Post #44

Note: This doomed post was in production right past the December 7th, 2024, announcement of the Classic Era Committee inductees for the BHOF. While time was being wasting thinking and writing about John Donaldson and Vic Harris, the CEC went ahead and inducted Dave Parker [!] and Dick Allen. The induction of Dave Parker was certainly a surprise to this blog. The idea was that the post would celebrate the induction of one of the two Negro League players. The only change since December 1st is finishing off the evaluations of the candidacies of Donaldson [Yay] and Harris [nay].

The Baseball Hall of Fame Class of 2025

December 11, 2024

Once you realize how good you really are, you never settle for playing less than your best. Reggie Jackson

Introduction One: The 2025 Classic Committee Election

The 2025 Baseball Hall of Fame [BHOF] Class will come from two different elections from basically three different player groups. The results of the first election will be announced on December 8, 2024. This first 2025 BHOF election will come from the latest incarnation of the maligned Veteran’s Committee. Of course, it is no longer called the Veteran’s Commitee. It is labeled the “Classic Baseball Era Committee.” It is one of three rotating Commitees who are the lastest bastard children of the original Veteran’s Committee [these 3 Committees will rotate their annual elections for the foreseeable future].* This Veteran Classic Committee will vote on eight men who contributed to the Baseball World before 1980. Notably, this is the only remaining BHOF Committee that can honor Negro Leaguers. The eight man ballot being voted on by the Classic Commitee will be prepared by yet another BHOF Committee, the Historical Overview Committee (HOC). The HOC is a group of 10 baseball historians, writers and sportscasters. The Classic Committee itself will consist of 16 voters. Each of these voters will get three votes. To be elected to the BHOF, the players on this ballot will need to receive 75% of the ballots cast (i.e. 12 votes). Of course, this sets some limits. The Classic Committee could theoretically elect 4 men (48 total votes/12 required equals 4 electees). In reality, the Classic Commitee will probably elect either one or two men to the BHOF (three is unlikely and four would raise questions about collaboration). Interestingly, the Hall of Fame has declined to name the 16 Classic Committee voters in advance. This is probably due to the very much derided 2019 election of DH Harold Baines to the Hall of Fame by a bunch of very biased supporters. Basically, the Classic Committee is a back door into the Baseball Hall of Fame with minimal oversight. Like most things done in the dark, the results may be a bit strange.

*In other words, the Classic Commitee will next meet and elect pre-1980 Baseball individuals for the 2028 Baseball Hall of Fame Class.

Introduction Two: The 2025 BBWAA Election

The second 2025 Baseball Hall of Fame election will be held by the BBWAA (Baseball Writers’ Association of America). The BBWAA sends its members (who are eligible to vote in the 2025 HOF election) their BHOF ballots before the end of November 2024. The voters need to return these ballots before December 31st, 2024. The results are announced on January 21st, 2024. Any player who is elected will be inducted on July 27th, 2025 at Cooperstown, NY, along with anyone voted in by the Classic Committee. Basically, the BBWAA members vote for one large group of players that can be sub-divided into two distinct groups: 1) Players on the ballot for the first time and 2) Players who were not elected on previous ballots but survived to be on the present ballot by receiving at least 5% of the vote. Those players who appear for the first time have to qualify to be on the ballot by being retired for at least five years and spending at least 10 seasons in the Major Leagues. Those players who have survived to be voted on again can stay on the ballot for up to 10 years as long as they keep receiving their 5% or more of the vote. Some of the rules are similar or identical to those of the Classic Committee. To be elected to the HOF, a player must receive 75% or more of the vote. But the BBWAA voter base is much larger, usually around 400 voters. Like the Classic Committee, everyone on the BBWAA ballot was screened beforehand by yet another Committee. Unlike the Classic Committee, the BBWAA only votes on players. There are a bunch of boilerplate rules that apply to both of these BHOF elections too, but they are not all that important for this discussion.* The BBWAA election is the front door into the Hall of Fame and would be what most caual Baseball fans consider to be the real BHOF election.

* For example, no players on the ineligible list (Pete Rose, Shoeless Joe); no write-ins; personal character should be considered, etc.

I.) A Breif Interlude to talk about WAR

Since the Baseball Hall of Fame [BHOF] opened up on June 12th of 1939, the qualifications for electing a player to the BHOF have changed and evolved, tightened and loosened, and continued to mutate. However, in recent years, a Baseball statistic called WAR (Wins Above replacement) has become pre-eminent in the discussion of who belongs in the BHOF. WAR is a stat that attempts to measure a player’s complete contribution to his team’s success, both offensive and defensive, and reduce it to a value that represents how many wins that player added to his team’s total. The very best players can be worth 10 wins or more per year at their peak. Only the greatest players will accumulate 100 WAR or more during their career.* For a player to be elected to the BHOF, the current break even point is about 50 career WAR. In other words, most BHOF players have 50 plus career WAR. If a player has a career total of over 60 WAR, he is almost surely BHOF worthy. However, if a player has below 40 career WAR, he probably should not even be in the debate. A total of between 40 and 60 WAR indicates that there probably needs to be a serious discussion about whether that player belongs or not. One thing outside the pale is to use the career WAR of individual players that have already been elected as a yardstick. If you let in every player who had more WAR than 19th-Century outfielder Tommy McCarthy [14.6 WAR], there would be thousands of players inducted rather than the current total of 273 Major League players as of 2024 (excluding the Negro League players whose total career WAR is reduced by the lack of a 154 game schedule, not by worthiness).

*As of the 2024 season, only 32 players have been credited with 100 career WAR by Baseball Reference, basically the inventor of this statistic.

However, any reasonably sane person will admit that WAR has serious problems. For one thing, it combines something that can be measured very accurately (offense) with something that cannot (defense). For another, the statistic is intentionally vague. Whoever created WAR made sure that only a mathematician could do the calculations. For example, rather than making each calculation distinct, they melded them together nonsensically. You cannot simply add offensive, defensive, and pitching WAR togther to get total WAR. Each sum contains a “positional adjustment” that ensures this simple addition goes wrong. Baseball Historian Bill James also claimed that WAR is a terrible system. He basically believed that because WAR has so many individual calculations, there is a good chance for an error cascade resulting in a completely ridiculous conclusion. In other words, if every calculation is slightly wrong in the same direction (either for or against a player), the calculation could end up with an exceedingly large error by geometric progression (of course, it could also be correct if those errors just cancel each other out). However, for better or worse, WAR is currently the system usually being used to evaluate modern BHOF candidates. So we will be talking about WAR while discussing possible HOF inductees. One other thing to always remember about WAR is: there are a lot of traditional BHOF voters in the BBWAA and on the Veteran’s Committees who don’t believe in it much (and some who actively reject it). This dynamic, between the “old school” traditionalists and the modern baseball analytics crowd, now plays out in annually in many BHOF elections (not to mention seasonal awards like the MVP). While this post will discuss player’s WAR scores, it will also be taking WAR with a grain of salt.

II.) The 36 Players Eligible for BHOF Election in 2025

There are 36 players eligible to be elected to the BHOF in 2025. It must be admitted up front that, if not for the traditional “old school” BBWAA voters who don’t believe in WAR (and refuse to let it guide their votes), all these elections would be duller than a convention of gout medicine salesmen overdosed on quaaludes. Because of this, the “old school” point of view has to be considered too as we review these players up for election to the BHOF in 2025. In many cases, it is the traditionalist view that is keeping some players out and letting other players in. To begin, these 36 eligible players should be split up into three different groups. The very first group contains the 14 players who are brand new to the BBWAA ballot for 2025. The second group consists of the 14 players from previous BBWAA ballots who have survived to be voted on once again. Of course, some would say that group one and group two are basically the same thing. But it is more like a snapshot versus a movie. Players on the ballot for the first time are the snapshot. It is one quick judgment, are they BHOF worthy or not? But the players who survive to be voted on more than once and possibly ten [10] times, are more like a movie. Sometimes you need to digest a movie for awhile before you can really accurately rate it. The third and final group will be those 8 players being considered by the Classic Committee. For the most part, these men have already been considered over and over by the BBWAA or previous Veterans Committees and denied (unless they are Negro League veterans). But they are getting one more chance (until their next chance because the BHOF has absolutely no mechanism to ever close the door to election) for their BHOF cases to be heard.

III) The 14 Brand New Players on the 2025 BBWAA Ballot [Ranked by WAR]

These 14 candidates are brand new to the BBWAA ballot and have never been voted on before. Each man retired, either of their own free will or because no Major League would employ them any more, after the 2019 season. The Baseball Hall of Famers elected on the first ballot are usually considered the elite of the BHOF.

1) C.C. Sabathia [62.3 WAR], born 1980, career 2001-2019: The interestingly named Carsten Charles “C.C.” Sabathia is somewhat of a transitional player. C.C. belongs to the last generation of starting pitchers who were expected to pitch more than 6 innings per start. When he pitched his league-leading and career-high of 253 innings in 2008, C.C. averaged just over 7 innings per start (35 starts total). Since he threw those 253 innings, no other pitcher has topped that total. Currently, it takes about 210 innings pitched [IP] to lead the Major Leagues. As time goes by and the workload of starting pitchers continues to decrease, Sabathia’s 251 wins and 161 losses record will begin to look more and more like a veritable mountain of victories. Under the WAR stat, Sabathia certainly qualifies for the BHOF (though not by much). Despite that, it must be said that CC Sabathia certainly feels like a Hall of Famer. From 2007 to 2011, he had a Hall of Fame peak. There is a fair chance that Sabathia will be elected in 2025 on his first ballot. If not, Sabathia will do well enough that his eventual election will be assured before too long. Of course, if Sabathia had stayed in shape for the back end of his career, there wouldn’t be any questions at all. Though it was certainly interesting to watch a 350 pound fat man pitch from 2013 to 2019, Sabathia could have spent that time padding his Hall of Fame resume instead and removing all doubts about his worthiness (to his credit, C.C. Sabathia is currently in far better shape than he was at the end of his career). If he is elected on the first ballot, it will be a triumph of the traditionalists over the statisticians. His stats don’t really support a first ballot election, but his reputation does. [Top 5 WAR: 6.7, 6.4, 6.3, 6.2, and 4.8= 30.4; all five in consecutive years with a 4.6 season to start off this six year peak.]

2) Ichiro Suzuki [60.0 WAR], born 1973, career 2001-2019: Ichiro Suzuki will be elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame in 2025 on the first ballot. The only question is whether Ichiro will be elected unanimously or not. Of course, Ichiro’s Major League total of just 60.0 WAR does not support this type of first ballot outcome. But his old school stats (1420 runs scored, 3089 hits, .311 career BA, 509 stolen bases, 2 batting crowns, and 1 MVP) should make him a no doubter in traditional analysis. But the upcoming overwhelming nature of Ichiro’s election is not really a contrast of traditional and modern evaluation. Ichiro will be getting credit for that part of his career played in Japan as well. If he had debuted in the Major Leagues at the beginning of the 1994 season instead of Japan, Ichiro would have amassed somewhere around 100+ WAR for his career.* Barring injury, Ichiro would have also certainly surpassed 4000 career hits in the Major Leagues and probably broken Pete Rose’s all-time hit record of 4256 (breaking the heart of the “Hit King” too). The unanimous (or nearly unamimous) election of Ichiro will be well and truly deserved. [Top 5 WAR: 9.2, 7.7, 5.8, 5.6, and 5.4= 33.7, all in the Major Leagues; Top 5 oWAR: 6.2, 6.1, 5.4, 4.4 and 4.4= 26.5; Career oWAR: 47.8].

*Ichiro’s WAR: From 1994 to 2000, Ichiro was a great (and consistent) player in Japan. In 2001, he jumped to the USA and had a 7.7 WAR season. If Ichiro had averaged 7.7 WAR per year from 1994 to 2000 in the USA, he would have added 53.9 WAR to his total of 60.0. From 2001 to 2003, Ichiro averaged 5.6 WAR per season [16.9/3] in the USA. If Ichiro had averaged 5.6 WAR per year from 1994 to 2000 in America, he would have added 39.2 WAR to his total of 60.0. From 2001 to 2007, Ichiro averaged 5.9 WAR per season [41.1/7] in the USA. If he had done that from 1994 to 2000 in America, Ichiro would have added 41.3 more WAR to his total of 60.0. In other words, if he had played in the USA from 1994 to 2019, Ichiro Suzuki would have collected somewhere between 95 and 115 WAR for his career.

3) Ian Kinsler [54.1 WAR], born 1982, career 2006-2019: No one seemed to consider second baseman Ian Kinsler a future Baseball Hall of Famer while he was playing ball. But he had an excellent “Tommy Harper” type career.* One year, Kinsler hit .319 (the only year he hit .300 or better). The next year, Kinsler hit .253 but with 31 HRs. Another year, he hit 32 HRs with 89 walks (usually he hit 11-20 homers and took 40 to 60 BBs per year). His career highs, all put togther, would make one hell of a player (121 R/188 H/42 2B/7 3B/32 HR/92 RBI/.319 BA/.517 SA). But usually it was just a bunch of this or a bundle of that, but not all together. It will be interesting to see if Kinsler will get the 5 percent necessary to survive the 2025 vote and maybe get another shot on the 2026 ballot. Although his statistics indicate that he is a borderline Hall of Fame player, the traditional evaluation of his career will be a problem for him going forward. Ian Kinsler also makes an interesting comparison with the next guy, yet another second baseman. [Top 5 WAR: 7.0, 6.0, 5.6, 5.1 and 5.0= 28.7, Kinsler was worth 4.0 or more WAR every year from 2007 to 2016 except for 2012; Top 5 oWAR: 5.5, 5.3, 4.7, 3.9 and 3.7= 23.1; Career oWAR: 44.8]

*Tommy Harper [born 1940] played in the Majors from 1962 to 1976. He twice led the League in stolen bases (73 in 1969 and 54 in 1973). They were the only two seasons that he stole more than 40. After hitting 9 HRs in 1969, Harper blasted 31 in 1970. His second highest total was 18 in 1965. One year, Harper walked 95 times. His next highest total was 78. He was a good, sometimes very good, player but not consistently.

4) Dustin Pedroia [51.9 WAR], born 1983, career 2006-2019: Pedroia was very definitely traveling down the Hall of Fame Highway when his march to glory was “kneecapped.” On April 21st of 2017, Manny Machado whacked Pedroia’s left knee as Machado slid into second base on a simple force play. Oddly, Pedroia was stretching out like a first baseman to recieve the throw from the shortstop at the time. Machado had to slide right over the second base bag in order to spike Pedroia’s left knee. Even more strangely, the collision didn’t seem to be all that bad. It looked like Machado had just spiked the back of Pedroia’s left leg, not hitting his knee at all. But Pedroia’s knee was already compromised. Pedroia had already needed surgery to repair the left knee meniscus in October of 2016. Basically, the Machado slide kicked off an injury cascade for Pedroia’s injured left knee. Pedroia would eventually be forced to have knee replacement surgery after he retired. Would Pedroia have been easily elected to the Hall of Fame if his left knee injury had never happened? The answer is almost surely yes (unless he was sidetracked by some other injury). If he had continued to play uninjured, Pedroia would have ended his career with probably in excess of 70 WAR. With a Rookie-of-the-Year Award and also an MVP [2008] plus being the gritty heart and soul of two World Series winning teams [maybe more as he missed playing for the Red Sox 2018 Championship squad), Pedroia would have been a total lock for election to the BHOF. Because of the what might have been, Dustin Pedroia, unlike Ian Kinsler, will probably linger on the BHOF ballot for years to come.* The traditionalists have always seen Pedroia as a Hall of Famer & his statistics just got over the border line. [Top 5 WAR: 8.0, 7.0, 6.1, 5.6 and 5.4= 32.1; ; Top 5 oWAR: 6.2, 5.6, 4.6, 4.6 and 4.3= 25.3; Career oWAR: 41.4]

Although 2B Ian Kinsler beats Dustin Pedroia slightly in Career WAR [54.1 to 51.9], Pedroia’s top 5 WAR is considerably better [32.1 to 28.7]. Interestingly, Pedroia’s career path was interrupted significantly by injury more than just once. In 2013, Pedroia played the entire season with a ligament injury to his thumb and it robbed him of his power in both 2013 and 2014. Next year in 2015, he only played 93 games due to a right hanstring strain.

5) Felix Hernandez [49.7 WAR], born 1986, career 2005-2019: King Feliz poses an interesting conundrum. As starting pitchers have gradually thrown every pitch harder and harder, the total number of innings that starting pitchers could throw each year has come down and down. Surely, this reduction in annual innings thrown by starters cannot go on and on forever (unless the rosters are increased). Perhaps that limit is now being approached? For the forseeable future, the top starters will probably be making 30-32 starts per season and hurling 180 to 200 innings pitched [IP].* If King Felix Hernandez had played his full career under this type of pitching regime, would he have lasted longer? The answer is almost surely yes. While IP totals fell off the table, Hernandez was somewhat brutally used by the Seattle Mariners. He pitched 191 innings at the age of 20 in 2006. From 2006 to 2015, Hernandez started 30+ games every year. He pitched over 230 IP from 2009 to 2012 and also in 2014. At the age of 30 in 2016, his arm simply wore out. Of course, compared to just slightly earlier in the Baseball timeline, this doesn’t look like much. In the 1960s, pitchers threw over 300 IP. In the 1990s, they were still throwing 250+ IP. But, in context, 230 IP in the 2010s was like 275 to 300 in the 1990s or 300 to 350 in the 1960s. So what would have happened if the Mariners had started King Felix in the bullpen at first and then kept his IP down from 2006 to 2015? The smart money would be on Hernandez still pitching (and pitching well) today. In real life, his arm did not come back from all this wear and tear. Hernandez retired after sitting out the 2020 Covid season. If he had been able to come back and hurl some average seasons after Covid, the bulk IP would have eventually helped his BHOF case. Doomed by all this overuse, Felix Hernandez is now doomed to linger on the BHOF ballot. [Top 5 WAR: 7.2, 6.4, 5.9, 5.3, 5.1= 29.9]

*Of course, some teams have talked about going on (or even briefly tried) a six man pitching rotation. Now it looks like the Los Angeles Dodgers may actually try to stay on one for the entire 2025 season. If this strategy takes hold, the maximum IP by starting pitchers even may fall to 135 to 162 IP in 25 to 27 starts. It goes without saying the Felix Hernandez would have pitched even better under that usage pattern.

6) Curtis Granderson [47.2 WAR], born 1981, career 2004-2019: In retrospect, Curtis Granderson had one hell of a career, even if it was quite a Doctor Jekyll and Mister Hyde affair. The highlights are fascinating. In his first full season of 2006, Granderson lead the American League in strikeouts [174]. A lot of Swing and miss would always be a part of his game [1,916 career SOs]. In 2007, he exploded on the game, looking like Rickey Henderson with less walks, not as much speed, but maybe even more power. He led the League in triples with 23, stole 26 bases and was caught only once, batted .302, and scored 122 runs. After another year like that in 2008 (only not as good), he began to change into a low average power hitter. By 2011 (41 HRs, 119 RBI, .262 BA) and 2012 (43 HR, 106 RBI, .232 BA), this metamorphis was complete. In 2013, he was injured (fractured right forearm and then broken left pinkie finger, both after being hit by pitches) and played badly. From 2014 to 2019, Granderson played out his career as a low average, power hitting slugger. Modern statistics love Granderson’s game (a left handed, pull hitting center fielder who would take a walk). Old school stats probably get stuck on his low average, hang over the plate in a crouch to pull homers and draw walks, style. Curtis Granderson was much closer to be deserving of a BHOF place than seemed likely at first glance. Hopefully he will be rewarded with a long linger on the ballot. [Top 5 WAR: 7.6, 6.1, 5.1, 4.4 AND 4.4= 27.6; ; Top 5 oWAR: 6.4, 6.2, 4.8, 4.2 and 3.8= 25.4; Career oWAR: 43.6]

7) Troy Tulowitzki 44.5 WAR, born 1984, career 2006-2019: Troy Tulowitski, if fate had been kinder, would have just retired at the end of the 2024 season at the age of 40 to await his eventual induction to the BHOF. He goes on the Conigliaro list: players who had a certain Hall of Fame trajectories derailed by injury.* Tulowitzki was basically a star player from his first full season in 2007 until his injury in 2014. And he also played in the mile-high thin-air of Colorado for the Rockies. This made his statistics look way better than they actually were. However, in 2014, he hurt his hip so badly that it derailed his career. Sadly, Tulowitzki was in the middle of his greatest campaign at the time of the injury. [Top 5 WAR: 6.8, 6.7, 6.5, 6.2, and 5.7= 31.9, but Tulo was on his way to about a 9.0 to 10.0 bWAR total when injuries overwhelmed him in 2014; Top 5 oWAR: 5.2, 4.8, 4.8, 4.7 and 4.7= 24.2; Career oWAR: 34.2]

*Tony Conigliaro had his career destroyed by an errant fastball to his left eye in 1969. After his age 29 season, Derek Jeter had accumulated 40.6 WAR in 1212 games. After his age 29 season, Troy Tulowitzki had accumulated an impressive total of 37.7 WAR in 961 games. Per game, Tulowitzki was actually better player than Jeter at that point. But staying healthy and posting is a skill too.

8) Ben Zobrist [44.5 WAR], born 1981, career 2006-2019: Ben Zobrist is the type of player that WAR loves. He walked a lot, hit for decent power, had some speed, played good defense, etc. Basically, Zobrist had across the board skills but no one talent that really stood out. He wasn’t a batting champion, didn’t walk 100+ times a year, never scored or batted in 100 or more runs a year, wasn’t a flashy defensive player, and never hit 40 bombs in a season. But, at his peak in 2009 and 2011, Zobrist was a WAR superstar. Old school stats were not as impressed. But what will really keep Zobrist out of the BHOF is simply the fact that he didn’t play his first full season in the Majors until he was 28-years-old. It isn’t really discussed much but the determining factor in many BHOF borderline cases is simply whether the player entered pro ball out of High School or College. If he had signed out of high school, Zobrist may have been a regular in the Major Leagues three or four (or even five) years before he did. Assuming he played to his talent level in those years, his career WAR would have probably been in the 60s (or higher). His case for the Hall of Fame would be much stronger.* In fact, he would have a whole chorus of WAR loving writers backing his candidacy. But Ben Zobrist entered pro ball after graduating from College and now his candidacy is on life support. [Top 5 WAR: 8.6, 7.6, 5.8, 5.2 and 4.6= 31.8; Top 5 oWAR: 6.1, 5.7, 5.4, 4.3 and 4.0= 25.5; Career oWAR: 39.2]

*Oddly enough, Ben Zobrist may have lost some WAR in the twilight of his career too. In 2019, after a good year in 2018, the 38-year-old Zobrist had his career pretty much stopped cold by his divorce (allegedly his wife had an affair with his pastor – who was also accused of misappropriating some funds from Zobrist’s charity). Of course, Zobrist was 38 at that point so the end of his career was around the corner but he may have been able to tack on two or maybe even three more years of some production.

9) Russell Martin [38.9 WAR], born 1983, career 2006-2019: There are two competing versions of WAR. The most common version is the Baseball Reference website brand (bWAR). The much less common version is the Fangraphs website variety (i.e. fWAR). As far as career bWAR goes, the Baseball Reference version lists Russell Martin with all of 38.9 career WAR. This would be right in line with Martin’s reputation when he was an active player. A quality catcher, perhaps a minor star, but certianly not headed to the Hall of Fame (although, if anything, his 38.9 WAR is surprisingly good and on the cusp of BHOF consideration). On the other hand, the Fangraphs version of fWAR lists Russ Martin with 54.5 WAR! This total would actually qualify Russell Martin for serious BHOF consideration (especially since he is a catcher). It is certainly not far over the minimum, but it is solidly over the 50 WAR line. In most cases, there is not such a large discrepancy between bWAR and fWAR. So why is there such a large divergance here? Fangraphs seems to be giving Russell Martin enormous credit for framing pitchs (the ability to fool an umpire into calling balls as strikes). Of course, the Lords of Baseball are going to legislate this ability away with the institution of Robot umpires and/or strike and ball challenges. However, like most changes in Baseball, it is going to hapen at a glacier like pace. Much like Ross Barnes,* Russell Martin should not be getting into the Hall of Fame for an ability that 1) never should have been allowed in the rule book or on the field & 2) will soon be legislatated away. [Top 5 bWAR: 5.7, 5.6, 4.1, 3.9 and 3.2= 22.5 (Top 5 WAR by Fangraphs: 7.3, 6.1, 5.5, 5.4 and 5.0= 29.3); ; Top 5 oWAR: 4.3, 3.9, 3.8, 3.2 and 2.5= 17.7; Career oWAR: 33.1]

*Ross Barnes (played 1871-1882) was the best batter for the first six years (1871 to 1876) of professional baseball due to his ability to chop “fair fouls” (which initially landed fair and then spun foul). One tweak of the rules – a ball needed to stay fair until it passed either the first or third base bags or it was foul when it went foul – and Barnes’ skill disappeaed.

10) Hanley Ramirez [38.0 WAR], born 1983, career 2005-2019: Ramirez certainly had Hall of Fame talent and potential. But his path to the BHOF was derailed by some combination of the psychological (immaturity and a lack of commitment) and the physical (a relentless cascade of injuries). Basically his career peaked from the ages of 23 to 25 (2007-2009). If he had maintained that peak until he was about 33 or so, Ramirez would have a serious BHOF case. But he spent the rest of his career alternating between the injured list and letting himself get out of shape…except for one brief shining sunburst of talent. In 2013, the 29-year-old Ramirez was injured for the first half of the season. Returning for the second half, Ramirez went supernova and led the Los Angeles Dodgers, his club at that point, into the playoffs. If you double his 2013 Statistics, you get to see what a committed, uninjured Hanley Ramirez may have looked like: 608 AB, 124 R, 210 H, 50 2B, 4 3B, 40 HR, 114 RBI, .345 BA, .638 SA, 20 SB and also 10.4 WAR! After that performance, Ramirez roared into the playoffs with 8 hits in 16 at bats (4 2B, 1 3B, 1 HR) for a .500 BA/1.063 SA but had his ribs fractured in 1st inning of the Championship Series, eventually removing him from the Series and ensuring that the Dodgers lost to St. Louis (who eventually lost the World Series to Boston). At the very least, there are probably more than twice as many players outside the Hall of Fame who had the talent but not the luck or mental fortitude to make it into the BHOF. Hanley Ramirez is definitely one of those guys. It is unlikely that Ramirez will see the 2026 ballot. [Top 5 WAR: 7.3, 6.7, 5.2, 4.9 and 4.4= 28.5; ; Top 5 oWAR: 7.2, 7.1, 7.1, 5.2 and 5.1= 31.7; Career oWAR: 49.6]

11) Adam Jones [32.6 WAR], born 1985, career 2006-2019: A good outfielder and minor star for a couple of seasons, the appearance of Adam Jones on the BHOF ballot is like a merit badge for good attendance at the Academy Awards. If the basic qualifiaction for the Baseball Hall of Fame is 50 WAR, a player would need to average 5.0 WAR each season for 10 straight years just to make this minimum. In Adam Jones’ very best two seasons, he was only credited with 4.8 WAR [2013 & 2014]. Jones is another old school pick for the BHOF ballot. His great weakness as a player was his inability to take his fair share of walks. In 2014, one of his peak seasons, Jones walked just 19 times but struck out 133 times. The odds that Adam Jones receives 5 percent of the vote in 2025 so that his candidacy can live to be voted on again next year are slim and none….and slim has moved out of state. [Top 5 WAR: 4.8, 4.8, 4.1, 3.5 and 3.1= 20.3; Top 5 oWAR: 5.7, 4.7, 4.4, 3.8 and 3.5= 22.1; Career oWAR: 37.3]

12) Brian McCann [32.0 WAR], born 1984, career 2005-2019: Brian McCann is basically just Russell ‘The Pitch Framer‘ Martin 2.0 on the 2025 BHOF ballot. Like Martin (actually to an even greater extent), the website Fangraphs is giving McCann enormous credit for his ability to frame picthes (Fangraphs lists McCann with 52.1 WAR). Interestingly, according to Baseball Reference, Brian McCann was a better hitter than Martin over his career but a worse defensive catcher. According to Fangraphs, McCann was a better defensive catcher than Martin. Even more interesting is the fact that Fangraphs credits McCann with giant peak (much greater than any Russell Martin peak) from 2008 to 2011. In those four consecutive seasons, McCann was basically Yogi Berra….according to Fangraphs [26.8 WAR]. But, much like Russell Martin, Brain McCann should not be elected to the BHOF for the hard to measure and soon to be irrelevant skill of pitch framing. [Top 5 WAR: 5.5, 4.3, 3.6, 3.2 and 2.8= 19.4 (Top 5 WAR by Fangraphs: 8.3, 6.5, 6.0, 6.0 and 4.3= 31.1); ; Top 5 oWAR: 4.7, 4.4, 3.8, 3.7 and 2.9= 19.5; Career oWAR: 34.2]

13) Carlos Gonzalez [24.4 WAR], born 1985, career 2008-2019: Gonzalez is an old school choice for the BHOF ballot. In 2010, he won the National League batting crown (.336). In 2015, he hit 40 home runs (exactly 40). But Gonzalez spent almost all of his career playing for the Colorado Rockies. During his time in the Majors, he hit 143 HR with a .319 BA and .581 SA at home (mostly in the Rocky Mountains). On the Road, he was not anywhere near as good: 91 HR, with a .250 BA and .418 SA. Because of his short career and insane road/home splite, Gonzaleze is an idiosyncratic choice for the BHOF ballot. Carlos Gonazalez will pretty definitely be a one and done [only one year on the ballot and then off it because he does not get the required 5% of the vote]. [Top 5 WAR: 5.9, 5.1, 4.3, 2.6 and 2.3= 20.2; Top 5 oWAR: 5.8, 3.9, 3.4, 2.9 and 2.6= 18.6; Career oWAR: 22.5]

14) Fernando Rodney [7.4 WAR], born 1977, career 2002-2019: No offense to Fernando Rodney, who had a very long career as a relief pitcher [327 career saves, two peak years of 48 saves each], but a Committee promptly needs to be formed to investigate and sack the Committee that oddly recommended Fernando Rodney to the BHOF Committee that actually votes for the BHOF. In his 17 years in the Majors, Rodney had an ERA over 4.00 in 10 of them. He only had an ERA under 3.00 in just three different years. Of course, his 2012 season was pretty historic [76 games, 0.60 ERA, 48 saves] in a Roger Maris kind of relief pitcher way. So the year 2025 will almost surely be Fernando Rodney’s one and only year on the BHOF ballot. He may not get a single vote which would be cruel and underserved (unless he bribed someone to put his name on the ballot. Here is to hoping that he doesn’t get shut out and can say that he got a vote for the BHOF. [Top 5 WAR: 3.7, 1.0, 1.0, 0.9 and 0.8= 7.4, doubled 7.4, 2.0, 2.0, 1.8 and 1.6= 14.8; Career WARx2= 14.8*]

*As far as WAR is concerned, the Baseball Hall of Fame voting patterns for relief pitchers make absolutely no sense unless you double their WAR totals. Whether this is right or wrong is debatable. But, although it feels completely wrong, itt represents real world results well.

Wrap-up of the 14 Players New to the Ballot

The basic questions for the 14 players appearing on the BHOF ballot for the first time are: A) what will their percentage be; B) will they be elected; C) will they not be elected but receive enough votes [5%] to reappear on the 2026 ballot; or D) will they not be elected and be gone for good unless some odd future Veteran’s Committee takes pity on them? Predictions for the newbies: 1) Elected on the first ballot: Ichiro Suzuki; 2) Elected or almost Elected: CC Sabathia; 3) Retained for the 2026 ballot: Dustin Pedroia, Felix Hernandez, Troy Tulowitzki [for what might have been]; 4) On the edge of retention but probably falling into the oblivion of the Veteran’s Committees: Ian Kinsler [we don’t need no stinking WAR]; 5) One and Done: Russell Martin & Brian McCann [what is Fangraph’s smoking?], the great and unappreciated Curtis Granderson; the very versatile Ben Zobrist, the unfortunately unrealized potential of Hanley Ramirez [I coulda shoulda been a contender], steady Adam Jones, inflated Carlos Gonzalez, and Fernando [how did I get here] Rodney.

IV) Discussions of the 14 Players Who Are Returning to the 2025 BBWAA Ballot [Ranked by their percentage of the 2024 BBWAA vote]

For the Players returning to the BBWAA ballot from the 2024 election, WAR is no longer all that important. Basically the BBWAA has already evaluated & judged these players. The two most important criteron for the returnees is 1) How much support did they get in the previous election; 2) Do they still have momentum [their vote totals are still increasing]; and 3) Have they run out of time [will they have a last minute vote surge].

1) Billy Wagner [73.8% in his 10th and last year] 27.7 WAR: On the very cusp of election and in his last year before falling off the ballot, Billy Wagner is almost 99% sure of being elected in 2025. Whether this is a good or a bad thing depends on your perspective. Even by doubling his WAR, Wagner is barely qualified and he also has the dead weight of his horrific post-season performances. On the other hand, if the BBWAA doesn’t vote him in, it will smack of Lucy pulling the football away from Charlie Brown one more time. On a purely human level, they should let the poor man in rather than just throw him to the tender mercies of the dessicated Veteran’s Committees where he could twist in the winds for years uncounted. As always, it also bears mentioning that Billy Wagner was still one hell of a relief ace when he up and retired after the 2010 season at the age of 39 years young. It would have been interesting to see how long that Wagner could have lasted into his 40s. [Top 5 WAR: 3.8, 3.4, 2.8, 2.7 and 2.5= 15.2, doubled 7.6, 6.8, 5.6, 5.4 and 5.0= 30.4]; Career WARx2= 55.5]

*See comment of Relief Pitcher WAR under Fernando Rodney.

2) Andruw Jones [61.6% in his 8th year] 62.7 WAR: If Andruw Jones stalls in 2025 (his vote total doesn’t increase), his candidacy may be in trouble. It would indicate that his support has peaked. Jones is the poster boy for the WAR measurement’s defensive issues. WAR rates him as an incredibly great center fielder, nothing short of epic. The eyeball test certainly agrees that he was great before he got fat and his knees failed. But was he incredibly better than someone like Paul Blair or Garry Maddox? Or did Jones simply play with lousy right and left fielders and catch a lot of balls to cover over their deficiencies? If Jones had played between Blair and Maddox, it is very likely that his range factor would have been greatly diminished. Would this make him any less valuable as a center fielder? Unlike offense in Baseball (which is mostly individualistic), defense is a team statistic. WAR has a lot of problems coping with that quandary. If he does eventually get in, Jones’ election will be a triumph for the WAR metric over the traditionalists. [Top 5 WAR: 8.2, 7.4, 7.1, 6.7 and 6.5= 35.9; Top 5 oWAR 5.9, 5.1, 4.5, 4.5 and 3.9= 23.9; Career oWAR: 39.8]

3) Carlos Beltran [57.1% in his 3rd year] 70.1 WAR: Carlos Beltran would have already gone into the BHOF if it wasn’t for his participation in the Houston Astros’ 2017 sign stealing scandal. Like almost every other Baseball scandal, there is a lot of blame there that should have splattered the Owner(s) and the Commissioner (or whoever fronts for the Owners). Beltran is qualified & should have been elected to the BHOF already. Can you really blame Carlos for doing all he could do to win when the perception was that everyone was doing it? All that being said, he made good progress in just his second year on the ballot [46.5% to 57.1%]. Now in his third year on the ballot, the 2025 election will probably put him on the cusp if not all the way in. It will be interesting to see if Beltran leap frogs a stalled Andruw Jones. The election of Carlos Beltran to the BHOF is inevitable. [Top 5 WAR: 8.2, 7.0, 6.8, 6.5 and 5.8= 34.3; Top 5 oWAR: 7.0, 6.2, 5.9, 5.9 and 5.3= 30.3; Career oWAR: 66.6]

4) Alex Rodriguez [34.8% in his 4th year] 117.6 WAR: By WAR, Alex Rodriguez is an all-time great, inner circle Hall of Famer, and totally overly qualified for the BHOF. His steroid usuage and behavior covering it up will keep him out. No reason to shed any tears over this. Rodriguez, like Pete Rose and Joe Jackson for the sin of gambling, can best serve the beautiful game of Baseball by being a warning about the consequences of cheating the game in this manner. His candidacy is stalled out and will time out in six years. It can remain swinging on the gallow’s pole as an example until the very end. [Top 5 WAR: 10.4, 9.4, 9.4, 9.4, 8.8= 47.4 with a next five of 8.5, 8.4, 8.3, 7.6 and 6.8= 39.6…ridiculous; Top 5 oWAR: 9.5, 9.4, 9.2, 8.9, 8.7= 45.7; Career oWAR: 115.3]

5) Manny Ramirez [32.5% in his 9th year] 69.3 WAR: The candidacy of Manny Ramirez is also doomed by the taint of steroids. But it is very interesting to contrast his case with that of Alex Rodriguez. When Rodriguez was accused, he lied and slandered others about it. He even threw one of his own family members under the bus. He never accepted any responsibility unless it was shoved down his throat. On the other hand, Ramirez simply stated that he had done it and he was sorry. Like Alex Rodgriguez, Manny Ramirez is totally over-qualified for the BHOF but his candidacy is stalled and will eventually time out. But he should, if there was justice in the world, be receiving more support than A-Rod. [Top 5 WAR: 7.3, 6.0, 6.0, 5.4, 5.3= 30.0; oWAR: 7.1, 6.4, 6.4, 6.3 and 6.0= 32.2; Career oWAR: 81.8]

6) Chase Utley [28.8% in his 2nd year] 64.5 WAR: If Chase Utley makes good progress in his second year on the ballot, his eventual election is probably assured. Utley had a pretty ferocious peak from 2005 to 2009 (his age 26 to 30 seasons) and then struggled in the rest of his 30s with injuries, many of them from playing all out. Utley is another player who would have almost surely been elected easier if he had began his career after High Scool rather than college. The beginning of his peak at age 26 was also his first full year in the Majors. The smart money says Utley is going to take a rocket ride up and be elected within the next two or three years. [Top 5 WAR: 9.0, 8.2, 7.8, 7.3 and 7.3= 39.6; Top 5 oWAR: 7.0, 6.1, 6.0, 5.5 and 4.9= 29.5; Career oWAR: 51.3]

7) Omar Vizquel [17.7% in his 8th year] 45.6 WAR: Another scandal stalled & doomed candidacy, Omar Vizquel changes things up by not being guilty of steroids. Instead, he was accused in December 2020 of domestic abuse (by his second wife in the middle of their divorce) and then, in 2021, of sexual harassment during 2019 of an autistic bat boy (who worked for the Chicago White Sox minor league team that Vizquel was managing). These back-to-back scandals, and possibly the fact that WAR does not love him, destroyed Vizquel’s candidacy for the BHOF. His voting percentages, after looking very good, have collapsed: 1st year-37.0 [2018], 2nd-42.8 [2019], 3rd-52.6 [2020], 4th-49.1 [2021], 5th-23.9 [2022], 6th-19.5 [2023], and 7th-17.7 [2024]. If these two scandals had happened 5 or so years later, Vizquel would have already been elected. And that would have been that, there is no removal from the Baseball Hall of Fame. Now, he will remain stalled until he times out. [Top 5 WAR: 6.0, 4.0, 3.5, 3.5 AND 3.4= 20.4; Top 5 oWAR: 4.8, 3.7, 3.4, 3.3 and 3.1= 18.3; Career oWAR: 32.9]

8) Jimmy Rollins [14.8% in his 4th year] 47.6 WAR: More loved by traditional statistics than WAR, Jimmy Rollins has stayed on the ballot but made very little progress. Currently on course to eventually time out at ten years, it will be interesting to see if the eventual election of his double play partner, Chase Utley, does anything to boost his chances. Ofc ourse, if someone is putting double play combinations in the BHOF, that line should definitely start with getting Lou Whitaker in to pair with Alan Trammell [Top5 WAR 6.1, 5.5, 4.9, 4.7 and 4.6= 25.8; Top 5 oWAR: 5.7, 3.8, 3.7, 3.6 and 3.5= 20.3; Career oWAR: 43.7]

9) Bobby Abreu [14.8% in his 6th year] 60.2 WAR: There used to be a singer named Bobby Bland. For some reason, it is hard not to think of Bland when thinking about Bobby Abreu. With across-the-board skills (hit for average and power, take walks, steal bases, and not kill a team on defense), Bobby Abreu was a great player. But he played without flash and no one seems to have really thought of him as a Hall of Famer when he was active. For this sin, he is stuck in a type of BBWAA purgatory, good enough to get enough votes to stay on the ballot but not good enough to get any traction going towards his eventual election to the BHOF. His stats may lend themselves better to his election many years from now after reputation fades and the statistics are all that is left. [Top 5 WAR: 6.6, 6.4, 6.2, 6.1 and 5.8= 31.1; Top 5 oWAR: 6.5, 5.7, 5.7, 5.2 and 4.8= 27.9; Career oWAR: 61.6]

10) Andy Pettitte [13.5% in his 7th year] 60.2 WAR: It is unknown how much Andy Pettitte’s BHOF case is hurt by his admission in the Mitchell Report (about steroids in Baseball) that he took Human Growth Hormone [HGH]. But it must be substantial. Pettitte was pretty famous as part of the 1990s Yankee dynasty, he has excellent post-season statistics, and he is actually qualified to go into the BHOF. And yet, despite all this, Pettitte has had only lukewarm support so far. Pettitte has been evidently tarred by the Steroid scandal despite being tangential to it. This is just part of the weirdness of Baseball morality. It is like having the same exact punishment for any and all crimes [death] whether the crime is an unpaid ticket or manslaughter. If Pettitte can ever get past this, his 256-153 won/loss record (with another 19-11 in the post season) will be his ticket. As the years roll on, those 256 wins are going to look more and more formidable. [Top 5 WAR: 8.4, 6.8, 5.6, 3.8 and 3.6= 28.2]*

*Pettitte’s WAR is actally weird. He won 21 games twice. He had other years in which he won 19, 18, 17, 16, 15 twice and also 14 games four times. Unless he was injured, he just pumping out these number two starter seasons. In 13 different years, his WAR was between 2.1 and 3.8. But then he also had three monster WAR years, a 5.6 [21-8], a 6.8 [17-9], and a 8.4 [18-7]! So why did he have 3 seasons much much better than all the rest? Or is the WAR whacky?

11) Mark Buehrle [8.3% in his 5th year] 59.1 WAR: The pitching equivalent of Bobby “Bland” Abreu, Mark Buehrle was the essence of unflashy. A chunky unathletic-looking pitcher, Buehrle ground out one good year after another (his name, usually pronounced “Burly” was perfect). During his career, no one thought of him as a BHOF pitcher. You have to wonder just how many seasons of this type of good performance it would take to get him into the BHOF concervastion. Unfortunately, Buehrle retired at the age of 36 after the 2015 season in which he went 15-8. There were clear signs of decline though. Buehrle pitched only 198 innings in 2015 after pitching 200+ every season from 2001-2014. So far, his WAR score has kept him from falling off the ballot. But that is all it will do, no more. [Top 5 WAR: 6.1, 6.0, 5.3, 5.0 and 4.8= 27.2]

12) Francisco Rodriguez [7.8% in his 3rd year] 24.2 WAR: Francisco Rodriguez is the Roger Maris of saves, though no one has broken Rodriguez’s single season save record of 62 in 2008 yet. Of course, Maris was never elected to the BHOF. The election of Billy Wagner to the BHOF may help Rodriguez. By the BHOF rule of closers (double their WAR), Rodriguez is a borderline BHOF candidate. But he wasn’t as good as Wagner. If the line is drawn right after Billy Wagner, Rodriguez is out of luck. [Top 5 WAR: 3.7, 3.3, 2.5, 2.3 and 2.2= 14.0, doubled 7.4, 6.6, 5.0, 4.6, 4.4= 28.0; Career WARx2= 48.4]

13) Torii Hunter [7.3% in his 5th year] 50.7 WAR: A good outfielder and minor star for many years, Torii Hunter was a very consistent player. Showing what dedication and application can accomplish, Hunter continuously got better during his career. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of his career was the fact that he had his best year at the age of 36 (by WAR). His 2nd best year was at the age of 33. Hunter obviously kept himself in shape and defied the normal aging curve. As for the BHOF, Torii Hunter is right on the borderline by career WAR and doesn’t have a great peak as his alternative argument. But he has always had a reputation as a good guy. He will need every bit of it to get elected to the BHOF. [Top 5 WAR: 5.4, 5.3, 4.7, 4.2 and 3.9= 23.5; Top 5 oWAR: 4.2, 4.2, 4.1, 4.1 and 4.0= 20.6; Career oWAR: 47.4]

14) David Wright [6.2% in his 2nd year] 49.2 WAR: Met Third Baseman David Wright is another ‘What Might Have Been” candidate (like this year’s first ballott wannabe Troy Tulowitzki). Like so many other players, he was on a BHOF trajectory when a cascade of injuries knocked him off course. Wright suffered a concussion in 2009, followed by a lower back injury in 2011, and then had the rest of his career called off by spinal stenosis in 2015. Without all these injuries, there is very doubt that Wright would have been elected eventually. Even as it is, Wright made it right up to the BHOF borders [Top 5 WAR: 8.3, 7.1, 6.9, 5.2 and 4.8= 32.3; Top 5 oWAR: 7.2, 6.4, 6.0, 5.4 and 5.2= 30.2; Career oWAR: 51.9]

V) Discussions about the 8 Players Being Considered by the 2025 Classic Committee [Ranked by WAR]

The Classic Committee is one of three versions of the Veteran’s Committee currently being used. This Committee considers players overlooked by the BHOF who were active before 1980. The other two Committees consider (1.) players supposedly overlooked by the BHOF who were active after 1980 and (2.) umpires, managers, executives, and the guy who invented hot dogs. Of course, this Classic Committee is once again going over soil that has been well tilled and already harvested. Except for the 2 Negro League stars, the players being considered by this Classic Committee has been given chance after chance after chance to be elected to the BHOF. Each time, they have been found wanting (and even the 2 Negro League stars have been judged, found wanting, and not elected previously). Despite this, there are several players being considered who definitely deserve election to the BHOF. Of course, the Veteran’s Committees has the same reputation as a blind man playing darts. If they elect the right players, it will probably just be luck.

1) Luis Tiant [66.1 WAR], Playing Career 1964-1982: Luis Tiant, by the WAR metric, should already be a Hall of Famer. During his actual career, El Tiante did all the things that should have traditionally cemented his reputation as a Hall of Fame pitcher. He won 20 games multiple times and racked up two ERA titles. He starred in the World Series. He had style and panache with his Fu Manchu mustache, corkscrew wind-up, and cool nickname. He had a fascinating back story, being the son of a great Cuban pitcher (Luis Tiant Sr.) who had starred in the Negro Leagues. With modern metrics and traditional statistics supporting his candidacy, why isn’t Tiant already in the Baseball Hall of Fame? One of El Tiante’s problems is simply timing. In 1988, his 1st year on the BHOF ballot, he received 30.9% of the vote. Usually any player starting out with a percentage that high is certain to be eventually elected. Instead, in 1989, Tiant’s percentage of the BHOF ballots collapsed down to 10.5% of the votes. In Tiant’s entire fifteen years on the Ballot [1988-2002], he would never approach his initial 30.9% of the vote again. In those 15 years, the 2nd highest percentage that Luis Tiant ever received was 18.0% in his final year. From 1989 on, Tiant was simply buried under an avalanche of more deserving candidates, both players and epecially pitchers starting in 1989 with Gaylord Perry [314-265], Ferguson Jenkins [284-226], and Jim Kaat [283-237].* In 1989, Luis Tiant’s candidacy for the BHOF permanently stalled because of this bad timing and it has never recovered.

* Of course, whether Jim Kaat was better than Luis Tiant is debatable. But these 3 pitchers were followed up on the BHOF ballot by: Jim Palmer [268-152] in 1990; the also debatable Rollie Fingers [341 saves] in 1991; Terrific Tom Seaver [311-205] in 1992; Phil Niekro [318-274] in 1993; Steve Carlton [329-244] and Don Sutton [324-256] and Bruce Sutter [300 saves] in 1994; Tommy John [288-231] in 1995; Bert Blyleven [287-250] in 1998; Nolan Ryan [324-292] in 1999; Rich Gossage [310 saves] and Jack Morris [254-186] in 2000. This avalanche of future Hall of Famers buried Luis Tiant’s candidacy.

What happened to Jim Bunning shows exactly how bad Tiant’s timing was. In 1988, which was Tiant’s first year on the ballot, Bunning was in his 12th year on the ballot. That year Jim Bunning crested at 74.2% of the vote (his first year had been 1977 when he recieved 38.1% of the vote). It looked like his election was inevitable in 1989. Instead his candidacy was buried under the same avalanche of new candidates that wiped out Luis Tiant’s chances. In 1989, his 13th year, Bunning fell from 74.2% to 63.3%. In 1990, he fell all the way down to 57.9%. In 1991, his 15th and last year on the ballot, Bunning crept back up to 63.7% and then his candidacy expired.* Because he came so close in 1988, there was a groundswell of support for the unlucky pitcher. Jim Bunning was eventually elected to the BHOF in 1996 by the old Veteran’s Committee. Of course, El Tiante never came close to election and had the BHOF tell him: “No Cigar!” And Tiant never had any outpouring of support because he had been shafted. But it is interesting to compare the won/loss record of Jim Bunning [224-184] with that of Luis Tiant [229-172]. Bunning is by that record and the WAR metric, directly inferior to Tiant. When your candidacy is on the margins of the BHOF, it often simply comes down to luck. [Top 5 WAR: 8.5, 7.7, 6.5, 6.3 and 5.6= 34.6]

*BBWAA BHOF Candidates stayed on the ballot for 15 years at that time but it is currently 10 years.

2) Ken Boyer [62.8 WAR], Playing Career 1955-1969: Ken Boyer, like several players on the current BBWA ballot (Bobby Abreu, Andy Pettitte, and Mark Buehrle) and somewhat like someone on this ballot (Tommy John), is cursed with a case of Bland Compiler Disease [BCD]. The symptoms of BCD are: 1) being an underrated very good to great player; 2) compiling enough WAR so that your statistics qualify for the BHOF but not overwhelmingly so; and 3) not having any type of organized supporters pushing for your election to the BHOF. One interesting thing to keep in mind about Boyer is that he lost two seasons to Military Service before he ever debuted in the Majors. If he had not served, Boyer would have started his Major League career one or two years earlier and his basic statistics would be better. Punishing a man for this seems unjust. But possibly the worst thing that happened for Boyer as far as the BHOF goes (not to mention himself) was that he died early. In 1982, Ken Boyer passed away from lung cancer. Because of his early death, Boyer has been largely forgotten unlike those players who continue in the game as managers, coachs, or broadcasters. This is a shame because Boyer definitely deserves to be elected. [Top 5 WAR: 8.0, 7.4, 6.8, 6.5 and 6.1= 34.8; Top 5 oWAR: 6.7, 6.7, 6.2, 5.5 and 5.3= 30.4; Career oWAR: 55.9]

3) Tommy John [61.6 WAR], Playing Career 1963-1989: Unlike Luis Tiant*, it is not that hard to understand why Tommy John has never been elected to the BHOF. John was a compiler of statstics extraordinaire without a great peak. However, the sheer volume of Tommy John’s career is outstanding. Because his famous elbow surgery bears his name, you could argue that Tommy John is as well-known as virtually any living baseball player (it is certainly better being known for Tommy John surgery than Lou Gehrig disease). In any case, if someone needed to place a bet to save their life on who would be elected to the BHOF by the Classic Committee in 2025, John would be your man. The election of Jim Kaat in 2022 paved the way for Tommy John to be elected. It is undeniable that John had a better career record than Kaat [John went 288 and 231 to Kaat’s 283 and 237]. Not only that, the Classic Committee will be under pressure to elect someone living. That leaves just three possibilities. Tommy John is by far the easier choice over the WAR under-qualified and scandal-plagued two other options, Steve Garvey and Dave Parker. [Top 5 WAR: 5.6, 5.5, 5.5, 5.1 and 4.4= 26.1]

*Tommy John won 288 games and lost 231 during his career. Luis Tiant went 229 and 172. In other words, John won exactly 59 more games than Tiant and also lost exactly 59 more games than Tiant.

4) Dick Allen [58.7 WAR], Playing Career 1963-1977: Virtually all professional athletes are very competitive people.* The very best athletes are usually able to structure their lives so that they can pour all their competitiveness into their chosen profession. Dick Allen is an example of a man who had to waste far too much of his competitve fire on struggles unrelated to sports. Reading through biographies of Allen, one gets the impression of a man at war, or at least struggling fiercely, with the daily injustices that society and his employers inflicted upon him. Nothing represents this better than the ridiculous amount of energy and time that Dick Allen had to spend telling people not to call him “Richie” because his name was “Dick” (also one of the great Baseball metaphors, though how one interprets it can vary). In some alternate universe, Dick Allen was able to concentrate all his talent on Baseball and is a legendary slugger, maybe even on par with Ruth, Williams, and Bonds. It is interesting to compare Allen with Albert Belle, a troubled man and incredible slugger from the 1990s (though Belle’s troubles were more psychological than societal). Belle would almost certainly be in the BHOF if his career hadn’t been prematurely ended by a hip injury, and he still gets some support anyways. Comparing their careers very broadly, Dick Allen played 1749 games, accumulated 58.7 WAR, and had an OPS+ of 156 while Belle played 1539 games, accumulated 40.1 WAR, and had an OPS+ of 144. At his peak in the 1990s, Belle was the only man in Baseball History to have a season with 50 doubles and 50 home runs in a season. Dick Allen was basically 17% better than that. It would have been fascinating to see what type of statistics Allen could have put in the 1990s rather than the run hungry and pitching dominated 1960s. [Top 5 WAR: 8.8, 8.6, 7.5, 6.4, 5.4= 36.7; oWAR 8.9, 8.8, 8.3, 7.2 and 6.9= 40.1; Career oWAR: 70.2]

*Allen, who has received 11 votes (exactly one short of the 12 necessary for election) in both of the last two Veterans Committee elections in which he was elligible, will surely be elected in 2025. He will be getting a Jim Bunning Hall Pass to the BHOF. Unfortunately, he is no longer with us to enjoy it or to give a speech that might make someone uncomfortable (which might be the point).

5) Dave Parker [40.1 WAR], Playing Career 1973-1991: At the beginning of his career, Dave Parker was certainly on a path to the Hall of Fame. The Pirates were a very good team, Parker grew into their best player, and they won the World Series in 1979. Dave Parker won the NL MVP in 1978 after finishing 3rd in both 1975 and 1978. He won back to back Batting Championships in 1977 and 1978. By the end of the 1979 season, he had accumulated an impressive 32.5 WAR and was probably going to end up with in excess of 70 or even 80 WAR if he aged well. If you were listing active Major Leaguers who would be going to the BHOF in the future at that point, Dave Parker would have been at the top of the list. But that was pretty much the end. He lost the next 5 years of his career to a cocaine addiction, his recovery from that addiction, and the ensuing legal problems [1980-1984]. In 1985 and 1986, Dave Parker had two rebound seasons [34 HR with 125 RBI plus a .312 BA in 1985 & 31 HR with 116 RBI plus a .273 BA in 1986]. But that was basically it. From 1980 to the end of his career, Parker earned only 7.6 WAR in 12 years. Parker got old and fat, wrecked his knees, and was just the ghost of his former great self. Moreawesome self. More importantly than this, many Hall of Fame voters have an indiscriminate moral streak. Between the voters who will not vote for Parker due to his low WAR total and those who will not vote for him on moral grounds, he has no chance of being elected in 2025 or any other year. [Top 5 WAR: 7.4, 7.0, 6.7, 6.3 AND 4.7= 32.1; Top 5 oWAR: 6.9, 6.4, 4.7, 4.6 and 4.1= 26.7; Career oWAR: 41.7]

6) Steve Garvey [38.0 WAR], Playing Career 1969-1987: Steve Garvey and Dave Parker should belong in their own little group. The members of this group would be players who were: 1) once thought to be inevitable BHOF inductees while they were active; 2) had their careers tarnished by scandal,* and 3) have had all their career accomplishments down-sized by the WAR statistic [Garvey’s sin according to WAR was not drawing enough bases on balls]. Like Parker, Steve Garvey has almost no chance of getting inducted but is still being pushed for the BHOF by traditionalist supporters who just don’t believe in the WAR metric. By traditional statistics, Steve Garvey has a much better case: 6 seasons of 200 or more hits in seven years (weirdly enough, 3 seasons with exactly 200 hits), 2599 career hits, 7 seasons of 162 (or more) games played (and another of 161), 5 years of 100+ runs batted in, and fantastic post season numbers (55G, 11 HR, .338 BA, .550 SA), plus the 1974 NL MVP (and runner up in 1978). This certainly seems to add up to a lot more than just 38.0 Career WAR. This conflict, between those who believe in the modern statistics and the traditionalists who do not (not to mention the immoral minority who think Baseball players should lead the celibate & sinless lives of saints) will keep Steve Garvey out of the BHOF for life (and beyond). [Top 5 WAR: 5.1, 4.7. 4.7, 4.4 and 3.8= 22.7; oWAR: 4.5, 4.4, 4.3, 4.3 and 3.3= 20.8; Career oWAR: 36.8]

*In 1988 and 1989, after a brutal divorce from his first wife, Steve Garvey impregnated one woman, then impregnated another woman and also got engaged to her, and then broke off that engagement to get engaged to yet another woman. In his defense, Garvey is still married to the third and last lady in this sequence.

7) John Donaldson [NA WAR], Playing Career 1908-1941: By reputation, John Donaldson was one of the greatest Negro League pitchers of All-Time (and the greatest left-handed pitcher). But his career was actually spent almost entirely outside the Negro Leagues (or even against the elite of Blackball before the Negro Leagues really began in 1920). Donaldson spent most of his career annihilating white semi-pro teams across the midwest for thirty years. The argument against him is pretty simple: how do you really know how good he was without any hard evidence? The evidence that is currently available doesn’t support Donaldson’s reputation at all. The Negro Leagues database Seamheads currently lists Donaldson’s career won/lost record in the Negro Leagues at 23 wins and 24 losses from 1916 to 1921.* And this was the middle or prime of his career. Was he just average? Fortunately, there is a mountain of other evidence about Donaldson’s career. A man named Peter Gorton from Minnesota runs a website named The John Donaldson Network. This fabulous website has chronicled Donaldson’s actual career, in amazing depth (if only all Negro League stars had such a website). Does this website lend any support to Donaldson’s reputation?

*John Donaldson’s complete career record currently on Seamheads is 23-25 with a record of 23-24 between 1915 and 1921. He is credited with one extra loss in 1932.

The answer is yes, it does. For a small example, an analysis of Donaldson’s Seamheads 23-25 record is quite interesting. Seamheads lists Donaldson’s ERA+ [a measure of the quality of John’s pitching adjusted for ballpark and compared to his opponents] as 123 [or comfortably above average].* This would indicate that he should have had a record of about 29-19 rather than 23-25. So why is it only 23-25? A start by start analysis reveals a fascinating answer. In general, John Donaldson was only starting games against the top Blackball teams and the very best pitchers available (in 1918, he pitched an entire series of games vs. Smokey Joe Williams). Basically, Donaldson, who was probably the most famous African-American pitcher in the country, was being featured in match-ups to draw a crowd. Donaldson was not pitching in a regular rotation. In proper context, his 23-25 record on Seamheads is actually pretty impressive (even more impressive than 29-19 in reality). Of course, this still doen’t mean that his performance from this brief window can be extrapolated over his entire 30 years career. Perhaps one day there will be enough computer power to really data mine the evidence collected by Peter Gorton. But, at the moment, there aren’t any available computer experts to do this task. So a simpler, much more broad, method must be found to evaluate the career of John Donaldson.

*ERA+ [Adjusted Earned Run Average]: A percentage representing a pitcher’s Earned Run Average (the number of runs given up per 9 innings by a pitcher not caused by fielding errors) accounting for the ballpark and League ERA. A percentage of 100 is average, above 100 above average, below 100 etc.

So what would be the best direct argument that John Donaldson was one of the greatest pitchers of all-time?* In 1951, the African-American newspaper The Pittsburgh Courier assembled a panel of 31 Blackball veterans, experts and executives to rate the best players from the expiring world of the Negro Leagues. These men selected the 5 best Black pitchers from their time as: 1) “Smokey” Joe Williams, 2) Leroy “Satchel” Paige, 3) Charles “Bullet” Rogan, 4) John Donaldson, and 5) William “Bill” Foster. The 7 pitchers selected after this top 5 were: Dave Brown, Richard “Dick” Redding, James “Nip” Winters, William “Dizzy” Dismukes, Don Newcombe, and Andrew “Rube” Foster. There is one caveat to this list. The panel was supposed to limit their selections to players who were active from 1910 on. Rube Foster was at his peak in the decade from 1900-1909. This may have reduced his support (he also picked up many votes as a manager which may have also lessened his vote total). Rube Foster should probably be included with the other pitchers in the top five. Interestingly, in the years after Organized Baseball integrated, players inducted into the BHOF were split roughly 50-50 between Black/Latin and white players (in other words, exactly between the two sides of segregated Baseball). If this fact remained true for before integration, who would the white comps for these Negro League pitchers be? And, if this fact was also true before integration, it would also be an excellent broad argument about John Donaldson’s greatness.

Smokey Joe Williams is easy. While active, he was often compared to Walter Johnson [166.9 career WAR]. Paige is also easy. His career and that of Lefty Grove have quite a lot in common [106.8 WAR].* But Rogan is hard. He was basically a unicorn like current day Shohei Ohtani, both a great pitcher and hitter. The only man remotely like Rogan in the 1920s was Babe Ruth. But Rogan would have surely been at least close to a 100 WAR pitcher if he had spent his entire career in the Majors. Rube Foster is a dead comp for Christy Mathewson [106.7 WAR]. All these men, like Donaldson, pitched for around 20 years. Bill Foster, Brown, and Winters are somewhat different. None of these men lasted twenty years pitching. Their comps would all be pitchers who dominated more briefly like Carl Hubbell (68.5), Charles “Dazzy” Vance [60.3], or Wes Ferrell [60.1]. Dick Redding is odd in his own way. His comps would be pitchers like James “Hippo” Vaughn [46.8], Rube Marquard [32.5], and Jeff Tesreau [24.3] if you combined them all into one pitcher. Dismukes comps with such long time hurlers as Charles “Red” Farber [63.8] or Eppa Rixey [55.9]. Of course, Don Newcombe played in the Major Leagues. While there, he accumulated 38.7 WAR. However, he missed two years (plus really another year to re-establish himself) to Military Service and would have also started his career 2 or 3 (or more) years earlier without discrimination. Newcombe would have probably finished his career with 55-60 WAR without all these detours. So what does all this mean, if it is true?

*Robert “Lefty” Grove pitched for the minor league Baltimore Orioles of the International League from 1920 to 1924. The Orioles refused to sell Grove to the Major Leagues during this time. If this had not happened, Grove would have most likely accumulated 120 to 130 WAR during his career.

The Pittsburgh Courier experts who judged Negro League pitchers placed John Donaldson in the same League as Joe Williams, Satchel Paige, Bullet Rogan, Bill Foster and also his brother Rube. They judged Donaldson to be an even better pitcher than Dave Brown, Dick Redding, Nip Winters, Dizzy Dismukes and Don Newcombe. All these pitchers could be very broadly rated by WAR and their comps with some mathematical analysis. Basically, saying John Donaldson was as good as Williams, Paige, Rogan and either of the Fosters was the equivalent of saying that he would not look out of place in the company of Walter Johnson, Lefty Grove, Christy Mathewson and even Babe Ruth. And Donaldson himself has a comp. There was another pitcher who amassed 100+ WAR during the 1910s and 1920s and continued to pitch in the 1930s. That would be Grover “Pete” Alexander [119.6 WAR]. Of course, John Donaldson and Grover Alexander are hardly perfect comps. Alexander was more of a control pitcher who liked his whiskey while Donaldson was more of a strikeout pitcher who was a fine upstanding citizen off the field.* What does all this mean? Basically, it means that, even if he was 10% (or maybe even 20%) worse than the experts of the Pittsburgh Courier classed him, they judged John Donaldson to be a career 100+ WAR pitcher. This also makes John Donaldson most likely the greatest player on either of the 2025 BHOF ballots with all due respect to Alex Rodriguez and Ichiro Suzuki. The Hall of Fame is incomplete without him. [Projected Career WAR: 115-125]

*Grover Alexander did lead the National League in strikeouts six times and had very good speed when he was young. But John Donaldson had a Koufax like back breaking curve ball as a strikeout pitch to back up his excellent fastball. It is unlikely that Donaldson could match Alexander’s control but who could? Alexander’s control was otherworldly.

8) Vic Harris [NA WAR], career 1924-1945: Vic Harris will most probably be the next Negro Leaguer elected to the BHOF. In the 2022 vote by the Classic Baseball Era Committee, Harris received 10 votes from the 16 ballots cast (in other words, he was two votes shy of being elected). John Donaldson, the other Negro League player on that ballot, received 8 votes. Donaldson, of course, would be elected as a pitcher. But Vic Harris is going to elected to the BHOF as a field manager rather than a player. Some of his supporters suggest that Harris was good enough to be elected as an outfielder too. But this actually doesn’t seem to be true. Vic Harris played in the Negro Major Leagues from 1922 to 1947 [ages 17 to 42]. His primary position was left field. If he had played his entire career in the Major Leagues unblocked, Harris could have been a starting outfielder from 1924 to 1938 [for 14-15 seasons]. Of course, in real life, Harris may have been blocked out of a job early in his career and possibly stuck in Triple-A. Under those conditions, Harris may have reached the Majors any year between perhaps 1924 and 1928. On the other end, Vic Harris would have had a hard time holding onto a starting job in the Major Leagues from 1939 to 1943 (his last full time season in the Negro Leagues). It is more likely that he would have been a part-timer or returned to the Minors. A very cursory analysis of Harris’ career suggests a player who would have amassed 30 to 40 WAR during his time spent in the Majors. This is not a bad total. But, as an outfielder, Harris would have to stand in line behind a bunch of much better qualified contempories such as: Fats Jenkins, Roy Parnell, Rap Dixon, Nat Rogers, Bill Wright, and Neil Robinson (not to mention Latin players like Tetelo Vargas).

So the crux of Vic Harris’ BHOF Candidacy rests on his managerial record. This record is, to put it mildly, damn impressive. According to Seamheads, Vic Harris managed the Homestead Grays of Pittsburgh (and from 1939 on, Washington too) from 1936 to 1942, and then again from 1945 to 1948. The Grays’ record while Harris managed them was reportedly an incedible 639 Wins, 323 Losses, and 28 Ties in 989 Games [for a .664 Winning Percentage]. With the Negro Leagues now being considered Major Leagues, this is the highest winning percentage of any long term manager. It certainly seems like it is past due to elect Vic Harris to the BHOF as a manager. But there is a problem here. In his autobiography, Buck Leonard has some things to say about Vic Harris as a manager, none of them all that good (it is very obvious that Leonard didn’t like Harris much). But the bigger problem is something that is inherent to the Negro Leagues: cold hard cash. In the early years of Major League Baseball, frugality reigned. For instance, John McGraw of the New York Giants is famous for being their field manager. But he was also their part owner, general manager, traveling secretary, and chief scout in the beginning. As more money became available, McGraw was one of the men who eventually developed all these positions into separate jobs (and he also hired coaches galore). For a long time, Cum Posey filled McGraw’s situation for the Homestead Grays. In 1935-1936, Posey began delegating these positions to others. His brother Seward Posey became the traveling secretary and Vic Harris became the field manager. But was this position as we would understand it today? Or was it more like that of a road manager? It is apaprent that Posey stopped being the full-time field manager because he no longer wanted to travel around. How did this play out in real life?

There is a chance that Vic Harris was more like a road manager/traveling secretary than a full-time field manager. It is hard to picture Cum Posey, who was a control freak, not micro-managing the team from above. There are also indications that, if Posey was present, he was managing the team and Harris was taking a back seat. Cum Posey has already been elected to the BHOF in 2006. In other words, the real manager of the Homestead Grays dynasty may already be in the Hall. Before Vic Harris is elected, perhaps it should be determined to some degree of certitude what actually was his role? Was he a passenger on the bus or was he driving it? It is also pretty interesting to note that Vic Harris did not manage the Homestead Grays in 1943 and 1944. Harris got a defense job and played a little for the Grays on weekends and such. Cum Posey hired Candy Jim Taylor to manage the club in 1943 and 1944. Taylor, formerly a star third baseman, had for many years been a John McGraw type baseball executive. If someone wanted to own a baseball team, they hired Candy Jim to be the general manager, chief scout, field manager, coach, and even ticket taker if needed. During the 2nd World War (1942-1945), the Negro Leagues were very profitable. Posey was able to hire someone to really fill all the roles he once filled. Taylor did a good job. The Homestead Grays won two more pennants in 1943 and 1944 & compiled a 144 wins, 55 losses, and 5 ties record. Of course, this is a remarkable .724 winning percentage. In other words, the team did better without Vic Harris aboard. But Cum Posey was dissatisfied with Taylor and brought Vic Harris back in 1945. Why couldn’t Posey get along with Candy Jim, considering the results? The question remains: was Vic Harris a field manager or some sort of assistant manager for Cum Posey? Vic Harris shouldn’t be elected to the BHOF until this question is answered. [Projected Career WAR: 30-40]

*Buck Leonard, Baseball Hall of Fame first baseman for the Homestead Grays from 1934-1950, wrote his biogrpahy (published in 1995) with the help of Negro League historian James Riley. It is an interesting book about a fascinatingly honest man.

VI) Conclusion: The 36 Player Ranked 2025 BHOF Ballot.

The following list ranks the players eligible for election to the Baseball Hall of Fame in 2025 all the way from 1 to 36. Of course, this list will (probably) have very little correlation to who actually gets in the BHOF this year (other than the fact that whoever gets in will definitely be on it somewhere). The Endless Fields of Green blog official actaul 2025 BHOF class prediction is: 1) Ichiro Suzuki, 2) CC Sabathia, 3) Billy Wagner, 4) Dick Allen and 5) Tommy John (with the forlorn hope that John Donaldson gets in too).

The List: Elligible 2025 BHOF Inductees Ranked 1-34 by Merit

A. Players of Inner Circle BHOF Quality

1) John Donaldson

2) Alex Rodriguez [Tainted]

3) Ichiro Suzuki

B. Players of No Dount BHOF Quality

4) Manny Ramirez [Tainted]

5) Dick Allen

6) Luis Tiant

7) Carlos Beltran [Semi-tainted]

C. Players of Upper Tier BHOF Quality

8) Ken Boyer [extra credit for Military Service]

9) CC Sabathia

10) Chase Utley

11) Bobby Abreu

12) Andy Pettitte [Semi-tainted]

13) Tommy John

D. Players of Lower Tier BHOF Quality

14) Mark Buehrle

15) Billy Wagner

16) David Wright

17) Andruw Jones

18) Felix Hernandez

19) Dustin Pedroia

20) Francisco Rodriguez

21) Ian Kinsler

E. Players Right Below BHOF Quality

22) Hanley Ramirez

23) Curtis Granderson

24) Torii Hunter

25) Dave Parker

26) Ben Zobrist

27) Jimmy Rollins

F. Players of Debatable BHOF Quality

28) Troy Tulowitzki

29) Russell Martin [extra credit for Catching]

G. Players Not of BHOF Quality

30) Steve Garvey

31) Omar Vizquel

32) Brian McCann [extra credit for Catching]

33) Vic Harris [no credit for Managing]

34) Adam Jones

35) Carlos Gonzalez

36) Fernando Rodney

Note on the Rankings: These rankings correspond to WAR in the following manner: A) 90 or above; B) 60-89.9 WAR; C) 55-59.9 WAR; D) 50-54.9 WAR; E) 45-49.9 WAR, F) 40-44.9 WAR and G) below 40 WAR. But the WAR values have been slightly reconfigured to emphasize peak, de-emphasive defense, and reward 10% extra for being a catcher. Ken Boyer was also given some extra credit for Military Service, which moved him from slot 10 to 8. Because of this emphasis on these slightly different metrics: 1) Manny Ramirez moved up (minimizing his horrible defense) and Andruw Jones fell down (without all the credit for his supposedly supernatural defense). Perhaps the most interesting result was that Steve Garvey’s position remained unchanged. It seemed like he should rise if defense was minimized. But Garvey did not as WAR gives him good credit for his defense. Perhaps the inbred 1B positional adjustment is off? Or perhaps he really just wasn’t good enough? If only by his reputation, it seems like Garvey should be in the BHOF discussion.

Post #43

2024 Seasonal Wrap-up

November 30, 2024

History repeats itself, but in such cunning disguise that we never detect the resemblance until the damage is done. Sydney J. Harris

Introduction: The 2024 Season in a Nutshell

In the beginning of the Baseball season, teams have to lift off. Of course, with some clubs, there is a complete failure to launch (Houston in 2024). This Lift off phase usually lasts for the first third of the season [games one through 54]. Once the season is really under way, teams reach the proving grounds of the middle of the year. Adjustments are made. The players who started quickly usually fade. The players who struggled sometimes get hot. This Dog Days phase usually lasts through the second third of the season [games 55-108]. After sprinting or slogging through the Dog Days, the very best teams race to the finish. This Stretch Run phase lasts until the season ends [games 109-162]. In one way, the year 2024 was quite unusual. During most seasons, teams surge or collapse. Occasionally, some teams, that are not even expected to contend, pick themselves off the floor and win (1914 Miracle Braves, 1951 New York Giants, and 1967 Impossible Dream Red Sox). In 2024, there was not much movement in the team standings. The Chicago White Sox immediately crumbled so completely that they set the modern record for games lost [121]. However, no one sane went into 2024 expecting the White Sox to be any good. As mentioined, the periennally good Astros failed to ignite. But they got it togther and went on a rocket ride back to the top. The final obituary for their current mini-dynasty will have to wait. There were some surprises around the edges (the Detroit Tigers and Kansas City Royals unexpectedly made the playoffs). But, for the most part, teams just remained steadily on pace during 2024.

The Waxing and Waning of the 2024 Season

Five clubs blasted out of the gate in 2024 looking like they would end the 2024 season as superteams, winning 100 or more games. However, none of these five teams – Baltimore, Cleveland, Los Angeles (NL), New York (AL), & Philadelphia – could maintain their pace. Instead, for the first time in many years,* no Major League club finished the season with 100 or more wins. But all five of these teams still went to the play-offs. On the flip side, six teams began the season with absolutely no chance at all – Colorado, Los Angeles (AL), Miami, Oakland, Washington, and Chicago (AL). All six of these teams ended up in the basement. This left nineteen other teams playing musical chairs for the other seven play-off spots. At the July 30th trade deadline, so many teams were still in the hunt for a playoff spot that it was a seller’s market. At the finish line, there were some mild surprises. After losing 106 games in 2023, the KC Royals had loaded up and made the 2024 play-offs. Detroit jelled, Seattle and Minnesota faded, and the 2023 World Champion Texas Rangers were wrecked by injuries. The Chicago Cubs, Boston Red Sox, and San Francisco Giants saw their dreams of a good luck season dashed. The Arizona Diamondbacks, who muddled through the 2023 season but made it to the World Series anyways, muddled through the 2024 season but did not make the play-offs. The Atlanta Braves were so good that they made the play-offs despite having a season equivalent to an airplane crash. In the end, the best teams got into the play-offs; and the two best teams faced off in the World Series.

*Except for the Covid-stunted season of 2020, the only 21st Century seasons without a 100 (or +) winning team were: 2000, 2006, 2007, 2010, 2012, 2013, & 2014. Recently, the number of 100 (or +) winning teams reached a historical high. In 2019 & 2022, four teams won 100 or more. In 2017, 2018, 2021 & 2023, three teams reached at least 100 wins. Even in 2020, three teams were on a pace that would have resulted in 100 win seasons. In respect to recent years, 2024 has been the anomaly. It will be interessting to see if five teams can do it one year. It is the Age of the Superteam.

The 2024 Major League Baseball Play-Offs

After the 2023 Major League Baseball season ended, Baseball columnists, sportswriters, and internet talking heads (loudmouths) lamented that the current Baseball play-off system kept the very best teams from winning the World Series. The 2023 Series featured two teams that basically muddled through the season and then got hot at the right time. Changing things up, the two best teams (measured by seasonal wins) in each League made it all the way to the World Series in 2024. Not only that, the two teams were the New York Yankees and the Los Angeles Dodgers, the most famous and also most successful MLB franchises. On top of all that, the NY Yankees employ Aaron Judge and Shohei Ohtani works for the LA Dodgers. Judge and Ohtani are, far and away, the most recognizable and marketable superstars in the current game. Not to even mention that Los Angeles and New York are the largest media markets in the country. It was almost enough to make one believe that karma or destiny was giving the finger to all those complaints about the 2023 Series. Of course, fate is known to throw curveballs. Judge slumped during the Series. He seemed to be breaking out in the fifth game but that was the final game of the Series. That game ended in a Yankee loss after an error by Judge himself opened the floodgates. Ohtani looked ready to dominate the World Series but injured his shoulder badly in Game Two. And the World Series did not go the full seven games, denying the drama of one last game for all the marbles. It was still a fantastic World Series and awesome year for Baseball. You can’t have everything.

Shohei Ohtani and Aaron Judge Redux

Baseball is easily the most mathematical of all sports. It lends itself to measurement. Of course, most of this analysis goes into comparing one player to another, sometimes one team to another, and occasionally one League to another. But the long 162-game Baseball season has it’s own numerical pleasures. It divides evenly into 27, 54, and 81 game segments (and comes close at 16, 32 and 40 game pieces). In 1979, Dave Kingman of the Chicago Cubs had 29 Home runs when Chicago played it’s 81st game of the year (he had played 78 of those 81 games). Kong was on pace to hit 58 homers, maybe even challenge Roger Maris’ record of 61 if he got hot. Alas, it didn’t happen. King Kong Kingman hit a respectable 19 bombs in the 2nd half of the 1979 season, finishing with a league leading 48. Every Baseball season is filled with a lot of these mathematical figments of imagination. Sometimes they even come true. In 2024, Aaron Judge and Shohei Ohtani both had dream seasons. Judge did not break his American League home run record of 62. But he came close with 58. Ohtani had a season for the ages, becoming the first man to hit both 50 homers and steal 50 bases in the same year. He also set the Dodger franchise record with 54 home runs, breaking the previous record of 49 (Shawn Green). All season long, Ohtani and Judge made the 2024 season a mathematical delight, keeping on top of their paces for possibly historical seasons.

The Future of Baseball?

At the beginning of the 20th Century, the New York Yankees were sometimes a contender but hardly the most successful team in the first two decades of that new century (that would have been the Boston Red Sox, if measured by World Series won). At the beginning of the 3rd decade of that 20th Century (the 1920s), the Yanks traded for Boston’s best player who also happened to be the best player in Baseball (Babe Ruth). The Yankees went on to be the most successful team of the 20th Century with 27 World Championships. At the beginning of the 21st Century, the Los Angeles Dodgers were sometimes a contender but hardly the most sucessful team in the first two decades of the new century (that would have been the Boston Red Sox, if measured by World Series won). At the beginning of the 3rd decade of that 21st Century (the 2020s), the Dodgers traded for Boston’s best player (Mookie Betts) and then signed arguably the best player in Baseball (Shohei Ohtani). Will the Los Angeles Dodgers be the greatest team of the 21st Century like the New York Yankees were for the 20th? Only time will tell. But it sure looks good right now. The Dodgers are perfectly situated to be the beneficiaries of a steady stream of Japanese Stars with which to build their dynasty (as the Yankees were the beneficiaries of a steady stream of Boston Red Sox stars). For the team of Jackie Robinson, this almost seems like fate.*

*The Dodgers have already signed two time Cy Young Award winner Blake Snell in the 2024-25 off season. If they sign Roki Sasaki and Juan Soto too, sportswriters will have to start thinking up cool nicknames like the Yankees’ “Murderer’s Row” [The Killer Queue? The Assassin Train? Something not so violent?].

2024 Team Abstracts:

With the 2024 season in the books, the rest of this post will consist of brief snapshots of the state of each MLB team. These snapshots will be broken up into two parts. First, there will be a brief discussion of some aspect of that team’s 2024 season that stands out [Prognosis]. Second, there will be a superficial perusal of a player or 2 (or 3) who stepped up in 2024 and may a building block going forward for the club [Youngblood].

1. Los Angeles Dodgers [98-64]

First Third: 33-21 [99] ; Halfway: 50-31 [100]; Second Third: 30-24/63-45 [94.5]; Stretch Run/Final Third: 35-19 [98-64].

Prognosis: The Dodgers have won 91 or more games every full season since 2013 (and were on pace to win 116 during the Covid pandemic year of 2020). No team has ever won 100 (or more games) four seasons in a row. In 2024, the Dodgers could have become the first team to accomplish this feat (106 in 2021, 111 in 2021, and 100 in 2022). But they won only 98. Despite having an off-season, the 2024 season will go down as pivotal in LA Dodger history. They won the 2024 World Series. Shohei Ohtani joined the team. The future is so bright they may all have to wear shades. If most of the injured Dodger pitchers come back in 2025, the team will be a juggernaut. Will the Dodgers embrace their future as the 21st Century Yankees? If they sign Roki Sasaki, the Japanese star pitcher who will be posted in January 2025, the Dodgers will be embracing this destiny. If they sign Juan Soto, the Yankees slugger, they will have married it. Youngblood: The Dodgers let Corey Seager and Trea Turner go (in part) because they believed in their 2016 first round pick: Gavin Lux. In 2019, Lux destroyed Triple-A pitching. But his 2020 season was lost to Covid. In 2021 and 2022, Lux struggled to establish himself. Then the 2023 season was lost to a wrecked knee. Lux looked tentative to start 2024. However, in the second half of 2024, Lux finally seemed to have arrived. It seemed like some of that original promise was finally being delivered. But then Lux ended the season poorly. Will the Dodgers finally cut bait on Lux? Imagine how good this team could have been if they had kept either Seager or Turner. As far as actual rookies go, the Dodgers established Gavin Stone in their rotation (11-5, 3.53 ERA). But then Stone ended his season as just another Dodger pitcher on the injury list. Of course, Yoshinobu Yamamoto was hardly a rookie (even if he qualified as one), but he showed the goods both before and after the injury avalanche got him too.

2. Philadelphia Phillies [95-67]

First Third: 38-16 [114]; Halfway: 53-28 [106]; Second Third: 28-26/65-43 [97.5]; Stretch Run/Final Third: 30-24 [95-67].

Prognosis: The Phillies looked like the one team that would just coast to the finish line with a 100 win season for 2024. But mid-season injuries to Bryce Harper and Kyle Schwarber knocked them off that 100 win path. However, like the Dodgers, the Phillies basically spent the entire season looking right past the regular season to the play-offs and the World Series. Once again, they were disappointed. Like the 2008 to 2011 Phillies, the current Phillies team is getting better every year while also seemingly sliding further away from the World Series itself. Will the 2025 Phillies win over 100 games and get immediately bounced from the Play-offs like the 2011 Phillies? Watching the Phils in the play-offs, the problem may be that they are too traditional. Modern play-off strategy is to basically manage like there is no tomorrow. LA Dodger manager Dave Roberts gave a master class of managing like his pants were on fire during the 2024 play-offs. On the other hand, Phillies’ “old school” manager Rob Thomson managed like there would always be another day. Strangely enough, the maverick Phillie general manager Dave Drombowski may be too much of a traditionalist. He extended Thomson’s contract through the 2026 season after the season ended. Youngblood: The Phillies, as a mature contender, did not had any real contributions from a rookie in 2024. The development of Ranger Suarez and Christopher Sanchez into reliable rotation mainstays in 2024 was somewhat unforeseen, since neither man was young. Andrew Painter, the one rookie that could have made quite an impression, lost the 2024 season to Tommy John surgery. Hopefully he makes it all the way back.

3. New York Yankees [94-68]

First Third: 37-17 [111]; Halfway: 52-29 [104]; Second Third: 26-28/63-45 [94.5]; Stretch Run/Final Third: 31-23 [94-68].

Prognosis: The New York Yankees started the 2024 season so hot that they were able to withstand a severe mid-season swoon before cruising into the play-offs and then all the way into the World Series (their first appearance there since the Yanks’ 2009 Championship). To listen to some sportswriters and Yankee fans talk about it, you would assume the Yankees were pathetic from 2010 through 2023. The actual fact is that the Yankees worst season in that 14 year span was an 82-80 finish in 2023. In those 14 years, the Yankees never had a losing record. They won 100 games in 2018, 103 in 2019, and 99 in 2022. Other than those three seasons, the Yanks won over 90 games five other times. In other words, the Yankees had 14 straight seasons without a losing record with 8 seasons of over 90 wins including 2 seasons of 100 (or more) victories sandwiched in-between World Series appearances. All fans should be so lucky. The real problem here may be a perception that Yankee owner Hal Steinbrenner only begrudgingly fields an expensive team. Unlike his late father George, Hal will never “damn the torpedoes” and just use the Yankees financial might to simply overwhelm the opposition. In defense of Hal, his father was pathologically competitive. The big story this off-season is whether the Yankees will overwhelm Juan Soto with an offer that he can’t refuse. The little story is that, even if Soto signs elsewhere, the NY Yankees will still be good. Youngblood: The emergance of Luis Gil as a top-of-the-rotation starter was one of the major reasons for the Yankee’s great start in 2024. As with all starting pitchers, how long Gil will be able to keep his arm healthy is a question mark. Even more unexpected was the emergance of 24-year-old rookie catcher Austin Wells. Have the Yanks possibly found the next link in their long legacy of good and great catchers (Bill Dickey, Yogi Berra, Elston Howard, Thurman Munson, Jorge Posada) or will Wells turn into the pumpkin that he seemed to be as the season was winding down. Can he adjust to the adjustments that pitchers are making against him and keep himself healthy at the most demanding position? It will be interesting to see.

4t. Milwaukee Brewers [93-69]

First Third: 31-23 [93]; Halfway: 48-33 [96]; Second Third: 30-24/61-47 [91.5]; Stretch Run/Final Third: 32-22 [93-69].

Prognosis: The Brew Crew seem to be the ultimate “under the radar” team. Despite trading way their ace pitcher before the season, the Brewers kept chugging along like an auto maintaining 90+ miles per hour no matter how many pieces fall off. Milwaukee hasn’t had a real losing season since back in 2016 [they did go 29-31 in Covid wrecked 2020]. You have to give credit to a well run sabermetric front office and an owner who stays out of the way. In a bad year, they will win 80+ and compete. In a good year, they win 90+ and take a shot at glory. But, strangely enough, the Brewers never feel like a real contender. Of course, the Brew Crew are one of five current MLB teams who have never won the World Series (along with Colorado, San Diego, Seattle, & Tampa Bay). In the olden days, this would be explained by a curse (like the Cubs’ billygoat curse or the Red Sox’ curse of Babe Ruth). The Brewers need a curse of the Seattle Pilots (in honor of Jim Bouton and Ball Four) or a Bud Selig curse to explain away their oddly successful mediocrity (and to use as publicity until they break it). Youngblood: The Alcoholics debuted their next potential superstar, Jackson Chourio, in 2024. After a slow start, the 20-year- old Churio was the Brew Crew’s best player in 2024. His 148 game, 21 HR, 79 RBI, .275 BA and .464 SA stats were pretty good but his second half (after the All-Star Game) 61 G-12 HR-44 RBI-.310 BA-.552 SA stats scream superstar. The upside seems to be the Hall of Fame. The downside, as long as injuries or fate does not intervene, would seem to be a Raul Mondesi type career. In any case, it seems that Chourio will be the foundational superstar for the Drunkards for quite some time. Their signing of Chourio to that eight year contract (with two more team options) before the 2024 season seems like genius right now as long as the curse of Wander Franco doesn’t get him.

4t. San Diego Padres [93-69]

First Third: 27-27 [81]; Halfway: 41-40 [82]; Second Third: 30-24/57-51 [85.5]; Stretch Run/Final Third: 36-18 [93-69].

Prognosis: The Friars were predicted to be a playoff team lock in 2023. But, after underperforming badly, the Monsignors fell just short of the play-offs despite a futile last minute rush. The team owner who was fueling the push for a Championship died and key players left. So, in 2024, the Padres were forecast to spend the season picking up the shattered pieces. Instead, San Diego muddled along, then caught fire, and charged into the 2024 play-offs. At the crest of their wave, they almost took out the eventual championship Dodgers and advanced to the World Series. One of the beauties of sport is the underdog team that overperforms after disappointing (the NY Mets of 2024 also fit this description). On the other hand, the 2024 Padres have a lot of similarities to the 2024 Brewers. They finished with the same record and neither team has ever won the World Series. Both team’s best player was a rookie named Jackson. But, in 2024, the Brew Crew just never really ignited while the Padres crashed painfully. One has to ask the age-old question: Is it better to burn out or fade away? Prognosis: If the Padres were the HMS Titanic, GM AJ Preller would be the man shoveling Major Leaguers & Minor League prospects into the coal burners at a furious pace to increase the speed. Thus, the Padre’s patience with rookie outfielder Jackson Merrill was fascinating. And it was rewarded. Before the season started, the three top rookie player hopefuls were all named Jackson. In order of hype, they would have been probabaly been listed as: 1. Jackson Holliday, 2. Jackson Chourio and 3. Jackson Merrill. But Merrill ended up as the best of them in 2024. If not for Paul Skenes*, Merrill would have been the runaway NL Rookie-of-the-Year winner (with Jackson Chourio second). Of course, Holliday spent most of 2024 back in the minors. It will be interesting to see if their careers continue along this path. Like Chourio, Merrill was on-fire after the All-Star break [61 G-12 HR-44 RBI-.314 BA-.596 SA]. In fact, his post All-Star stats are almost copies of Chourio’s numbers, just a little bit better.

*The Players Union seems to have missed a sub-clause or two here. In the 2022 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), the MLB and the Union agreed to fight rampant service time manipulation with the PPI (Player Promotion Incentive). If a qualifying Rookie player accrued a year of service time as a rookie and then won the Rookie of the Year Award, the player’s club received a draft pick after the first round. Because he was brought up mid-season by the Pirates, Paul Skenes did not qualify for the extra draft pick. But Jackson Merrill, because he finished 2nd to Skenes in the Rookie-of-the-Year voting, did not bring home a draft pick either. If the Player’s Union had been on the ball, the PPI would have just defaulted from Skenes to Merrill.

6. Cleveland Guardians [92-69]

First Third: 38-16 [114]; Halfway: 52-29 [104]; Second Third: 28-26/66-42 [99.0]; Stretch Run/Final Third: 26-27 [92-69].

Prognosis: The pythagorem theorem finally caught up with the Guardians in 2024. The Guards spent their entire season outperforming the percentages (politically correct or not, Guards simply doesn’t have the ring of the Tribe). After breaking out of the gate like Secretariat on a bender, Cleveland simply played .500 ball for the rest of the year and then glided into the playoffs. The Guardian’s transcedence of Baseball mathematics was usually credited to the club’s sublime bullpen and their great closer, Emmanuel Clase. But the Baseball Gods are fickle. Once Cleveland drifted into the playoffs, their relief core betrayed them. Emmanuel Clase, who was almost untouchable during the regular season, went from superman to a pinata. For those who like their karma served cold, it was a frigid fate. Guardian manager Stephen Vogt, who had replaced the very successful Terry Francona before the 2024 season, got a lot of credit for how well the team played at first. But, in the end, Cleveland finished with 92 wins, which was pretty much the normal win total under Francona. Youngblood: All of the pre-season prognasticators believed that a lack of power would be a serious problem for Cleveland in 2024. So their resident superstar Jose Ramirez decided to personally deal with that issue [he would hit 39 homers in 2024]. Josh Naylor also stepped up [with 31 HRs]. Mid-year, they were joined by one Jhonkensy Noel [13 HRs in 67 games]. A 6 feet 3 inch, 250+ pound Dominican, the sturdy Noel goes by the wonderful nickname of “Big Xmas” (in honor of his fellow Dominican David “Big Papi” Ortiz). Despite a minor league track record that suggests Major League pitchers will eventually carve him up and strikeouts will eat his future, there is also the possibility that Noel can eventually stay ahead of the coming adjustments. Just watching him hit, it appears that Noel has already figured out that he doesn’t have to pull every pitch. With his great strength, he has opposite field power. Without any adjustments, Noel will be a 30 homer a year, low BA slugger going forward. If he can adjust, Noel will be a 40+ Homers a year monster. Noel is my favorite 2024 Rookie, if only for the rekindled memories of my favorite player of the 21st Century.

7. Baltimore Orioles [91-71]

First Third: 35-19 [105]; Halfway: 51-30 [102]; Second Third: 29-25/64-44 [96]; Stretch Run/Final Third: 27-27 [91-71].

Prognosis: Despite going from 101 wins in 2023 to 91 wins in 2024, the Birds are still on the dynasty track. After a second straight 90+ win play-off team, the three brutal 100+ loss seasons suffered between 2018 to 2021 are finally in the rear view mirror. All they need now is a World Series appearance or two to take the next step (and hopefully win a World Championship). More importantly, the Birdos seem to have upgraded to a new ownership group that will attempt to keep the dynasty together (replacing the Angelos family is almost surely a net poisitve). It will be interesting to see how the Orioles try to turn their horde of minor league talent into Major League success. If they can resign or replace ace Corbin Burnes, the Birdos will be on the right path. Youngblood: All this being said, the El Birdos treatment of infielder Jackson Holliday’s 2024 rookie season raises a tiny red flag. Holliday hit well enough to make the team out of Spring Training. The Birdos then sent him down to Triple-A anyways. Shortly thereafter, they brought him right back up. Obviously pressing, Holliday slapped an atrocious two singles in 34 at bats. So the Orioles sent him back down again. They left him in the minors until July 31st, bringing him back for the pennant race. Would it have been better to keep him right out of Spring Training, bat him ninth, and tell him that (rain or shine) he was there to stay? Do everything possible to let him relax into the Majors? Perhaps there was an underlying strategy to all this? In 2024, Holliday used up his rookie elligibility. Because of his poor season, he did not win the Rookie of the Year. Of course, this would have shortened his eligibility for free agency from 6 years to 5. One of the keys to any sports dynasty is to know how to break a rookie in. The current Oriole organization hasn’t shown that it has acquired this skill yet. How Holliday responds in 2025 to this poor handling of his rookie season will be interesting to watch. Another interesting player to watch in 2025 will be Adley Rutschman. After 3 years, it seems like Rutschman may be suffering from Catcher Stagnation Syndrome.* It may be yet another example of poor Oriole talent handling.

*Catcher Stagnation Syndrome: Because of the brutal wear and tear of their position on the field, tthe inability of catchers to improve over time.

8t. Atlanta Braves [89-73]

First Third: 31-23 [93]; Halfway: 46-35 [92]; Second Third: 28-26/59-49 [88.5]; Stretch Run/Final Third: 30-24 [89-73].

Prognosis: In cartoons, a character would step on the prongs of a rake and then get whacked in the face by the handle. Rooting for the Atlanta Braves in 2024 must have been like watching someone step on 100 rakes in a row. The good news was that, despite injuries and underperformance hobbling the team all season long, Atlanta still won 89 games and made the playoffs (although they were quickly bounced out). But It is also obvious that the Braves’ season was also only this successful because of a lucky trade. They picked up former ace pitcher Chris Sale off the trash heap and he then won the 2024 NL Cy-Young-Award. Despite this, you had to root for the Braves in 2024, a team trying to win a tough race while stuck in third gear. Just getting into the playoffs must have felt like winning the World Series to them. The Braves’ motto in 2024 must have been: Live to fight another day. It will be quite interesting to see how the Braves do in 2025. Often, when everything goes wrong for a club one year, it bounces back in the other direction in the following year. If this holds true, the Braves should be a menace in 2025. Youngblood: With all the injuries to Braves players in 2024, Atlanta rookies had plenty of opportunites to shine. The best of them was the wonderfully named Spencer Schwellenbach. Coming up from the minors on May 29th, 2024, Schwellenbach showed a repertoire of pitches good enough to give Braves’ fans fond memories of their long gone aces (Maddux, Glavine, and Smoltz). While it is unlikely that he will last that long (Schwellenbach has already had a Tommy John in 2021), his emergance gives the Braves a good chance of replacing the departed Max Fried in their rotation. If ace Spencer Strider returns healthy from his own Tommy John, the Braves may not even miss a stride back to the top of the standings.

8t. Arizona Diamondbacks [89-73]

First Third: 25-29 [75]; Halfway: 39-42 [78]; Second Third: 32-22/57-51 [85.5]; Stretch Run/Final Third: 32-22 [89-73]

Prognosis: The 2024 Arizona Diamonback season may seem like a step back from their 2023 year. In 2023, the Snakes snuck into the playoffs and made it all the way into the World Series before losing. In 2024, the Diamonbacks finished the year tied with two other teams with the exact same records for the final two playoff spots. But Arizona was eliminated because both teams had winning records against Arizona during the season. The Serpents were eliminated without even a old-style one-game play-off series. However, the Serpientes went from 84 wins in 2023 to 89 wins in 2024. The team is still on the glory road and the immediate future looks bright. The Front office simply needs to make smart moves and let the talent mature. Youngblood: Of course, it would help Arizona take the next step up if the team had a true ace and superstar. In 2024, sophmore pitcher Brandon Pfaadt established himself in the Majors. He made 32 starts, pitched 181.2 innings, walked only 42 players, and struck out 185. But a 11-10 record and 4.71 ERA was not good enough. If Pfaadt can improve, he could certainly be their ace. Some would argue that Arizona already has a superstar player in Ketel Marte. But, even in his best years, he falls a little short. He is just a solid star. 2023 Rookie-of-the-Year Sophmore Corbin Carroll certainly seemed to be on the verge of superstardom (25 HR-76 RBI-.285 BA). But his sophmore 2024 season (22 HR- 75 RBI-.231 BA) was a disappointment. But this comes with a caveat. Carroll evidently had a bad shoulder early in 2024. His statistics after the All-Star break seem to show that his shoulder had healed (64G-17HR-42 RBI-.259 BA- .568 SA). If he produces at that rate over a entire season, Carroll will be a superstar. There is even a good chance that he can do better.

8t. New York Mets [89-73]

First Third: 22-32 [66]; Halfway: 40-41 [80]; Second Third: 35-19/57-51 [85.5]; Stretch Run/Final Third: 32-22 [89-73].

Prognosis: Billionaire Hedge Fund Manager Steve Cohen is often publicized as the “richest owner in Baseball.” Cohen has now owned the New York Mets for four years (2021-2024). In 2021, the Mets finished 77-85 as the residue of Wilpon’s (the former owners) mismanagement washed away. In 2022, Cohen turned on his money faucet, brought in a bunch of high priced free agents, and the Mets went 101-61. But that season ended in disappointment as the Braves ran them down for the divisional crown and the Metros were quickly eliminated with a Wild Card Series loss in the playoffs. In 2023, Cohen tried to replicate the 2022 season by throwing money around. Instead, the 2023 Mets were a massive disappointment with a record of 75-87. So the Metros announced that they would reset in 2024 and take a couple of seasons off to rebuild. The players certainly seemed to buy into this strategy and the team floundered in the early going. But then they caught fire. New York roared down the stretch right into the playoffs. The Mets then eliminated two good teams (Milwaukee and the Phillies) before falling to the eventual World Champion Dodgers in the National League Championship Series. Will the team’s success in 2024 cause owner Steve Cohen to scrap the rebuilding plans and return to his former free spending ways? Youngblood: If Steve Cohen signs 26-year-old superstar Juan Soto for 2025, the five-year-plan is toast. If they add Soto, they will be going for it big time. And this will be very interesting. Soto would join a couple of other sluggers with 30 home run potential (Francisco Alvarez and Mark Vientos). Of course, this doesn’t even include yet another 30 HR slugger and the Met’s current best player, Francisco Lindor. If the Mets also resign first baseman Pete Alonso, there is good chance that the Mets 2025 line-up would start with the 20+ HR hitting on-base machine Brandon Nimmo followed by five straight 30 HR crunching threats. The 2025 Metropolitan line-up may be quite intimidating.

11. Houston Astros [88-73]

First Third: 24-30 [72]; Halfway: 40-41 [80]; Second Third: 32-22/56-52 [84.0]; Stretch Run/Final Third: 32-21 [88-73]

Prognosis: The 2024 Astros started slow but kept on coming all season long, eventually making the playoffs by the skin of their teeth. It has been pretty obvious since 2023 that the Astronauts’ success cycle would be drawing to a close soon (the signing of first baseman Jose Abreu in 2023 was the canary in the coal mine). But the Asteroids were able to fight off the undertaker for one more year during 2024. Although tainted by the 2017 trash-can-banging and sign-stealing scandal, this Astro success cycle was quite successful. The team won two World Series titles during their ten year run (2015-2024). But rampant owner interference and the jettisoning of a Moneyball philosophy front office for one with a “jockocracy” ideology will eventually overwhelm this team. Youngblood: 30-year-old rookie pitcher Ronel Blanco illustrated a somewhat hidden strength of this Astro dynasty. The Asteroids were able to find and develop Latin pitchers with little to no pedigrees [large signing bonuses] such as Framber Valdez, Christian Javier, and Jose Urquidy. Blanco fits this pattern well. Signed way back in 2016 at the age of 22, Blanco has wandered through the Astro’s minor league for years before finally making undistinguished appearances for the Astronauts in 2022 (7.11 ERA in 6.1 IP) & 2023 (4.50 ERA in 52.0 IP). His 2024 season (13-8 with a 2.80 ERA in 167.1 IP) was a complete surprise. It will be interesting to see if Blanco can maintain any of his 2024 success in 2025. If he can, it could help keep the Asteroids from finally succumbing to gravity for yet another year. Meanwhile, perhaps 2025 will be the season in which slugger extraordinaire Yordan Alvarez plays a full season (150 or more games).

12t. Detroit Tigers [86-76]

First Third: 27-27 [81]; Halfway: 37-44 [74]; Second Third: 25-29/52-56 [78.0]; Stretch Run/Final Third: 34-20 [86-76].

Prognosis: In 2024, the Detroit Tigers emerged from a long slumber in the baseball depths (2017-2023). This came as a surprise to not only the rest of the League but to the Tigers themselves. At the trade deadline, the Tigers, believing themselves not to be contenders, traded veterans away, including their #2 starter, Jack Flaherty. But a final surge at the end of the season put them into the playoffs. There is a chance that the Tigers’ conversion from a kitten to a tomcat may be somewhat premature. But the Tigers now have a resident superstar in Cy Young award winner Tarik Skubal and also potential superstar hitter in Riley Greene. Youngblood: It doesn’t take much to dream about the Tigers becoming an offensive juggernaut. The ballclub has quite a few players who could back up Riley Greene in the line-up if they all take a step forward together: Spencer Torkelson, Parker Meadows, Matt Vierling, the and fantastically named, western gunslinger sounding, Colt Keith. Riley Greene himself could still improve. However, the one Big Cat who seems to have the most potetnial to improve has to be 26-year-old Kerry Carpenter. He has the hitting potential to turn into a 30+ HR/100+ RBI and .275-.300 BA slugger if he can just play a complete season. If Carpenter, Torkelson, and Greene can all reach their 30+ HR potential in 2025, there is a good chance that the Tigers continue their 2024 rampage into the next season.

12t. Kansas City Royals [86-76]

First Third: 34-20 [102] ; Halfway: 43-38 [86]; Second Third: 25-29/59-49 [88.5]; Stretch Run/Final Third: 27-27 [86-76].

Prognosis: The Royals spent the entire 2024 season simply going for it. They signed their one potential superstar long term, signed necessary free agent pitchers to shore up their staff, and then continued trying to upgrade their roster all season long. In other words, the small market Royals spent talent through trades and money in 2024 like an expiring man trying to go out with a bang. Considering that they finished 2023 with a 56-106 record, their 2024 strategy seemed to lack basic sanity. But incredibly, it worked. The Kansas City Royals made the playoffs in 2024 for the very first time since they won the World Championship in 2015. Usually, this type of desperation scenario ends in a complete disaster (the 2023 Los Angeles Angels, for example). Any true Baseball fan has got to be rooting for the Royals after the 2024 season. They should rewarded for their institutional bravery. Youngblood: Before the 2024 season, Bobby Witt Jr. signed a contract that will keep him on the Royals until he is at least 31-years-old. Witt then exploded into a superstar during the 2024 season and finished second to Aaron Judge in the AL Most Valuable Player [MVP] voting. Will he continue to improve? If he improves as much as he did from 2023 to 2024, Witt will be the greatest player in the game, bar none. Even if he just maintains or slightly recedes from his 2024 level, the Kansas City Royals have their franchise player for quite some time to come. Witt currently comps, at age 24, as prime time Robin Yount. There is even a chance that he will eventually eclipse George Brett as the face of the KC Royals franchise. This is Hall of Fame stuff. Of course, Witt’s career could crash and burn like Grady Sizemore’s did. Hopefully, the Royals can continue to surround him with enough talent that he reaches the playoffs multiple times.

14. Seattle Mariners [85-77]

First Third: 28-26 [84]; Halfway: 45-36 [90]; Second Third: 28-26/56-52 [84.0]; Stretch Run/Final Third: 29-25 [85-77]

Prognosis: The story of the Seattle Mariners 2024 season was reportedly a great pitching staff dragged down by a complete lack of offense. Of course, some of it was simply the ballpark. The Mariners’ hitters scored 371 runs on the road against just 305 at home. The Mariners’ pitchers allowed 351 runs on the road but just 251 at home. In other words, the Mariners’ 2024 pitching staff was probably better than their batting line-up, but not by much. But it also may have just been a park illusion. Perhaps the Sailors should reshape their park to equalize the benefits given to pitchers and/or hitters. As it is currently configured, the park may contribute to some unfortunate Mariner front office delusions about their own team. Also, much like San Francisco in the National League, the large bias of their home park towards pitchers may discourage free agent hitters to sign with Seattle. Youngblood: George Kirby is a fascinating pitcher. He has extreme control. In 2024, which was his third season, he walked just 23 men while striking out 179 in 191 innings pitched. The 26-year-old Kirby had a good, but not fantastic, 3.53 ERA. This was basically his third straight, pretty much identical, season in a row. How can the Mariners help Kirby improve and become the ace they need? During the 2024 season, there was a fascinating story about Greg Maddux (who the control freak Kirby has often been compared to). Apparently in 2008, Greg Maddux, in the last year of his career, was playing for the Dodgers when he taught the Japanese pitcher Hiroki Kuroda his two seam fastball. This pitch looked like a ball to the batter and then, at the last moment dove back over the plate, for a strike. Kuroda credited this two-seamer with extending his career for 10 years. Maybe the Mariners should hire Maddux to tutor Kirby. What better pitch for a man who is a strike throwing machine than one that does not even look like strike until the last minute?

15t. Chicago Cubs [83-79]

First Third: 27-27 [81]; Halfway: 37-44 [74]; Second Third: 24-30/51-57 [76.5]; Stretch Run/Final Third: 32-22 [83-79].

Prognosis: The Cubs were one of the many middling type teams that made some nice upgrades during the 2023-2024 off-season and hoped to catch a wave that they could ride home into the play-offs. But injuries to their star players during 2024, dashed those hopes against the rocks. Much like the Boston Red Sox, the Chicago Cubbies will reload in 2025 and try to catch the next wave to contention. In fact the Bear Cubs and the Red Sox have many similarities in common. Like the Red Sox, the Cubs have been stuck in the breakdown lane since ending a reported ancient curse. Like the Red Sox, they no longer seem overly anxious to field a winning team. Like the Red Sox, the Cubbies seem to be trying to accumulate as much young talent as humanly possible in the hope that it will all jell into a playoff run before their fans boycott the park. Youngblood: Outside of the L.A. Dodgers, the Cubs may have the best refugees from the Japanese Major Leagues. While not young, the 30-year-old pitcher Shota Imanaga was worth every penny in his first Major League season [15-3/2.91 ERA/173.1 IP/28 BB/174 SO]. Now in his third season, the 29-year old Seiya Suzuki has steadily improved despite being injured in each and every season. Hopefully he gets just one season of good health to really show what he can do. The Cubs also added former Dodgers prospect Michael Busch in 2024. The 26-year-old Busch had a 2024 season that could be built upon [21 HR-65 RBI-.248 BA). The Cubbie’s talent pool is deep, but they don’t have a single superstar type player. Collections of good players without any great players do not often win it all.

15t. St. Louis Cardinals [83-79]

First Third: 27-27 [81]; Halfway: 42-39 [84]; Second Third: 29-25/56-52 [84.0]; Stretch Run/Final Third: 27-27 [83-79].

Prognosis: The St. Louis Cardinals, years ago now, were one of the teams in the forefront of the Moneyball/Sabermetrics revolution. But they lost their stats guru (Jeff Luhnow) to the Houston Astros. Then one of their remaining Moneyball guys was busted for a cyber-crime (breaking into Luhnow’s Astro database). In reaction to all this, the Cards went in a different direction. Or, to be precise, they went back to the type of jock meritocracy that Moneyball had replaced. The Redbirds hired a traditional GM (John Mozeliak) to head the club. The Cards have been in a slow motion death spiral ever since that fateful decision. After the 2023 season, sabermetics would have demanded that the club reset. Instead, the Cardinals decided to double down on their current club, bringing in even more veterans to prop the team up. It worked for awhile (though Pythagoras said it was all an illusion). It is really hard to compete when you are the stupidest guy in the room. Youngblood: In 2023, the St. Louis Cardinals had a potential Rookie-of-the-Year prospect in 3rd baseman Jordan Walker. One way to break a rookie player into the Majors is to proceed cautiously. For batters, a club can platoon. For pitchers, a team can start them in relief. At all times, the team should let the player know that it has their back. They are going to let the player settle in. Of course, a team can also use the old “sink or swim” approach. Throw the player right into the conflict. Yank him right out of the line-up if any little thing goes wrong. Put him on the bench to rot. Send him to the Minor Leagues and recall him. Last year, the Cards did their best to wreck Jordan’s rookie year by changing his position from 3B to the OF (without even prepping him), & then sending him down to the Minors the minute he cooled off from at hot start. It will be interesting to see if he can recover. In 2024, the Cardinals brought up their hotshot SS prospect, Masyn Winn. They left Winn alone and simply let him play. Why the Cardinals didn’t treat poor Jordan Walker like this will apparently remain a mystery.*

* Incredibly, Masyn Winn didn’t get any support, not even a third place vote, for Rookie-of-the Year in 2024 despite finishing 2nd to Paul Skenes in Rookie bWAR. (Baseball Reference Wins Above Replacement). Weird.

17. Minnesota Twins [82-80]

First Third: 30-24 [90]; Halfway: 45-36 [90]; Second Third: 30-24/60-48 [90.0]; Stretch Run/Final Third: 22-32 [82-80].

Prognosis: For most of the 2024 season, the Twins looked like lock to make the playoffs. Their 2023 strategy of deep depth because their players are so injury-prone was working again. But then the Doppelgangers were dragged down by injuries and slumps as the season expired. As usual, the Twinkies were pulled down by the inability of their three potential superstars (Carlos Correa, Brian Buxton and Royce Lewis) to just remain healthy for a full year. In Baseball history, has any other ball club ever had three such injury-prone star players? Of course, there were a bunch of other Twins’ players that just could not post everyday either (Max Kepler, Edward Julien &, Jose Miranda, for a start).* Predicting how the Twins will do in the year 2025 is an exercise in futility. Will this team have good health? Then they will be a contender. Will they all be unavailable for some portion of the season like usual? Then they won’t be contenders. Youngblood: Royce Lewis has been in the Majors for three years now. In those three years, Lewis has played 152 total games. In that span, he has hit 33 HRs-104 RBI-.268 BA-.497 BA in 549 at bats. If he could just stay healthy, Lewis would be star player. As far as actual rookies go, starter Simeon Woods Richardson had a very good year. But perhaps the most interesting young Twin is sophomore first baseman and slugger Matt Wallner. Wallner, a left-handed batter, destroys right-handed pitching. But he apparently cannot hit left-handed pitching at all so the Twins platoon him (only let him hit righties). There is a potential 30-40 home runs a year bat in Wallner if he can just learn to hit lefties. Would it hurt to simply put him on first base and see if a little on-the-job training could bring some of his potential left-handed hittting talent out? With all the new Sabermetics’ programs out there, could he be taught? It certainly seems worth a try.

*In Ocotber 31, 2024, 26-year-old Minnesota Twins’ deep depth outfielder and former top prospect Alex Kiriloff announced his retirement due to one injury after another crippling his talent and career prospects. During his career, he played 54 games in Triple-A, hitting 17 HRs & 53 RBIs with a .362 BA and .667 SA. His promise will never be realized. Seems like perfect Twinkie.

18. Boston Red Sox [81-81]

First Third: 27-27 [81]; Halfway: 43-38 [86]; Second Third: 31-23/58-50 [87.0]; Stretch Run/Final Third: 23-31 [81-81].

Prognosis: The BoSox strategy of constantly building, but never really going for it (in place since their 2018 World Championship), continued during the 2024 season. The team stayed on the fringes all year long and will be able to point to all the talent bubbling up when they sell tickets for 2025. Oddly enough, one somewhat justifiable decision probably doomed their chances in 2024. In Spring Training, the Crimson Hose dumped the injury-plagued Chris Sale, technically their ace, on Atlanta for more slowly bubbling talent. Improbably, Sale returned to his sparkling 2018 form after spending 2019 to 2023 basically nursing one injury after another. With Sale in 2024, the BoSox would almost surely have made it to the playoffs. If the Red Sox strategy for 2025 is to once again hope that Lady Luck winks their way, they may want to consider that she doesn’t actually like them. Youngblood: The Boston Red Sox debuted two fine rookie players in 2024: Ceddanne Rafaela and Wilyer Abreu. Rafaela is the younger and more interesting one. He is fast in every way (his swing, quick twitch reflexes, running the bases, etc). But he has one great weakness (he doesn’t control the strike zone). Abreu is more steady (a good hitter with power). Unfortunately, the BoSox potential sophmore star and middle-of the-order bat, Tristan Casas, spent almost the entire season sidelined with a rib injury. On top of all this, the Red Sox reportedly have 4 of the very top prospects in the Minors (Roman Anthony, Kristian Campbell Marcelo Mayer, and Kyle Teel). Who will they trade for pitching when they finally decide to compete? Will they ever again decide to once again join the fray for pennant and glory? Red Sox Nation waits with irritability. But the smart money is on 2025 being just another season of slow boil.

19t. San Francisco Giants [80-82]

First Third: 27-27 [81]; Halfway: 39-42 [78]; Second Third: 26-28/53-55 [79.5]; Stretch Run/Final Third: 27-27 [80-82].

Prognosis: Can a team’s progress through the sucess cycle be derailed by just one fluke season? The success cycle usually begins with a club that is down and out, finishing at the bottom of the standings. This team acquires top draft picks and can trade away it regulars for more young players. All this talent matures and the team rises and contends, hopefully getting to the World Series at least, if not winning one. Then the talent ages out and the team descends back down in the standings until it bottoms out and the cycle begins all over again. From 2009 to 2016, the Giants had a good run, inexplicably winning 3 World Series during that time (2010-2012-2014).* The team fell apart in 2017 but quickly rose back to mediocrity. This rise caused the Giants to try to restart their success cycle. And then, in 2021, they went an insane 107-55 with a badly aging line-up. From 2022 to 2024, they tried hard to recapture this magic. But it resulted in years of mediocrity (81-81, 79-83, and 80-82) and eventually cost their GM, Farhan Zaidi, his job (much to the delight of many SF Giant fans). It can be argued that the SF Gigantes should have wallowed at the bottom a bit longer after their 2017 bottom. But what is done is done. Youngblood: The Giants do have some interesting but not really established players (such as Tyler Fitzgerald & Kyle Harrison). However, the shortstop Fitzgerald is already 26 and Harrison is a pitcher, an inherently risky proposition. The Giants face the exact same decision that they have since 2021: should they rebuild or go for it. Of course, going for it has not worked for three years in a row now. They still desperately need a superstar.

*If you believe in the God of Baseball, the Giants’ three-straight even-season Wold Series victories from 2010 to 2014 are proof that he has a sick sense of humor. Barry Bonds, one of the greatest players ever but who was never on a World Championship team, was forcibly retired by the SF Giants and MLB after the 2007 season. The prickly and disliked Bonds then had to watch his team win those three Series in a row. Ouch.

19t. Tampa Bay Rays [80-82]

First Third: 26-28 [78]; Halfway: 40-41 [80]; Second Third: 29-25/55-53 [82.5]; Stretch Run/Final Third: 25-29 [80-82].

Prognosis: In 2024, the former Devil Rays had their first losing season since 2017. It will be interesting to see if their success cycle from 2018 to 2023 is now over and the Rays will have to reset. It seems like they should. There seems to be no escape from the Wander Franco disaster. Strangely enough, the signing of Franco to an 11-year 182-million dollar contract in November 2021 seemed like just another brilliant move by the respected Tampa front office.* Franco looked like a pretty good bet for a Hall-of-Fame career. But then the curse of Cesar Cedeno struck (immaturity). It looks like it will be years before Franco is able to restart his career (if ever). Probably the only way that Franco will get into the Hall now is by buying a ticket at the door. What happens to this franchise in 2025 seems like a good test to see if they can rebound. Youngblood: The Manta Rays got pitcher Ryan Pepiot from the LA Dodgers in exchange for their former ace pitcher, Tyler Glasnow. This was a perfect example of what should be called a Tampa trade. Tyler Glasnow was traded for some one who could fill at least 50% of his value at far less than half his price (the trade also contained 2 outfielders who fit the same bill (Tampa sent veteran Manuel Margot for propsect Jonny DeLuca). The 26-year-old Pepiot went 8-8 with a 3.60 ERA/48 BB/142 SO in 130.0 IP. Good stuff. The Rays may be able to get over the Wander Franco debacle if their best prospect, Junior Caminero, develops. The 6-foot-1/220 lb 21-year-old Caminero may not the same caliber of defensive talent as Franco, but he has a chance to be an even better hitter with much greater power. If Franco never returns, the lost paring of Caminero and Franco in the middle of the Tampa Bay Rays batting order may be written in the book of “Never Was.”

*In defense of Tampa Bay’s front office, it should be pointed out that Franco has never really collected much from this contract. His salary in 2024 was just 2.454 million. He was scheduled to receive 8+ million in 2025 but will not get paid as he is on the ineligable list [potentially wiping out his 15+ rising to 25+ million salaries from 2026 to 2028 too]. It will be interesting to see if Franco returns in, say, 2030 after missing years of playing time. But is then due the 25.454 million on the re-activated contract.

21. Texas Rangers [78-84]

First Third: 25-29 [75]; Halfway: 37-44 [74]; Second Third: 27-27/52-56 [78.0]; Stretch Run/Final Third: 26-28 [78-84].

Prognosis: After (surprisingly) making it all the way to the World Series in 2023 and (even more suprisingly) winning it, Texas fell apart (or imploded) back to the middle of the pack in 2024. So the question is: where exactly is this team on the path to the playoffs? Are they still improving or are they actually declining? Much of the answer to this will simply be in the injury list. Will Corey Seager come back from his hernia? Will Jacob DeGrom ever contribute at all? Will Josh Jung bounce back? Was Evan Carter in 2023 a mirage? On top of all that, the pitching staff looks thin. Will they bulk it up before 2025? A good case can be made for the Texas Rangers 2025 season going either way. Youngblood: Texas rookie outfielder Wyatt Langford got somewhat lost in the shuffle with several other rookie outfielders having great 2024 campaigns (Jackson Merrill, Jackson Chourio, Colton Cowser, and Wilyer Abreu). Their OPS+ tells the story: Merrill 127, Cowser 123, Chourio 117, Abreu 114, and Langford 111.* After the All-Star break, the OPS+ (unadjusted by park) were a bit different: Merrill 160, Cowser 126, Chourio 153, Abreu 115, and Langford 118. By these splits, Merrill and Chourio are the clear class of 2024’s rookie outfielders. However, Langford was the one rookie who hit for much more home run power as the season went on (1st half: 5 HR & 11 HR: 2nd half). With nothing other than an undeucated hunch, there seems a good chance that Langford hits more HRs in 2025 than any of his rookie compatriots. All that being said, the Sherrifs will probably overachieve in 2025 if some pitching develops. Jack Lieter and Kumar Rocker, the Texas Ranger’s lonely eyes turn to you.

*OPS+ is calculated by adding the player’s slugging percentage and on-base percentage together, adjusting it by park, and then dividing it by the League averages for those two statistics. A score of 100 equals League average and 110 would supposedly indicate the hitter was 10 percent better than League average. However, this statistic is apparently geometric. In other words, an OPS+ OF 110 means the hitter was actually 21 percent better than the League [110 squared = 121]. If it really is geometric, it would mean that Aaron Judge, with his OPS+ OF 200, is actually four times better than an average hitter.

22. Cincinnati Reds [77-85]

First Third: 24-30 [72]; Halfway: 38-43 [76]; Second Third: 28-26/52-56 [78.0]; Stretch Run/Final Third: 25-29 [77-85].

Prognosis: The Cincinnati Reds simmered but never boiled during 2024. But they made some progress anyways. Shortstop Elly De la Cruz took a big step towards superstardom. All Cruz needs to do now is control the strike zone a whole lot better to be one of the 4 or 5 best players in the game. Of course, this is easier said than done. Irregardless, Cruz may be the most incredibly gifted player in the Major Leagues today outside of Ohtani. And, even more importantly, he will be just 23 years old in 2025. In addition to Cuz, the Reds’ ace pitcher Hunter Greene also showed signs of stardom in 2024. But that comes with a sad caveat. Greene spent 6 weeks on the DL (Disabled List) in 2024 with a sprained elbow. This type of injury is often the precursor to an upcoming Tommy John Surgery. If Cruz and Greene can both stay healthy & continue to improve, the Redlegs may have their first real contender since 2012 and 2013. All the Cincinnati Reds’ front office has to do is effectively fill in around these stars. Youngblood: Reds’ Sophmore Starter Andrew Abbott seems to be on the verge of becoming a very nice #2 starter behind Greene. Nick Lodolo had an up and down year but flashed enormous potential. If these three pitchers can give the Reds 30-32 relatively good starts in 2025, the team will be primed to take off. The core of a really good team is here. If second baseman Matt McLain can come back all or most of the way from the shoulder injury that wiped out his entire 2024 season, the Crimson Tide may wash over the National League. McLain flashed superstar potential in 2023. Throw in a couple good trades and the Reds will be in business.*

*After writing this but before posting, the Reds traded excess 2B Jonathan India plus a fungible outfielder to Kansas City for starting pitcher Brady Singer. Even if it doesn’t work out, this is exactly the type of trade that Cincinnati should be making.

23. Pittsburgh Pirates [76-86]

First Third: 25-29 [75]; Halfway: 39-42 [78]; Second Third: 30-24/55-53 [82.5]; Stretch Run/Final Third: 21-33 [76-86].

Prognosis: In Baseball, it is hard to take a run at the top or even get into the playoffs unless your team has a resident superstar. In the beginning of the 2024 season, the Pirates had no superstar in residence. Like several other teams (the Cincinnati Reds with De Cruz and Greene, the Kansas City Royals with Witt, and the Washington Nationals with Wood and Crews), the Corsairs were waiting and hoping that their savior would arrive and lead them to the promised land. For the Reds, Hunter and especially Cruz took steps toward becoming superstars in 2024. For the Royals, Witt went almost supernova & led them to the playoffs in 2024. For the Nats, Wood and Crews established themselves in the Major Leagues in 2024. But, for the Pirates, their lack of a superstar was remedied the minute pitcher Paul Skenes stepped onto the field in 2024 after spending his first six weeks in the Minors. The Privateers now just need to sign or develop some decent players to support their ace (providing his arm holds up). Youngblood: Of course, it could be disputed that Paul Skenes was really a superstar in 2024. Skenes arrived to play his first game on May 11th, 2024. It was the Pirates 40th game of the season. In the 3/4 of the season that remained, Skenes put up 5.9 WAR* (Wins Above Replacement). If Skenes had played the whole season and produced at the same rate, he would have compiled about 8.0 WAR in 2024. This stat would have made Skenes the 5th or 6th best basebll player in the Major Leagues for 2024. If that’s not a superstar, what is? In 2024, Skenes’ debut actually pushed the Pirates into the fringes of the NL Pennant Race for a little while. With a whole season of Skenes in 2025 and some more players percolating, the Pirates may end up in the middle of the pennant scrum in 2025.

*The 5.9 WAR measurement is from Baseball Reference’s measurement. The Fangraph website figured Paul Skenes’ WAR as 4.3. Quite frankly, Frangraphs seems way off base with many of their pitching WARs.

24. Toronto Blue Jays [74-88]

First Third: 25-29 [75]; Halfway: 37-44 [74]; Second Third: 25-29/50-58 [75.0]; Stretch Run/Final Third: 24-30 [74-88].

Prognosis: The Toronto Blue Jays went into the 2024 season believing that they were approaching the top of a success cycle. After three straight losing seasons from 2017 to 2019, the Bluebirds edged back over .500 in 2020. This was followed by three straight 90 or so winning seasons (2021-2023: 91, 92, & 89). But they were elimanted in the wild card play-offs in 2020, 2022 & 2023. Toronto was lead by two nepobaby stars who were coming into their primes (Bo Bichette and Vlad Guerrero Junior). In an effort to go all out in 2024, the team even made a doomed effort to sign Shohei Ohtani. Thus, it probably was a shock to the system when the Bluebirds staggered through 2024 like a high-performance car with four flat tires. It appears now that the 2020-2023 success cycle may have already crested. In fact, Toronto seems to be caught between a rock and a hard place. Both Bichette and Guerrero Jr. will be free agents after the 2025 season. Neither seems likely to resign. The question for the Bluebirds going into 2025 will be: should the Jays attempt to roll the play-off dice 1 more time or tear down and rebuild? Youngblood: For fans of bad body players, Alejandro Kirk of the Blue Jays has to be a favorite. Listed as 5 foot 8 eight inches tall and a generous 245 pounds give or take a Fred Flintstone steak, Kirk is following in the footsteps of the unforgetable John Kruk (His autobiography title: I ain’t an Athlete, Lady, I’m a Baseball Player). Unfortunately, after starting out his career with a pretty potent bat, Kirk has been a sub-average hitter for two straight years. If the Bluebirds do decide to rebuild, they may want to tell Kirk to forget about being a catcher, place him on first base after trading Guerrero, and tell him to just concentrate on bashing the ball. In 2024, Kirk will be 26-years-old. If they want to maximize his value, they may not want to go down the Earl Williams path.*

*Earl Williams was an defensively challenged but offensively gifted catcher from 1970-1977. As a rookie in 1970, he crushed 33 HR with 87 RBI (.260 BA). Then he career spiraled down the drain due to psychological problems. Of course, one of these problems was that he didn’t want to be a catcher.

25. Washington Nationals [71-91]

First Third: 25-29 [75]; Halfway: 38-43 [76]; Second Third: 24-30/49-59 [73.5]; Stretch Run/Final Third: 22-32 [71-91].

Prognosis: The Nats are finally coming out of their long stay on the bottom of the standings after winning the 2019 World Championship. It would be fascinating if they were able to resign Juan Soto this coming off-season to cap off their rebuild. But their trade of Soto to the San Diego Padres in 2022 for 6 players (5 prospects) will still be written down in the history of good trades. While 2 of those prospects have not ripened into anything yet, the next Nat contender will probably feature C.J, Abrams, MacKenzie Gore, and James Wood as stars. If even just 2 of them reach their potential, the Nats will still have won the trade. Youngbood: In 2024, the Nats called up Dylan Crews, who they selected #2 in the 2023 Draft. Physically, he reminds one of Bobby Witt Junior. In other words, he looks good. But the most interesting Nats’ rookie is the 21 year old and 6-feet 7-inch left-fielder James Wood. He has been compared (with a straight face) to both Darryl Strawberry and Ted Williams. However, there is one main difference between Woods and those two ferocious hitters. Both of those men were basically pull hitters. Woods currently seems to hit most everything to the opposite field. How good will James Woods be if he learns to pull the ball? Woods’ downside is probably a Jason Heywood type career. His upside is obviously sky high. Without any bad luck, the Nationals will probably have (at least) two future superstars now to build their team around. The year 2025 may see their 1st baby steps back on the pennant path.

26. Oakland Athletics [69-93]

First Third: 22-32 [66]; Halfway: 29-52 [58]; Second Third: 22-32/44-64 [66.0]; Stretch Run/Final Third: 25-29 [69-93].

Prognosis: Despite the entire future of the franchise being up in the air, the Athletics are making progress towards their next good team. Unfortunately for Oakland A’s fans, that team will probably be named the Las Vegas A’s or, if the rebuild is quick, maybe even the Sacramento A’s (or perhaps they will rebrand the team and turn into the Las Vegas Nights or Gamblers or some such thing). In any case, it looks like the 2023 season was the low point for this team. Youngblood: The A’s have some interesting players. Brent Rooker is one hell of a clean-up hitter (though why it took him until 28 to establish himself is strange). Catcher Shea Langeliers, center fielder J.J. Bleday, and second baseman Zack Gelof give the A’s middle-of-the-diamond strength. Right fielder Lawrence Butler, who broke out in 2024, gave them another good player. This team can really hit for a bottom dweller. Of course, the best Oakland story in 2024 was Mason Miller, a 103-105 mph flamethrower relief pitcher. All season, the smart money (i.e. talking head sportswriters) had been saying that the Oakland A’s should trade Miller before his elbow implodes. But what if it never does and the ligaments hold? There is a relief player with a supersonic fastball who has held up now for 15 whole years. Why can’t Mason Miller be the next Aroldis Chapman? Of course, that is a more-or-less best case scenario.

27. Los Angeles Angels [63-99]

First Third: 21-33 [63]; Halfway: 35-46 [70]; Second Third: 26-28/47-61 [70.5]; Stretch Run/Final Third: 16-38 [63-99].

Prognosis: The Angels may be incompetently owned and incomprehensibly managed; Shohei Ohtani is gone and the cursed second-half career of Mike Trout continues; but this team stills does some fascinating stuff. They are like a lab for half-baked ideas. Collect every first draft reclamation project that we can get our hands on? OK. Draft only pitchers one year? Let’s do it. Look to immediately promote draft picks to the Majors? Why not? Hire a well-regarded Baseball lifer as our manager despite the fact that he lost his previous managerial career to drug scandal over a decade ago? What could go wrong? Of course, half-baked ideas have a tendency to blow up in your face. The admirable, but also completely nuts, decision to go all in to win during Ohtani’s last year in 2023 should haunt this organization for the next 4 or 5 years. But you never know. Sometimes, it is better to be lucky than smart. Youngblood: The Angels have a number of building blocks despite getting nothing back for Ohtani. Zack Neto [SS] and Logan O’Hoppe [C] are building blocks for the future. Nolan Schanuel [1B] could turn into a good player. Although less likely, Jo Adell [RF] may realize his promise too. They may be able to turn some of their remaining veterans into valuable pieces. However, like their West Coast neighbor above (Oakland A’s), perhaps their most interesting player is a 105 mph flamethrowing reliever. Ben Joyce, like Mason Miller, is probably going to blow out his elbow out sometime soon. Should he be traded before this happens or should they keep him on the off chance that his arm can hold up too? The answer may be: they should definitely trade him. The Dodgers collect guys like this.

28. Miami Marlins [62-100]

First Third: 19-35 [57]; Halfway: 29-52 [58]; Second Third: 21-23/40-68 [60.0]; Stretch Run/Final Third: 22-32 [62-100].

Prognosis: Unlike the two teams below them (Colorado and the White Sox), there is a slim chance that the Marlins will improve in the near future. Their new GM, Peter Bendix, has a Tampa Bay front-office pedigree. And perhaps he is the right man for the Miami job. However, just because you come from a highly regarded organization, it doesn’t mean that you will be competent all on your own. So far, his actions as the Miami GM seem to be impetuous. He has basically burned the Miami front office down to the ground. Maybe it needed it. But wouldn’t it have been more prudent to simply prune? Keep the good and discard the non-functional? Only time will tell. Youngblood: Connor Norby and Xavier Edwards, the Marlins rookie 2B & SS, have shown the talent to be a good keystone combination going forward. But, if the Fish are to make a quick return to respectability, both Sandy Alcantara and Eury Perez will have to return and once again be front line starters. Of course, this is easier said then done. Some organizations, because of the inherent injury risk of pitching talent, have concentrated on acquiring mostly batting talent in the draft (notably the Boston Red Sox). Apparently, these teams believe that they can simply acquire pitching later by trade or free agency. But the Swordfish don’t have that option here. They will be done or undone by their pitching talent for the near future. Will the curse of Jose Fernandez continue to haunt them? Or perhaps the curse of Kim Ng, their competent 2023 GM who was thrown off the Marlin bus by Bendix without even a nice gift basket.

29. Colorado Rockies [61-101]

First Third: 19-35 [57]; Halfway: 27-54 [54]; Second Third: 19-35/38-70 [57.0]; Stretch Run/Final Third: 23-31 [61-101].

Prognosis: If it wasn’t for the pitiful Pale Hose Sox (see below), the Rockies would be, hands down, the Major League’s most pathetic team. However, they still are the most boring team in the Majors. The White Sox have the excitement of chasing records for futility and losing epically. The Rockies have basically nothing. The team’s ownership and it’s front office seem to be either incompetent or detached (perhaps they are just stoned). Every move they make seems to lack reason or motive. Youngblood: By bWAR, the Rockies’ two best players in 2024 were a pair of sophmores, Brenton Doyle and Ezequiel Tovar. Doyle epitomizes the Colorado conundrum. He hit 23 HR-72 RBI-.260 BA in 2024. He also hit 12 HRs at home and 11 HRs on the road. But he had a .313 BA at home with a woeful .211 BA away from his Colorado condo. On the other hand, Tovar hit almost as well on the road as he did at home in 2024 [overall he hit 26 HR-78 RBI-.269 BA with a 13 HR-36 RBI-.261 BA line on the road]. If you were trading with Colorado, would it be a good idea to trade for the player who hits better at ground zero than up a mile high? Of course, Tovar is also just 23 while Doyle is already 26. Tovar is obviously more valuable. There is a chance that, at his peak in Colorado, he may put up some 30 HR-100 RBI-.300 or so BA seasons. In any case, neither player looks like a potential superstar. The Rockies do have the remains of a superstar on their roster. But is there even a slim chance that Kris Bryant ever returns to a semblance of his former form? The Rockies have 4 more seasons (2025-2028) to find out. It is doubtful that the wreck of the Rockies will post a wining record in any of them.

30. Chicago White Sox [41-121]

First Third: 15-39 [45]; Halfway: 21-60 [42]; Second Third: 12-42/27-81 [40.5]; Stretch Run/Final Third: 14-40 [41-121].

Prognosis: It seems like this team hasn’t even begun to formulate the first year of a five-year rebuilding plan to reach mediocrity. You have to assume that the White Sox cannot be worse than this in 2025. But the evidence for an actual turnaround is scarce. From all reports, the Pale Hose are trying to unload all their remaining assets. Even worse, the Major League Baseball ecosystem no longer rewards quite so handsomely the strategy of tanking your team to acquire high level draft picks. The Sox may be approximately this bad for some time, even if they don’t get back down to 121 losses again. Youngblood: Although the bottom completely fell out on the Pale Hose in 2024, they just kept running their veteran players out there anyways. Why they didn’t trade everyone (and throw in the kitchen sink too) is a mystery. They should have filled the roster with guys acquired in trades, reclamation projects, and rookies.* Instead, the Pale Sox decided that riding this Titanic down to the bottom of the sea with its current crew was a good idea. They did throw their doomed manager Pedro Grifol overboard; and replaced him with Grady Sizemore, a skipper with virtually no qualifications other than he had once been a Major League player. To underline the pointlessness of this move, they announced that they would not be considering Sizemore for the job in 2025, come hell or high water. The only really interesting player left here is the Sox’ flamethrower starting pitcher Garrett Crochett. But all that interest really comes down to two Questions: 1) What will the White Sox get for him in trade; and/or 2) Will his arm blow out again before he gets traded (Crochett had Tommy John Surgery in 2022). In all probability, the Useless Hose will keep Crochett until he is all but worthless (at which point, the Los Angeles Dodgers will pick him up and attempt to fix him. Unless you are a masochist, it must be terrible to root for the Chicago White Sox right now.

*The White Sox probably need to have a Spring Training in 2025 like the one shown in the first Major League movie. Though it is doubful that they would come up with anyone quite as good as Willie Mays Hayes, Rick Vaughn, or Pedro Cerrano for real. But it certainly would be fun.

The Success Cycle:

A. Mountain Top

1) Atlanta Braves, 2) Baltimore Orioles 3) Los Angeles Dodgers, 4) New York Yankees, 5) New York Mets (as long as they sign Soto) and 6) Philadelphia Phillies.

Teams that are on the top of the success cycle with no plans to come down. There seems to have been a shift during this Century between the Baseball franchises haves and have nots. Some teams are now able to stay on top of the standings almost permanently. For example, the Los Angeles Dodgers have had 14 straight winning seasons [2011-2014] and only 2 losing seasons this Century [2000-2024].

B. Slippery Slope

1) Boston Red Sox, 2) Chicago Cubs, 3) Cleveland Guardians, 4) Milwaukee Brewers, 5) San Francisco Giants, and 6) Seattle Mariners.

Teams trying to contend on a hope and a prayer that everything goes right and nothing goes wrong. The common denominator between these teams is an aversion or inability to spend enough money to ascend the mountain top. They are all average to good teams that, unless all goes right, are just not good enough. The San Francisco Giants get special mention as a team that has tried to actually spend the money but not found anyone willing to take it.

C. Glory Road

1) Arizona Diamondbacks, 2) Cincinnati Reds, 3) Detroit Tigers, 4) Kansas City Royals, 5) Pittsburgh Pirates, and 6) Texas Rangers.

Teams that are preparing to make a Championship run by bulking up their rosters through trades or free agency. One thing that almost these teams have in common is a resident young superstar or superstar-to-be: Arizona (Carroll), Cincinnati (De la Cruz), Tigers (Skubal), Royals (Witt), and Pirates (Skenes). The Rangers are slightly different as they have 3 resident players who were once, and might be again, of superstar caliber (Seager, DeGrom & Semien).

D. Downward Spiral

1) Houston Astros, 2) Milwaukee Brewers, 3) Minnesota Twins, 4) St. Louis Cardinals, 5) Tampa Bay Rays, and 6) Toronto Blue Jays.

Teams that baseball gravity is trying to pull down into the sun where they will burn up or out. Each has a slightly different slant to their problems with staying afloat: Astros (age), Brewers (luck), Twins (constant injuries), Cardinals (organizational rigidity), Rays (personnel problems), and the Blue Jays (impending free agents).

E. Ocean Bottom

1) Chicago White Sox, 2) Colorado Rockies, 3) Los Angeles Angels, 4) Miami Marlins, 5) Oakland [Sacramento/Las Vegas] Athletics [?] and 6) Washington Nationals.

Teams that will not be contending any time soon. Some of these teams are showing signs of life (Oakland and Washington). Some are thrashing around like a gasping fish on land (LA Angels and Miami). Some are just dead on the ground after drowning in a 1-inch-deep pool of water (Chicago & Colorado).

END

Post #42

2024 Mid-Season Round-UP

No plan of operations reaches with any certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy [usually misquoted as: No plan survives first contact with the enemy] – German General Helmuth von Moltke

July 17, 2024

The 2024 season has reached its mid-point. Team’s off-season strategies have been tested and found either inspired, neutral, or wanting. Basically, the clubs can be broken down into three separate categories so far: 1) five great teams (#1-5), nineteen contenders and pretenders (#6-24), and six teams without a hope of anything more than just finishing out the season (#25-30). Where are each of the Major League teams in their individual success cycles? These brief following team capsules will try to answer that question.

Individually, the 2024 season seems to heading into the record books as the year of monster seasons from Aaron Judge in the American League and the irrepressible Shohei Ohtani in the National League (with Gunnar Henderson as a welcome party crasher if he can keep up his pace). Of course, injuries could derail Judge’s and/or Ohtani’s historic years but Baseball fans should send up a prayer that both men remain relatively injury free (Judge has already been hit in the hand and Ohtani slightly hurt his leg sliding but neither player has missed significant time.

#1-5: Great Teams of 2024

1. Philadelphia Phillies [NL] 62-34 [.646] pace 104.6-57.4 [After a third of the season (54 games), the Phillies were 38-16 [on a 114 win pace] . At the halfway point (81 games), they were 53-28 [a 106 win pace].

Of all the teams that broke out of the gate like a house on fire in 2024, only the Phillies have been able to maintain a 100+ win pace at the All-Star break, and this despite injuries to line-up mainstays Trea Turner, Bryce Harper, Kyle Schwarber, and JT Realmuto. Of course, there is good news too. Alec Bohm has matured into a star. Bryce Harper may play close to 150 games this year. Ranger Suarez and Christopher Sanchez have suddenly given the Phillies an incredibly deep starting staff. Kyle Schwarber appears to be in the best shape of his career. The Phillies are peaking and it’s doubtful that their competitive window will be closing any time soon. Go-for broke Dave Drombrowski, the Phillie’s GM, is the perfect fit for this team. The Phillies have to be the odds-on-favorite to win the World Series. Of course, in the current playoff format, the actual odds of that happening are roughly 8.3% [1 of 12 teams in the playoffs] so there’s no reason to begin celebrating yet.

2. Cleveland Guardians [AL] 58-37 [.611] pace 98.9-63.1

Throughout the history of Baseball, many teams have improved their records after a well-regarded long-term manager retired or was fired (almost like the players resented the credit being given to such a manager). I must admit that I believed that the Indians, I mean Guardians, would take a step back once the much beloved Terry Francona left. Instead, the Tribe (I mean Guards) continue to play out of their minds. Is this a one year aberration or the beginning of a new cycle of success? Of course, sometimes its better to be lucky than good. The Guardians fortuitous first lottery pick in 2024 certainly will not hurt. How far away is Travis Bazzana (and why can’t I chose whether that name is cool or ridiculous)? More importantly, can Steven Kwan continue his metamorphism into the late great Tony Gwynn after the former Padre had a conversation with Ted Williams about hitting for power? The Guardians look good for right now and the foreseeable future.

3. Baltimore Orioles [AL] 58-38 [.604] pace 97.9-64.1

Baltimore’s off season strategy was: 1) to let their core continue to mature; 2) acquire an ace to anchor their pitching staff; and 3) add a potential superstar to the roster. The ace, Corbin Burnes, has been everything that was required. The young superstar, Jackson Holliday, was banished back to minors and has been seemingly forgotten. Nevertheless, all eyes are on Gunnar Henderson, who has apparently morphed from a star into a superstar near the caliber of Judge. Despite winning 100 games last season, this Orioles team seems to be just at the beginning of a long success cycle. The team is loaded, the club’s minor leagues are loaded with talent, and the line-up is very very deep. It will take quite a bit of bad luck to take this team back under the 90 win line.

4. New York Yankees [AL] 58-40 [.592] pace 95.6-66.4

The Yankees hit a rough patch before the All-Star break and, predictably, it was their great early 2024 starting pitching that skidded out. But two other huge contributors to the Yank slide were Anthony Volpe and Alex Verdugo. With a third of the season past, Verdugo looked like quite a savvy pick-up. And Volpe looked like he was going to be a star-caliber or even superstar level player. But neither man has been worth a warm pile of spit since then. Despite this, it is extremely unlikely that the Yankees are going to fold up their tents this year. As long as Juan Soto, Aaron Judge, and now Gerrit Cole are healthy, the Evil Empire is back. Unlike some people, I believe that Baseball is better off when the New York Yankees are the overdog.

5. Los Angeles Dodgers [NL] 56-41 [.577] pace 93.5-68.5

The 2024 season has been a long struggle for the LA Dodgers. Injury after injury has crippled the team, particularly the pitching staff. If you could wave a magic wand and make all the Dodger pitchers healthy, this club would have am embarrassment of pitching riches unlike any in baseball history. Sadly, at this point, it doesn’t look like the Dodgers will be able to win one hundred or more games this year (which would give them four straight 100 win seasons, a record). But the signing of Shohei Ohtani last post-season has proven (so far) to be worth every penny. The Dodgers have won at least 91 games in every full season since 2013 and there is no indications that this streak will end any time soon. If they don’t win 100+ games this year, they are a good bet to win 100+ games next year. Like the Yankees, Baseball just seems better off when the Los Angeles Dodgers, the team of Jackie Robinson, are successful.

#6-24: Contenders & Pretenders of 2024

6. Milwaukee Brewers [NL] 55-42 [.567] pace 91.9-70.1

The Brewers continue to walk the tightrope by shedding star players but still continuing to compete. They have been in a “good enough for the playoffs” success cycle for quite some time now. Despite considerable player turnover in recent years, Milwaukee continues to find a path to success. It helps that their one time superstar, Christian Yelich, is having his best season in years. Like most teams that defy gravity, Milwaukee has added some good rookies, Brice Turang and Jackson Churio, while consummating one-sided trades for Willy Adames and William Contreras. The Adames trade (for basically Drew Rasmussen) even fleeced the most respected front office in Baseball (Tampa Bay). The fact that Milwaukee is once again in a playoff position for 2024 is particularly notable because the team has used an astounding 16 different pitchers to start games so far. How long they can continue this Houdini act is unknown. But, if you need to bet on one team to collapse, you may want to put your money on Milwaukee.

7. Minnesota Twins [AL] 54-42 [.563] pace 91.1-70.9

The 2023 Minnesota Twins had a good season by constructing a team with deep depth. The strategy worked and continues to work in 2024. Of course, this blueprint has been used by many clubs over the years (John McGraw and Casey Stengel preached it), but never really for the reason the Twins needed to adopt it. The Twinks have two superstars, Byron Buxton and Royce Lewis, who simply cannot stay healthy. If the Twins ever get both men healthy for an entire season while they are still in their primes, it would probably be epic. But it is unlikely at this point. Injuries beget injuries. When any part of the human body gets hurt, other parts have to compensate. Those parts are then more prone to injury themself. The Hall of Fame pitcher Dizzy Dean reportedly hurt his shoulder after getting hit in the toe by a line drive. As long as the Twins are led by Buxton and Lewis, deep depth is the way to go.

8t. Atlanta Braves [NL] 53-42 [.558] pace 90.4-71.6

The Braves juggernaut seems to be permanently in second gear for 2024. The team’s best player, Ronald Acuna, is injured and out for the year. But he was having a down, way down, season even before he was hurt. Basically, every returning position player on the club, with the exception of Marcell Ozuna, is having an off-year. Despite this, Atlanta is on track for another 90 win season and play-off berth. Strangely, the primary reason for the club’s success this year has been it’s patchwork starting pitching staff. Chris Sale and Reynaldo Lopez were picked off the scrap heap and turned into aces. Max Fried came back completely from an injury plagued 2024 to give the team another ace. Sometimes, it is better to be lucky than good. If the offense ever comes back on-line, the Braves will probably come roaring down the stretch this year. All things considered, the Braves continued competitiveness indicates just how good this team would be with all engines firing.

8t. Boston Red Sox [AL] 53-42 [.558] pace 90.4-71.6

The Red Sox may be the surprise of the season. Perhaps Alex Cora is as good as his publicity claims. The Sox came into 2024 with a plan: 1) Hope enough of their players had good years that the BoSox could contend for a wild card; and 2) Have their starting pitchers throw far more breaking balls than they did in 2023. The first part worked well as the players, despite a bunch of injuries (Tristan Casas, Trevor Story, Vaughn Grissom, etc.), turned into a pretty deep and productive line-up. The second part worked, for awhile, as the starting rotation was lights out in the early season. But you have to wonder how good the BoSox would have been if they had not thrown away the oft-injured Chris Sale before the season started (for Grissom). Obviously, Sale’s return to his 2018 pitching form was not guaranteed. But there were signs in 2023 that it was possible. Making Sale walk the plank was a sign that the Red Sox front office saw this season as yet another rebuilding year. But Baseball can always surprise you. And possibly the biggest surprise of the 2024 season has been the possible transformation of Sox outfielder Jarren Duran into a superstar (or near superstar). Of course, it remains to be seen if Duran is just the second coming of Jacoby Ellsbury (one great season) or the real deal.

10. Kansas City Royals [AL] 52-45 [.536] pace 86.8-75.2

The Royals are one of the best stories in 2024. In 2023, the Royals went 56-106, finishing dead last in the American League Central, 31 games behind the first place Minnesota Twins. But the Royals had hope. The division was weak. In shortstop Bobby Witt, they had a potential franchise cornerstone. In Cole Ragans, they had a possible ace. So, over the winter, the Royals, took a page out of the Twins’ playbook and signed a bunch of deep depth for 2024. They say fortune favors the bold. This KC Royals team is living proof of that axiom. Bobby Witt apparently wants to make Royals’ fans forget George Brett. Cole Ragans has proven to be an ace for as long as his arm holds up. Pitcher Seth Lugo, picked up for deep depth, has been an even better than Ragans. Brady Singer went from washout to yet another very good starter. This is an easy team to root for. Here is hoping that the Royals can grab a playoff spot and make some ripples in the post-season.

11. Seattle Mariners [AL] 52-46 [.531] pace 86.0-76.0

The Mariners have spent the entire 2024 season so far pitching extremely well while hitting like termites have gotten into the wood pile. Julio Rodriguez, the team’s star, has been one of the main culprits for this offensive malaise. Last year, Rodriguez played 79 games in the first half of the season. His offensive stats were 329 AB/48 R/80 H/14 2B/1 3B/13 HR/43 RBI/.243 BA with a .410 SA. Then, playing 76 games in the 2nd half, Rodriguez crunched along at 325 AB/ 54 R/100 H/23 2B/1 3B/19 HR/60 RBI/.308 BA and a .560 SA. He turned 23 on December 29, 2023. It seemed likely that 2024, his 3rd season in the Majors, would herald the arrival of Rodriguez as a superstar with 35 to 40 Home Runs, 110 to 125 Runs batted in, and a batting average around .300 plus a slugging percentage well over .500. Instead, Rodriguez had an even worst 1st half in 2024 than he did in 2023. Will not hitting in the 1st half of the season be a feature, not a bug, in Rodriguez’s game going forward? If they can just start hitting again, the Mariners should cruise into another playoff spot.

12t. Houston Astros [AL] 50-46 [.521] pace 84.4-77.6

Houston is far past the GM Jeff Luhnow tenure now. The architect of the 2017 garbage-can-banging Champions was fired back in January 2020. However, the team he built continues on like some Frankenstein monster, winning the World Championship again in 2022, and still competing in 2024. It seemed like the Astros may may finally met their Waterloo this year, getting out of the gate with a brutal 12-24 record. Despite a decimated pitching staff, the team rebounded nicely to go 38-22 the rest of the way to the All-Star break. There is still enough talent here to compete. But the technocrats brought in by the late and unlamented Luhnow have been replaced by the Jock elite and those that sniff them. Eventually, enough talent will drain away that this Houston dynasty will collapse under the weight of yet unsigned Jose Abreu types. But 2024 will evidently not be that year.

12t. St. Louis Cardinals [NL] 50-46 [.521] pace 84.4-77.6

The St. Louis Cardinals had an off-year in 2023. Rather than shake up the club and bring in some young blood, the Cards’ GM John Mozeliak doubled down on the team’s veteran presence for 2024. He brought back the Field Manager, Oliver Marmol (despite the many signs that Marmol couldn’t manage a meat market). He rebuilt the team’s terrible starting rotation with a bunch of mid-30s free agents who seemed to be all but washed up. This strategy, bringing in even more veterans to prop up an old veteran team, has been used before. The Philadelphia Phillies even won the 1980 World Championship by trying it. However, the usual result is a going down in flames, let’s ride the Hindenburg right to the ground, disaster. But, in this case, the double down strategy has actually worked so far. It could even be argued that, if only the two Cardinals’ resident superstars, Paul Goldschmidt and Nolan Arenado, were performing up to par, the Cards would be even more competitive. Maybe the Redbirds will make another playoff run in 2024. But I simply cannot believe in this club. Bad management and bad karma normally make for bad results. Who would have thought that Masyn Winn would be the Cardinal’s best player in Spring Training this year?

14. New York Mets [NL] 49-46 [.516] pace 83.6-78.4

The Mets are another team trying a deep depth strategy. The team has been stockpiling decent players and now, even with multiple injuries, the strategy is paying off. The Mets have a very robust line-up. Francisco Lindor, Brandon Nimmo, Francisco Alvarez, Pete Alonso, and J.D. Martinez can all crunch the ball. It has been further strengthened by the arrival of Mark Vientos. Barring any injuries, these players will provide the offense. The starting pitching is veteran deep while relief ace Edwin Diaz seems to have finally come back to his 2022 form. If it all comes together, the NY Mets could easily make the playoffs. On the success cycle, the Mets are somewhat of an anomaly. Steve Cohen, the Met’s owner, is reportedly the richest man in Baseball. With plenty of resources, he is trying to field a competitive team while building up a contender/champion from below too. It will be interesting to see the path that the Mets take over the next decade.

15t. Arizona Diamondbacks [NL] 49-48 [.505] pace 81.8-80.2

After losing to the Texas Rangers in the 2023 World Series, Arizona seemed to be a team on the upswing. But 2024 has just been one step forward and then two steps back. Despite the struggles of their best hitter and franchise player Corbin Carroll this year, the primary problem for the Serpientes has been their starting pitching. Merrill Kelly has been hurt. Zac Gallen and Brandon Pfaadt have been mostly second-rate. Jordan Montgomery has lost whatever magic he had in 2023. The Snakes may still make a run this year. If Corbin Carroll can return to form and join the Diamondbacks deep line-up, Arizona will be able to make a playoff charge if the starting rotation is able to step up a little bit. Despite their appearance in the 2023 World Series, Arizona is not at the peak of the success cycle. They are still on the way up.

15t. San Diego Padres [NL] 50-49 [.505] pace 81.8-80.2

The Padres are somewhat unique in respect to the success cycle pattern. In typical cases, a team is either building up, holding on to the peak, trending down, or bottoming out. However, in recent years, the SD Padres threw just about everything they had into immediately peaking before the club’s owner Peter Siedler passed away. This frantic attempt to build a quick champion all but short-circuited the success cycle for San Diego. More importantly, it did not work and Siedler passed away in November of 2023. The Friars seem to have been left with an odd club of refugees from this noble (or crazy) attempt to win one for the Gipper. If they continue to try to win, the Padres risk being caught in the whirlpool that keeps teams in the middle: not good enough to compete and not bad enough to rebuild. Ten years from now, it will be very interesting to go back and see what the Padres gave up by trying to build a quick skyscraper made of straw rather than slowly building it with bricks.

17t. Pittsburgh Pirates [NL] 48-48 [.500] pace 81.0-81.0

The arrival of ace pitcher Paul Skenes has suddenly thrust the Pirates into a win now mode before their interesting core begins reaching free agency. With Mitch Keller and Jared Jones backing up Skenes (and possibly Luis Ortiz, if he is for real), Pittsburgh could give their opponents in the playoffs a rough time if only the Buccos can get there. Unfortunately, the Pirates don’t really have the offense to back up their pitching yet. Brian Reynolds is a good solid star. Shortstop Oneil Cruz has potential to be superstar. Ke’Bryan Hayes may just be having an off year. There is some potential in their rookies and on their farm. But as long as Skenes stays healthy, the Pirates are like the skinny weak guy in the room with the biggest gun.

17t. Tampa Bay Rays [AL] 48-48 [.500] pace 81.0-81.0

Tampa Bay’s front office deservedly has the reputation as being the smartest guys in the room. They keep on competing with a limited budget and near constant turnover of fungible players. Recently, many of the best front offices in Baseball have adopted the strategy of locking up their star and/or superstar players right after they debut in MLB (and sometimes even before their first game). Atlanta made such a fetish of this practice that they basically signed almost their entire up-and-coming team (applying an even greater strategy, spreading the risk). So when Tampa Bay signed 20-year-old future superstar Wander Franco after his rookie season in November 2021 to a 11-year/182 million dollar contract (with 12th year option for 31 million more), it seemed like Tampa Bay had frosted its cake. But sometimes reality smacks even the best laid and most intelligent plans upside the head. With Franco placed on the restricted list for having sex with a 14-year-old girl in his home country of the Dominican Republic, his entire career now is in jeopardy. The only good that come out of this for Tampa is that Franco had not really began to collect any of the monies due him yet (after making 2 million in 2024, his salary was scheduled to jump to 8 million in 2025 but salaries are not paid to players on the restricted list). Now the formerly named Devil Rays find their team in an unenviable position, stuck in the MLB middle. They will need all their smarts or just good luck to get out of this one.

19t. Cincinnati Reds [NL] 47-50 [.485] pace 78.5-83.5

The year 2024 will probably not be the first year of a future success cycle for the Cincinnati Reds. They already have a probable future franchise superstar, Elly De La Cruz, on hand. They also have a possible future ace (barring injury), Hunter Greene, in the rotation. The Redlegs are filling in the supporting cast (Spencer Steer, Andrew Abbott, the injured Matt McClain, maybe Rece Hinds). They reportedly have a good farm system. They are down at the very bottom of success cycle slope looking up. Now it’s just a question of some good luck in player development and drafting, lack of injuries, and maybe some choice trades for a couple of runs at a National League pennant. If the Baseball Gods are good, the spectacular De La Cruz will perform in the post-season soon.

19t. Detroit Tigers [AL] 47-50 [.485] pace 78.5-83.5

The year 2024 will probably not be the first year of a future success cycle for the Detroit Tigers. However, they now have future franchise clean-up hitter, Riley Greenez, on hand. They already have their once and future ace (barring injury), Tarik Skubal, in the rotation. The Felines are filling in the supporting cast (Reese Olson, maybe Colt Keith, the non-seriously injured Kerry Carpenter and Casey Mize). They reportedly have a good farm system. The Cats have a very tradeable asset in Jack Flaherty. They even have another clean-up hitter, Spencer Torkelson, who may be salvageable. They are down at the bottom of success cycle slope looking up. Now it’s just a question of some good luck in player development, drafting, lack of injuries, and maybe some trades for a run or two or three or more at the American League pennant. If the Baseball Gods are kind, the Detroit Tigers will have two 30-40 home run mashers in the heart of their order for the next five years or so.

19t. San Francisco Giants [NL] 47-50 [.485] pace 78.5-83.5

The story of the San Francisco Giants’ off-seasons in recent years has been their search for a tentpole franchise player. Despite all this, the Giants have had no luck. Their best player (by WAR) in 2024 is the offensively flawed but defensively gifted 31-year-old free agent Matt Chapman, signed right before the 2024 season started. If only the promise of Mike Yastrzemski’s first two seasons in the Majors has held up, the SF Giants would have their own star [161 G/563 AB/103 R/158 H/36 2B/7 3B/31 HR/90 RBI/.281 BA/.535 SA/5.3 WAR in 2019 and the 2020 strike seasons combined]. But instead, the 4th-generation Yaz, has had a very weird career, kind of like the Giants themselves recently. Mike Yastrzemski never really showed any promise in the minors. then burst on the scene (as detailed above), and now has settled in, from 2021-2024, as a very useful, but unexciting quasi-regular. The Giants have gone from mediocre (2017-2020), to awesome (107-57 in 2021), to basically exactly average (2022-now). The Giants need to break this cycle of gloom.

22. Chicago Cubs [NL] 47-51 [.480] pace 77.7-84.3

The Chicago Cubs are a hard team to root for because they are one of the many MLB teams owned by a disreputable billionaire. That being said, the Cubbies are one of many teams stuck in the muddling middle of the MLB: not good enough to compete and not lucky or bad enough to get the probable future superstars at the top of the draft. That being said, the Cubs have tried to use the strategy of deep depth (like Minnesota or Boston or San Fran). The basic concept of this strategy is to bring in enough Major League talent that, if they all (or most of them) have good seasons, your club will get into the playoffs. Unfortunately, when injuries and off-years swamp your players, the team will remain stuck in the middle with yet another year wasted. One very interesting aspect of the Cubbies player hoard is that, outside of the Dodgers, they have probably accumulated as much Japanese talent as any other MLB team. Seiya Suzuki is a very good player and may be even greater if he can just stay healthy for a whole season. Shota Imanaga has been a revelation on the mound. Of course, as a very unorthodox pitcher, Imanaga has had the drop on MLB batters. His ERA has risen as they get more familiar with him (now 2.97 at the All-Star break). It will be very interesting to see who ends up with a higher ERA at the end of 2024. Imanaga, or the more highly touted Dodger, Yoshinobu Yamamoto (currently on the injured list with a 2.92 ERA). As far as the Cubbies are concerned in 2024, it is a case of (to paraphrase the old Dodger slogan): Wait until next year.

23. Texas Rangers [AL] 46-50 [.479] pace 77.6-84.4

The 2023 Baseball World Champion Texas Rangers have played in 2024 like someone completely hung over from one hell of a party. Will they get over this vicious hangover before the bell chimes in Baseball’s version of musical chairs? Every year at least one team (sometimes more) in the Major Leagues is completely overwhelmed by injuries (in 2023, it was the Yankees). Perhaps the writing was already on the wall when Texas’ best player, Corey Seager, started the season with a hernia. If Josh Jung and Evan Cater (or even Jacob DeGrom) can return and contribute, if the regular line-up can play up to its standard, if Max Scherzer can remain healthy, the Sheriffs still have a chance. But 2024, so far, just seems like it is destined not to be the Texas Rangers’ year. The glow of the 2023 Championship will have to sustain them.

24. Toronto Blue Jays [AL] 44-52 [.458] pace 74.3-87.7

Break up the Blue Jays. This team is like watching water that never boils. At first, the strange nepotism of having a team lead by the sons of a superstar (Vlad Guerrero Sr.) and plain old star (Dante Bichette) was compelling. But it never congealed. The Club’s two superstars probably need to go some place else and be second fiddles on another team. The likelihood that Vlad Junior turns into the second coming of Prince Fielder increases every year. And who knows what has happened to Bo Bichette? Did the pressure of carrying this team turn him into a pumpkin? Or is he the victim of constant leg injuries this year but keeps on playing. There is a lot of talent here. Time to see if the Jay’s front office can turn this lumpy oatmeal into pudding by cleaning house.

#25-30: Bottom Feeders of 2024

25. Washington Nationals [NL] 44-53 [.454] pace 73.5-88.5.

The Nationals have one thing that the other five bottom feeder MLB teams (#26-30) do not: some justifiable hope. The Nats have traded and drafted well while lying down in the cellar. In fact, as the years meander by, the National’s trade haul from San Diego for Juan Soto will probably generate just as many articles as the St. Louis Cardinals long ago fleecing of Hall of Famer Lou Brock from the hapless Chicago Cubs. With the debut of James Woods in the MLB and the appearance on the horizon of Dylan Crews,* the Nationals have two potential superstars in the pipeline. And these two players are just the tip of the spear. The Nationals stand at the bottom of the success cycle hill. But they are planning a Light Brigade charge to the top.

*Every time I read the last name Crews, I think of the fantastic Burt Reynolds 1974 movie, The Longest Yard, possibly the greatest sports movie ever made. In that movie, Reynold played quarterback Paul (Wrecking) Crew. Unfortunately, I also have to remember the absolute abortion of the Adam Sandler remake. Will Dylan Crews be nicknamed “Wrecking Crews?” I hope not. Who would want to constantly remember something great that was turned into such crud?

26. Los Angeles Angels [AL] 41-55 [.427] pace 69.2-92.8

After being abandoned quite righteously by Shohei Ohtani, the Angels have adopted a dual strategy: 1) sign players who were high draft picks by other teams but have failed to thrive, and 2) sign players in the Draft that they can immediately throw into the crucible of MLB competition.* Neither plan has actually really worked yet. But this flotsam and jetsam have keep the club above the true depths of the the bottom four teams in 2024. Oddly enough, and despite the fact that the team is still owned by Arte Moreno, the Angels are an easy team to root for now. The field manager, Ron Washington, has a history just like his players. He has been knocked down but continues to get right back up. Unfortunately, over the long term, the LA Angels are probably going to continue to be stuck right where they are, in the lower class suburbs of MLB. And, if there is a God in heaven, he will get the talented but always injured Mike Trout out of here and on to a contender (like the Phillies), where he will immediately be healthy enough to play a full 150 games or so.

*They began this odd strategy after bizarrely drafting only pitchers in 2021. That strategy didn’t work either.

27. Oakland Athletics [AL] 37-61 [.378] pace 61.2-100.8

If they were a car, the Athletics would be stuck in neutral. The team is simply marking time until it’s Sacramento to Las Vegas travel plans are realized (or go up in flames). The only real question is: will the A’s completely commit to a five-year tear down plan or just try to muddle through? If they do commit, Mason Miller and his bazooka arm will be traded immediately before he has to undergo a, probably inevitable, Tommy John surgery (an ulnar collateral ligament strain put him into the bullpen). Brent Rooker, currently 29 years old, and every other player over 30 should be traded away for whatever they can bring in, either a suspect prospect or a ham sandwich. No matter whether they trade or stay the course, the Athletics’ position in the winning cycle will probably be wallowing in the shallow end of the pool for quite some time.

28. Colorado Rockies [NL] 34-63 [.351] pace 56.8-105.2

The Major Leagues most boring team is probably the Rockies. Probably the club’s two most interesting players (from an accomplishment perspective) are Charlie Blackman and Kris Bryant. Blackman is all but washed up while Bryant has been all but washed away by a constant stream of injuries and possibly indifference. Ownership & the front office are functionally clueless. Perhaps the only hope is that the Rockies draft well (or luckily). But the changes to the amateur draft make this much harder to do while haunting the lower depths of the Major League standings. Many companies operate on five (or ten) year plans. If the Rockies even have a plan, it is either unknown or, more likely, just incompetent.

29. Miami Marlins [NL] 33-63 [.344] pace 55.7-106.3

Does Miami suffer from the curse of Jose Fernandez? The team’s pitching seems to be repeatedly ravaged by injuries. If he had not died in a September 2016 boat accident, Fernandez would have turned 32 on July 31, 2024. Would his career already be over, his arm broken by the modern pitching obsession with throwing as hard as possible all the time? Or would his career have been simply derailed by injuries and possibly drug suspensions like a modern-day Dwight Gooden? Or would he have matured into a multiple Cy Young award winner? It is always good to remember that sometimes team building is more about luck than anything else. If only Fernandez’ boat had missed that pier. Before the 2024 season, the Fish flushed out the last little bits of the Derek Jeter’s former front office regime by throwing GM Kim Ng overboard while demoting her. However, there does not appear to be any plan in place on how to proceed now that she’s gone. The club seems to be operating on a wish and a prayer.

30. Chicago White Sox [AL] 27-71 [.276] pace 44.6-117.4

At the All-Star break, the White Sox still employ and regularly play two of the worst players in the Majors, Andrew Benitendi [the #2 worst player by WAR at -1.8] and Martin Maldonaldo [#4 at -1.5].* Both of these players were terrible free agent signings. However, it could have been much worse. Imagine if the Pale Hose had resigned Jose Abreu [#3 at -1.6] and Tim Anderson [#8 at -1.3]. Fortunately for Chicago, they did not bring either player back, hoping for a dead cat bounce but getting a dead cat splat. Both Abreu and Anderson have been discarded by their new teams like yesterday’s newspapers. Unfortunately for Baseball history, the White Sox did not keep their two washed up stars so they could make a run at the all-time 1899 Cleveland Spider record of 134 losses in a season. Here is hoping that the doomed White Stockings trade away their only remaining valuable players (Garrett Crochett in particular), so they can take a shot at the modern record for losses, 120 by the 1962 New York Mets. If you are going to go down in flames, you might as well make it epic. The White Sox position in the success cycle? The Pale Hose are flat on their faces while drowning in a one-inch puddle.

*The player with the worst WAR at the 2024 All-Star break was the Pittsburgh Pirates outfielder Jack Suwinski at -2.1 wins below average.

Post# 41

Baseball’s Basic Math: New York Yankees

Nothing great was ever achieved without enthusiasm. Ralph Waldo Emerson

June 12, 2024

Introduction

From May 24th [San Diego Padres] to May 30th [Atlanta Braves], all the teams in the Major Leagues played their 54th game of the 2024 season. For reasons no longer completely clear to me, I spent from May 25th to June 10th writing 30 team summaries for the first third of the 20204 season. By the time that I was done, the summaries were slightly to considerably out of date. Instead of simply publishing them all at once after the expiration date, I decided to post them one at a time with an update. I’ll begin with the NY Yankees because: 1) it was the longest essay and 2) took up the most time. One last explanation: I wanted to rank the teams 1 through 30. This was made difficult by the simple fact that: 2 teams ended the first third at 31-23; 6 teams finished at 27-27; five teams finished at 25-29; etc. So I used a formula to differentiate. For Example, the Yanks below finished the first third at 37-17. If they kept that pace for the entire season they would finish 111-51. But their Pythagorean record actually would come out to 115-47.* The ranking is based on doubling their projected wins (111 x 2) and then adding in their Pythagorean wins (115 x 1) for a total of 337. The Yankees finished a close second to the Philadelphia Phillies using this completely arbitrary system. In any case, here is the Yankee essay which was also the first finished on May 28th.

*Pythagorean projection based on Runs Scored Squared/(Runs scored squared + Runs scored against squared). In the first third, the NY Yankees scored 264 runs while giving up just 169. Their offense was sixth but their defense was first by a considerable margin.

Out of Date Yankee Essay (played their 54th game on May 25th]

Essay 2. New York Yankees 37-17 [Pace 111-51/Pythagoras 115-47/~337].

What a difference a year makes. The Yanks, destroyed in 2023 by injury after injury, have had much better health this year. The Yankees’ only main injury in 2024, to starter Gerrit Cole, has been completely mitigated by the emergence of 2 good starting pitchers: Luis Gil (projected 18-3 and 6.0 WAR)* and also Clarke Schmidt (p 15-6 and 4.8 WAR). The free agent signee Marcus Stroman (p 12-6 and 2.76 ERA), a healthy Carlos Rodon (p 18-6 and 2.95), and Nelson Cortes (p 9-12 but 3.29) have combined with both Gil and Schmidt to give the Yankees the best pitching staff in the Majors. With 5 healthy starters, a decent bullpen, and Clay Holmes emerging as a great closer (p 69 games, 1.57 and 45 saves), the pitching was the backbone of the Yankees impressive start. The offense hasn’t been bad either. The trade for Juan Soto (p 42 HR-129 RBI-.309 BA/8.1 WAR) was predictably good. Aaron Judge, after a slow start, has turned back the clock to 2022 (p 162 G/54 2B/51 HR/117 RBI/.280 BA/.637 SA and 9.9 WAR). Giancarlo Stanton (p 39-87-.250/.509/1.5 WAR) has contributed rather than disintegrated. The trade for Alex Verdugo (p 18-81-.261) has lengthened the line-up. But the smartest move made by the Yanks was letting Anthony Volpe struggle through the 2023 season. Now a seasoned player, Volpe has given the Yankees an additional superstar (p 18-69-.282/105 runs scored/30 stolen bases). Volpe is projected to have a 7.5 WAR season in 2024. Even if he fades, Volpe has almost surely become the third best Yankee after Judge and Soto. From the ashes of 2023, this championship season is rising.

*Statistics in these third of a season essays are usually projected over a full year (in other words, multiplied by 3). Projected stats are listed with an initial “p.” If there is no “projected” designation or “p” notation, these are the actual stats.

Outlook for the rest of 2024: The Yankees almost feel like a team of destiny at this point. They could even improve a bit if Anthony Rizzo (p 21-75-.250) and Gleyber Torres (p 12-48-.222) return to form. There is even the possibility the Stanton has untapped reserves (he is projected for just 36 walks this season, possibly a sign of impatience). Stanton has always been a streaky player. He could go on a tear. The Yankees offense may actually be under-performing too. Their statistics indicate that the Yanks should have the best offense in the Majors. The team OPS+ is 774, first over the Dodgers (765) and Phillies (752). But the main reason to believe in the Yankees comes down to two things: 1) Gerrit Cole is evidently OK and coming back and 2) there are signs that Aaron Judge (absent injury) may actually be on his way to a better season than he had in 2022. I watch a lot of Yankee games. Judge looks totally relaxed and locked in. He does not have to worry about his next contract. He will not have the added pressure of trying to break the American League home run record. The Yankees are playing fantastically well. There is an old saying that a rising tide lifts all boats. I think that the Yanks and Judge are a closed circuit. Judge will ascend as the Yankees rise and the Yankees will ascend as Judge rises. I think there is a good chance that Judge re-breaks his own AL HR record. It may even be in the cards for Judge to take a run at Bonds. It probably will not happen, but beautiful dreams are just that until they become reality.

New York Yankees 2024 Update [June 13]: Record 49-21 [12-4 since 54].

The Yankees rampage continues. Clarke Schmidt’s recent injury (oblique) has not even slowed them down. Cody Poteet, a career minor leaguer, stepped in and has filled in remarkably (great and good teams are often distinguished by obscure minor leaguers having terrific years). The arrival of Gerrit Cole is right around the corner now. When Schmidt returns, the Yanks will have excellent pitching depth to deal with injuries. The Yanks have actually accelerated since the end of the first third. For the most part, all the players, with one exception, are playing at about the same pace. But the one exception is huge. After 54 games, Aaron Judge was hitting .280/.413/.637 with 17 homers. In 15 games since (16 team games, he took one off), Judge has crunched 8 more HRs and is now slashing .306/.443/.702 and is on pace for a 12.0 WAR season (up from just 9.9 projected WAR after 54 games). It is often said that Aaron Judge is the consummate team player. It certainly looks like he is feeding off the Yankee’s success this year. He is always smiling. History awaits.

Post #40


Baseball Season’s Basic Math

Yesterday is not ours to recover, but tomorrow is ours to win or lose. Lyndon B. Johnson

May 23, 2024

Diamond Dust #3

Introduction: Calculations, Computations and Projections

One of the most basic joys of every baseball season is projecting how well (or how poorly) a player, a pitcher or even a team is doing over a short stretch for the whole 162 game length. After 27 games, the season is exactly 1/6th in the books (6×27=162). When the Angels played their 27th game this year, Mike Trout had hit 10 home runs. He was precisely on pace for 60 HRs for the year. Of course, poor Trout went down with a knee injury shortly thereafter, quickly ending any dream that he would hit even 30, much less 60, home runs for the season. When the Dodgers finished their 27th game this year, Shohei Ohtani had stroked 14 doubles. He was on pace for 84 doubles in 2024, which would obliterate the Major League record of 67 in a season by Earl Webb (and was also almost halfway to his own career high of 30 which took him 157 games). Oddly, Ohtani promptly stopped hitting boatloads of doubles and his 2B rate quickly fell behind Webb’s record pace. The Chicago White Sox began 2024 by going a horrific 3-22 and articles where written that they might break the New York Mets’ record of 120 losses in a season. Since then, the White Sox have gone 12-13, making that complete collapse scenario quite unlikely. The adjustments and counter-adjustments by the players, the ebb and flow of the teams’ schedules, and the capricious luck of the game itself eventually evens almost everything out. Except for those rare times when it does not.

Just two years ago, baseball gravity did not bring Aaron Judge back to earth and he crushed 62 homers to break the America League HR record. In 2024, we may be seeing yet another Icarus who does not fall out of the sky. Shohei Ohtani, taking a year off from the rigors of pitching, free from the LA Angels’ dungeon, with his concentration possibly sharpened by getting married, and perhaps even hyper-focused after his interpreter stole millions of dollars from him, may be on his way to a Baseball season to remember. Or not, only time will tell. But, whether Ohtani does or does not continue to impress, it will not detract one bit from the simple mathematical beauty of the first half of every Baseball season. Of course, the 6×27=162, 5×32=160, and even the 4×40=160 calculations are already in the 2024 rear view mirror. However, the 3×54=162 marker is already almost here. The perfect fulcrum calculations of 2×81=162 and somewhat far less satisfying 1.5×108=162 multiplications still wait in the not too distant future. Usually, all these early season projections of Baseball player’s future performance are just an exercise in daydreaming. But, when they are not, a baseball fans gets to watch Baseball history unfold in real time. Of course, math is not the only way to enjoy the Baseball present. One other way is to look over what is happening and search for deeper trends.

Does increasing pitch speed depress position player career length?

In 2022, the 42-year-old Albert Pujols retired after a long career [2001-2022]. Basically, the first half of Pujols’ career [2001-2011] was a superb audition for the Hall of Fame. The second half of his career [2012-2022] was a long slow decline into mediocrity. From 2017 to 2021, Albert was a below average hitter (by OPS+). In 2022, he did have one last glorious part-time season, ending on a high note. In 2023, the 40-year-old Miguel Cabrera also retired after a long career [2003-2023]. Cabrera started his career as a very good hitter and eventually peaked as an all-time-great batter from 2010 to 2013. Until 2016, he was still one hell of a hitter. A back injury in 2017 basically ended his useful career as a player. From 2017 until 2023, Cabrera was a below average hitter (by OPS+) for five of his seven remaining seasons. The two seasons that Cabrera was not below average (2018 & 2020), he barely played (38 & 57 games respectively). Unlike Pujols, Cabrera did not go out in a blaze of glory. He waddled through 2023 to collect the last year on his contract. For many years, I believed that the two main reasons behind both Pujols’ and Cabrera’s long slow glidepaths into retirement were: 1. neither player bothered to keep themselves in good condition at all after signing long-term contracts; and 2. neither player’s team could buy into the economic philosophy of “sunk costs” and simply eat the remainder of their bloated contracts. But now, thinking it over, I wonder if there was another reason that both men struggled mightily in their 30s?

It has been stated that the average speed of a Major League fastball has risen from about 91 mph in 2000 or so to 94 mph presently [2020 or so]. The basic fast-twitch-muscle-responses of the human body peaks from ages 18 to 21. With pitchers throwing harder & harder, would it not follow that this rise in velocity would make it harder and harder for players aging into their 30s to continue to perform at a high level? Was this a contributing factor to the decline of Pujols and Cabrera? Perhaps more importantly, will this have an effect on all the players currently signing contracts that take them deep into their 30s and even 40s? Recently, there have been a few articles written about the fact the no active players are really close to collecting 500 home runs or 3000 hits. The basic conclusion of these articles was that this was just an anomaly and it would straighten itself out eventually. But what if it is not? What is Baseball is becoming more and more a young man’s game because of fast-twitch dominance? Mike Trout, the greatest player of the last Baseball generation, has seen his career in his 30s derailed by injuries…but also by a sky-rocketing strikeout rate. There are other players (looking at you, Giancarlo Stanton) who have also lost control of the strike zone in their 30s. Has the game tilted strongly towards those who are still in their 20s? If it has, this will also have long term ramifications on the economics of Baseball. Right now, the salary structure of Major League Baseball is designed to take money from young players and reward veterans (an arrangement which was built by both the Baseball owners and the Player’s Union). Can any system which robs the productive members and rewards the unproductive persist?

Will six man pitching rotations start being adopted in 2024?

It is almost inevitable that Major League pitching rotations will increase from five to six pitchers. With pitching staffs now almost always 13 men large, the split of 6 starters and 7 relievers (rather than 5 and 8) seems more logical. It will reduce the stress on starter’s shoulders and elbows. Right now, a pitcher in a five man rotation will start about 32 or 33 games in a season. A pitcher in a 6-man rotation will start exactly 27 games if their team sticks strictly to such a schedule. Of course, with pitchers averaging about six innings per start, the qualification (162 innings pitched in a season) for winning the ERA [earned run average] title may become problematical. If all the teams used a six-man rotation, it would be possible for only four or five pitchers, all below average, to qualify for that title. In 2023, the Philadelphia Phillies went to a six-man rotation to prepare for the play-offs. At the beginning of 2024, it seemed likely that the he Dodgers could become the first team to permanently adopt a six man rotation. The Achilles heal of the recent Dodger’s super teams has been just getting into the post-season with a healthy starting pitching staff (the teams’ one recent World Championship came when the 2020 strike kept their starters fresh). Yoshinabu Yamamoto, the teams’ new ace pitcher from Japan has spent his entire career pitching in a six-man rotation. The other Dodger’s ace, Tyler Glasnow, has never even approached the 5-man rotation minimum 30 starts & 180 IP standard because of injuries. The Dodgers have multiple pitchers returning from assorted injuries (Clayton Kershaw, Walker Buehler, and Dustin May), not to mention a bunch of possible rookie starters. It seems inevitable that the LA Dodgers will eventually go a strict six-man or looser always five days of rest rotation. And it also seems likely that a strict 6-man rotation will also let average fastball velocity increase yet some more. But it hasn’t happened yet.

Many proposals have been floated to bring back the old school 250-300 IP starting pitcher. But the answer is obvious. It is just a question of roster size. With 13 pitchers, the average pitcher has to throw 112 or so innings (162×9= 1458/13=112+ innings pitched). If you limit the roster size of just pitchers to 10, that jumps to 145+ innings pitched. Of course, the Player’s union would almost surely object severely to that type of roster limitation. However, the 10 pitcher limit does have a link to tradition. The 25-man player roster has been around since about 1920; and, for most of that time, the pitching staff was usually 10 men. The recent (2020) increase of the total roster size to 26 players did not help with the diffusion of innings pitched between ever more pitchers. As long as the Major Leagues allow their teams to place 13 (even 14) pitchers on the roster, the current trend against starting pitchers pitching 200 or more innings in a season will continue. Perhaps a limit to just twelve pitchers would be a start? One interesting facet of this roster management problem could be combination pitcher/players like Shohei Ohtani. Perhaps the Major Leagues could encourage future Ohtanis by excluding players who play more games in the field (or at DH) from the roster limit? But, no matter what the Major Leagues decides to do about this issue, the actual solution to increasing starting pitching workload will always begin with just reducing the number of pitchers that a team can carry. And, of course, reducing the roster size of the pitching staff will also bring down the average fastball velocity as pitchers need to preserve their arms to throw more pitches & innings.

What happens to Players caught up in the Current Culture War?

Long ago, Major League caliber players were excluded from the Majors for a completely spurious reason: the color of their skin. But, other than that piece of historical stupidity, players have usually been allowed to play in the Majors no matter what horrible blemish is contained in their life stories. Both Henry Thompson and Cesar Cedeno played in the Major Leagues despite murdering someone. Manslaughter, at the very least, was not enough to keep them out. In the 1930s, Edwin “Alabama” Pitts was allowed to play in the minors despite spending 6 years in Sing Sing prison for robbery. In the 1970s, Ron Leflore played in the Major Leagues after three years behind bars for armed robbery. Considering that past, it seems slightly strange that three star caliber players are currently unemployed basically by becoming entangled in modern culture wars. Alphabetically, these players are Trevor Bauer, Wander Franco and Julio Urias. All have run afoul of the “MeToo movement” that condemns violence against women. This movement began in 2006 and peaked in 2017 with the accusation and eventual conviction of movie producer Harvey Weinstein for multiple offenses against numerous women. Although none of the Baseball players accused of violence against women seems to be quite the monster that Weinstein apparently is (was?), each has been accused of something that should make them unwelcome in polite society. Trevor Bauer was accused of beating a woman unconscious during consensual “rough” sex (and several other women came forward to establish this as his pattern). Wander Franco was accused of sexually exploiting a 14-year-old girl. Julio Urias got into an argument with his significant other and put his hands on her in a very hostile manner.* Will any of these men play Major League Baseball again?

*The Urias incident, as reported, is actually a bit confusing. Some sources stated Urias hit his girlfriend. Other sources claimed he choked his wife. Apparently, he is not married and it was his long term significant other. Exactly how Urias assaulted her is somewhat unclear.

Right now, there doesn’t seem to be any path back to the Major Leagues for Bauer, Franco, or Urias. Although all three men deserve to be punished, I am uncomfortable with the current electric chair to their career approach. While retaliation has its place, there must also be rehabilitation in a civilized society. Could the Commissioner’s Office and the Player’s Union not negotiate some type of agreement outlining these player’s way back. Make them give half of their salaries to charities against whatever crime they committed. Make them do community service. Take away the argument that these players need to be ostracized forever and replace it with the fact that they could do some good. Of course, that would be pro-active approach, something usually foreign to Baseball. The Major Leagues seem to usually like to wait until a problem just disappears or becomes life-threatening. In the case of the 3 players named above, they are all probably doomed. Franco is probably the least doomed. He is still drawing his salary from Tampa Bay, his crimes happened in another country with different rules, and the situation between himself and the victim contains a greater criminal (the victim’s mother). Urias may eventually be able to return to the Majors because no one seems to be paying any attention to it. Bauer, who was never convicted of anything at all, is probably just screwed. He was considered an asshole before the scandal happened, has been totally unrepentant since it happened, and his signing by a team will surely generate a ton of bad publicity. Perhaps his only hope now is that someone from the ownership ranks, a traditionally uber-conservative group, desires to send a message of contempt to modern cancel culture.

The Latest Candidate for the Dwight Evans’ Career Path?

One of my favorite players of all time was Dwight Evans (Dewey!), the right fielder for the Boston Red Sox in the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1970s, Dwight was one-third of a fascinating outfield with Jim Rice and Fred Lynn. All three players ended their careers with borderline Hall of Fame cases. A very good argument can be made that any or all of the three belong in the Hall; but an equally good argument could be made that none of them do. Rice, of course, is in the Hall despite his sketchy qualifications. Lynn and Evans remain on the outside looking in. Rice and Evans are somewhat opposite. Rice had his best years in the 1970s but faded in the 1980s. Dwight Evans, on the other hand, struggled in the 1970s but found himself in the 1980s. Fragile Freddy Lynn, perhaps the most talented of the three, simply could not stay healthy enough in either decade. Evans’ career path was pretty unusual. He came up in 1972 at the age of 20. But he could not seem to harness his talents. Dewey had injuries, inconsistencies and an everchanging batting stance. However, in the strike year of 1981, Evans seemed to finally put it all together. From 1972 to 1980 (ages 20-28), he had only played 140 or more games 4 times with a high of 152. But in 1981, he played every game (all 108) during the aborted season. Before 1981, his highest OPS+ was a good, but not great 128. In 1981, Evans had a fantastic (and career high) OPS+ of 163. He led the American League in plate appearances, homers, total bases, and walks. It was Evans’ career year but it was not a fluke. Dewey maintained a much higher level of production for the rest of his career. After he turned 30, Evans played 140 or more games seven more times with a peak of 162 twice. He also cleared an OPS+ of 128 six more times with a peak of 157. After turning 30, Evans accumulated more than half of his career WAR [Wins Above Replacement]. Dwight Evans was a quintessential Baseball late bloomer.

A little while ago, I wondered if another Red Sox outfielder, Jackie Bradley Jr., would follow in Dwight Evans’ footsteps. Bradley came up in 2013 at the age of 23 (Evans had signed out of High School while Bradley had signed out of College which partially explains the difference in their ages during their Major League debuts). Bradley was, with Andrew Benintendi and Mookie Betts, also part of a much celebrated young outfield trio. But unlike Evans and his mates, not all of these three players turned in very good to almost great careers. The unbelievable Betts turned into a no-doubt Hall of Famer. But Bradley Jr. and Benintendi will need to buy a ticket to visit that Baseball shrine. Like Dewey, Bradley was a fantastic defensive outfielder. But Jackie Jr. was a center fielder while Dewey played right. Bradley played his first full season in 2014. And it was beyond ghastly offensively. In 127 games and 382 ABs, Bradley hit just one home run, batted .198, and slugged .266 (his OPS+ was just 49).* But he hit well in a half season in 2015 (119 OPS+), had his career year in 2016 (26 HRs/87 RBIs/.267 BA). From 2017-2019, Bradley was a slightly below average batter (OPS+ from 89 to 92). But the really odd thing about Bradley was that he, in every season from 2015 to 2019, combined hot streaks in which he was the best hitter on the team with terrible cold spells that looked he had never ever swung a bat before. In the strike year of 2020, Bradley was 30 and hit a career high .283. His OPS+ was 116. If he could minimize the cold patches & maximize when he was on-fire, it seemed like he could have a much greater second half of his career. Instead, Bradley promptly hit for the consecutively pathetic BAs of .163, .203, and .133 [2021-2023]. Bradley then fell right out of the Majors. Jackie Bradley Jr. was no Dewey Evans.

*OPS+ equals a player’s on-base percentage [OBP] and slugging average [SA] combined and then normalized for park effects on a scale of 100. A 49 OPS+ is beyond terrible.

There are two current players who may be able to be qualify for the mythical Dewey Evans Late Bloomer Award. One is Minnesota outfielder Matt Kepler. Kepler was raised in Germany by his American mother and Polish father, who were both ballet dancers. Hardly a normal Baseball lineage. Reportedly, he had never faced a pitcher who threw over 80 mph before he came to the US as an adult. In his 20s, Kepler was noted for a significant flaw: he hit far too many ground balls to access his full talents. He seemed to have all the signs of a late bloomer: little experience at Baseball when he was young, underlying talent, and correctable flaws. He debuted for the Twins in 2015 at the age of 22 and has been a regular since 2016. But basically, with the exception of the home-run-happy year of 2019 and the dismal strike-shortened 2020 , Kepler was a below average hitter from 2016 to 2022. However, he seemed to turn a corner in 2023 after turning 30 years old (123 OPS+ matching his career high in 2019). He has so far continued this late-in career renaissance in 2024. Here is hoping he can keep it up. The other current player who is a possible Dewey Evans style late-bloomer is Jurickson Profar. Profar debuted in the Majors in 2012 at the age of 19 and looked like a potential coming star in 2013. Profar then missed both the 2014 & 2015 seasons to shoulder injuries. From 2016 to 2023, Profar has mixed decent seasons (2018, 2020, 2022) with poor years (2016, 2019, 2021, and 2023) and yet another injury season (2017). It seemed like all his initial potential had been squandered. This was quite sad because, by all reports, Profar is a well respected man. However, in 2024 at the age of 31, Profar seems to have gotten a second win. Will it continue on? Only time will tell. On thing that both Kepler and Profar have in common is that, as they reached their 30s, both players rediscovered their joy in playing the game. If they can keep it up, it will make for a great and uplifting story.*

*It could be argued that the ever increasing fastball velocity in the Majors will make it even harder to be a late bloomer like Evans. If this is true, the stories of Kepler and Profar will be that much better if they are able to maintain their recent improvements deep into their 30s.

Conclusion: Waiting for the 54th and 81st mile (game) markers.

The 2024 season is fully underway. It will soon be Summer once again and some questions will be clearer. Will Shohei Ohtani and Gunnar Henderson be able to keep up their current paces? Will some player explode on the League like Sammy Sosa did in 1997 with his record (although steroid fueled) 20 HRs in month. The season is still young but the prologue and the first act are now in the books.

Post #39

Spring Training Dreams

I’ve always been fascinated by people, their psychology, what drives them and trying to understand them. Adan Canto

March 27, 2024

Diamond Dust #2

Perhaps the most famous meeting in the history of Baseball was when Branch Rickey met Jackie Robinson in 1945. Rickey, part-owner and also the General Manager of the Brooklyn Dodgers, interviewed Robinson for over two hours to try to determine whether Jackie was the man who should break the odious “color line” that had stained the game basically since its inception. But it is also obvious that Rickey wanted to know if Jackie Robinson’s psyche was as well suited for the game of baseball as it was for integration. In many ways, Rickey’s entire career was an exercise in such amateur psychology. Branch Rickey was always fascinated by how a player’s personality affected athletic performance. This is also an interesting subtext to the recent book Moneyball that has been lost in all the hoopla about applying modern business analysis to baseball. The very sad core of the book is how Billy Beane’s psychological makeup made it difficult for him to apply his natural athletic gifts to playing baseball. He should have been a superstar. He was not. Psychology both giveth and taketh away. One of the wonderful things about Baseball’s Spring Training is that hope springs eternal. And all this hope is usually some type of applied psychology. Young players make mental adjustments. Older players train harder (or not) to stay young. Pitchers adopt new pitches and strategies. Hitters come up with a new plan. Whole teams either change their course or double down on a strategy that works (or does not). In Spring Training, all dreams are possible before the rubber hits the road of the actual season. In Spring Training, you can watch the psychology of the game and its players unfold before your eyes.

The Tao of Ohtani

Of course, the biggest story of the Spring was Shohei Ohtani. His move from the Angels to the Dodgers reinforced the impression that he was completely in control of every aspect of his life. Ohtani basically wrote his new contract himself. He then presented it to those teams that he was considering. In the end, he choose the Dodgers, the logical choice. The contract maximized the chances for Ohtani to be on a winning team, get to the play-offs, and finally be part of a World Championship team. Ohtani has always been presented by his handlers as a baseball savant. Baseball was his life. Everything he does is part of his goal to be the best there ever was (shades of Roy Hobbs). During the Spring, it was announced that he had gotten married. The careful reveal of his wife and even the name of their dog was totally on message. Ohtani was completely in control. Psychologically, it seemed like Ohtani was just a freak of nature. There was no messiness in his life, no loose ends. Everything was carefully considered and perfectly planned. And then the illusion crashed to the earth. His personal interpreter, Ippei Mizuhara, got caught paying 4.5 million dollars to a bookie! There were only two real possibilities. Either the interpreter was running bets for Ohtani or the interpreter had embezzled the money from Ohtani. Fortunately for Baseball, it appears that the disheveled* Mizuhara stole the money and that Ohtani is not some modern day Pete Rose. But the carefully constructed media image of Ohtani has almost surely been ruined for good. He may be more of an idiot savant than a baseball buddha. Like most people who put all their energy into a single pursuit, other skills are seriously lacking (like the ability to judge people). It will be very interesting to see if Ohtani psychologically sublimates all this. In other words, he puts all his disappointment and energy into the one thing that has always rewarded him. If so, I predict Ohtani hits more than 50 HRs this year, breaking the Dodger’s single season team record.

*Every time I’ve ever seen Ippei Mizuhara, I always wondered about his hair. Was this a common Japanese hairstyle? Did he know it looked like he had never meet a hair stylist? Why was he so disheveled looking? But then my conscience would remember the old saying: “Never judge a book by its cover.” And I would feel slightly bad. But perhaps there is some truth in stereotypes? Can a stereotype even become a stereotype without any truth at all?

Some Players to Watch in 2024

But Ohtani and the Dodgers are hardly the only Spring Training daydream that is available. There is his teammate Mookie Betts’ transfer from the OF to 2B and then shortstop. Mookie has a reputation for being one of the nicest guys in baseball.* If he has the uber-competitive gene of most top athletes, Betts keeps it well hidden. But his position transfer actually revealed it briefly. When he was signed by the Boston Red Sox in 2011, Betts originally played second base (and some shortstop). But the Red Sox soured on Mookie as an infielder. By 2014, the year that he debuted in the Majors, Betts was just an outfielder. With his position switch back to the infield, Mookie revealed that he has always resented the Red Sox’ judgment of his infielding skills. It will be interesting to see who is right, the Red Sox or Betts. My money is on Mookie. Many great athletes are driven by grievance. It will also be interesting to see how Bryce Harper’s resentment of his contract works itself out. In one of the stranger storylines from 2024 Spring Training, Harper announced his desire to rework his contract [330 million dollars over 13 years]. With the top baseball players now making up to 42 million dollars a year, Harper is obviously feeling that his 25 million plus per season is inadequate. Of course, if Harper injures his back tomorrow and can no longer play, all that money is still going to be paid to him. And Bryce Harper has, shades of Don Mattingly, a history of back issues. His team, the Phillies, has done the right thing and basically ignored the demands of their best player. Harper’s response to Philadelphia’s refusal to engage was fascinating. He stated that he would remain productive deep into his 40s and was worthy of a raise. Both Betts and Harper now carry their resentments into the 2024 season. Unless injury unfortunately interferes, they are also both primed psychologically, like Ohtani, for great seasons.

*A woman that I know meet Mookie Betts out on the town when he played for Boston. She is an attractive woman and was studying dentistry at Tufts. She had no idea who Betts was (she began a conversation with me by asking: “Have you ever heard of this guy?”). She told me that he was a perfect gentlemen, talked about his long time girlfriend, and then paid for her and her friends’ drinks and hors d’oeuvres.

Some Things to Anticipate in 2024.

The psychology of Spring Training is all about anticipation. Which pitchers will take a step forward? Spencer Strider unveiled a new curve ball. Will he become the modern Sandy Koufax or Nolan Ryan? Yoshinabu Yamamoto is here in the Majors. Will he be the star that he was in Japan? Tyler Glasnow announced that his elbow actually felt good for the first time in years. Will he be able to pitch for a whole season without falling apart? The San Francisco Giants are giving the 100-mph flamethrowing-reliever Jordan Hicks a chance to transition to a starting pitcher. Will Hick’s new splitfinger pitch allow him to become the ace of the SF staff (or even just a good starter)? But there are negative anticipations too. Which pitchers will blow out their arms? Is Gerrit Cole going to need a Tommy John procedure? Will Kodai Senga’s shoulder heal? Of course, pitchers are far more volatile than position players. Among the position players, Spring Training is even more of a fresh start. Will Bobby Witt Jr. and Julio Rodriguez take yet another step forward from superstars to legends? Will Juan Soto, finally in his walk year, recover his Ted Williams type mojo and receive a long term contract? Will Cody Bellinger recover his 2019 MVP type form, have another good season like 2023, or sadly turn back into the pumpkin that he was from 2020 to 2022? Will Vlad Guerrero Jr. reverse the downhill slope of his career before he turns into the next Prince Fielder? Will Anthony Volpe be able to change his swing from a home run uppercut to a line drive machine gun? Will rookie Wyatt Langford rampage through the Majors as he has through the Minors? Will Joey Gallo hit more than .200 far away from the lights of Broadway? And on down the line to players that not only the biggest baseball nerd knows. When Spring Training finally ends, the answer to all these questions starts.

Teams have Psychology too

Of course, there is also the group psychology of the team itself to consider. Last year, the New York Yankees’ season was swamped by injuries and under-performance. But the institutional memory of the Yankees almost demands excellence. Will this group identity be enough to overcome their lost season? In other words, will the fact that they did not rise to what was expected cause them to work harder as a group to rebound? Giancarlo Stanton is probably the weathervane of this particular speculation. It will also be very interesting to see how the Yankees traditional rival, the Boston Red Sox, play out the year. The Red Sox have decided as a team to do the minimum to compete, hoping to just a catch a wave of over-performance to make a play-off run. During the off-season, it seemed like the Red Sox matched perfectly with free agent pitcher Jordan Montgomery. They needed pitching. Jordan’s wife attended college in Boston. But the BoSox just could not pull the trigger. No reason why was given. Was it because Montgomery’s conditioning will remind you of David Wells’ physique? But how does this affect team morale? Indications are that the core players of the Red Sox know the team is non-competitive from the top. It seems like this season for Boston may be much worse than is being projected [somewhere between 78-82 wins]. But the most interesting group psychology experiment for the 2024 season is being conducted by the St. Louis Cardinals. Ollie Marmol, the team’s manager in 2023, ran the Cards into the ground with a series of poorly thought-out personnel decisions and conflicts. Rather than firing Marmol, the Cardinals oddly doubled down by extending him. In the long history of Baseball, there are many examples of managers that lost control of their clubhouses [most famously, Ossie Vitt and the 1939 Cleveland Indians and Vern Rapp and the 1978 St. Louis Cardinals]. If the Cardinals collapse in 2024, will they finally fire Marmol?

Conclusion (or Play Ball!)

Watching the drama of applied human psychology play out on the field is one of the many joys of Baseball. But sometimes this psychology ends up playing out over the course of several seasons or even an entire career. For the 2024 season, the Atlanta Braves placed a bet on two potentially brilliant change-of-scenery moves. They traded for a young Jarred Kelenic, who had cracked into pieces under the pressure to be a superstar in Seattle, and old Chris Sale, who had broken apart from the workload of being Boston’s ace. Atlanta, already loaded with stars and superstars, obviously believes that, with all the pressure to be the leader of the pack removed, Kelenic and Sale can thrive. Only time will tell if this strategy turns into filet or dogfood. Of course, sometimes it is already clear if something is already just dogshit. Anthony Rendon, perhaps unwisely made it quite clear early this Spring what he thought about Baseball as an avocation. Long story short, Rendon said that he only played the game for the money. The Angels must have been thrilled. Rendon signed a seven year contract that runs from 2020 to 2026. The first four years, 2020 to 2023, have simply been brutal with Rendon usually injured, unavailable, and hostile. It will be a total miracle if, in the last three years from 2024 to 2026 (in which Rendon is making $38,571,479 dollars per year), he improves even one iota. It would be interesting to know how Branch Rickey, who loved Baseball with a religious fever, would have dealt with such a player. You could probably make some good money if you could place a bet that Rendon immediately retires when his contract is up in 2026. But Baseball will not care. By that time, we will know far more interesting things like whether Oniel Cruz and (his cousin by last name only) Elly de la Cruz, have transformed into the National League answer to Aaron Judge and Shohei Ohtani.

Post #38

Brinksmanship

February 23,2024

It’s how you walk to the ATM. It isn’t whether the ATM exists, right? Scott Boras on the Baseball Owner’s deep pockets.

Diamond Dust [Number 1]

It is late February and five major free agents* have not yet signed with a new (or former) team. The one thing that all these men have in common is the same business agent: the indefatigable Scott Boras, who is possibly the most beloved and despised baseball agent of all time. For any long time Baseball fan, Boras, a stocky man with the demeanor of a pit bull, seems to be almost inevitable. His modus operandi is to negotiate for his baseball player clients as fiercely as possible, extracting every penny possible from whichever club owner will pay. For almost 40 years, almost every Baseball off-season has had a prolonged and torturous Boras negotiation as a major storyline. It seems like most of the players that he represents love him. On the other hand, most Baseball fans despise Scott Boras. He punctures their dreams that the players have team loyalties and Baseball is anything more than just a business. As for the Baseball owners, Boras is a very specific nightmare. He usually advises his clients to maximize their value in the free agent marketplace. Boras is not in favor of ‘hometown discounts’ or leaving any money on the table. His players routinely switch teams for large contracts. These tactics, negotiating right up to the brink, have been very successful for the players represented by Boras. But this off-season may be different. The Boras tactic of ‘Brinkmanship’ may have, at least for this season, met it’s match. It is late February. The spring training camps are open. And his five free agent stars still twist in the wind.

*Cody Bellinger [OF], Blake Snell [P], Jordan Montgomery [P], Matt Chapman [3B] and J.D. Martinez [DH].

One thing that you can surely say about Scott Boras is that he does actually love the game of Baseball. Born in November of 1952, Boras walked on to his college team, made the cut, and reportedly led his team in batting average [BA]. Drafted by the St. Louis Cardinals, he played in the Minor Leagues from 1974 to 1977 as primarily a second baseman. By 1977, Boras had made it to the Texas League where he hit for a .275 BA with 43 walks and 27 strikeouts in 265 at bats. Basically, Boras was a prototypical ‘scrappy’ second baseman. He had no real power but obvious contact skills with a very good eye at the plate. But that year was where his career ended, reportedly because of a knee injury. Could he have made the Majors? Possibly. In 1977, Boras was only 24. Many players do not come into their own until they are 25 to 30. If he got stockier and gained some power while refining his batting eye to draw 100 walks each year and also not slipped down the defensive spectrum, it possibly could have happened. But a much more likely outcome, if he had stayed in Baseball, was that he would have became a minor league manager or coach. Earl Weaver, the legendary Baltimore Oriole manager, was probably his ceiling.* Instead of pursuing this path, Boras went to law school, graduating in 1982. Before he even got his diploma, Boras was already representing Major League players. He then opened the Boras Corporation which he built into one of the largest sports agencies in the world. Fascinatingly, his business only represents Major League Baseball players, no athletes from any other sport. As far as Baseball goes, the Boras Corporation is the top sports agency, by far.

*Earl Weaver was a very similar Minor League Player to Boras. The Baltimore skipper was a scrappy second baseman who hit for a decent BA without any real power and drew a lot of walks.

How did Scott Boras and his corporation get to be so successful? Over time, he built his business into a full service organization for his players. The Boras Corporation offers marketing, conditioning, and psychological services to its clients. Interestingly, it does not offer investment advice or services. As that type of advice usually causes ‘conflicts of interests‘ between the agents and their clients, it indicates that Boras must have some ethical standards. But the actual basis of Boras’ success as a sports agent is much simpler. Boras quickly established a reputation for fighting to always get his clients the most money possible. He refused to let the Owners cry poor mouth.* He had no problems going directly to an owner to make a pitch, bypassing the front office. Boras developed (or already had) an aggressive, even bombastic, personal style. He used the press to publicize his efforts on behalf of his players. Boras had no problems with refusing to sign and holding out, long past what seemed to be reasonable, until he got all that could be gotten for his clients. This created a very interesting feedback loop. By getting them maximum dollars, he lured more and more Baseball players to his agency. These players came to Boras because they did not want to be cheated out of a single cent. The Baseball teams quickly realized that money was the primary driver of the player-team relationship for any client of Boras. For any player he represented, Boras was playing high stakes poker with the Club Owners and consistently winning. As he won over and over, the feedback loop strengthened itself. But all winning streaks almost always end if you keep playing.

*It is often stated that Boras animus against the Owners’ cries of poverty stem from his experience in the Minor Leagues. Considering that the Minors have often been compared to indentured servitude or chattel slavery, this may well be true.

Is this what is happening right now for Scott Boras’ big five 2024 free agents? It certainly seems like it is. To continue with the poker analogy, Boras has a very poor hand in 2024. Cody Bellinger is a former MVP who is coming off a very good year. But he had three terrible years in between his MVP year and 2023. If his shoulder gives out again, Bellinger will be worthless. Blake Snell has won two Cy Youngs Awards in 2018 and 2023. But, in every other year of his career, he has never been anywhere near the very best pitcher in baseball, posting average ERAs and walking too many men. Even in 2023, Snell issued the most bases on balls in the National League. Jordan Montgomery seems to be turning into a rotation mainstay and he has pitched pretty well for years. But his 10 and 11 won/lost record in 2023 was the very first time he ever had won in double digits. Despite a great 2023 post-season, Montgomery hasn’t ever impressed anyone with his conditioning. Matt Chapman began the 2023 season like a house on fire. Then he cooled off until he was virtually helpless. On the wrong side of 30, Chapman could reach the end of the line before the end of any multi-year contract. J.D. Martinez, who had a good comeback year in 2023, is currently 36 and will be 37 before the 2024 season is over. Despite having five flawed clients, Boras has spent almost the entire 2024 off-season endlessly negotiating for the absolute best deal possible. Now both he and his players are standing on the brink and staring into the abyss.

Scott Boras has made many enemies among the Baseball Owners and their front offices while endlessly out-negotiating them. It is also very obvious that quite of few of these people are enjoying Boras’ current discomfort. Will any of them break ranks to sign one of Boras unlucky big 5 free agents of 2024? The Owner and Front Office fraternity are going to be unhappy with anyone who gives one of Boras’ big five that contract that they are looking for. They will surely celebrate any team that gets one of Boras’ clients on the cheap. It will be very interesting to see how long they force Boras and his unfortunate five players to squirm. Will Boras learn anything from this free agent fiasco? Will he temper his use of contract brinkmanship in the future? Will he work harder to get the best fit for his players rather than simply the most money possible? It seems unlikely. People resist change. But, strangely enough, I wouldn’t bet against Boras. He certainly seems more capable of change than his Major League Baseball opponents. It will be very interesting to see what happens in the coming seasons.

Addendum #1:

The Boras Corporation actually represented 8 players going into the 2024 free agent market. There were the 5 elite players but also 3 other players who you would hardly call the ‘top’ of this free agent class. These 3 other players were: Rhys Hoskins, Sean Manaea, and Joey Gallo [shades of My Cousin Vinny!]. All three of these players were basically fungible. Of the three, Hoskins probably offered the most upside. But he had missed the entire 2023 season because of a severe knee injury. Manaea was a decent pitcher and could definitely fill a rotation spot. But, even at his best, he had never been a star and now was on the wrong side of 30. Gallo still had prodigious power. But he had batted under .200 for four consecutive seasons [.181-.199-.160-.177]. Despite their flaws, the Boras Corporation did very well for each player. Hoskins signed for 16 million in 2024 with a 18 million player option for 2025 and also 18 million mutual option 2026. Manaea signed for 14.5 million plus a 13.5 million dollar option for 2025. Gallo, who seemed to be headed for a non-roster invite to Spring Training, signed for 5 million in 2024 with an 8 million mutual option for 2025. It seems that, for each of these three players, the Boras Corporation identified an interested team and hammered out an agreement with that club before they could change their mind. Quite a difference from the negotiating strategy that they used for their big five.

Addendum #2:

In yet another attempt to shorten my posts, I tried to write one in a single day like some old school newspaper reporter under a deadline. It still wasn’t short enough. But I did get it done in just one day. For this style of post, I decided to title them with a “Diamond Dust” heading. This is hardly original to me. I saw it in an old newspaper. But I have claimed it as mine for now.

Post #37

2024 Baseball Hall of Fame Election

January 21, 2024

Happiness Is Making Your Dreams Come True. Jourdan Dunn

1. Introduction

It’s that time of year, once again. On January 23rd of 2024, the Baseball Writers Association of America [BBWAA] will announce the results of their annual vote to let some more retired Baseball players into the Baseball Hall of Fame [BHOF]. These lucky players will be going in through the front door [the back door being the various shady committees where the dirty work of the BHOF is done]. In this post, I will look at each candidate’s worthiness through the lens of the: 1) Wins Above Replacement [WAR] and 2) Win Shares [WS] player evaluation systems. To determine whether any candidate is actually worthy under either of these two systems, I will be using the Lowest Common Denominator Method [LCDM] to evaluate each player’s WAR and WS scores. The LCDM tries to ensure that no player is elected to the BHOF who does not already have a better WAR or WS score than the worst player who should have been elected. After evaluating a player’s WAR and WS numbers by the LCDM, a discussion will be had for each player on the ballot about whether they are worthy, whether they could have been worthy with better luck, or whether they were never really good enough for election to the BHOF. We will also mention where each player is on the Ryan Thibodaux “Baseball Hall of Fame Vote Tracker” [BHFVT]. The BHFVT compiles already published votes ahead of the actual announcement and is invaluable in taking almost 100% of the fun out of the actual BHOF announcement of who is going to be inducted.

2. Player Evaluation Methods

What is the difference between the two player evaluation systems that will be used in this post? Bill James’ Win Shares [WS] method measures the bulk of a player’s career. Under this system, good hitting players with long careers are rewarded. In other words, it favors a long workman career offensively over a shorter but more spectacular career. Defensively, Win Shares favors the other eight men in the field over the pitcher. In fact, pitchers are so undervalued by WS that this system may have to be disregarded when considering if a pitcher is worthy of election to the BHOF. Although WS increases the defensive value of every positional player across the board by devaluing pitcher contributions, the defensive metrics used by the WS system are conservative. On the other hand, Wins Above Replacement [WAR] does not reward the bulk of a player’s career. It removes any credit for that part of a player’s value that falls below Replacement Value [RV].* By removing RV from a player’s career, WAR is able to more highly reward the short spectacular career while downgrading long bulk careers. Defensively, WAR does not seem to favor the hitters over their pitching brethren or vice versa. However, WAR seems to greatly reward what it measures as defensive excellence while heavily penalizing any inept fielding players. WAR, of course, has become the pre-eminent player evaluation tool. On the other hand, Win Shares is all but obsolete. But it is interesting to note the differences between the methods. If the Baseball Reference website had adopted WS rather than WAR as their main player evaluation tool, it is quite obvious that there would be some differences in the marginal players that get inducted into the BHOF.

*Replacement Value is a pre-determined value of WAR which could easily be produced by any fungible player grabbed off the Major League bench or out of the minor leagues.

3. The Lazy Man’s BBHOF Lowest Common Denominator Method

In past posts, I liked to use what I called the “Lowest Common Denominator Method” [LCDM] for analyzing whether a player was qualified for the BHOF by the WAR [Wins Above Replacement] system of player evaluation. The LCDM simply assumed that the BHOF had used career WAR to choose its members. In other words, the LCDM assumed that, if there are 300 Baseball players in the Hall of Fame, those players ranked from 1st thru 300th in career WAR. If a newly eligible player for the BHOF has a better WAR than that player ranked 300th, then that player deserves to also be inducted. In my “original” LCDM system, I found the lowest ranking BHOF member by ignoring Negro League players [as their career WARs are not fully realized], removing those players who were banned [for steroids, gambling, idiocy], and also disregarding the ineligible [still active or too recently retired]. After all this, I discovered that the LCDM player at that time was ranked 276th on the career WAR list. But this time, I am just going to be lazy. There are currently 343 men in the Hall of Fame and 270 of them have been elected as players. For the 2024 BBHOF election, the LCDM will simply be set at 270 with 271 to 343 constituting the grey area. The 270th best player by WAR is Jimmy Collins with a score of 53.3; and the 270th best by Win Shares is four guys tied at 279.7 [Ryan Braun, Lave Cross, Steve Garvey, and Fred Lynn]. If a player has more than 53.3 WAR and 279.7 WS, then he should be elected to the BHOF. If the player cannot meet either of these thresholds, he should not. If a player meets one but not the other, that is where things get interesting.

1) Adrian Beltre: 93.5 WAR [40th All Time]; 375.5 WS or so [79th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 99.0% of 179 votes [approximately 49.7% of the Ballots counted]. His 1st year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Beltre is well above the bottom lines for both WAR [40th vs. 270] and WS [79th vs. 270]. It is obvious that Beltre will be elected to the BHOF in 2024, almost unanimously, as he should be. At this point, only some type of ballot catastrophe could keep him out [“100 senile baseball writers forget to include Adrain Beltre on their ballots”…or something similar].

Comment: So far above the WAR and WS bottom lines for the BHOF that only some steroid abusing, wife beating, and/or nasty gambling allegations could have kept him out…but there are none. Adrian Beltre has one of the oddest career paths of any Hall of Famer. He debuted at 19 years old. At age 20, he had a very good first full year [Beltre would have easily been the Rookie of the Year if he not lost his rookie status the year before]. At the age of 21, he had an even better second full year. From 22 to 24, he struggled through injuries that would have derailed a lesser player. Then, at 25, he had his peak season, slugging as he never would again and leading the League in home runs, all in a free agent walk year.* From 26 to 30, Beltre played in a pitching-friendly park that seemed to bank the fire in his bat down from an inferno to just a campfire. From 31 to 38, he was Hall of Fame caliber player, year after year, with very little degradation of his skills until leg injuries derailed that 38-year-old season. At 39, Beltre returned to the game but was diminished to simply an average player and promptly retired after the season ended.

*In 2004, Adrian Beltre [48 HRs-121 RBIs-.334 BA-.629 SA] finished second in the National League MVP voting behind peak steroid Barry Bonds [45-101-.362 -.812] and ahead of monster seasons by Albert Pujols [46-123-.331-.657], Scott Rolen [34-124-.314-.598], and Jim Edmunds [42-111-.301-.643]. Does this count for Beltre as a steroid stolen MVP? Fate took both a Rookie of the Year award and an MVP award away from Beltre.

2) Joe Mauer: 55.2 WAR [250th All Time]; 305.0 WS [197th or so All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 83.2% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 1st year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Mauer qualifies for the BHOF under both the WAR [250/270] and the WS [197/270] systems. Given extra credit for catching, it makes perfect sense that he is a making a strong showing in his very first year. The BHOFT currently shows him with enough support to withstand the usual erosion of support contained in unpublished ballots. With half of the votes counted by the HOF Tracker, it will be an total upset if he is not elected in 2024.

Comment: It is almost a certainty that Joe Mauer will be elected to the BHOF on his first year on the ballot. Oddly, this result seems to have caught some sportswriters by surprise. However, Mauer is a catcher and, traditionally, that position gets extra credit for the brutal toll it takes on its practitioners. Mauer was on his way to being one of the most unique and very best catchers of all time (a too tall and lanky catcher who also won multiple batting titles) when a series of concussions forced him to play first base instead and shortened his career significantly. It probably also doesn’t hurt that Mauer spent his whole career playing for his hometown team while being a singularly wholesome & handsome looking man.

3) Todd Helton: 61.8 WAR [171th All Time]; 316.5 WS or so [167th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 82.2% of 179 votes [~49.7% of the Ballots counted]. His 6th year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Helton qualifies under both WAR and WS. After barely missing election in 2023, it looks like he is finally in this year. Like Mauer, he is high enough above the 75% line that the inevitable erosion of support from the voters who do not reveal their ballots will not be able to bring him down.

Comment: Todd Helton, after six long years of waiting, will finally be getting elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame. The only real question now is: why did it take so long? There are three usual options given: 1) some unproven steroid allegations during his career, 2) some post career DUI arrests, and 3) the fact that he played his whole career in Colorado. It may have helped Helton if he had played a few seasons out of Colorado’s thin air and proven that he could also hit at sea level. Many players have left Colorado and proven that there is a significant “bounce back” in their batting statistics. In other words, players in Colorado have trouble adjusting to other parks after hitting at a mile high altitude. This depresses their road batting and slugging averages while they play for Colorado but goes away once they leave the Rockies. On the other hand, Todd Helton had a higher batting and slugging average at home every single year of his career. However, WAR and WS, which adjust for park, both believe that he is qualified.*

*Just for fun you can add together Todd Helton’s road totals for the 2000 and 2001 seasons. You get a first baseman who hits .319, slugs .613 with 54 2Bs, 1 3B, 37 HRs, 94 runs, 121 RBIs, 91 BB, and 88 strikeouts while playing in a home park that probably suppresses this road production. Not bad.

4) Billy Wagner: 27.7 WAR [tied for 994th All Time]; 182.1 WS or so [who knows All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 78.5% of 179 votes [49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 9th year on the ballot.

Prognosis: The only real question left now for the 2024 Baseball Hall of Fame class is whether Billy Wagner will be elected. It is going to be very close but it looks like he will not make it. Even if he doesn’t get in this year, Wagner will probably be pushed over the finish line in 2025 by a “final-year-on-the-ballot” bump.

Comment: As a relief pitcher, Billy Wagner does not come close to qualifying for the BHOF under either WAR or WS. But it is obvious that the Hall of Fame voters give a lot of extra credit to a good relief pitcher. Basically, these voters seem to think that the high leverage situations faced by ace relievers should be used to multiply the relief pitcher’s WAR by two. The BHOF candidacy of Wagner illustrates that BHOF voters are basically doubling the career WAR of these top relievers. If he had been credited with twice his career WAR [27.7 x 2 = 55.5 WAR], Billy Wagner would have finished his career tied with three other men for 243rd in WAR for all time, comfortably under the bottom line of 270th. See also the Francisco Rodriguez comment.

5) Gary Sheffield: 60.5 WAR [183rd All Time]; 428.4 WS or so [notably 38th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 74.3% of 179 votes [~49.7% of the Ballots counted]. His 10th and last year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Sheffield is quite overqualified for the BHOF by both the WAR and (especially) the WS player evaluation systems. The steroid allegations against him have kept him out of the BHOF for his full 10-year term on the writer’s ballot. Even with a substantial bump in his 10th and final year, Sheffield is finally going to time out. His fate is now in the hands of the appropriate Hall of Fame committee. God help him.

Comment: WS has Sheffield rated as the 38th greatest player of all time. WAR ranks him 183rd. Basically, WAR alleges that Sheffield played in the field like a crippled water buffalo. WR would rate him higher if he had just been a DH for his entire career. But this makes no sense at all. If he would have been more valuable as a DH, is it the player’s fault that his team required him to play in the outfield? If a player decreases his value by playing out of position for his team, who gets the discredit? The misplaced player or the team? As for the steroid allegations, the best case scenario is that Sheffield is telling the truth: he was briefly involved with BALCO (Barry Bonds’ steroid supplier), mistakenly used a steroid cream, and only knowingly bought vitamins from BALCO. The worst case scenario would be that Gary Sheffield, feeling his baseball career winding down to its end, dabbled in steroids briefly with BALCO in his waning years. Even if the worst case scenario is true, Sheffield should be elected in a landslide. Baseball owners, led by their Commissioner Bud Selig, let steroids taint the game while they tried to illegally break the Players Union. After they failed despite canceling the 1994 World Series and damn near wrecking the sport, these same men were then happy to profit off the steroid fueled home run boom while the drugs inundated Baseball. The minute that Bud Selig was inducted into the BHOF (2017), Baseball lost all moral authority to punish the players who got mixed up in steroids before their 2004 ban.

6) Andruw Jones: 62.7 WAR [163rd All Time]; 275.7 WS or so [the 283th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 70.7% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 7th year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Other than the many steroid-tainted players, Jones probably has the most currently contentious BHOF case. WAR has him very comfortably over the 270th bottom line requirement, ranking him 163rd. But WS ranks him 283rd and believes that he is a marginal candidate. Of course, WAR has won the day as the player evaluation method of choice and it looks like Jones will get elected by the writers before his eligibility runs out. Although Jones will obviously not be elected in 2024, He still has three years of eligibility left and continues to make progress. It will help even more if all four men on the top of the ballot are elected this year, clearing the way for Jones to possibly get over the hump in 2025.

Comments: Whether you believe Jones is Hall of Famer or not depends a lot on how much faith you have in WAR’s defensive ratings. WAR believes that his defense was equal to 61.3% of his offense. Meanwhile, WS figures that his defense was equal to only 49.7% of his offense. WS sees Jones as a very great CF. But WAR sees him as perhaps the greatest centerfielder of all time. Jones had some unsavory personal incidents during his career (some 2001 strip club shenanigans & a 2012 domestic abuse allegation). How much these 2 issues have impacted his candidacy is unknown; but it seems like they have probably been responsible for keeping him out of the Hall for several additional years. If he does get elected, it will not be the worst thing in the world. He is right on the margin even by WS. There’s probably 50 or so Hall of Famers worse than him already. Of course, all this also completely ignores one indisputable fact: if Jones had simply kept himself in good shape after he turned 30, there would almost surely be no argument about his induction to the BHOF at all.

7) Carlos Beltran: 70.1 WAR [tied for 102nd All Time]; 368.7 WS or so [87th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 66.5% of 179 votes [49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 2nd year on the ballot.

Prognosis: It will obviously not be Beltran’s year in 2024. But 2025 is looking good after several other players come off the ballot. Beltran is overqualified for the BHOF by both WAR and WS but is still being punished by the writers for his role in the Astro’s 2017 sign stealing scandal.

Comment: Beltran makes a very interesting comparison with his fellow center fielder, Andruw Jones. Beltran clears the bar by a country mile under both of the ranking systems while Jones is a marginal candidate unless one accepts that WAR’s evaluation of him as the greatest center fielder of all time is not inaccurate. Beltran is being punished for possibly inventing an advanced sign stealing plan for his team but has otherwise always been considered a model citizen. Jones has no cheating accusations against him (though it could be argued that he “stole” his teams’ money by not staying in shape) but a couple of nasty personal blemishes. One of the problems with the moral judgments made by the Baseball writers who vote for the Hall of Fame is proportionality. Murder and jaywalking are both crimes. But one is a far greater crime. But it seems like the writers sometimes cannot tell the difference between Baseball crimes. Beltran, who has already been punished by losing the New York Mets’ managerial job, has already been properly chastised. Time to let him in.

8) Chase Utley: 64.5 WAR [tied for 144th All Time]; 288.9 WS or so [tied for 238th of All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 41.4% of 179 votes [~49.7% of the ballots counted]. His 1st year on the Ballot.

Prognosis: Utley is qualified for the BHOF by both WAR and WS, though WAR has him considerably higher by (perhaps) overvaluing his defense. The Hall of Fame tracker indicates that Utley will not come close to being elected in 2024. However, he is making a good showing in his 1st of 10 years on the Ballot. It seems like Utley’s election to the BHOF is eventually inevitable. It will just be a question of how long it takes.

Comment: In June 1997, when he was 18-years-old, Chase Utley was drafted in the 2nd round by the LA Dodgers out of high school. Rather than sign, he went to UCLA. In June 2000, Utley was drafted in the 1st round and signed by the Phillies. Utley marinated in the minors and then on the Phillie bench until finally playing his first full Major League season in 2005 at the age of 26. In a way, Utley is being punished for going to college. If he had signed with the Dodgers in 1997, there is a chance that he may have debuted in the Majors much sooner than he did, perhaps as early as 2000 or 2001 [his competition would have been the Dodger’s middle of the diamond banjo-hitters, Cesar Izturis and Alex Cora, for the most part]. If he was given back those four or five “lost” seasons at the beginning of his career, Utley’s bulk numbers would make his BHOF case much stronger. It doesn’t seem quite right to punish a man for getting an education. WAR finds that Utley’s defense is worth 33.7% of his offense while WS measures it as 31.8% That slight difference seems to be the main reason WAR ranks Utley 94 slots higher than WS.

9) Alex Rodriguez: 117.5 WAR [16th All Time!!!!!]; 492.0 WS or so [22nd All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 39.3% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 3rd year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Despite being completely over-qualified for the BBHOF and very obviously the best player on the ballot by both WAR & WS, ARod is doomed to twist in the wind until the 10-year-limit finally ends his candidacy. The year 2024 was number 3 on his 10-year-long road-to-nowhere.

Comment: Rodriguez is the most qualified player on the 2024 HOF ballot by a significant margin, leaving even Adrian Beltre in the dust. However, he is also a convicted steroid cheat from after the enforcement curtain came down. As such, he will spend eternity in the dustbin of Baseball history with Joe Jackson and Pete Rose. In fact, I would advocate the enshrinement of either Jackson or Rose long before inducting Rodriguez. It is interesting how time is washing away just how egregious and slimy his behavior was while he tried to escape any punishment at all for his sins.

10) Manny Ramirez: 69.3 WAR [108th All Time]; 408.6 WS or so [50th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 35.1% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 8th year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Overqualified for the Hall of Fame by both WAR and WS. Pretty much admitted that he took steroids throughout his career. Would he have Hall of Fame stats without the juice? Just two more years until he falls off the ballot into whatever purgatory holds the Chicago eight, Pete Rose, Clemens, Bonds, eventually Alex Rodriguez et al.

Comment: Other than Alex Rodriguez (and perhaps Gary Sheffield), Manny Ramirez is the most qualified hitter on the ballot (though Rodriguez was way more valuable defensively, of course). Ramirez is, also like ARod, not going to elected to the BHOF because he was caught using steroids after testing and punishment began in 2004. But unlike ARod, Ramirez simply admitted that he used the juice and accepted the consequences without dispute. On the other hand, Rodriguez lied, threw people under the bus, refused to admit guilt, and generally acted like a complete dirtbag while fighting the allegations. So why is this not reflected in their BHOF vote totals? Why has Rodriguez, now in his 3rd year on the ballot consistently polled better than Manny despite the fact that Ramirez had already spent 5 years on the ballot when ARod arrived? Like many other things about Manny, it’s a mystery.

11) Bobby Abreu: 60.2 WAR [tied for 190th All Time]; 357.3 WS or so [95th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 19.4% of 179 votes [49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 5th year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Despite being well over the qualification line for the BHOF by WAR (and quite over-qualified by WS), Bobby Abreu has made almost no headway to actually being elected. Now in his 5th year on the ballot, Abreu’s eventual election by the Baseball writers does not look good. He will probably have to wait until some BHOF committee re-evaluates him, in the distant future, when his statistics begin to outweigh his lack of pizzazz.

Comment: In the 1960s and 1970s, there was a prominent American rhythm & blues singer named Bobby Bland (“That’s the Way Love is” & “I Pity the Fool”) who had a long and fruitful career. But Bland is hardly as well remembered as his contemporaries Sam Cooke, Wilson Pickett, Otis Redding (& many others). I always think of Bobby Abreu as the Bobby Bland of Baseball. He did many things consistently well but never the monster season (or number one hit in Bobby Bland’s case) that would force someone to remember him. He was just there in the background, consistently excellent, but drawing only a little bit of attention to himself. While he was playing, I never once thought of Abreu as a Hall of Fame type player. But he was.

12t) Andy Pettitte: 60.2 WAR [tied for 190th All Time]; 226.2 WS or so [not even close All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 15.2% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 6th year on the ballot.

Prognosis: In 2024, Andy Pettitte will collect the highest number of votes for any starting pitcher on the BHOF ballot. And he will not even come close to being elected. His admitted use of Human Growth Hormone [HGH] seems to have scuttled his candidacy. He is 6 years in and making no progress.

Comment: Andy Pettitte is similar to two other pitchers on the 2024 ballot, Mark Buehrle and James Shields. All were workhouse starting pitchers, but Pettitte was surely the best of the three [before even considering his post-season work]. None of the three has really gotten any real support for the Hall of Fame [despite both Pettitte and Buehrle being completely qualified by the WAR system]. Pettitte, who is far more famous than either of the other 2 pitchers because of his long service as a New York Yankee and his post-season success, seems to be paying a heavy price for admitting he used HGH. Once again, it is a question of proportionality. HGH is definitely not steroids and Pettitte admitted that he was using it to heal an injury faster so that he could return to the field and earn all the money he was being paid. This is almost honorable. That the Baseball writers seem to be excessively punishing Pettitte for that is a disgrace. However, if that is not the reason for his lack of support, then one has to wonder what the BBWAA writers are thinking.

12t) Jimmy Rollins: 47.6 WAR [tied for 358th All Time]; 305.1 WS or so [tied for 194th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 15.2.% of 179 votes [~49.7% of the Ballots counted]. His 3rd year on the ballot.

Prognosis: If WS was the preferred metric, Rollins would probably be receiving much, much stronger support. He comfortably qualifies under WS. The WAR method is much more lukewarm on Rollins, not even rating him as someone who is a marginal Hall of Famer. His lack of WAR has him spinning his wheels so far in the annual ballots.

Comment: Rollins makes a very interesting pair with his long term keystone partner, Chase Utley. WS prefers Rollins over Utley for the BHOF. But WAR, the preferred metric, prefers Utley over Rollins. Of course, WS rewards bulk or, as some have phrased it, a player’s ability to post [show up and play]. It is easier to play well if you take some days off. But there is value in playing as much as possible too. Rollins played between 154 and 162 games 10 times in his career (including 7 straight years). On the other hand, Utley played from 154 to 162 games just four times. When evaluating players for the BHOF, you have to start with what you want to reward.

14) Omar Vizquel: 45.6 WAR [tied for 398th All Time]; 282.6 WS or so [tied for 258th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 10.5% of 179 votes [~49.7% of the Ballots counted]. His 7th year on the ballot.

Prognosis: The candidacy of Vizquel has been completely torpedoed by the revelations of martial discord and allegations of homosexual harassment. He has three more years until he falls off the ballot. That he stubbornly remains on the ballot seems to indicate that some BHOF voters are not bothered by wife beating or bat boy molestation.

Comment: Before the scandals, Vizquel was obviously headed to election. It would be interesting to know what would have happened if all this godawful publicity had come out after his election. Interestingly, like Jimmy Rollins, WS (which favors bulk careers) is very much in favor of electing Vizquel. But WAR doesn’t like him anywhere near the same.

15) Mark Buehrle: 59.1 WAR [201st All Time]; 220.6 WS or so [not known All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 7.9% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 4th year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Buehrle, who is qualified by WAR but not even close by WS (like most pitchers), continues to stagnate on the annual BHOF ballot. He is, in some ways, the Bobby Abreu of pitchers.

Comment: I always think of Mark Buehrle as a pitcher who came right out of the Rick Reuschel starting pitcher mold. Reuschel [who went 214-191 during his career] was a very large pitcher who worked fast, threw strikes, and kept the game moving along, Mark Buehrle [214-160] was also a large man who worked fast, threw strikes, and kept the game moving. Interestingly, both men won exactly 214 games but Reuschel lost many more. Despite all this, Reuschel was a better pitcher than Buehrle. Reuschel just played for much worse teams over his career.

16t) Francisco Rodriguez: 24.2 WAR [somewhere around 1000th All Time]; 168.3 WS or so [also about 1000th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 6.8% of 179 votes counted [~49.7% of the Ballots counted]. His 2nd year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Rodriguez will almost surely survive to be on the ballot for a third year, staying just above the minimum 5% threshold. But his candidacy has no traction. His chances of getting into the BHOF appear slim.

Comment: The candidacy of ace reliever Francisco Rodriguez serves as a very interesting bookend for ace reliever Billy Wagner’s case. If you just double his career WAR, Wagner qualifies for the BHOF. But if you double the career WAR of Rodriguez, he does not qualify [48.2 WAR would put Rodriguez in a tie with Bob Lemon for 341st place]. In other words, the double credit reward for the high leverage of an ace reliever’s work is not enough to push Rodriguez over the line. It remains to be seen if the Wagner/Rodriguez boundary holds going forward. Interestingly, if you double the Win Share [WS] total for Rodriguez, he would qualify. WS seems to reward ace reliever bulk work more than it does a starter’s bulk innings. I’m not sure why. So far, Rodriguez’ record 62 save season in 2008 does not seem to have had any impact on his candidacy. Unless it is the one thing keeping him on the ballot.

16t) David Wright: 49.2 WAR [329th All Time]; 266.1 WS or so [320th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 6.8% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 1st year on the ballot.

Prognosis: David Wright’s career was cut short by spinal stenosis with both WAR and WS having him right on the edge of the BHOF. It looks like he will have a “Don Mattingly” type time on the writers’ ballot. Mattingly, another player who had his BHOF career path cut short by back problems, lingered on the ballot for the full 10 years before shuffling off into Baseball limbo.

Comment: There was a great wave of third baseman at the beginning of the 21st Century: Adrian Beltre [debuted 1998]; Eric Chavez [1998]; Hank Blalock [2002]; David Wright [2004]; and even Evan Longoria [2008]. Wright may have been the greatest of all these third baseman, greater even than Beltre, if fate had just let him complete his career uninjured. However, like most of these third baseman, injuries derailed him. It would be interesting to know just how good Wright could have been absent the spinal stenosis that shortened and then ended his career. Note to self, write a post about this great wave of 3B.

18) Torii Hunter: 50.7 WAR [300th All Time]; 275.0 WS or so [285th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 4.7% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 4th year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Hunter does not qualify under either WAR or WS for the BHOF, though he is well into the grey area for both evaluations. In 2024, his luck seems to have run out. After surviving for 3 years, it looks like he will not make the 5% minimum to be back for his fifth try.

Comment: Torii Hunter makes a fascinating contrast with Andruw Jones. Both were well regarded centerfielders. WS has them as basically equal [Jones has a very slight edge 275.7 to 275.0]. But WAR has Jones as the far better player [62.7 to 50.7]. Their career paths couldn’t be more different. Jones came up in 1996 at 19-years old and starred in the World Series before even playing a full season. He played his first full season in 1997 and then was a star for the Atlanta Braves from 1998 to 2006. In 2007, just 30 years old, Jones had a (for him) poor season. And that was basically it. He played part-time, dogged by weight and injury issues, from 2008 to 2012 and his career was over at just 35. Hunter took a different path. He struggled in the minors from 1993 to 1997. In 1998, the 21-year-old Hunter had a decent year at Double-A. In 1999, the Minnesota Twins gave the 22-year old Hunter the CF job. He would start in the Major Leagues from 1999 until 2015 when he was 39. Hunter maintained his value exceedingly well. By WAR, his best seasons were 2009 [33 years old] and 2012 [36]. Hunter was always in shape, durable, and kept improving. In many ways, Hunter was the opposite of Andruw Jones. Off the field, Hunter had the reputation of a man of honor, depth, and focus. Which was also quite a contrast to Jones.

19) Jose Bautista: 36.7 WAR [tied for 641st All Time]; 229.2 WS or so [not very qualified All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 1.6% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 1st year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Bautista doesn’t qualify for the BHOF under either the WAR or WS systems. His first year on the ballot will be his last year on the ballot. He will not be making any spectacular bat flips on the Cooperstown lawn.

Comment: Jose Bautista had the back half of a BHOF career. If he had been a golfer, he would have played the first nine holes of his career like an absolute amateur and then played the back nine like one of the best ball strikers on the pro tour. It’s too bad that Bautista didn’t discover the timing mechanism that unleashed his formidable power in 2003 or 2004 rather than very late in 2009. If he had, Bautista would have probably accumulated 25 to 35 more WAR and had a very interesting, if not inevitable, BHOF case. You can combine the back end of Bautista’s career to the front end of Andruw Jones’ career to make one hell of a BHOF candidate.

20) Victor Martinez: 32.0 WAR [tied for 804th All Time]; 230.9 WS or so [not close All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 1.0% of 179 votes [~49.7% of the Ballots counted]. His 1st year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Martinez is not supported by either WAR or WS for induction into the BHOF. He was a very good professional hitter. If he was a beer, he would be Bud Lite to Miguel Cabrera’s top-of-the-line Bud. The year 2024 will be his first and last on the Hall of Fame ballot.

Comment: Victor Martinez was one of those players who had a monster year, completely out of context with the rest of their career, that was worthy of a Hall of Fame player. Many players have these types of years [Kevin Mitchell in 1989, 47 HRs-125 RBIs-.291, MVP]. But very few (if any) have this type of year in their mid-30s. In 2014, the 35-year-old Martinez hit 32 HRs-103 RBIs-.335 BA for the Detroit Tigers. He set career highs in HRs, BA, on-base percentage and slugging. He also had the best WAR of his career. His OPS+ was a very sparkling 172 [meaning he was 72% better than the average hitter]. The next best OPS+ in his career was just 131 in 2011. It goes without saying that, if the rest of his career had been much more like 2014, Victor Martinez would have had a one hell of a better case for the BHOF.

21t) Matt Holliday: 44.5 WAR [tied for 431st All Time]; 266.8 WS or so [313th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 0.5% of 179 votes [approximately 49.7% of the Ballots counted]. His 1st year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Both WAR and WS together do not see Matt Holliday as a BHOF member. This will be his first and only year on the BHOF ballot. But there is a non-zero chance that he still gets to go to Cooperstown. It will just be as the father of Jackson Holliday.

Comment: In 1998, the 18-year-old Matt Holliday signed with the Rockies and began playing in their minor league system. His minor league career was, to say the least, not particularly inspiring. By 2003, he had risen only to Double A, two levels below the Major Leagues, where he hit just 12 HRs while batting .253 and slugging .395. Despite this, the Rockies gave him their left field job in 2004; and he was off and running [14 HRs-.290 BA-.488 SA]. Of course, he played in a hitter’s park but this hardly explains both a two level jump and all that increase in offense . He was even better in 2005 [19 HRs-.307-.505], and then exploded in 2006 [34 HRs-.326-.586] and 2007 [36 HRs-.340-.607]. What happened to so quickly turn around Holliday’s career from 2003 to 2007? At this point, it is a puzzle. Unlike his former teammate Todd Helton, Holliday got a chance to prove that he could hit at sea level too. From 2009 to 2014, Holliday was a pretty potent bat for the St. Louis Cardinals. Perhaps because of his reserved demeanor, Holliday always struck me as a “Kevin McReynolds” type: someone who wasn’t getting exactly 100% out of their talent.* With the insane drive of a Ty Cobb, would Matt Holiday have been an inner circle Hall of Famer? Possibly, but he probably wouldn’t have been as happy.

*Kevin McReynolds was a star outfielder for the New York Mets (among other teams). He gave the impression that he would rather be anywhere other than a Baseball field.

21t) Bartolo Colon: 46.2 WAR [tied for 387th All Time]; 204.7 WS or so [just nowhere close All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 0.5% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 1st year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Bartolo Colon does not qualify for the BHOF under either the WAR or WS system. The year 2024 will be the only year that Bartolo Colon appears on the BHOF Ballot.

Comment: Bartolo Colon will go down as a hugely fun and interesting former Baseball player but an induction into the Hall of Fame is not in his future. His career path is actually fascinating [1997 to 2018, ages 24-45]. Basically he was a fireball throwing starting pitcher from 1998 to 2005. Then he was lost in the woods for awhile from 2006 to 2009. Then, he finished his career as a control artist starter from 2009 to 2016 (with his last two years, 2017 and 2018 spent proving that he no longer had it). Few pitchers have such a clearly delineated career as first a flame thrower and then a command kingpin.

23t) James Shields: 30.7 WAR [tied for 847th All Time]; 133.8 WS or so [God only knows where All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 0.0% of 179 votes [~49.7% of the Ballots counted]. His 1st year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Neither the WAR nor WS systems see Shields as a qualified Hall of Famer. He will have to settle for having the totally cool modern nickname of “Big Game James” [so few modern baseball nicknames are as good as the old school ones from 100 years ago].

Comment: During his career, James Shields did a partial “Don Sutton.” From 2007 to 2015, he was a good to very good workhouse starter. He was never really great (peak years of 16-12 and 15-10 in 2011 and 2012) but still very reliable. But pitchers like this get into the BHOF only if they do the full “Don Sutton” (over 20 years as a dependable Clydesdale). Neither WAR nor WS see Shields as a BHOF inductee on even his best day [or year].

23t) Jose Reyes: 37.4 WAR [tied for 620th All Time]; 255.5 WS or so [378th or so All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 0.0% of 179 votes [approximately 49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 1st year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Jose Reyes does not qualify under WAR or WS. His BHOF dream will die with this year’s ballot. In other words, this will be his only year on the BHOF ballot.

Comment: Jose Reyes, like many other players, started his career like he was on the highway to the BHOF. Between 2006 to 2008 when he was 23 to 25 years old, Reyes looked like a superstar in incubation. But then it just didn’t happen. Injuries sapped his speed and health, his power and plate discipline never developed, and his career petered out in his early 30s. But there was a BHOF dream there at one time.

23t) Brandon Phillips: 28.4 WAR [tied for 953rd All Time]; 209.0 WS or so [God only knows All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 0.0% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 1st and last year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Brandon Phillips is a Hall of Fame ballot consolation prize player. In other words, he is on the Hall of ballot simply so he can take pride in that fact. But 2024 will be his only year on the ballot.

Comment: Brandon Phillips was a very good second baseman. But neither WS nor WAR sees him as a viable Hall of Famer. A viable candidate for the BHOF under WAR should accumulate close to 50 Wins Above Replacement. In other words, ten seasons of 5.0 WAR would make the player viable. But realistically, the player should have some peak seasons of 7.5 or so WAR. Did Phillips ever come close to 7.5 WAR in a single season? No, his best year was just 4.9 WAR in 2011 and his career total of 28.4 WAR is only slightly more than half way to an actually viable BHOF case.

23t) Adrian Gonzalez: 43.5 WAR [tied for 456th All Time]; 286.4 WS or so [tied for 249th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 0.0% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 1st and last year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Gonzalez would have had a much better chance under the WS system (in which he qualifies) rather than the WAR system (where he is not close). With WAR ascendent, the HOF tracker has him currently voteless. He will not be on the 2025 ballot.

Comment: Absent injuries, Gonzalez could have certainly had a BHOF career. After his October 2010 shoulder surgery for a torn labrum, he was never the same hitter. He had one last great season [2011] by changing his swing from a pretty power hitting uppercut to a formidable line drive stroke before the continuing degradation of his shoulder sapped his might. Despite that 2010 surgery, Gonzalez was extremely durable, playing 156 or more games every season from 2006 to 2016. But then a herniated disk in his back crippled him during the 2017 and 2018 seasons and forced him into retirement. Gonzalez displays very interestingly the differences between the WAR and WS player evaluation systems. WAR, which values defense and peak highly, has Adrian Gonzalez [rated 456th] not even close to the LCDM line of 270th to qualify for the BHOF. But WS, which values offense and bulk, rates Gonzalez as one of 249th best players of all time, comfortably over the LCDM boundary. If WS rather than WAR was the chosen method of evaluation, it is likely that Adrian Gonzalez’s candidacy for the BHOF would have not been so quickly dismissed.

Conclusion

The 2024 Baseball Hall of Fame class will consist of: 1. Jim Leyland [already voted in as a field manager]; 2) Adrian Beltre [3B], 3. Joe Mauer [C]; 4. Todd Helton [1B]; and possibly 5. Billy Wager [relief pitcher]. For the Baseball Hall of Fame’s sake, it will be nice to see a nice big 2024 class. But it will be even nicer to just see a bunch of the worthy players cleared off the ballot, all at once, to make room for some other worthy players now buried on the ballot.

Breaking the 2024 BHOF Ballot Down by Categories:

1) Qualified by WAR & WS and being elected [3]: Adrian Beltre, Todd Helton, and Joe Mauer;

2) Not qualified by WAR or WS and possibly being elected [1]: Billy Wagner;

3) Qualified by WAR and WS and NOT being elected or removed from the ballot: [6] Bobby Abreu, Carlos Beltran, Manny Ramirez, Alex Rodriguez, Gary Sheffield, and Chase Utley;

4) Qualified by only WAR and NOT being elected or removed from the ballot: [3]: Mark Buehrle, Andruw Jones, and Andy Pettitte;

5) Qualified by only WS and NOT being elected or removed from the ballot [2]: Jimmy Rollins and Omar Vizquel;

6) Qualified by only WS but NOT being selected and dropped from the ballot: [1] Adrian Gonzalez;

6) Not qualified by either WAR or WS and NOT being dropped from the ballot [2]: Francisco Rodriguez and David Wright;

7) Not qualified by either WAR or WS and being dropped from the ballot [8]: Jose Bautista, Bartolo Colon, Matt Holliday, Torii Hunter, Victor Martinez, Brandon Phillips, Jose Reyes and James Shelds,.

My personal ballot [in order if only I had a vote]: 1) Adrian Beltre, 2) Gary Sheffield, 3) Carlos Beltran, 4) Joe Mauer, 5) Andy Pettitte, 6) Bobby Abreu, 7) Chase Utley. Arod and Manny Kept out by steroids.

Post #36

Intrinsic Value [Rethinking Player valuation systems]

January 17, 2024

Baseball is 90 percent mental.  The other half is physical.  Yogi Berra

1. Introduction

On January 23, 2024, the Baseball Hall of Fame [HOF] will announce which players are being inducted into the 2024 HOF class [manager Jim Leyland has already been selected].  Until the announcement, most of the discussion about these inductions will concern two subjects: 1) how are the eligible players doing on Ryan Thibodaux’s Hall of Fame Tracker and 2) how do these eligible players measure up using the Wins Above Replacement [WAR] evaluation system.  While writing this blog, I have used the WAR method myself to evaluate players; even though I could not figure out a player’s WAR to save my life.*  This is, to say the very least, sub-optimal.  In this essay, I will look at the history of how WAR became: 1) so widely disseminated and 2) the pre-eminent Baseball player evaluation system, especially over Bill James Win Shares [WS] system.  Every Baseball player evaluation system has shortcomings.  If you are going to use such a method, an understanding of the system’s weak spots should be required.  As far as WAR goes, there are definitely some ghosts in the machine.  The flaws inherent in the WAR system may even be large enough to deny the qualified and elect the unworthy to the Baseball Hall of Fame.  Thus, knowledge of WAR’s defects should be a pre-requisite before using it to evaluate any player for any reason.

*Figuring Slugging Percentage: basic Baseball math.  Figuring WAR: Baseball physics.

2. A Brief History of Win Shares and WAR

In 2003, the baseball writer Bill James, the godfather of Sabrmetrics [applying the scientific method to Baseball], published a book titled Win Shares.  The Win Shares system was an all-encompassing player evaluation system.  In his book, James explained his system and then got to the fun part: ranking all the players.  Meanwhile in the 1990s, there was a Baseball annual published called the Baseball Prospectus [which was inspired by Bill James’ own annual Baseball Abstracts of the 1980s].  In these Baseball Prospectus books, Keith Woolner developed his own player evaluation system which he called VORP [Value Over Replacement Player].  In subsequent Baseball Prospectus annuals, the VORP system mutated into WARP [Wins Above Replacement Player] and then into WAR itself.  In the realm of ideas, these two player evaluation methods, Win Shares and WAR, competed in the early 2000s.  And WAR won this competition rather easily.  One of the main reasons that WAR became the preferred method for evaluating Baseball players had a lot to do with simple accessibility.  In 2009, the WAR system results were adopted by and included with every player’s statistical profile on the Baseball Reference website [baseballreference.com].  Baseball Reference had been founded in 2000 and, by 2005, had made all the printed Baseball Encyclopedias [BE] obsolete.*  From 2009 on, WAR was right there on the source where virtually every Baseball fan goes to get their statistical fix.  Meanwhile, the results of the Win Shares system were not readily accessible [though they could eventually be accessed on billjames.online].  Perhaps the first question to ask is: Did WAR win out because it was a better system than Win Shares or just because it was right there at your fingertips?

* The last MacMillan BE was published in 1996 and last Total Baseball BE in 2004.

3. Explaining Win Shares

Bill James believed any system for player evaluation needed to be grounded in actual results.  If the Boston Red Sox won 105 games in 1912, the players on that 1912 Red Sox team needed to each be credited with an individual share of those 105 wins.  For reasons that escape me, James then decided to triple those 105 wins so that the 1912 Red Sox players had 315 partial Win Shares to be split amongst themselves.  Using statistical formulas to measure each player’s defensive and offensive contributions, James then did precisely that: he credited each player on the 1912 Red Sox with their share of the 315 partial wins.*  Critics of the Win Shares system immediately pointed out that the players should have also gotten some discredit for the 47 losses suffered by the 1912 Boston Red Sox too.  James would later explain that the players did receive won-loss records, but these records were then simplified into a single number.  After all, a single number to rank players was the objective.  Bill James did his WS calculations for every Major League team throughout history.  By far the most important thing about this system was that you couldn’t see the sausage being made [which, of course, is also even more true of the WAR system].  When evaluating Baseball players, the offensive side is the much easier task.  For the most part, each batter hits and produces runs without any help [disregarding the small gray areas of driving runners in, sacrifice outs, intentional walks and so forth].  In Baseball, batting or offensive contributions are easy to measure.  But the defensive side is quite a bit harder.  How much of pitching is just team defense?  How much of defense is just good (or bad) pitching?  How much defense is simply illusions of the park, defensive schemes of the team, whether the pitcher is left-handed or right-handed, player positioning, catcher framing, elective plays, etc?  Perhaps the best recommendation of them all for the Win Shares system was Bill James apparently life-long obsession with quantifying Baseball defense.

*Tris Speaker led the 1912 BoSox with 51 Win Shares [or 17.0 full Wins].  Smokey Joe Wood was second with 44 [or 14.67 full wins].  But the WAR evaluation methods disagrees and lists Smokey Joe first with 11.1 WAR followed by his good friend Speaker at 10.4.

4. Win Shares Evaluated: The Problem of Luck

However, the Win Shares method had a very large problem buried in its calculations.  The basic flaw of Win Shares as a Baseball player evaluation tool can be demonstrated with a hypothetical.  Imagine that the exact same player performs for two different teams.  Just for fun, imagine that this player is the star of each of these teams [bats .300, hits 30 homers, drives in 100 runs].  Both teams score 700 runs but also give up 700 runs during a 162-game season.  The Pythagorean theorem tells us that each of these teams should have finished with a record of exactly 81 wins and 81 losses.  But what if one of these teams gets lucky?  Despite scoring exactly as many runs as they gave up, the team finishes with a record of 90-72.  Meanwhile, the other team is unlucky and ends the season at 72-90.  Random variations like these happen during Major League seasons all the time.  Win Shares, which ties player value to the exact number of wins that his team gets, will conclude that the exact same player on these two teams is worth a completely different amount.  In fact, the player on the lucky team will be judged to have been 25% better than the exact same player on the unlucky team.*  This is nonsensical on both a player evaluation and/or single season level.  It is the exact same player and his value is only fluctuating by chance.  But the accuracy of the Win Shares system obviously improves over multiple seasons and longer careers.  Over time, luck washes out and Win Shares should become more and more accurate.  Basically, Win Shares is a player evaluation system which is not very good at evaluating single seasons or short careers; but improves steadily over time with more seasons and longer careers.  Strangely enough, I would have more faith in Win Shares evaluation of Willie Mays entire career rather than any single season.

*In other words, the same exact player such as our 30HR/100 RBI/.300 star, would be given different Win Share amounts depending on the team’s finish: 24 WS with the 72-90 team, 30 WS with the 81-81 team; 37.5 WS with the 90-72 club.  But, in each case, he is exactly the same player.

5. Another problem with Win Shares

And there is another major problem with Win Shares.  Unlike the problem of random luck explained above, there have been (as far as I know) no articles addressing this flaw anywhere.  Win Shares seems to underrate pitchers badly.  This doesn’t necessarily mean that Win Shares is wrong in its evaluation of pitchers.  But Win Shares evidently believes that pitchers are worth far less than the WAR system or the most basic Baseball player evaluation system of them all, the Hall of Fame.  In the Baseball Hall of Fame right now, 343 people have been elected.*  This breaks down as 84 pitchers, 186 position players, 40 executives, 23 managers, and 10 umpires.  In other words, the Hall of Fame believes that 84 of the 270 best Baseball players of all time were pitchers [31.1%].  Of the top 270 players rated by WAR, 88 are pitchers [32.6%].  By WAR standards, the Hall of Fame seems to have a very slight bias towards hitters over pitchers.  But it is also within any reasonable standard of random variation.  Then we have Win Shares.  Of the top 270 players rated by Win Shares, only 49 players are pitchers [a meagre 18.1%].*  The question of whether WS is correct in downgrading all pitchers is beyond my mathematical capability.  But, to say the least, it certainly feels completely wrong.  On top of that, WS also seems to heavily favor pitchers from long ago and far away over their modern brethren.  So, the question becomes: Why does the Win Shares system underestimate pitchers so badly and penalize modern pitchers even worse?

*It would be 50 pitchers if you counted John Ward, but Ward is not counted as a pitcher by either the Hall of Fame or WAR system.  Of course, there is no easily accessible list of the current career WS leaders, so I may have missed a pitcher (or two at most).  But, even if I did, the poor showing of pitchers in the WS system would still be remarkable.

6. Win Shares and the Question of Defense

The only way Win Shares can underestimate Pitcher Value [PV] would be to minimize the pitcher’s share of defensive credit.  On the most basic level, the game of Baseball is 50% offense and 50% defense.  One is the ying to the other’s yang.  Offensive credit is easy to give.  The production of offense in Baseball is easily broken down into individual units.  But defense in Baseball is always a team effort that begins with the pitcher.  Defensive credit is almost always shared.  For an example, a pitcher throws a good pitch in on a batter’s hands, breaks his bat, and induces a weak pop-up.  The pop-up could be easily caught by the second baseman.  But the shortstop runs over, calls for it instead, and elects to make an easy catch himself.  Who gets credit?  Obviously, the pitcher should get the lion’s share for this play.  But what about the shortstop and second baseman?  In many cases, defensive plays are elective plays.  How do you cut up defensive credit for elective plays?  In another example, the pitcher gives up an absolute rocket and the centerfielder makes an outstanding play running it down.  Who gets credit on this play?  In this case, it’s the center fielder, not the pitcher, that should get the lion’s share of the credit.  Every Baseball player evaluation system must decide how to apportion defensive credit, especially between pitchers and all other defensive players.  Justin Verlander, the most accomplished of all the currently active pitchers, ranks exactly 63rd by WAR right now, but just 306th (more or less) by Win Shares.*  WAR credits Verlander with being an inner circle Hall of Famer.  Win Shares believes Verlander to be a very marginal HOF candidate.  Does that WS result feel correct?  It certainly feels wrong to me.  If it is incorrect, there is very obviously a defensive apportionment problem with the WS system.  WS may have shifted too much credit for the defense from the pitchers to the other players.  It also means that all the other players, except for the pitchers, have had their defensive value increased across the board.  It is also not the only problem with the WS defensive evaluation scheme.  Every Baseball player evaluation system has to also address the Timeline problem.

*The source for career Win Shares is the Bill James website.  To put it bluntly, the Win Shares finder there is a mess.  Everything from rampant mathematical mistakes to more serious errors like the two different Elmer Smiths having their careers combined.  Verlander may actually be 307th or even 308th (I compiled the career WS list as carefully as I could but who knows).

7. The Pitching Timeline Problem

Throughout the history of Baseball, starting pitchers have thrown harder and harder and, because of this fact, have also hurled less and less innings.  In the 19th Century [1871-1899], starting pitchers threw hard but probably almost never threw all out.  Some pitchers would throw over 500 (even 600) innings in a season.  But they still needed to save their arms.  It would be fascinating to know how hard they threw.  Were they consistently over 80 miles per hour [mph]?  They were obviously throwing hard enough that the distance from the pitching box [later mound] was twice moved back by about 5 feet.  In 1893, the traditional distance of 60 feet and 6 inches from pitching rubber to home plate was established.  Innings pitched [IP] fell below 400 and continued to drop.  In the early 20th century, there were obviously starting pitchers who threw above 90 mph.  But they paced themselves, throwing hard in a pinch.  However, as innings continued to drop, these pitchers threw harder more consistently.  By the end of the 20th century, pitchers could lead the league with only 250 IP or so.  In the 21st century, the League leading totals of IP dropped even further to just over 200 IP.  Now, virtually every pitcher (starting or relieving) is throwing the ball as hard as humanly possible all the time, even over 100 mph.  Were the “Old-Innings-Eating” pitchers of yesterday more valuable than the “Better-to-Burn-Out-than-Fade-Away” flamethrowers of today?  By WAR and Win Shares, the ancient pitchers are evaluated as much more valuable than any modern pitcher.  But the fact is that those ancient pitchers relied much more on their defense than today’s hurlers.  A modern ace, such as Jason Verlander, deserves a much greater percentage of the defensive credit for his pitching than a 19th Century Hall of Famer like Charles Radbourn.  In other words, modern pitchers are most surely getting shortchanged because the pitcher’s percentage of the defensive credit should not be constant over time.  Of course, in evaluating any large group of Baseball players, there will always be timeline issues    .

8. Explaining WAR

WAR is a complex statistical calculation that assigns each player a value after making determinations of that player’s contributions on Offense [batting] and Defense [pitching and fielding] and then subtracting the Replacement Value [RV] both offensively and defensively.  The replacement value is yet another determined number and represents how much value a completely fungible or replaceable player would have.  Once all these calculations are made, WAR adds up the player’s offense and defense for a season or a career, subtracts the replacement value, and gives the player his seasonal or overall score.  In WAR, unlike Win Shares, it is possible to get a negative score (the player is worse than some random minor league players that could replace him).  Of course, all this needs to be taken on faith.  The inventors of this system are not even letting anyone how what is in the sausage much less how it is being made.  In fact, WAR is separated into offensive and defensive WAR on Baseball Reference.  But you cannot just add these two figures up to get the overall WAR.  Each figure includes a duplicated RV.  It is almost like they don’t want anyone to check their work.  The calculations underlying WAR are based on formulas that make the assumption that certain truths are unchangeable [such as replacement value and the value of the defensive spectrum, i.e. which positions are more or less valuable].  However, there is a problem with codifying your formulas about Baseball.  Baseball mutates over time.  The Replacement Value and the defensive spectrum valuations are not applicable throughout the ages and eras of Baseball.  This can be a major problem with the system.

*Third Base is the position usually used to illustrate how positional RV changes over time.  In the early days of Baseball, third baseman needed to be quick and agile to field the numerous bunts of the time.  Basically, they were good fielding players with the arm but not the range to play shortstop.  But as home run hitting took over the game, bunting went all but extinct.  Third basemen became players with the arm to play right field but athletic enough to also play the infield.  The Replacement Values for these two sets of talents are completely different.

9. WAR Evaluated: The Problem of Compounding Errors

Basically, the main problem with WAR is the problem of Compounding Errors [CE].  WAR has so many calculations that, if the inherent errors do not cancel each other out, these flaws can compound each other and arrive at a truly odd result.  The problem of these Compounding Errors is pretty much entirely on the Defensive side.  The Designated Hitter penalty is a good example of one of these CEs.  Of course, Designated Hitters [DH] hit for the Pitcher and do not play the field.  They have no defensive value at all.  Because of this, WAR gives the DH position a massive penalty, assuming DHs need to hit a ton to justify their value.  But, in real life, the DH is a much harder job than it looks.  Players with the proper focus to be DHs are hard to find.  Usually, First Basemen [1B] hit better than DHs.  But 1Bs are not penalized by WAR as badly as DHs.  Over a career, this penalty compounds and a career long DH would be completely undervalued next to an equivalent 1B.  WAR also seems to overvalue the top of the defensive spectrum (CF, SS and 2B, ignoring catchers).  WAR’s undervaluing of poor defensive players and overvaluing of good defensive players can be demonstrated by two outfielders of this year’s HOF ballot.  Gary Sheffield was admittedly not the best outfielder.  But WAR compounds his poor defense until arriving at the odd conclusion that he is twice as bad as a normal DH.  Meanwhile, Andruw Jones, a great centerfielder [CF] who got fat and lost his range mid-career, rates as the best CF of all time.  Although personal opinions make for bad arguments, I watched both men play often.  I don’t remember Sheffield as the equivalent of a cripple in a wheelchair playing Baseball.  I also don’t remember Andruw Jones, even at his peak, as the Baryshnikov of the outfield.  He was very good until he gained the weight.  But I never thought that he was incredibly better (or even better) than other CFs that I watched such as Paul Blair, Garry Maddox, Jim Edmunds, or Kevin Kiermaier.  But WAR has, for better or for worse, adopted calculations that will excessively penalize poor defense and unreasonably overvalue good defense.  Over a long career, this difference can compound and lead to some truly odd player evaluations.

10. WAR and another Defensive Problem

Other than Compounding Errors, there is another problem with Defense that needs to be addressed.  Defensive value is often credited to a player although the player himself basically does not deserve it.  An example would be the recently banned (or curtailed) shift.  In the classic shift, an infielder is shifted onto the other side of the infield or into the opposite-side outfield between the outfielders and the infield.  Basically, the shift is designed to thwart pull happy hitters.  A shifted infielder will generally make far more plays than an unshifted infielder.  Player evaluation systems will then credit this infielder with all these extra plays; and he will seem to be a much more valuable player.  But is it an individual or a team value?  If the same exact player plays for a team that refuses to shift, does the player lose value?  Is he a worse player?  The answer would seem to be No.  His “intrinsic value” as a Baseball player has not changed but his team value has risen.  Another example would be the art of “pitch framing” by catchers.  Some catchers, by the way they receive the ball, can trick the umpire into calling borderline balls as strikes.  Is this valuable to the team?  Absolutely.  But is it an “intrinsic value” for catchers?  No, it is an umpire weakness.  Relatively soon, the art of pitch framing will probably be all but extinct after the Major Leagues adopt video reviews of strike calls.  An “Intrinsic Value” cannot simply be erased.  And then there is the problem of “elective defense.”  Imagine your team has a great center fielder [CF].  This CF gets great jumps on the ball.  He glides over to catch the ball.  Many of these balls could be caught by either the right [RF] or left fielder [LF].  But, because this CF is the best outfielder on the team and is also considered the “captain” of the outfield, the CF consistently calls off the RF and/or LF and “elects” to catch the ball.  Under Player Evaluation Systems, the CF gets all the extra credit for this “elective defense.”  But does the CF deserve credit for these plays?  On a team with a bad CF, these plays still get made, just by the RF or LF.  In other words, a lot of defensive credit needs to be taken with a grain of salt.

11. Intrinsic Value

A decent Baseball Player Evaluation system should take these types of Defensive Value caveats under consideration.  Defense is a team, not an individual value.  Teams can even make choices that directly “devalue” their players under these evaluation systems.  Last season [2023], there was a classic example of this type of situation.  The St. Louis Cardinals promoted their prize rookie, Jordan Walker, to the Major Leagues.  Walker had been a third baseman for his entire career but was blocked in St. Louis by Nolan Arenado, a probable future Hall of Famer.  The Cardinals decided to move Walker to the outfield and let him play right [RF].  A decent hitter, WAR credits Jordan with 1.6 WAR on offense.  But, with very little experience in the outfield, Walker was brutal out there in the sun field.  On defense, WAR gives Walker a negative 2.1 WAR.  In other words, a team decision made Walker a below average player according to WAR.  If the Cardinals had posted Walker at third base [3B], it is very likely that Walker would have had a positive defensive WAR and been, by the Player Evaluation system’s estimation, a much more valuable player.  Walker’s WAR system rating definitely devalued hum but his “intrinsic value” as a Baseball player remains.  The great Pete Rose is another player whose value is underrated in this way.  Rose began his career as a 2B [1963-1966].  Then he played LF [1967, 1972-1974] and RF [1968-1971].  He moved to 3B [1975-1978] before finishing out his career as a 1B [1979-1986].  By WAR, Rose was about average at 2B, poor in RF, good in LF, brutal at 3B, and then washed up at 1B.  In each case, Rose switched positions to help his team.  But WAR gives him no credit for this.  According to WAR, the versatility of Rose is not an asset.  It is obvious that WAR would consider Rose a more valuable player if he had just played 2B or LF for most of his career.  Perhaps someday a Player Evaluation system will be designed that can measure a Baseball Player’s Intrinsic Value and the credit Pete Rose for his versatility.  But, until the supercomputer capable of making these calculations is invented (and programmed), Intrinsic Value will just remain the ideal.

12. Conclusions

Every Baseball player evaluation system has its flaws.  Win Shares bases its evaluation method on games won during the season.  Because simple luck can play a large part in this annual total, individual player Win Share totals for each single season can contain large errors.  However, the Win Shares system improves its accuracy as more and more seasons of any player are included, and luck washes out.  Win Shares also has the problem of devaluing pitcher’s contributions to the team across the board.  Every pitcher, but especially modern pitchers, are not credited with their full value.  This missing defensive value is spread out among the rest of the team’s players.  In other words, the defensive value given to every player, except the pitchers, by the Win Shares system should be reduced.  On the other hand, the WAR system for evaluating Baseball Players is almost surely better at judging individual seasons.  But WAR uses set formulas to generate its player evaluations and some of these formulas are off by a degree or two.  In some cases, the errors in these various formulas compound with each other and the player career evaluations can get completely out of whack.  It is also apparent that WAR over zealously rewards good to great defensive players while punishing poor to bad defensive players like they stole WAR’s wallet.  Someday, a properly programmed computer will be able to correctly value Baseball players.  Until that time, it is probably best to simply use every available tool to look at each player.  But it may already be too late.  The WAR system is ascendent and the Win Shares system is about to be throw on the ash heap of history.*  On January 23, 2024, several Baseball players may be elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame because their WAR score is good although their “Intrinsic Value” is not quite as high.  It’s a damn shame.

*The Win Shares system seems to be going the way of the dodo bird.  Bill James just published his last “Bill James handbook” annual [the 2024 Walk-Off Edition].  His Bill James Online site, the only place, as far as I know, to get updated Win Share information, is shutting down (James seems to be retiring).  Win Shares has conceded the field to WAR.

NEXT POST: Evaluating the 2024 Baseball Hall of Fame Candidates by using a combination of the WAR and Win Shares Player Evaluation Systems while trying to also consider the Player’s actual “Intrinsic Value.”

FUTURE POSTS: Exploring the concept of Intrinsic Value: 1) Who was a better player, Joe DiMaggio or Stan Musial, and 2) Who was best player out of David Ortiz, Manny Ramirez, and Gary Sheffield?

Post #35

Showtime Baseball Style

January 7, 2024

Glory lies in the attempt to reach one’s goal and not in reaching it.  Mahatma Gandhi

1. Introduction

A literal ton of articles have discussed pitcher and designated hitter Shohei Ohtani’s move from the Los Angeles Angels of the American League [AL] to the Los Angeles Dodgers of the National League [NL].  This will be yet another one.  However, almost a month has passed since he signed on December 11, 2023, and that may be enough time to gain a little perspective.  To start, this article will discuss the Ohtani transaction from the viewpoint of the Dodgers themselves.  Next, the article will discuss what the financial aspects of Ohtani’s new contract reveal about him.  Finally, the article will speculate on the future implications of the Dodgers’ acquisition of Ohtani, who is currently the best Baseball player in the world .  Hopefully, this article will give the reader a fresh viewpoint.  Regardless, much of this article will still probably just being going over the same ground that so many other articles have already covered.  But angry people need to vent, happy people need to laugh, and most Baseball fans need to talk about Shohei Ohtani.

2. The Los Angeles Dodgers trample the Angels

One aspect of the LA Dodgers’ signing of Shohei Ohtani that has not really been discussed is the ramifications on the Los Angeles Baseball economy.  The Dodgers and the Los Angeles Angels share the same metropolitan area and fight each other for market share.  Every potential Dodger fan is also a potential Angel fan.  While having a winning team is surely the single most important factor in a team’s portion of their local Baseball market chunk, the next most important factor is probably having superstar players that fans can identify with, root for, and most importantly buy branded merchandise from the teams that bears the player’s names.  As far as simply winning goes, the Dodgers are currently wildly successful [13 straight winning seasons lasting from 2011 to 2023 with no end in sight].  The Angels?  Not so much.  But the lackluster Angels have had two superstars that the Dodgers could not match, Ohtani and Mike Trout.  It has been apparent for several years [since 2019, at least] that the Dodgers have been thinking about, coveting, and planning to sign Ohtani when he became a free agent after the 2023 season.  Literally, the Dodgers have been salivating over getting a share of the merchandising and marketing bonanza if they could sign Ohtani. Hopefully, ten years from now, some enterprising journalist or financial analyst will write an interesting piece on just how the Dodgers were able to capitalize on the Ohtani brand.

During this time, every Dodger personnel move [free agent decisions, luxury tax considerations, and rookie usage] has been evaluated as possibly being related to their eventual acquisition of Ohtani.  Of course, this could have just been normal sportswriter hyperventilation.  But good sportswriters are usually tied into the zeitgeist of the teams that they cover.  There was so much smoke about the Dodgers’ desire to sign Shohei from the Dodger writers that there had to be a raging fire somewhere in the Dodger organization.  But it can’t be emphasized enough that the Dodgers knew that signing Ohtani would also be a metaphorical stake into the LA Angels’ heart.  Like Van Helsing hunting Dracula, the Dodgers knew how they wanted their pursuit of Ohtani to end [with a stick through the Angels’ heart].  The LA Dodgers also appear to be aware that Major League Baseball [MLB] is evolving into 3 different classes of teams: 1) some clubs that are perennial winners, 2) other clubs that alternate between winning and losing cycles, and 3) a few clubs that are the perennial losers.  In this probable future, the perennial losers will grow the superstars for the perennial winners to eventually acquire.*  It is in the LA Dodger’s best interest for the LA Angels never to be a perennial winner.  By taking Shohei Ohtani away from them, the Dodgers took a large step towards making the Angels a permanent second class citizen in their own home city.

*If the Players Union can get the Major League service time requirement down from six years to five or less years, this process will be accelerated.

3. The Pacific Rim of Baseball

Of course. the Dodgers were reportedly interested in signing Shohei Ohtani both when he signed in 2013 with the Nippon Ham Fighters of the Japanese Pacific League [JPL]; and in 2018 with the Los Angeles Angels of the AL.  But each time, Ohtani made his decision to sign on which team would allow him to pursue his double duty dreams [pitching and hitting].  To do that, Ohtani needed to a team that could use a designated hitter [DH].  Since the National League did not adopt the designated hitter rule until 2022, the Dodgers were out of luck both times.  But it was apparent for years that the DH was coming to the NL.  Major League Baseball [MLB] was just holding the implementation of it hostage as a negotiating chip against the Players Union.  After the Covid pandemic forced the NL to temporarily adopt the DH in 2020, the permanent adoption of the DH rule by the NL was inevitable.  When it finally happened, the Dodgers’ dreams of acquiring Ohtani actually became possible.  But it also became possible for the LA Dodgers to realize dreams that went back before Ohtani was even born. In the 1960s and 1970s, the two greatest untapped resources of Baseball talent in the world by MLB were Cuba and Japan.  Omar Linares and Sadaharu Oh, two the greatest players of all time, played out their careers without ever appearing in the MLB. The Dodgers, who traveled often to Japan to played series against teams there, were well aware of the quality of the Japanese Major Leagues.

Of course, the Dodgers had been heavily recruiting Latin players since the 1950s.  But in 1980, Dodger owner Peter O’Malley also committed his team to heavily recruiting players from the Pacific Rim [Japan, Korea, Taiwan].  In many ways, the Pacific Rim players were even more important to the Dodgers than low-cost Latin talent [except perhaps players of Mexican origin like Fernando Valenzuela].  The Dodgers are basically a Pacific Rim team themselves [along with the Angels, Padres, Giants, Mariners, and the sad A’s until they move to Vegas].  The Los Angeles metropolitan area has the largest Asian population of any United States city [about 1.5 million in 2020] and largest population of Japanese origin in the continental United States [about 180 thousand].*  It was obvious that a Baseball player of Asian origin would be a perfect fit for the Dodgers. O’Malley’s attempts to procure players from the Pacific Rim eventually bore fruit. In 1994, the LA Dodgers signed Chan Ho Park, the first Korean star player in the MLB. Then, in 1995, they also signed Hideo Nomo, the first true Japanese star player.  The Dodgers were committed to cornering the market for Pacific Rim players and had made a great start. They had set themselves up to be the first choice for future Asian Pacific Rim players.  By location and fan base and ownership, the advantage was all theirs.  But then the Dodgers threw it all away. 

*San Francisco is second with 66 thousand, New York third with 56, and Seattle fourth with 53. The Honolulu, Hawaii, metropolitan area has reportedly about 200 thousand or so residents of Japanese origin.

4. The Dark Days of Dodger Baseball from 1998 to 2012

In 1998, Dodger Owner Peter O’Malley sold the LA Dodgers team to Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation.  O’Malley stated that he was selling because he was worried about Estate Taxes [at present in 2024, he is still reportedly alive and no Estate Taxes have come due]. O’Malley really sold the Dodgers in a fit of petulance.  He was upset by the continuing ugliness between the Owners and Players after the Player’s strike in 1994 and 1995 [which was pretty much completely the Owners’ fault for trying to break the Players Union].  The LA Dodger family mystique that O’Malley liked to cultivate had gone pretty sour for him.  Simply as a business decision, Peter O’Malley’s sale of the team was remarkably foolish [like most such judgments made emotionally].  Because of wounded pride or hurt feelings, O’Malley sold away an asset that any astute businessman would have died to hold onto. In 2012, when the Dodgers once again went up for sale, O’Malley would try to buy the team back.  But he did not have the funds any more to buy it just by himself. The consortium that he put together was quickly outbid. O’Malley’s foolishness cost his family several billion dollars. But even more importantly, O’Malley’s ill-considered decision to sell the Dodgers in 1998 also threw away all of his own good work mining the Pacific Rim for talent.

From 1998 to 2004, the LA Dodgers were owned by the News Corporation.* Murdoch’s company bought the team as part of a larger struggle with TBS [Turner Broadcasting System] for Baseball content.  In 2004, the LA Dodgers were sold by News Corp to con-artist and grifter named Frank McCourt who was approved by Baseball Commissioner Bud Selig himself.  There is a very interesting article to be written about some of Selig’s strange choices for his fellow owners during his tenure, but this is not it.  McCourt bought the LA Dodgers with MLB credit, proceeded to squeeze the franchise for every cent, and then cashed out for an undeserved fortune in 2012 (while under extreme pressure from Selig to sell). Both the News Corporation and Frank McCourt had one thing in common.  Neither had any long-range vision for the team. While they owned the club from 1998 to 2012, the Dodgers missed out on the cream of the crop of the first great wave of Baseball talent coming over from the Japanese Major Leagues (Ichiro Suzuki, Hideki Matsui, Masahiro Tanaka, et al). By 2012, when the Guggenheim Group purchased the LA Dodgers from McCourt, the team’s once great advantage in signing Pacific Rim talent had evaporated. Although some of their decisions have not been stellar (Trevor Bauer), the overall record of the franchise under the Guggenheim stewardship speaks for itself.  No one has been accusing the Guggenheimers of lack of vision. Now, their signing of the Japanese version of Babe Ruth may be just the capstone of their management.  With it, the Guggenheimers have taken a giant step towards cementing the Los Angeles Dodgers’ status as perennial winners and re-established the Dodgers as the primary destination for Pacific Rim players.

*Just like O’Malley, News Corp would sell the LA Dodgers right before Baseball franchise values exploded upwards. Rupert Murdoch may know the newspaper business but his acumen in the business of Baseball was non-existent.

5. The Contract of Shohei Ohtani

In many ways, Shohei Ohtani’s new contract with the Dodgers is unlike any other sports contract ever signed.  The 2 million dollars a year from 2024 to 2033 and then 68 million dollars a year from 2034 to 2043 is as unique as Ohtani himself.  Even more unique is that it became obvious that Ohtani and his representatives designed the contract themselves and then presented it to the teams that Ohtani was actually considering [the LA Dodgers and Angels plus the San Francisco Giants].*  MLB calculated this odd contract, for luxury tax purposes, as exactly 46 million dollars a year for 10 years in current value.  Interestingly, the Players Union calculated it as 43.5 million a year in current value.  Basically, Ohtani and his reps seemed to have just decided to top the highest average annual pay ever [43 and a third million dollars a year for 2 years to Justin Verlander and 3 years to Max Scherzer] and then pair that with the length of contract [10 years or more] usually given to drive that average annual amount down.  Not coincidentally, the contract also topped, by either the MLB or the Player Union calculations, the largest amount of total dollars ever of any MLB contract previously given out [to Ohtani’s former teammate Mike Trout for 426.5 million over 12 years]. Most importantly, all the deferrals until 2034 to 2043 in Ohtani’s contract will help free up the Dodgers to spend more in an attempt to absolutely dominate during his actual playing career with the Dodgers from 2024 to 2033. Ohtani claimed that winning was, by far, the most important thing and then, incredibly, structured his contract to back up those words to the hilt. You have to respect that.  

*Actual Contract Math: 2 million from 2024-2033 not discounted; 68 million deferred from 2034-2043 with a discount rate of 4.43% which equals a present day annual value of $44,081,476.50 per year.  Adding back the 2 million gives a contract of $46,081,476.50 per year for 10 years with a Total Contract Value of $460,814,764.97 dollars.

Another prime consideration in Ohtani’s strange contract seems to have been the California State Income Tax, currently the very highest in the United States at 13.3% for all income over one million dollars a year [and heading to 14.3% in 2024].  Under a US Federal Statue that prohibits States from taxing deferred payments if they last for at least 10 years and the recipient no longer lives in the State, Ohtani and his reps crafted a contract that will allow him to possibly collect those 68 million dollars a year from 2034 to 2043 and also not have to pay a single dime of that exorbitant California State Income Tax (provided he does not live in CA during that time).  If he moves to a some place like Florida or Texas with no State Income Tax at all during those years, it will be the same as if Ohtani had stashed his 46-million-dollar paycheck in a tax-free fund that returns 13 to 14 percent.  This is one hell of a return in a world where financial analysts will tell you that a 10 percent annual return is fantastic.  Interestingly, no one has yet weighed in on whether Japan itself would tax the 2034-2043 deferred payments if Ohtani returns to his Homeland.  If he wanted to finish his Baseball career in Japan after the Dodger contract runs out after the 2033 season, would it cost Shohei Ohtani any money?  Someone needs to look at the Japanese Income Tax Code.  But, for some reason, I believe the answer is: “No.” If anything, Shohei Ohtani has consistently shown that his preparation is completely on point.

*Sportswriters have indicated that Toronto might have also been given a chance to consider Ohtani’s terms.  But that seems as unlikely as the false ‘Ohtani plane ride to Toronto to sign’ story.

6. The Tao of Shohei Ohtani

What does all this say about Shohei Ohtani?  Nothing that is not already known.  He is intelligent, smart, driven and extremely methodical.  He seems to put in the work to not only to develop his talent, but also to structure his life.  Before he even signed with the Dodgers, it was hypothesized that Ohtani preferred to stay on the West Coast because it would keep him closest to his Homeland.*  Considering that he almost surely only gave Pacific Rim teams a chance to match the LA Dodger contract, this was almost certainly true.  After his LA Dodger contract was signed, it was reported that Ohtani could take just 2 million dollars a year while deferring 68 million annually because he already makes 40 to 50 million dollars a year in endorsements.  If he truly makes that much in endorsements (or even one half of that), Ohtani had an even greater reason to stay in Los Angeles, the media capital of the United States [if not the World].  How much more in endorsements will Ohtani make if he is the member of a Los Angeles Dodgers Super Team that makes annual play-off appearances?  How much more if they win multiple World Championships? Every aspect of Shohei Ohtani’s career has been methodically planned out. It is apparent that he took all this into consideration too. For years, it has been reported that Ohtani would eventually sign with the Los Angeles Dodgers. It was inevitable because it made too much sense. But, in the real world, things that simply make too much sense often do not come to pass (such as Bryce Harper to the Yankees). The Tao of Shohei Ohtani seems to be a Baseball life that makes perfect sense.

*Los Angeles is 5477 miles away from Tokyo, Japan. Both San Francisco and Oakland [5138 miles] are closer, but Seattle [4782 miles] is actually the closest. San Diego is even further away [5582 miles].

But the most important takeaway from Shohei Ohtani’s contract negotiations is that the man must have an almost unshakeable belief in himself.  His belief in himself is evidently so strong that money seems to have never his primary motivation.  Ohtani seems to believes that, if he simply pours his heart & soul into performing on the field, the money will follow.  When he signed his first Baseball contract in Japan, Ohtani’s firm belief that he could be a double duty player, both hitting and pitching, was essential to his choice of a team. When Ohtani came to the United States, he once again chose the team that would allow him to be a double duty player.  By coming over early, Ohtani forfeited the chance to make millions from the established posting system and had to accept the MLB minimum salary.  Basically, Ohtani then used his initial team in the MLB as an apprenticeship. Once he had conclusively proved that he could be a two way superstar, Ohtani moved on.  And now he has reached Baseball Nirvana.  The best player in the world is playing for an organization that will surround him with players that can help him to repeatedly get to the greatest Baseball stage of all, the MLB World Series.  If there is a God in heaven and he or she loves Baseball, this will all work out for Ohtani. He must believe that it will work out because everything has always worked out before. Possibly the only thing that could derail this Ohtani dream is if his team does not hold up it’s end of the bargain by not trying to surround Shohei with the teammates that he needs. The LA Angels, to their credit, did try to do this. They simply failed. It is already becoming apparent that the LA Dodgers will not fail. In fact, it is very likely that Ohtani is going to now spend his prime as the best player on a team with a good chance to go down in history as legendary.

Some of the Shohei Ohtani’s actions can only really be understood with a basic knowledge of Japanese Baseball [and/or culture].  While Americans love their sporting contests, Football reigns very comfortably as the number one American sport, and Basketball and Baseball compete for a distant second place (a competition that Baseball has been losing).  It is a far cry from 100 years ago when Baseball was unquestionably the supreme American sport and was called the National Pastime with good reason.  In Japan, there is not this problem.  The Japanese have two main sports, Baseball and Sumo.  And Baseball is pretty much clearly number one.*  In a way, the Baseball players and pitchers coming out of Japan are throwbacks to the men who at one time existed here.  The very best Japanese players, such as Ichiro Suzuki and Shohei Ohtani, live and breathe Baseball in a way that American professional athletes are probably now incapable of doing.  That the current best Baseball player in the world came out of the Japanese Baseball ecosystem was almost inevitable. One of the most unusual aspects of Shohei Ohtani’s signing of his LA Dodger contract was that he also reportedly presented the exact same contract to his former team, the LA Angels, and asked them if they would match it. But, even if the Angels had said yes, it is almost certain that Ohtani would have turned them down. His offer of the same contract to the Angels was meant as a sign of respect. Interestingly, the Angels seemed to understand the gesture and politely declined to match the Dodger offer. But this was a very Japanese thing for Ohtani to do.

*Robert Whiting’s wonderful seminal books on Japanese Baseball culture, The Chrysanthemum and the Bat and You Gotta Have Wa, still stand as probably the best introductions to Baseball in Japan.

7. What the Future Holds for Ohtani

Ever since he arrived in the Major Leagues, Shohei Ohtani has continued to improve.  He closed the holes in his swing, becoming ever more dangerous.  He has refined his pitching repertoire, becoming ever more unhittable.  But was 2023 his apex?  It is inevitable that Ohtani will not be as valuable in 2024 as he was from 2021-2023.*  In 2024, he will only be hitting, not hitting and pitching.  On July 5th of 2024, Ohtani will turn 30 years old.  Common wisdom holds that the typical baseball player peaks when he is 26 to 27 years old and then slowly declines until he is about 30 years old; before rapidly declining in his later 30s. Few Baseball players last until they are 40 years old [or older]. But Ohtani is anything but typical.  The year 2022 was Ohtani’s best year as a pitcher.  The year 2023 was Ohtani’s best year as a hitter [and overall].  Can he improve offensively in 2024?  Ohtani will be able to focus solely on his batting this year.  Of couse, Ohtani will also begin 2024 less than one year removed from his second Tommy John procedure.  As Philadelphia Phillies star Bryce Harper showed in 2023, recovery from Tommy John surgery can rob a hitter of his power for quite some time.  It will be interesting to see if this is the case with Ohtani.  A conservative prediction would probably state that it is likely that Ohtani’s power (his home runs and slugging percentage) will go down in 2024 while his on-base skills (walks and on-base percentage) will go up.  A more optimistic projection will have Ohtani breaking the LA Dodgers’ single season home run record [49] while also becoming the first Dodger to hit 50 or more home runs in a season. In any event, it will be fascinating to see him bat in the heart of the Dodger’s line-up.

*2021-2023 Ohtani Total WAR: 2021-9.0 [batting 4.9 and pitching 4.1]; 2022-9.6 [3.4 batting and 6.2 pitching]; 2023-10.0 [6.0 batting and 4.0 pitching]; but, if injuries had not ended his 2023 season early, Ohtani was on pace for about a 12.0 WAR season.

But the real fun will start in 2025.  If Ohtani is healthy, there is a chance that he may turn in one of the greatest seasons of all time. In fact, if his health holds, Ohtani may just peak anywhere between 2025 and 2029.  Of course, there is a chance that Ohtani will spend the late 2020s declining like a normal player. But there have been many position players who, for one reason or another, continued to improve into their early 30s [Honus Wagner and Joe Morgan, for example].*  Even more pitchers have continued to improve in their 30s.  The flamethrower Randy Johnson peaked from 1999 to 2002 when he was 35 to 38.  Is there any reason to believe that Ohtani could have a late career renaissance like Joe Morgan or Randy Johnson (or both)?  The answer to that question is obviously yes (though that doesn’t mean it will happen, just that it might).  What Ohtani is doing, juggling a career as a pitcher and a hitter is tremendously hard.  Time spent perfecting his pitching takes away time perfecting his hitting (and vice versa).  Ohtani reportedly eats, sleeps, and dreams Baseball.  It seems like there is a good chance that he still has some room to improve. In fact, he was still improving in 2023. How great a season could Ohtani actually have if he does continue to improve for awhile? Ohtani has already had 6 Wins Above Replacement [WAR] seasons as both a hitter and as a pitcher [not the same season though]. If he peaks together a 12 WAR season would be inevitable. But perhaps he could go even higher, maybe even much higher. It is unlikely but only time will tell.

*Morgan spent his early career battling both injuries and a manager who he thought was a racist [Harry Walker].  Traded to Cincinnati, Morgan learned to re-love Baseball from his teammate, Pete Rose, and had a ferocious peak at the late age of 32.

What the Future Holds for the Dodgers

The signing of Yoshinabo Yamamoto, who has been the best pitcher in the Japanese Major Leagues from 2021 to 2023, shows that the LA Dodgers now have an advantage, probably a great one, in any future attempts to sign the very best Japanese players.  Yamamoto himself, while admitting that he would have probably signed with the Dodgers in any case, did also state that the opportunity to play with Shohei Ohtani was a consideration (and it certainly helped that Shohei went out of his way to make Yamamoto feel welcome).  However, the most interesting thing, by far, about Yamamoto’s signing was that he obviously solicited offers from other teams [the Mets, Yankees, and Giants in particular]; and then gave the Dodgers the opportunity to match the best offer.  In fact, the Yankees offer was probably superior to the Dodgers’ offer.  The Dodgers seem to have sealed the deal by offering the reverse of the Ohtani’s deal.  Instead of deferring money, the Dodgers paid Yamamoto an upfront bonus of 50 million dollars [which also reportedly escapes the very onerous California State Tax].  If many of the future Japanese star players who come over also give the Dodgers the opportunity to match any offer, this will give the Dodgers an enormous advantage.  Who wouldn’t prefer, all things being equal, to play on the team that employs the “Babe Ruth” of Japan? In the very near future, two more great Japanese superstars [players with Hall of Fame caliber talent] will almost certainly be posted to play in the MLB. If the Dodgers sign both of these players, pitcher Roki Sasaki and home-run hitter deluxe Munetaka Murakami, the Dodgers may be renamed the Japan Giants or Tokyo Dodgers.

But the Dodgers still have to hold up their end of the bargain.  The Dodgers need to field a winning team.  After signing Ohtani, they immediately signed Yamamoto and also front-line starter Tyler Glasnow [to an extension of 5 years for 136.5 million dollars].  Of course, Glasnow is a risk due to his injury history. But the injury risk is counterbalanced by his tremendous upside.  Like Ohtani, Glasnow recently had a Tommy John surgery [2021].  His return in 2023 from the surgery was delayed by an oblique issue too. But Glasnow still managed to reach a career-high in starts (21) and innings (120).  Interestingly, Glasnow claimed in his initial interviews after the Dodger signed him that his elbow, which had been bothering him for basically his entire MLB career, finally felt whole.  If that is true, there is a actual chance that Tyler Glasnow will be the LA Dodgers’ best pitcher going forward.  In multiple ways, the signings of both Yamamoto and Glasnow are almost as important as the signing of Ohtani himself.  The Dodgers have announced that, not only do they have the Babe Ruth of Japan playing for them, they will go the whole nine yards to give him the supporting players that he deserves.  They seem to be intent on becoming a modern version of the 1927 New York Yankees (or maybe just the Yankees of the late 1990s).  Currently, the All-Time Baseball record for consecutive 100 or more win seasons is three, held by multiple teams. The Dodgers have won 100 or more games in 2021 [106], 2022 [111], and 2023 [100]. In 2024, the LA Dodgers are probably even money to become the first team to win 100 or more games in four consecutive seasons. And then five in 2025.

Postscript #1: The Elvis Moment

Perhaps the best thing about Shohei Ohtani’s signing with the LA Dodgers was his channeling of an American icon, Elvis Presley.*  With the LA Angels, Ohtani’s uniform number was 17.  But in 2023, relief pitcher Joe Kelly wore that number for the Dodgers.  Ashley Kelly, his wife, posted on their social media an offer to give her husband’s number to Shohei if he signed with the Dodgers. She even [one would assume jokingly] offered to rename her baby, Kai, to Shokai.  When Ohtani finally did sign with the Dodgers on December 11, Ashley proceeded to post an Instagram video of her throwing Kelly’s old number 17 uniforms onto their front lawn. She also drew a “Kelly 99” on the back of his shirt with a sharpie. Under this obvious pressure, Joe Kelly agreed to give up the uniform number 17 and took 99 instead as his new one. Then, on December 23, 2023, Shohei Ohtani had a brand new Porsche delivered to a flabbergasted Ashley as as a token of his appreciation and Xmas present. It may be impossible to root against Ohtani.  

*Elvis reportedly gave away a lot of automobiles during his life, but probably his most famous gift of a car happened in July 1975.  He was shopping for cars in a Memphis, Tennessee, Cadillac dealership.  A young black woman named Minnie Pearson walked by and was admiring the cars on display.  Noticing her looking, Elvis bought her a brand new white and gold Cadillac that retailed for $11,500. Of course, Elvis may have been as high as a kite when he did this. Ohtani was presumably sober.

Postscript #2: Memories of McGraw

The Dodgers pursuit of great Asian and Mexican players to give their large fan bases of those respective LA populations someone that they can identify with is reminiscent of New York Giants’ manager John McGraw’s [from 1902-1932] career long search for a great Hebrew player that would bring the large New York City Jewish population out to the Polo Grounds.  Unfortunately, McGraw had no luck at all fielding such Jewish players as Moses Solomon, the Rabbi of Swat. And, in an irony that still makes one laugh, McGraw then passed on the greatest Jewish player of the era (and possibly all time) when Hank Greenberg showed up for a tryout. The LA Dodgers, with Fernando Valenzuela and Hideo Nomo and now Shohei Ohtani, have not been so unlucky.

Postscript #3: The Dodgers sign Teoscar Hernandez [January 8, 2024]

One day after this post was published, the Dodgers continued their “Dr. Evil” plan to conquer the Baseball World by signing Teoscar Hernandez. At his best in 2021, the 28-year-old Hernandez hit 32 home runs, drove in 116 RBIs, and batted .296 while playing for the Toronto Blue Jays. With 2023 being his last year before achieving free agency, Toronto traded him to Seattle before the season started. Under pressure to perform and now playing in a new city and in a notable pitching park, Hernandez had a down year [26 HRs, 93 RBIs, and a .258 BA while striking out a whopping 211 times, up from his previous high of 163 during 2018, his first full season]. Interestingly, Hernandez struck out 107 times at home and 104 on the road but slashed just .217/.263/.380 [BA-OBP-SA] at home and .295/.344/.486 on the road. It is pretty obvious why the Dodgers signed Hernandez. They needed a powerful right-handed hitter to balance their majority left-handed line-up [Hernandez smacked lefties to the tune of .287/.307/.510 in 2023 and has swatted them at a .275/.329/.557 pace for his career]. They obviously figured getting him out of Seattle’s Kingdome #2 would not hurt.* Oddly, the Dodgers signed Hernandez to just a one year deal. It seems like a two year deal [or one year deal with options] would have lifted some of the pressure to perform that may have fueled his 211 strikeouts in 2023. But the Dodgers may believe that they are better suited to deal with the psychology in any case. Best case scenario: Hernandez repeats his 2021 stats in 2024. Worst case scenario [un-injured]: Hernandez repeats his 2023 season stats in 2024 and the Dodgers collect a draft pick for him and move on in 2025. Either scenario is probably a win for the Dodgers. More importantly, the Dodgers continue to uphold [to the extreme] their end of their bargain with Shohei Ohtani to build a Superteam around him.

*Branded Safeco Field at first and now as T-Mobile Park for the money.