Post #29

2023 Franchise Review [Number 3]: Atlanta Braves (2022 Record: 101-61)

Security is mostly a superstition. It does not exist in nature. Helen Keller

May 7, 2023

1. Introduction*

From 2017 to 2021, Baseball fans got to watch the bloated remains of Albert Pujols and Miguel Cabrera stumble through season after season. Each player was: 1) very obviously not in the best of playing shape; and 2) not worthy of their hefty contacts during this time period. Against all odds, Pujols went out in an improbable blaze of glory in 2022, retiring after one last monster season to remind everyone of his greatness. Cabrera was not so lucky. His dreadful 2022 season should have finally put his comatose career out of its blubbering misery. However, since he is still owed 32 million dollars to play in 2023, the Detroit Tigers decided not to get their money’s worth….. one…. more…. time (a truly odd decision). Each man was playing out the end of a contract that paid them deep into their 30s. Their fading years stand as a testimony to the folly of such long-term contacts. Seemingly not learning much from past mistakes of this sort, Major League teams have been recently giving out contracts that will actually cover players into their early 40s. Will these contracts, which are really designed to circumvent harsh penalties for having an excessive payroll, still seem like a good strategy when the players are actually in their 40s? Only time will tell (but it doesn’t look good). On the other hand, some of the more progressive Major League front offices have been trying to tie down their best players through their productive 20s and into their early 30s. Although they did not invent this particular strategy, the Atlanta Braves have implemented it to a unprecedented degree. This post will discuss two aspects of this type of team blueprint: 1) Was it wise for the Braves to sign virtually their entire player core to contracts of this sort; and 2) What would be the economic impact on Baseball itself if this strategy is followed to its logical conclusion?

*As I already wrote a long post specifically about the Atlanta Braves [Post #19], this post will try [and probably fail] not to be so specific to the team itself.

2. The Atlanta Braves’ Bright Idea

The Atlanta Braves have signed seven of the team’s young core to long-term contracts before they would have been eligible for free agency (in some cases, way before) after playing in the Majors for six years. These types of contracts give the players immediate financial security, but at the expense of eventually trying to maximize their value on the open market. The team gets both cost control and good publicity with the added bonus of a chance for an economic killing (to be able to pay a player far under his actual worth). Of course, there is always the possibility that the team could end up paying a player far more than he deserves too. Jon Singleton serves as a cautionary tale for overpaying a player. He was signed by the Astros to a long-term contract before he even established himself as a Major Leaguer. His career was derailed by a runaway marijuana addiction; and he was never worth a penny that the team paid. Do the Braves have a potential Singleton in their 7 player signed core? The quick answer is, of course, possibly Spencer Strider. He is the only pitcher and thus just a torn ligament or burst rotator cuff from becoming a shell of his present self. Sean Murphy, the Braves’ catcher, also is part of a group that often has their careers curtailed by injuries. Both Ronald Acuna Jr. & Ozzie Albies have already lost seasons to injuries; but also seem to have recovered without any lingering problems. Injuries often beget injuries though. But the Braves have extremely team friendly contracts for both men too. The two sluggers, Matt Olson and Austin Riley, are both signed until they are 35 (with team options for their 36th years). Sluggers like them often fade suddenly in their early 30s. Finally, there has been some chatter that Michael Harris II may turn out to be the second coming of Claudell Washington.* Even if he does, the Braves still win that scenario. But, even if two or possibly three of these seven contracts are total duds, the Braves will still win. By signing so many core players, they have (in insurance terms) spread the risk. Every Major League Baseball club should be trying to copy this strategy.

*Claudell Washington debuted in 1974 at age 19 with the Oakland As. He hit .285 in 221 ABs with an OPS+ of 108 [a measure of offensive production, Major League Average=100]. In 1975 at age 20, Washington hit 10 HRs, 77 RBIs, a .308 BA, 40 SBs, a 118 OPS+ and 4.9 WAR [Wins above replacement]. But that was his peak, he never got any better. However, he also played regularly until 1989 and was last seen in the Major Leagues at age 35 in 1990.

3. The Economic Impact of this Strategy

One very interesting aspect of the Baseball team strategy of signing up their young players to long-term contracts has not really been discussed (as far as I know). This practice will definitely effect free agency itself. Basically, the free agent market has been used by teams to improve themselves quickly since it was introduced in the late 1970s. But what happens if this market dries up to a certain extent? What happens if all (or almost all) of the best young players have been tied up by long-term contracts and the free agent market contains only those guys being sent to the Island of Misfit Toys? In the last off-season [2022-2023], it seemed like every star shortstop in the Majors was available as a free agent. Teams were able to go browsing or be caught short by window shopping too long. But many writers have already noted that the coming off-season [2023-2024] has a notably thin free agent class (essentially it’s Shohei Ohtani and some random guys). If the free agent market does dry up, will the free agents available be rewarded handsomely with more lucrative contracts? What will this do to team dynamics? What happens if you are the best player on a team but some guy signed in free agency is making twice what you are because you were convinced to sign away your free agency rights early on? It seems like the Atlanta Braves may already have this problem. The team has a obvious salary structure now.* Would the Braves sign a player in free agency who made significantly more than any of their players that have been tied up long-term? Interestingly, one player the Braves have not signed long-term is Max Fried, their ace pitcher [or, at least, he was until Strider showed up]. Fried has show no inclination to sell himself short and repeatedly fought the Braves in arbitration. Like Freddie Freeman and Dansby Swanson before him, he will obviously have to get paid in free agency. If the strategy of signing all of the best talent to early contracts is taken to the logical extreme, Baseball will end up with set teams fighting one another to overpay for the geriatric scraps that can put them over the top (much like the current Mets contracts for both Max Scherzer and Justin Verlander).

*The Braves have, for now, evidently set a salary ceiling of 22 million dollars a year. Matt Olson (in 2024), Austin Riley (in 2025) and Spencer Strider (in 2027) all eventually top out at this number. It will be interesting to see how long the Braves can hold this particular line.

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