Post #28

2023 Franchise Review [Number 2]: Houston Astros (2022 Record: 106-56)

April 5, 2023

Sweet dreams and flying machines in pieces on the ground – James Taylor [from the song “Fire and Rain”]

Editorial Comment

As a “writing exercise” for 2023, I decided that I would try to write a “brief” essay for each Major League Baseball team. These essays would be in order of the team’s 2022 records. The very first essay, for the 111-win Los Angeles Dodgers, was not brief. I promised myself that I would do better. For the 2nd essay, the 105-win Houston Astros, I first read a whole book about the team. This was hardly conducive to knocking out these 30 posts briefly and quickly. Once again, the essay was far too long; and more than two months elapsed between the team posts. At this rate, the final essay [Washington Nationals] will be published in 2025. I either need to get better at this or maybe skip a boring team or two.

1. The Houston Astros & Corporate Culture

The book Winning Fixes Everything (by Evan Drellich) was published recently. Basically, it is an expose on the corporate culture of the Houston Astros. This culture possibly led to a sign stealing scandal that tarnished the Astro’s 2017 World Series victory. The book, if one is interested in the analytical side of the game of baseball, is fascinating. Drellich’s story even serves as a bookend to a much more well-known book about baseball: Moneyball by Michael Lewis. Moneyball is, at its heart, a story about the conflict between a bunch of jocks and nerds. It is a latter day high school story where the nerds tear down the social structure of a jock society.* But the hero of the book is the Oakland A’s general manager, Billy Beane, a former jock. He opens the doors to his team’s corporate boardrooms to the nerds. With the help of the nerds, Beane finally becomes successful. In the end, Beane received what had been denied to him in his athletic career (despite formidable talent). It is a redemption tale and Hollywood loved the plot so much that it was made into a movie (starring the ridiculously handsome Brad Pitt as the jock turned nerd hero). No one will be turning Winning Fixes Everything into a Hollywood movie. Unlike Lewis’ book, the plot of Everything is scattershot. Lewis threw out anything that did not fit his main thesis (like how much of the Oakland A’s success was simply due to its great pitching staff). Drellich, the author of Everything, throws everything and anything about the Astros into his book. However, his main thesis, that the corporate culture of the Astros led directly to the sign-stealing scandal, is actually weak. The low tech of watching a TV and banging on a trash can was basically the player’s initiative. The analytically obsessed Astro executive team simply looked the other way once they knew it was happening. All that being said, the book Everything has, in some ways, an even more fascinating story to tell than the much more famous Moneyball.

* There is a whole series of movies, “Revenge of the Nerds” from the 1980s and 1990s, based on this exact same premise.

Winning Fixes Everything tells the tale of Jeff Luhnow, the general manager of the Houston Astros from 2012 to 2019. He began his professional career as a corporate consultant. Of course, consultant is simply another term for a “killer nerd.” As a consultant, Luhnow advised corporations how to restructure their business practices. This restructuring was usually accomplished by laying-off employees without any regard for sentimentality. A Baseball fan, Luhnow sent his resume to Major League teams when the Moneyball revolution swept thru the sport. Many clubs were trying to duplicate the success of Billy Beane and the Oakland A’s. Hired by the St. Louis Cardinals as their head nerd, Luhnow was their vice-president in charge of analytics from 2003 to 2011. On May 16, 2011, the last place Houston Astros were purchased by Jim Crane, a shipping magnate. Crane, who relied deeply on logistics (i.e. analytics) in his primary business, hired Luhnow to be his General Manager (GM). Now in full charge of a team, he quickly decimated the team’s “jock” employees and bought in a platoon of his analysts. Everything tells the fascinating story of this process, in which even the original “analysts” hired by Luhnow were quickly replaced by better analysts. The results were preposterously good. The Astros, who had lost over 100 games yearly from 2011 to 2013, were a winning team by 2015, won their first World Series in 2017, won over 100 games each season from 2017 to 2019, but lost the 2019 World Series in the seventh and penultimate game. After Luhnow was banished from Baseball as a result of the scandal, the Astros continued to win, losing the World Series in 2021 and then winning a second title in 2022. Despite his fantastic record as a Baseball GM, Luhnow will almost surely never run a Major League Baseball team again.*

*It probably doesn’t help that Jeff Luhnow has sued Jim Crane and the Houston Astros for 22 million dollars (the remainder of his contract).

On the one hand, Luhnow’s banishment is nothing to get upset about. By all accounts, he had the interpersonal skills of a bad-tempered badger. The fact that he was fired in much the same way that he fired people himself feels like karma. However, it is also true that Luhnow was scapegoated because he had no real friends in the world of Baseball. The real culprits went scott-free. The players were given “immunity to testify” by the powers that be. But, in reality, the Commissioner’s Office simply did not want to take on the Player’s Union. The Commissioner himself, guilty of not proactively policing and preventing the scandal itself, skated free. Crane – the Astro’s owner with a sordid past of allegations of racism, misogyny, and even “war-profiteering” against his main business – was absolved of responsibility by his employee, the Commissioner. Luhnow (along with manager A. J. Hinch and coach Alex Cora) was banished from Baseball for a year. But while Hinch and Cora were quickly re-employed after their year was up, Luhnow did not get a single offer. With Luhnow gone, Astro’s owner Crane hired yet another analytics oriented GM, James Click, to run his team. Click maintained the run of good seasons from 2020 to 2022. But Crane was not clicking with Click. For 2023, the Houston Astros have yet another GM, Dana Brown. Unlike Luhnow and Click, Brown does not belong to the nerd brigade that has taken over the sport of Baseball. A former minor league player and college teammate of Astro Hall of Famer Craig Biggio, he is squarely part of the jock blue bloods that usually run Major League teams. It seems as if Astro owner Jim Crane has changed the team’s course away from hardcore analytics. What does all this mean for the future of the defending World Champion Houston Astros?

The answer to that question is probably grim. The current Houston Astro’s team was built on analytics and the high draft picks that come from being a lousy team. Except for their 29-31 record in the Covid scuttled 2020 season, the Astros have not had a losing season since 2014. Not only that, the Astros lost draft picks as a result of the sign stealing scandal. Most well-publicized current farm system rankings list the Astro’s organization at the bottom, if not dead last, amongst all 30 Major League teams. The chances that the Astros can reload their Major League team from below are slim. The current team still has the strengths the led them to the 2022 Championship: a very strong pitching staff (both starting and relieving) and formidable line-up. However, pitchers are inherently fragile and the line-up is aging. After the 2024 season, Jose Altuve and Alex Bregman, both probably future Hall of Famers, are slated to become free agents. They could be resigned. But each will be in their 30s for those contracts. Without them, the line-up will no longer be formidable. With them, the line-up will be declining. The traditional front office response to a strong team with a weak or absent farm system is to bring in free agents to shore up the core. An analytical front office would tear the team down (i.e. tanking) and rebuild with draft picks and prospects acquired in the teardown. The corporate culture of the Houston Astros has almost certainly gone from analytical to traditional. Probably the most telling roster move made by the Houston Astros during the 2022/23 off-season was the signing of free agent first baseman Jose Abreu. The acquisition of a 36-year-old first baseman as your quintessential off-season move screams traditional.

It is almost certainly now just a question of player health until the Houston Astro dynasty from 2017 to 2022 comes crashing down to the ground and leaves nothing but wreckage. With good health, the Astros will probably still be strong contenders in 2023 and 2024. But sometime after that, the tide of time and the inevitable wear and tear on any pitching staff will take the Astros down to the bottom of the standings. They may stay there for quite awhile.

2. Jose Abreu & the Baseball Hall of Fame

For several years before Jose Abreu escaped from Cuba in 2013 (with various family members in a boat ride to Haiti), articles were written claiming that he was either: a) the best hitter not in the Major Leagues; b) the best hitter alive; or c) Babe Ruth reincarnated. In the end, all this hyperbole turned out to be just a trifle over-baked. Although he has not turned into the 2nd coming of the Babe himself, Abreu established himself as a very good hitter once he was in the Major Leagues. From 2014 to 2022, he compiled 31.8 bWAR.* Born in 1987, Abreu is now 36 years old. With a good finishing kick, he will probably end up with somewhere around 40 WAR for his career. This will leave Abreu short of the 50 WAR or so that it takes to make a good Baseball Hall of Fame argument. Should he be given any credit for what might have been? Abreu debuted in the Cuban National League in 2003 at the reported age of 16 (if that age is incorrect, the window for a nice finishing kick is probably shorter). Abreu was probably not a Major League caliber hitter until 2008. In the USA, he would have, if given the chance, broken into the Major Leagues then and definitely been a regular from 2009 to 2013 (his age 22 to 26 seasons). How many more WAR would Jose Abreu have compiled in those five seasons? A conservative estimate would be 15 or so [from 2014 to 2018, Abreu amassed 19.3 WAR]. If that had happened, Abreu would now be sitting on about 46 or 47 career bWAR. He wouldn’t need a good finishing kick to simply get into a Hall of Fame discussion; it would give him a worthy Hall of Fame case just on his Major League merits. There are several other Cuban and Japanese players that could make similar arguments if given the chance. It will be interesting to see if Abreu’s Cuban career is considered when he eventually comes up for Hall of Fame consideration. It is probably more likely that he will be a “one & done” candidate, falling off future ballots after not receiving the required five percent to stay on until his election or the 10 year limit runs out.

* Baseball Reference’s Wins Above Replacement formula.

3. Dusty Baker & Clubhouse Culture

The year 2022 was probably the apex of Dusty Baker’s career. After 25 years of managing Major League Baseball teams, Baker finally won a World Series Championship. His passport to the Baseball Hall of Fame has been stamped. Many anecdotes have been told about his managerial style. All these stories seem to agree that the secret to Baker’s success was the “clubhouse culture” that he created. His men just loved playing for him. Perhaps the best thing about this was that it was unquantifiable. In the sport where everything gets measured, Baker’s strength as a manager was virtually abstract. The annual “Bill James Handbook” always contains various measurements of managerial tendencies such as: their number of line-up changes, use of player platoons, quick or slow hooks removing starting pitchers, use of relievers, number of intentional walks given, preference for left-right or right-left batter/pitcher match-ups, partiality for either rookies or veterans, and even a bias for either speed or power. However, baseball analyst/historian Bill James himself has admitted that the tools used to rate managers are inadequate. How do you measure what is obviously a manager’s greatest strength or weakness: the ability to foster a clubhouse culture that lets the players win? Back in 1997, James wrote an entire book just about baseball managers. In that book, he told the story of Hall of Fame manager Joe McCarthy and Hall of Famer Hack Wilson. Wilson originally came up to the Major Leagues in 1923 with the New York Giants. But he did not thrive under the dictatorial Giant manager John McGraw. Traded to the Chicago Cubs, Wilson played for McCarthy from 1926 to 1930. For McCarthy, Wilson had great year after great year, culminating in his monstrous 1930 season (56 HR, 191 RB1, .356 BA). Joe McCarthy was then replaced as Cubs manager by Rogers Hornsby, a man with no tact at all. Hack Wilson’s career fell apart and he was out of the Major Leagues by 1934.

James hypothesized that McCarthy had created the “clubhouse culture” that allowed the free-spirited alcohol-loving Wilson to thrive. In other words, he maximized the value of Wilson to his team. Of course, no baseball manager can perfectly maximize a complete roster of baseball players (traditionally 25 men but currently 26). However, a great manager needs to ensure that his best players are able to focus on winning.* There is some actual proof that Dusty Baker may be good at this. From 1992 to 1996, second baseman Jeff Kent played for various teams, primarily the New York Mets. For the Mets, he played for manager Dallas Green, a dictatorial man with no tact. Defensively challenged, Kent put extreme pressure on himself to perform well. The teams and managers whom he performed for openly doubted his talent. In 1997, Kent was traded to the San Francisco Giants, managed since 1993 by Dusty Baker. Baker simply told Jeff Kent to relax, that he believed in him. In 1997, Kent had a very good season with 29 HRs and 121 RBIs. But he hit for just a .250 BA. Baker continued to build Kent up, make him feel secure. From 1998 until Baker was fired by the Giants in 2002, Jeff Kent was a monster, including seasons of 31-128-.297 in 1998, 33-125-.334 in 2000 winning the league MVP, and 37-108-.313 in 2002. Jeff Kent had basically all his best years playing for Dusty Baker. Unlike Hack Wilson, Kent did not fade quickly after his favorite manager left the club in 2002. He was still good from 2003 to 2008 when he retired at age 40. The Baseball Writers Association of America [BBWAA], who vote players into the Hall of Fame, recently dropped Kent from the ballot after he reached the ten year limit for. The argument for electing Kent raged on for that entire time. If he had played his entire career for Dusty Baker, it is likely that there would have been no argument at all. Jeff Kent would have sailed into the Baseball Hall of Fame without a glitch.

*Hall of Fame Baseball Manager Casey Stengel famously said that: The secret of successful managing is to keep the five guys who hate you away from the four guys who haven’t made up their minds.

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