adoption of the DH rule by the NL was inevitable.  When it finally happened, the Dodgers’ dreams of acquiring Ohtani actually became possible.  But it also became possible for the LA Dodgers to realize dreams that went back before Ohtani was even born. In the 1960s and 1970s, the two greatest untapped resources of Baseball talent in the world by MLB were Cuba and Japan.  Omar Linares and Sadaharu Oh, two the greatest players of all time, played out their careers without ever appearing in the MLB. The Dodgers, who traveled often to Japan to played series against teams there, were well aware of the quality of the Japanese Major Leagues.

Of course, the Dodgers had been heavily recruiting Latin players since the 1950s.  But in 1980, Dodger owner Peter O’Malley also committed his team to heavily recruiting players from the Pacific Rim [Japan, Korea, Taiwan].  In many ways, the Pacific Rim players were even more important to the Dodgers than low-cost Latin talent [except perhaps players of Mexican origin like Fernando Valenzuela].  The Dodgers are basically a Pacific Rim team themselves [along with the Angels, Padres, Giants, Mariners, and the sad A’s until they move to Vegas].  The Los Angeles metropolitan area has the largest Asian population of any United States city [about 1.5 million in 2020] and largest population of Japanese origin in the continental United States [about 180 thousand].*  It was obvious that a Baseball player of Asian origin would be a perfect fit for the Dodgers. O’Malley’s attempts to procure players from the Pacific Rim eventually bore fruit. In 1994, the LA Dodgers signed Chan Ho Park, the first Korean star player in the MLB. Then, in 1995, they also signed Hideo Nomo, the first true Japanese star player.  The Dodgers were committed to cornering the market for Pacific Rim players and had made a great start. They had set themselves up to be the first choice for future Asian Pacific Rim players.  By location and fan base and ownership, the advantage was all theirs.  But then the Dodgers threw it all away. 

*San Francisco is second with 66 thousand, New York third with 56, and Seattle fourth with 53. The Honolulu, Hawaii, metropolitan area has reportedly about 200 thousand or so residents of Japanese origin.

4. The Dark Days of Dodger Baseball from 1998 to 2012

In 1998, Dodger Owner Peter O’Malley sold the LA Dodgers team to Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation.  O’Malley stated that he was selling because he was worried about Estate Taxes [at present in 2024, he is still reportedly alive and no Estate Taxes have come due]. O’Malley really sold the Dodgers in a fit of petulance.  He was upset by the continuing ugliness between the Owners and Players after the Player’s strike in 1994 and 1995 [which was pretty much completely the Owners’ fault for trying to break the Players Union].  The LA Dodger family mystique that O’Malley liked to cultivate had gone pretty sour for him.  Simply as a business decision, Peter O’Malley’s sale of the team was remarkably foolish [like most such judgments made emotionally].  Because of wounded pride or hurt feelings, O’Malley sold away an asset that any astute businessman would have died to hold onto. In 2012, when the Dodgers once again went up for sale, O’Malley would try to buy the team back.  But he did not have the funds any more to buy it just by himself. The consortium that he put together was quickly outbid. O’Malley’s foolishness cost his family several billion dollars. But even more importantly, O’Malley’s ill-considered decision to sell the Dodgers in 1998 also threw away all of his own good work mining the Pacific Rim for talent.

From 1998 to 2004, the LA Dodgers were owned by the News Corporation.* Murdoch’s company bought the team as part of a larger struggle with TBS [Turner Broadcasting System] for Baseball content.  In 2004, the LA Dodgers were sold by News Corp to con-artist and grifter named Frank McCourt who was approved by Baseball Commissioner Bud Selig himself.  There is a very interesting article to be written about some of Selig’s strange choices for his fellow owners during his tenure, but this is not it.  McCourt bought the LA Dodgers with MLB credit, proceeded to squeeze the franchise for every cent, and then cashed out for an undeserved fortune in 2012 (while under extreme pressure from Selig to sell). Both the News Corporation and Frank McCourt had one thing in common.  Neither had any long-range vision for the team. While they owned the club from 1998 to 2012, the Dodgers missed out on the cream of the crop of the first great wave of Baseball talent coming over from the Japanese Major Leagues (Ichiro Suzuki, Hideki Matsui, Masahiro Tanaka, et al). By 2012, when the Guggenheim Group purchased the LA Dodgers from McCourt, the team’s once great advantage in signing Pacific Rim talent had evaporated. Although some of their decisions have not been stellar (Trevor Bauer), the overall record of the franchise under the Guggenheim stewardship speaks for itself.  No one has been accusing the Guggenheimers of lack of vision. Now, their signing of the Japanese version of Babe Ruth may be just the capstone of their management.  With it, the Guggenheimers have taken a giant step towards cementing the Los Angeles Dodgers’ status as perennial winners and re-established the Dodgers as the primary destination for Pacific Rim players.

*Just like O’Malley, News Corp would sell the LA Dodgers right before Baseball franchise values exploded upwards. Rupert Murdoch may know the newspaper business but his acumen in the business of Baseball was non-existent.

5. The Contract of Shohei Ohtani

In many ways, Shohei Ohtani’s new contract with the Dodgers is unlike any other sports contract ever signed.  The 2 million dollars a year from 2024 to 2033 and then 68 million dollars a year from 2034 to 2043 is as unique as Ohtani himself.  Even more unique is that it became obvious that Ohtani and his representatives designed the contract themselves and then presented it to the teams that Ohtani was actually considering [the LA Dodgers and Angels plus the San Francisco Giants].*  MLB calculated this odd contract, for luxury tax purposes, as exactly 46 million dollars a year for 10 years in current value.  Interestingly, the Players Union calculated it as 43.5 million a year in current value.  Basically, Ohtani and his reps seemed to have just decided to top the highest average annual pay ever [43 and a third million dollars a year for 2 years to Justin Verlander and 3 years to Max Scherzer] and then pair that with the length of contract [10 years or more] usually given to drive that average annual amount down.  Not coincidentally, the contract also topped, by either the MLB or the Player Union calculations, the largest amount of total dollars ever of any MLB contract previously given out [to Ohtani’s former teammate Mike Trout for 426.5 million over 12 years]. Most importantly, all the deferrals until 2034 to 2043 in Ohtani’s contract will help free up the Dodgers to spend more in an attempt to absolutely dominate during his actual playing career with the Dodgers from 2024 to 2033. Ohtani claimed that winning was, by far, the most important thing and then, incredibly, structured his contract to back up those words to the hilt. You have to respect that.  

*Actual Contract Math: 2 million from 2024-2033 not discounted; 68 million deferred from 2034-2043 with a discount rate of 4.43% which equals a present day annual value of $44,081,476.50 per year.  Adding back the 2 million gives a contract of $46,081,476.50 per year for 10 years with a Total Contract Value of $460,814,764.97 dollars.

Another prime consideration in Ohtani’s strange contract seems to have been the California State Income Tax, currently the very highest in the United States at 13.3% for all income over one million dollars a year [and heading to 14.3% in 2024].  Under a US Federal Statue that prohibits States from taxing deferred payments if they last for at least 10 years and the recipient no longer lives in the State, Ohtani and his reps crafted a contract that will allow him to possibly collect those 68 million dollars a year from 2034 to 2043 and also not have to pay a single dime of that exorbitant California State Income Tax (provided he does not live in CA during that time).  If he moves to a some place like Florida or Texas with no State Income Tax at all during those years, it will be the same as if Ohtani had stashed his 46-million-dollar paycheck in a tax-free fund that returns 13 to 14 percent.  This is one hell of a return in a world where financial analysts will tell you that a 10 percent annual return is fantastic.  Interestingly, no one has yet weighed in on whether Japan itself would tax the 2034-2043 deferred payments if Ohtani returns to his Homeland.  If he wanted to finish his Baseball career in Japan after the Dodger contract runs out after the 2033 season, would it cost Shohei Ohtani any money?  Someone needs to look at the Japanese Income Tax Code.  But, for some reason, I believe the answer is: “No.” If anything, Shohei Ohtani has consistently shown that his preparation is completely on point.

*Sportswriters have indicated that Toronto might have also been given a chance to consider Ohtani’s terms.  But that seems as unlikely as the false ‘Ohtani plane ride to Toronto to sign’ story.

6. The Tao of Shohei Ohtani

What does all this say about Shohei Ohtani?  Nothing that is not already known.  He is intelligent, smart, driven and extremely methodical.  He seems to put in the work to not only to develop his talent, but also to structure his life.  Before he even signed with the Dodgers, it was hypothesized that Ohtani preferred to stay on the West Coast because it would keep him closest to his Homeland.*  Considering that he almost surely only gave Pacific Rim teams a chance to match the LA Dodger contract, this was almost certainly true.  After his LA Dodger contract was signed, it was reported that Ohtani could take just 2 million dollars a year while deferring 68 million annually because he already makes 40 to 50 million dollars a year in endorsements.  If he truly makes that much in endorsements (or even one half of that), Ohtani had an even greater reason to stay in Los Angeles, the media capital of the United States [if not the World].  How much more in endorsements will Ohtani make if he is the member of a Los Angeles Dodgers Super Team that makes annual play-off appearances?  How much more if they win multiple World Championships? Every aspect of Shohei Ohtani’s career has been methodically planned out. It is apparent that he took all this into consideration too. For years, it has been reported that Ohtani would eventually sign with the Los Angeles Dodgers. It was inevitable because it made too much sense. But, in the real world, things that simply make too much sense often do not come to pass (such as Bryce Harper to the Yankees). The Tao of Shohei Ohtani seems to be a Baseball life that makes perfect sense.

*Los Angeles is 5477 miles away from Tokyo, Japan. Both San Francisco and Oakland [5138 miles] are closer, but Seattle [4782 miles] is actually the closest. San Diego is even further away [5582 miles].

But the most important takeaway from Shohei Ohtani’s contract negotiations is that the man must have an almost unshakeable belief in himself.  His belief in himself is evidently so strong that money seems to have never his primary motivation.  Ohtani seems to believes that, if he simply pours his heart & soul into performing on the field, the money will follow.  When he signed his first Baseball contract in Japan, Ohtani’s firm belief that he could be a double duty player, both hitting and pitching, was essential to his choice of a team. When Ohtani came to the United States, he once again chose the team that would allow him to be a double duty player.  By coming over early, Ohtani forfeited the chance to make millions from the established posting system and had to accept the MLB minimum salary.  Basically, Ohtani then used his initial team in the MLB as an apprenticeship. Once he had conclusively proved that he could be a two way superstar, Ohtani moved on.  And now he has reached Baseball Nirvana.  The best player in the world is playing for an organization that will surround him with players that can help him to repeatedly get to the greatest Baseball stage of all, the MLB World Series.  If there is a God in heaven and he or she loves Baseball, this will all work out for Ohtani. He must believe that it will work out because everything has always worked out before. Possibly the only thing that could derail this Ohtani dream is if his team does not hold up it’s end of the bargain by not trying to surround Shohei with the teammates that he needs. The LA Angels, to their credit, did try to do this. They simply failed. It is already becoming apparent that the LA Dodgers will not fail. In fact, it is very likely that Ohtani is going to now spend his prime as the best player on a team with a good chance to go down in history as legendary.

Some of the Shohei Ohtani’s actions can only really be understood with a basic knowledge of Japanese Baseball [and/or culture].  While Americans love their sporting contests, Football reigns very comfortably as the number one American sport, and Basketball and Baseball compete for a distant second place (a competition that Baseball has been losing).  It is a far cry from 100 years ago when Baseball was unquestionably the supreme American sport and was called the National Pastime with good reason.  In Japan, there is not this problem.  The Japanese have two main sports, Baseball and Sumo.  And Baseball is pretty much clearly number one.*  In a way, the Baseball players and pitchers coming out of Japan are throwbacks to the men who at one time existed here.  The very best Japanese players, such as Ichiro Suzuki and Shohei Ohtani, live and breathe Baseball in a way that American professional athletes are probably now incapable of doing.  That the current best Baseball player in the world came out of the Japanese Baseball ecosystem was almost inevitable. One of the most unusual aspects of Shohei Ohtani’s signing of his LA Dodger contract was that he also reportedly presented the exact same contract to his former team, the LA Angels, and asked them if they would match it. But, even if the Angels had said yes, it is almost certain that Ohtani would have turned them down. His offer of the same contract to the Angels was meant as a sign of respect. Interestingly, the Angels seemed to understand the gesture and politely declined to match the Dodger offer. But this was a very Japanese thing for Ohtani to do.

*Robert Whiting’s wonderful seminal books on Japanese Baseball culture, The Chrysanthemum and the Bat and You Gotta Have Wa, still stand as probably the best introductions to Baseball in Japan.

7. What the Future Holds for Ohtani

Ever since he arrived in the Major Leagues, Shohei Ohtani has continued to improve.  He closed the holes in his swing, becoming ever more dangerous.  He has refined his pitching repertoire, becoming ever more unhittable.  But was 2023 his apex?  It is inevitable that Ohtani will not be as valuable in 2024 as he was from 2021-2023.*  In 2024, he will only be hitting, not hitting and pitching.  On July 5th of 2024, Ohtani will turn 30 years old.  Common wisdom holds that the typical baseball player peaks when he is 26 to 27 years old and then slowly declines until he is about 30 years old; before rapidly declining in his later 30s. Few Baseball players last until they are 40 years old [or older]. But Ohtani is anything but typical.  The year 2022 was Ohtani’s best year as a pitcher.  The year 2023 was Ohtani’s best year as a hitter [and overall].  Can he improve offensively in 2024?  Ohtani will be able to focus solely on his batting this year.  Of couse, Ohtani will also begin 2024 less than one year removed from his second Tommy John procedure.  As Philadelphia Phillies star Bryce Harper showed in 2023, recovery from Tommy John surgery can rob a hitter of his power for quite some time.  It will be interesting to see if this is the case with Ohtani.  A conservative prediction would probably state that it is likely that Ohtani’s power (his home runs and slugging percentage) will go down in 2024 while his on-base skills (walks and on-base percentage) will go up.  A more optimistic projection will have Ohtani breaking the LA Dodgers’ single season home run record [49] while also becoming the first Dodger to hit 50 or more home runs in a season. In any event, it will be fascinating to see him bat in the heart of the Dodger’s line-up.

*2021-2023 Ohtani Total WAR: 2021-9.0 [batting 4.9 and pitching 4.1]; 2022-9.6 [3.4 batting and 6.2 pitching]; 2023-10.0 [6.0 batting and 4.0 pitching]; but, if injuries had not ended his 2023 season early, Ohtani was on pace for about a 12.0 WAR season.

But the real fun will start in 2025.  If Ohtani is healthy, there is a chance that he may turn in one of the greatest seasons of all time. In fact, if his health holds, Ohtani may just peak anywhere between 2025 and 2029.  Of course, there is a chance that Ohtani will spend the late 2020s declining like a normal player. But there have been many position players who, for one reason or another, continued to improve into their early 30s [Honus Wagner and Joe Morgan, for example].*  Even more pitchers have continued to improve in their 30s.  The flamethrower Randy Johnson peaked from 1999 to 2002 when he was 35 to 38.  Is there any reason to believe that Ohtani could have a late career renaissance like Joe Morgan or Randy Johnson (or both)?  The answer to that question is obviously yes (though that doesn’t mean it will happen, just that it might).  What Ohtani is doing, juggling a career as a pitcher and a hitter is tremendously hard.  Time spent perfecting his pitching takes away time perfecting his hitting (and vice versa).  Ohtani reportedly eats, sleeps, and dreams Baseball.  It seems like there is a good chance that he still has some room to improve. In fact, he was still improving in 2023. How great a season could Ohtani actually have if he does continue to improve for awhile? Ohtani has already had 6 Wins Above Replacement [WAR] seasons as both a hitter and as a pitcher [not the same season though]. If he peaks together a 12 WAR season would be inevitable. But perhaps he could go even higher, maybe even much higher. It is unlikely but only time will tell.

*Morgan spent his early career battling both injuries and a manager who he thought was a racist [Harry Walker].  Traded to Cincinnati, Morgan learned to re-love Baseball from his teammate, Pete Rose, and had a ferocious peak at the late age of 32.

What the Future Holds for the Dodgers

The signing of Yoshinabo Yamamoto, who has been the best pitcher in the Japanese Major Leagues from 2021 to 2023, shows that the LA Dodgers now have an advantage, probably a great one, in any future attempts to sign the very best Japanese players.  Yamamoto himself, while admitting that he would have probably signed with the Dodgers in any case, did also state that the opportunity to play with Shohei Ohtani was a consideration (and it certainly helped that Shohei went out of his way to make Yamamoto feel welcome).  However, the most interesting thing, by far, about Yamamoto’s signing was that he obviously solicited offers from other teams [the Mets, Yankees, and Giants in particular]; and then gave the Dodgers the opportunity to match the best offer.  In fact, the Yankees offer was probably superior to the Dodgers’ offer.  The Dodgers seem to have sealed the deal by offering the reverse of the Ohtani’s deal.  Instead of deferring money, the Dodgers paid Yamamoto an upfront bonus of 50 million dollars [which also reportedly escapes the very onerous California State Tax].  If many of the future Japanese star players who come over also give the Dodgers the opportunity to match any offer, this will give the Dodgers an enormous advantage.  Who wouldn’t prefer, all things being equal, to play on the team that employs the “Babe Ruth” of Japan? In the very near future, two more great Japanese superstars [players with Hall of Fame caliber talent] will almost certainly be posted to play in the MLB. If the Dodgers sign both of these players, pitcher Roki Sasaki and home-run hitter deluxe Munetaka Murakami, the Dodgers may be renamed the Japan Giants or Tokyo Dodgers.

But the Dodgers still have to hold up their end of the bargain.  The Dodgers need to field a winning team.  After signing Ohtani, they immediately signed Yamamoto and also front-line starter Tyler Glasnow [to an extension of 5 years for 136.5 million dollars].  Of course, Glasnow is a risk due to his injury history. But the injury risk is counterbalanced by his tremendous upside.  Like Ohtani, Glasnow recently had a Tommy John surgery [2021].  His return in 2023 from the surgery was delayed by an oblique issue too. But Glasnow still managed to reach a career-high in starts (21) and innings (120).  Interestingly, Glasnow claimed in his initial interviews after the Dodger signed him that his elbow, which had been bothering him for basically his entire MLB career, finally felt whole.  If that is true, there is a actual chance that Tyler Glasnow will be the LA Dodgers’ best pitcher going forward.  In multiple ways, the signings of both Yamamoto and Glasnow are almost as important as the signing of Ohtani himself.  The Dodgers have announced that, not only do they have the Babe Ruth of Japan playing for them, they will go the whole nine yards to give him the supporting players that he deserves.  They seem to be intent on becoming a modern version of the 1927 New York Yankees (or maybe just the Yankees of the late 1990s).  Currently, the All-Time Baseball record for consecutive 100 or more win seasons is three, held by multiple teams. The Dodgers have won 100 or more games in 2021 [106], 2022 [111], and 2023 [100]. In 2024, the LA Dodgers are probably even money to become the first team to win 100 or more games in four consecutive seasons. And then five in 2025.

Postscript #1: The Elvis Moment

Perhaps the best thing about Shohei Ohtani’s signing with the LA Dodgers was his channeling of an American icon, Elvis Presley.*  With the LA Angels, Ohtani’s uniform number was 17.  But in 2023, relief pitcher Joe Kelly wore that number for the Dodgers.  Ashley Kelly, his wife, posted on their social media an offer to give her husband’s number to Shohei if he signed with the Dodgers. She even [one would assume jokingly] offered to rename her baby, Kai, to Shokai.  When Ohtani finally did sign with the Dodgers on December 11, Ashley proceeded to post an Instagram video of her throwing Kelly’s old number 17 uniforms onto their front lawn. She also drew a “Kelly 99” on the back of his shirt with a sharpie. Under this obvious pressure, Joe Kelly agreed to give up the uniform number 17 and took 99 instead as his new one. Then, on December 23, 2023, Shohei Ohtani had a brand new Porsche delivered to a flabbergasted Ashley as as a token of his appreciation and Xmas present. It may be impossible to root against Ohtani.  

*Elvis reportedly gave away a lot of automobiles during his life, but probably his most famous gift of a car happened in July 1975.  He was shopping for cars in a Memphis, Tennessee, Cadillac dealership.  A young black woman named Minnie Pearson walked by and was admiring the cars on display.  Noticing her looking, Elvis bought her a brand new white and gold Cadillac that retailed for $11,500. Of course, Elvis may have been as high as a kite when he did this. Ohtani was presumably sober.

Postscript #2: Memories of McGraw

The Dodgers pursuit of great Asian and Mexican players to give their large fan bases of those respective LA populations someone that they can identify with is reminiscent of New York Giants’ manager John McGraw’s [from 1902-1932] career long search for a great Hebrew player that would bring the large New York City Jewish population out to the Polo Grounds.  Unfortunately, McGraw had no luck at all fielding such Jewish players as Moses Solomon, the Rabbi of Swat. And, in an irony that still makes one laugh, McGraw then passed on the greatest Jewish player of the era (and possibly all time) when Hank Greenberg showed up for a tryout. The LA Dodgers, with Fernando Valenzuela and Hideo Nomo and now Shohei Ohtani, have not been so unlucky.

Postscript #3: The Dodgers sign Teoscar Hernandez [January 8, 2024]

One day after this post was published, the Dodgers continued their “Dr. Evil” plan to conquer the Baseball World by signing Teoscar Hernandez. At his best in 2021, the 28-year-old Hernandez hit 32 home runs, drove in 116 RBIs, and batted .296 while playing for the Toronto Blue Jays. With 2023 being his last year before achieving free agency, Toronto traded him to Seattle before the season started. Under pressure to perform and now playing in a new city and in a notable pitching park, Hernandez had a down year [26 HRs, 93 RBIs, and a .258 BA while striking out a whopping 211 times, up from his previous high of 163 during 2018, his first full season]. Interestingly, Hernandez struck out 107 times at home and 104 on the road but slashed just .217/.263/.380 [BA-OBP-SA] at home and .295/.344/.486 on the road. It is pretty obvious why the Dodgers signed Hernandez. They needed a powerful right-handed hitter to balance their majority left-handed line-up [Hernandez smacked lefties to the tune of .287/.307/.510 in 2023 and has swatted them at a .275/.329/.557 pace for his career]. They obviously figured getting him out of Seattle’s Kingdome #2 would not hurt.* Oddly, the Dodgers signed Hernandez to just a one year deal. It seems like a two year deal [or one year deal with options] would have lifted some of the pressure to perform that may have fueled his 211 strikeouts in 2023. But the Dodgers may believe that they are better suited to deal with the psychology in any case. Best case scenario: Hernandez repeats his 2021 stats in 2024. Worst case scenario [un-injured]: Hernandez repeats his 2023 season stats in 2024 and the Dodgers collect a draft pick for him and move on in 2025. Either scenario is probably a win for the Dodgers. More importantly, the Dodgers continue to uphold [to the extreme] their end of their bargain with Shohei Ohtani to build a Superteam around him.

*Branded Safeco Field at first and now as T-Mobile Park for the money.