Endless Fields of Green

Baseball’s Basic Math: New York Yankees

Nothing great was ever achieved without enthusiasm. Ralph Waldo Emerson

June 12, 2024

Introduction

From May 24th [San Diego Padres] to May 30th [Atlanta Braves], all the teams in the Major Leagues played their 54th game of the 2024 season. For reasons no longer completely clear to me, I spent from May 25th to June 10th writing 30 team summaries for the first third of the 20204 season. By the time that I was done, the summaries were slightly to considerably out of date. Instead of simply publishing them all at once after the expiration date, I decided to post them one at a time with an update. I’ll begin with the NY Yankees because: 1) it was the longest essay and 2) took up the most time. One last explanation: I wanted to rank the teams 1 through 30. This was made difficult by the simple fact that: 2 teams ended the first third at 31-23; 6 teams finished at 27-27; five teams finished at 25-29; etc. So I used a formula to differentiate. For Example, the Yanks below finished the first third at 37-17. If they kept that pace for the entire season they would finish 111-51. But their Pythagorean record actually would come out to 115-47.* The ranking is based on doubling their projected wins (111 x 2) and then adding in their Pythagorean wins (115 x 1) for a total of 337. The Yankees finished a close second to the Philadelphia Phillies using this completely arbitrary system. In any case, here is the Yankee essay which was also the first finished on May 28th.

*Pythagorean projection based on Runs Scored Squared/(Runs scored squared + Runs scored against squared). In the first third, the NY Yankees scored 264 runs while giving up just 169. Their offense was sixth but their defense was first by a considerable margin.

Out of Date Yankee Essay (played their 54th game on May 25th]

Essay 2. New York Yankees 37-17 [Pace 111-51/Pythagoras 115-47/~337].

What a difference a year makes. The Yanks, destroyed in 2023 by injury after injury, have had much better health this year. The Yankees’ only main injury in 2024, to starter Gerrit Cole, has been completely mitigated by the emergence of 2 good starting pitchers: Luis Gil (projected 18-3 and 6.0 WAR)* and also Clarke Schmidt (p 15-6 and 4.8 WAR). The free agent signee Marcus Stroman (p 12-6 and 2.76 ERA), a healthy Carlos Rodon (p 18-6 and 2.95), and Nelson Cortes (p 9-12 but 3.29) have combined with both Gil and Schmidt to give the Yankees the best pitching staff in the Majors. With 5 healthy starters, a decent bullpen, and Clay Holmes emerging as a great closer (p 69 games, 1.57 and 45 saves), the pitching was the backbone of the Yankees impressive start. The offense hasn’t been bad either. The trade for Juan Soto (p 42 HR-129 RBI-.309 BA/8.1 WAR) was predictably good. Aaron Judge, after a slow start, has turned back the clock to 2022 (p 162 G/54 2B/51 HR/117 RBI/.280 BA/.637 SA and 9.9 WAR). Giancarlo Stanton (p 39-87-.250/.509/1.5 WAR) has contributed rather than disintegrated. The trade for Alex Verdugo (p 18-81-.261) has lengthened the line-up. But the smartest move made by the Yanks was letting Anthony Volpe struggle through the 2023 season. Now a seasoned player, Volpe has given the Yankees an additional superstar (p 18-69-.282/105 runs scored/30 stolen bases). Volpe is projected to have a 7.5 WAR season in 2024. Even if he fades, Volpe has almost surely become the third best Yankee after Judge and Soto. From the ashes of 2023, this championship season is rising.

*Statistics in these third of a season essays are usually projected over a full year (in other words, multiplied by 3). Projected stats are listed with an initial “p.” If there is no “projected” designation or “p” notation, these are the actual stats.

Outlook for the rest of 2024: The Yankees almost feel like a team of destiny at this point. They could even improve a bit if Anthony Rizzo (p 21-75-.250) and Gleyber Torres (p 12-48-.222) return to form. There is even the possibility the Stanton has untapped reserves (he is projected for just 36 walks this season, possibly a sign of impatience). Stanton has always been a streaky player. He could go on a tear. The Yankees offense may actually be under-performing too. Their statistics indicate that the Yanks should have the best offense in the Majors. The team OPS+ is 774, first over the Dodgers (765) and Phillies (752). But the main reason to believe in the Yankees comes down to two things: 1) Gerrit Cole is evidently OK and coming back and 2) there are signs that Aaron Judge (absent injury) may actually be on his way to a better season than he had in 2022. I watch a lot of Yankee games. Judge looks totally relaxed and locked in. He does not have to worry about his next contract. He will not have the added pressure of trying to break the American League home run record. The Yankees are playing fantastically well. There is an old saying that a rising tide lifts all boats. I think that the Yanks and Judge are a closed circuit. Judge will ascend as the Yankees rise and the Yankees will ascend as Judge rises. I think there is a good chance that Judge re-breaks his own AL HR record. It may even be in the cards for Judge to take a run at Bonds. It probably will not happen, but beautiful dreams are just that until they become reality.

New York Yankees 2024 Update [June 13]: Record 49-21 [12-4 since 54].

The Yankees rampage continues. Clarke Schmidt’s recent injury (oblique) has not even slowed them down. Cody Poteet, a career minor leaguer, stepped in and has filled in remarkably (great and good teams are often distinguished by obscure minor leaguers having terrific years). The arrival of Gerrit Cole is right around the corner now. When Schmidt returns, the Yanks will have excellent pitching depth to deal with injuries. The Yanks have actually accelerated since the end of the first third. For the most part, all the players, with one exception, are playing at about the same pace. But the one exception is huge. After 54 games, Aaron Judge was hitting .280/.413/.637 with 17 homers. In 15 games since (16 team games, he took one off), Judge has crunched 8 more HRs and is now slashing .306/.443/.702 and is on pace for a 12.0 WAR season (up from just 9.9 projected WAR after 54 games). It is often said that Aaron Judge is the consummate team player. It certainly looks like he is feeding off the Yankee’s success this year. He is always smiling. History awaits.

Baseball Season’s Basic Math

Yesterday is not ours to recover, but tomorrow is ours to win or lose. Lyndon B. Johnson

May 23, 2024

Diamond Dust #3

Introduction: Calculations, Computations and Projections

One of the most basic joys of every baseball season is projecting how well (or how poorly) a player, a pitcher or even a team is doing over a short stretch for the whole 162 game length. After 27 games, the season is exactly 1/6th in the books (6×27=162). When the Angels played their 27th game this year, Mike Trout had hit 10 home runs. He was precisely on pace for 60 HRs for the year. Of course, poor Trout went down with a knee injury shortly thereafter, quickly ending any dream that he would hit even 30, much less 60, home runs for the season. When the Dodgers finished their 27th game this year, Shohei Ohtani had stroked 14 doubles. He was on pace for 84 doubles in 2024, which would obliterate the Major League record of 67 in a season by Earl Webb (and was also almost halfway to his own career high of 30 which took him 157 games). Oddly, Ohtani promptly stopped hitting boatloads of doubles and his 2B rate quickly fell behind Webb’s record pace. The Chicago White Sox began 2024 by going a horrific 3-22 and articles where written that they might break the New York Mets’ record of 120 losses in a season. Since then, the White Sox have gone 12-13, making that complete collapse scenario quite unlikely. The adjustments and counter-adjustments by the players, the ebb and flow of the teams’ schedules, and the capricious luck of the game itself eventually evens almost everything out. Except for those rare times when it does not.

Just two years ago, baseball gravity did not bring Aaron Judge back to earth and he crushed 62 homers to break the America League HR record. In 2024, we may be seeing yet another Icarus who does not fall out of the sky. Shohei Ohtani, taking a year off from the rigors of pitching, free from the LA Angels’ dungeon, with his concentration possibly sharpened by getting married, and perhaps even hyper-focused after his interpreter stole millions of dollars from him, may be on his way to a Baseball season to remember. Or not, only time will tell. But, whether Ohtani does or does not continue to impress, it will not detract one bit from the simple mathematical beauty of the first half of every Baseball season. Of course, the 6×27=162, 5×32=160, and even the 4×40=160 calculations are already in the 2024 rear view mirror. However, the 3×54=162 marker is already almost here. The perfect fulcrum calculations of 2×81=162 and somewhat far less satisfying 1.5×108=162 multiplications still wait in the not too distant future. Usually, all these early season projections of Baseball player’s future performance are just an exercise in daydreaming. But, when they are not, a baseball fans gets to watch Baseball history unfold in real time. Of course, math is not the only way to enjoy the Baseball present. One other way is to look over what is happening and search for deeper trends.

Does increasing pitch speed depress position player career length?

In 2022, the 42-year-old Albert Pujols retired after a long career [2001-2022]. Basically, the first half of Pujols’ career [2001-2011] was a superb audition for the Hall of Fame. The second half of his career [2012-2022] was a long slow decline into mediocrity. From 2017 to 2021, Albert was a below average hitter (by OPS+). In 2022, he did have one last glorious part-time season, ending on a high note. In 2023, the 40-year-old Miguel Cabrera also retired after a long career [2003-2023]. Cabrera started his career as a very good hitter and eventually peaked as an all-time-great batter from 2010 to 2013. Until 2016, he was still one hell of a hitter. A back injury in 2017 basically ended his useful career as a player. From 2017 until 2023, Cabrera was a below average hitter (by OPS+) for five of his seven remaining seasons. The two seasons that Cabrera was not below average (2018 & 2020), he barely played (38 & 57 games respectively). Unlike Pujols, Cabrera did not go out in a blaze of glory. He waddled through 2023 to collect the last year on his contract. For many years, I believed that the two main reasons behind both Pujols’ and Cabrera’s long slow glidepaths into retirement were: 1. neither player bothered to keep themselves in good condition at all after signing long-term contracts; and 2. neither player’s team could buy into the economic philosophy of “sunk costs” and simply eat the remainder of their bloated contracts. But now, thinking it over, I wonder if there was another reason that both men struggled mightily in their 30s?

It has been stated that the average speed of a Major League fastball has risen from about 91 mph in 2000 or so to 94 mph presently [2020 or so]. The basic fast-twitch-muscle-responses of the human body peaks from ages 18 to 21. With pitchers throwing harder & harder, would it not follow that this rise in velocity would make it harder and harder for players aging into their 30s to continue to perform at a high level? Was this a contributing factor to the decline of Pujols and Cabrera? Perhaps more importantly, will this have an effect on all the players currently signing contracts that take them deep into their 30s and even 40s? Recently, there have been a few articles written about the fact the no active players are really close to collecting 500 home runs or 3000 hits. The basic conclusion of these articles was that this was just an anomaly and it would straighten itself out eventually. But what if it is not? What is Baseball is becoming more and more a young man’s game because of fast-twitch dominance? Mike Trout, the greatest player of the last Baseball generation, has seen his career in his 30s derailed by injuries…but also by a sky-rocketing strikeout rate. There are other players (looking at you, Giancarlo Stanton) who have also lost control of the strike zone in their 30s. Has the game tilted strongly towards those who are still in their 20s? If it has, this will also have long term ramifications on the economics of Baseball. Right now, the salary structure of Major League Baseball is designed to take money from young players and reward veterans (an arrangement which was built by both the Baseball owners and the Player’s Union). Can any system which robs the productive members and rewards the unproductive persist?

Will six man pitching rotations start being adopted in 2024?

It is almost inevitable that Major League pitching rotations will increase from five to six pitchers. With pitching staffs now almost always 13 men large, the split of 6 starters and 7 relievers (rather than 5 and 8) seems more logical. It will reduce the stress on starter’s shoulders and elbows. Right now, a pitcher in a five man rotation will start about 32 or 33 games in a season. A pitcher in a 6-man rotation will start exactly 27 games if their team sticks strictly to such a schedule. Of course, with pitchers averaging about six innings per start, the qualification (162 innings pitched in a season) for winning the ERA [earned run average] title may become problematical. If all the teams used a six-man rotation, it would be possible for only four or five pitchers, all below average, to qualify for that title. In 2023, the Philadelphia Phillies went to a six-man rotation to prepare for the play-offs. At the beginning of 2024, it seemed likely that the he Dodgers could become the first team to permanently adopt a six man rotation. The Achilles heal of the recent Dodger’s super teams has been just getting into the post-season with a healthy starting pitching staff (the teams’ one recent World Championship came when the 2020 strike kept their starters fresh). Yoshinabu Yamamoto, the teams’ new ace pitcher from Japan has spent his entire career pitching in a six-man rotation. The other Dodger’s ace, Tyler Glasnow, has never even approached the 5-man rotation minimum 30 starts & 180 IP standard because of injuries. The Dodgers have multiple pitchers returning from assorted injuries (Clayton Kershaw, Walker Buehler, and Dustin May), not to mention a bunch of possible rookie starters. It seems inevitable that the LA Dodgers will eventually go a strict six-man or looser always five days of rest rotation. And it also seems likely that a strict 6-man rotation will also let average fastball velocity increase yet some more. But it hasn’t happened yet.

Many proposals have been floated to bring back the old school 250-300 IP starting pitcher. But the answer is obvious. It is just a question of roster size. With 13 pitchers, the average pitcher has to throw 112 or so innings (162×9= 1458/13=112+ innings pitched). If you limit the roster size of just pitchers to 10, that jumps to 145+ innings pitched. Of course, the Player’s union would almost surely object severely to that type of roster limitation. However, the 10 pitcher limit does have a link to tradition. The 25-man player roster has been around since about 1920; and, for most of that time, the pitching staff was usually 10 men. The recent (2020) increase of the total roster size to 26 players did not help with the diffusion of innings pitched between ever more pitchers. As long as the Major Leagues allow their teams to place 13 (even 14) pitchers on the roster, the current trend against starting pitchers pitching 200 or more innings in a season will continue. Perhaps a limit to just twelve pitchers would be a start? One interesting facet of this roster management problem could be combination pitcher/players like Shohei Ohtani. Perhaps the Major Leagues could encourage future Ohtanis by excluding players who play more games in the field (or at DH) from the roster limit? But, no matter what the Major Leagues decides to do about this issue, the actual solution to increasing starting pitching workload will always begin with just reducing the number of pitchers that a team can carry. And, of course, reducing the roster size of the pitching staff will also bring down the average fastball velocity as pitchers need to preserve their arms to throw more pitches & innings.

What happens to Players caught up in the Current Culture War?

Long ago, Major League caliber players were excluded from the Majors for a completely spurious reason: the color of their skin. But, other than that piece of historical stupidity, players have usually been allowed to play in the Majors no matter what horrible blemish is contained in their life stories. Both Henry Thompson and Cesar Cedeno played in the Major Leagues despite murdering someone. Manslaughter, at the very least, was not enough to keep them out. In the 1930s, Edwin “Alabama” Pitts was allowed to play in the minors despite spending 6 years in Sing Sing prison for robbery. In the 1970s, Ron Leflore played in the Major Leagues after three years behind bars for armed robbery. Considering that past, it seems slightly strange that three star caliber players are currently unemployed basically by becoming entangled in modern culture wars. Alphabetically, these players are Trevor Bauer, Wander Franco and Julio Urias. All have run afoul of the “MeToo movement” that condemns violence against women. This movement began in 2006 and peaked in 2017 with the accusation and eventual conviction of movie producer Harvey Weinstein for multiple offenses against numerous women. Although none of the Baseball players accused of violence against women seems to be quite the monster that Weinstein apparently is (was?), each has been accused of something that should make them unwelcome in polite society. Trevor Bauer was accused of beating a woman unconscious during consensual “rough” sex (and several other women came forward to establish this as his pattern). Wander Franco was accused of sexually exploiting a 14-year-old girl. Julio Urias got into an argument with his significant other and put his hands on her in a very hostile manner.* Will any of these men play Major League Baseball again?

*The Urias incident, as reported, is actually a bit confusing. Some sources stated Urias hit his girlfriend. Other sources claimed he choked his wife. Apparently, he is not married and it was his long term significant other. Exactly how Urias assaulted her is somewhat unclear.

Right now, there doesn’t seem to be any path back to the Major Leagues for Bauer, Franco, or Urias. Although all three men deserve to be punished, I am uncomfortable with the current electric chair to their career approach. While retaliation has its place, there must also be rehabilitation in a civilized society. Could the Commissioner’s Office and the Player’s Union not negotiate some type of agreement outlining these player’s way back. Make them give half of their salaries to charities against whatever crime they committed. Make them do community service. Take away the argument that these players need to be ostracized forever and replace it with the fact that they could do some good. Of course, that would be pro-active approach, something usually foreign to Baseball. The Major Leagues seem to usually like to wait until a problem just disappears or becomes life-threatening. In the case of the 3 players named above, they are all probably doomed. Franco is probably the least doomed. He is still drawing his salary from Tampa Bay, his crimes happened in another country with different rules, and the situation between himself and the victim contains a greater criminal (the victim’s mother). Urias may eventually be able to return to the Majors because no one seems to be paying any attention to it. Bauer, who was never convicted of anything at all, is probably just screwed. He was considered an asshole before the scandal happened, has been totally unrepentant since it happened, and his signing by a team will surely generate a ton of bad publicity. Perhaps his only hope now is that someone from the ownership ranks, a traditionally uber-conservative group, desires to send a message of contempt to modern cancel culture.

The Latest Candidate for the Dwight Evans’ Career Path?

One of my favorite players of all time was Dwight Evans (Dewey!), the right fielder for the Boston Red Sox in the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1970s, Dwight was one-third of a fascinating outfield with Jim Rice and Fred Lynn. All three players ended their careers with borderline Hall of Fame cases. A very good argument can be made that any or all of the three belong in the Hall; but an equally good argument could be made that none of them do. Rice, of course, is in the Hall despite his sketchy qualifications. Lynn and Evans remain on the outside looking in. Rice and Evans are somewhat opposite. Rice had his best years in the 1970s but faded in the 1980s. Dwight Evans, on the other hand, struggled in the 1970s but found himself in the 1980s. Fragile Freddy Lynn, perhaps the most talented of the three, simply could not stay healthy enough in either decade. Evans’ career path was pretty unusual. He came up in 1972 at the age of 20. But he could not seem to harness his talents. Dewey had injuries, inconsistencies and an everchanging batting stance. However, in the strike year of 1981, Evans seemed to finally put it all together. From 1972 to 1980 (ages 20-28), he had only played 140 or more games 4 times with a high of 152. But in 1981, he played every game (all 108) during the aborted season. Before 1981, his highest OPS+ was a good, but not great 128. In 1981, Evans had a fantastic (and career high) OPS+ of 163. He led the American League in plate appearances, homers, total bases, and walks. It was Evans’ career year but it was not a fluke. Dewey maintained a much higher level of production for the rest of his career. After he turned 30, Evans played 140 or more games seven more times with a peak of 162 twice. He also cleared an OPS+ of 128 six more times with a peak of 157. After turning 30, Evans accumulated more than half of his career WAR [Wins Above Replacement]. Dwight Evans was a quintessential Baseball late bloomer.

A little while ago, I wondered if another Red Sox outfielder, Jackie Bradley Jr., would follow in Dwight Evans’ footsteps. Bradley came up in 2013 at the age of 23 (Evans had signed out of High School while Bradley had signed out of College which partially explains the difference in their ages during their Major League debuts). Bradley was, with Andrew Benintendi and Mookie Betts, also part of a much celebrated young outfield trio. But unlike Evans and his mates, not all of these three players turned in very good to almost great careers. The unbelievable Betts turned into a no-doubt Hall of Famer. But Bradley Jr. and Benintendi will need to buy a ticket to visit that Baseball shrine. Like Dewey, Bradley was a fantastic defensive outfielder. But Jackie Jr. was a center fielder while Dewey played right. Bradley played his first full season in 2014. And it was beyond ghastly offensively. In 127 games and 382 ABs, Bradley hit just one home run, batted .198, and slugged .266 (his OPS+ was just 49).* But he hit well in a half season in 2015 (119 OPS+), had his career year in 2016 (26 HRs/87 RBIs/.267 BA). From 2017-2019, Bradley was a slightly below average batter (OPS+ from 89 to 92). But the really odd thing about Bradley was that he, in every season from 2015 to 2019, combined hot streaks in which he was the best hitter on the team with terrible cold spells that looked he had never ever swung a bat before. In the strike year of 2020, Bradley was 30 and hit a career high .283. His OPS+ was 116. If he could minimize the cold patches & maximize when he was on-fire, it seemed like he could have a much greater second half of his career. Instead, Bradley promptly hit for the consecutively pathetic BAs of .163, .203, and .133 [2021-2023]. Bradley then fell right out of the Majors. Jackie Bradley Jr. was no Dewey Evans.

*OPS+ equals a player’s on-base percentage [OBP] and slugging average [SA] combined and then normalized for park effects on a scale of 100. A 49 OPS+ is beyond terrible.

There are two current players who may be able to be qualify for the mythical Dewey Evans Late Bloomer Award. One is Minnesota outfielder Matt Kepler. Kepler was raised in Germany by his American mother and Polish father, who were both ballet dancers. Hardly a normal Baseball lineage. Reportedly, he had never faced a pitcher who threw over 80 mph before he came to the US as an adult. In his 20s, Kepler was noted for a significant flaw: he hit far too many ground balls to access his full talents. He seemed to have all the signs of a late bloomer: little experience at Baseball when he was young, underlying talent, and correctable flaws. He debuted for the Twins in 2015 at the age of 22 and has been a regular since 2016. But basically, with the exception of the home-run-happy year of 2019 and the dismal strike-shortened 2020 , Kepler was a below average hitter from 2016 to 2022. However, he seemed to turn a corner in 2023 after turning 30 years old (123 OPS+ matching his career high in 2019). He has so far continued this late-in career renaissance in 2024. Here is hoping he can keep it up. The other current player who is a possible Dewey Evans style late-bloomer is Jurickson Profar. Profar debuted in the Majors in 2012 at the age of 19 and looked like a potential coming star in 2013. Profar then missed both the 2014 & 2015 seasons to shoulder injuries. From 2016 to 2023, Profar has mixed decent seasons (2018, 2020, 2022) with poor years (2016, 2019, 2021, and 2023) and yet another injury season (2017). It seemed like all his initial potential had been squandered. This was quite sad because, by all reports, Profar is a well respected man. However, in 2024 at the age of 31, Profar seems to have gotten a second win. Will it continue on? Only time will tell. On thing that both Kepler and Profar have in common is that, as they reached their 30s, both players rediscovered their joy in playing the game. If they can keep it up, it will make for a great and uplifting story.*

*It could be argued that the ever increasing fastball velocity in the Majors will make it even harder to be a late bloomer like Evans. If this is true, the stories of Kepler and Profar will be that much better if they are able to maintain their recent improvements deep into their 30s.

Conclusion: Waiting for the 54th and 81st mile (game) markers.

The 2024 season is fully underway. It will soon be Summer once again and some questions will be clearer. Will Shohei Ohtani and Gunnar Henderson be able to keep up their current paces? Will some player explode on the League like Sammy Sosa did in 1997 with his record (although steroid fueled) 20 HRs in month. The season is still young but the prologue and the first act are now in the books.

Spring Training Dreams

I’ve always been fascinated by people, their psychology, what drives them and trying to understand them. Adan Canto

March 27, 2024

Diamond Dust #2

Perhaps the most famous meeting in the history of Baseball was when Branch Rickey met Jackie Robinson in 1945. Rickey, part-owner and also the General Manager of the Brooklyn Dodgers, interviewed Robinson for over two hours to try to determine whether Jackie was the man who should break the odious “color line” that had stained the game basically since its inception. But it is also obvious that Rickey wanted to know if Jackie Robinson’s psyche was as well suited for the game of baseball as it was for integration. In many ways, Rickey’s entire career was an exercise in such amateur psychology. Branch Rickey was always fascinated by how a player’s personality affected athletic performance. This is also an interesting subtext to the recent book Moneyball that has been lost in all the hoopla about applying modern business analysis to baseball. The very sad core of the book is how Billy Beane’s psychological makeup made it difficult for him to apply his natural athletic gifts to playing baseball. He should have been a superstar. He was not. Psychology both giveth and taketh away. One of the wonderful things about Baseball’s Spring Training is that hope springs eternal. And all this hope is usually some type of applied psychology. Young players make mental adjustments. Older players train harder (or not) to stay young. Pitchers adopt new pitches and strategies. Hitters come up with a new plan. Whole teams either change their course or double down on a strategy that works (or does not). In Spring Training, all dreams are possible before the rubber hits the road of the actual season. In Spring Training, you can watch the psychology of the game and its players unfold before your eyes.

The Tao of Ohtani

Of course, the biggest story of the Spring was Shohei Ohtani. His move from the Angels to the Dodgers reinforced the impression that he was completely in control of every aspect of his life. Ohtani basically wrote his new contract himself. He then presented it to those teams that he was considering. In the end, he choose the Dodgers, the logical choice. The contract maximized the chances for Ohtani to be on a winning team, get to the play-offs, and finally be part of a World Championship team. Ohtani has always been presented by his handlers as a baseball savant. Baseball was his life. Everything he does is part of his goal to be the best there ever was (shades of Roy Hobbs). During the Spring, it was announced that he had gotten married. The careful reveal of his wife and even the name of their dog was totally on message. Ohtani was completely in control. Psychologically, it seemed like Ohtani was just a freak of nature. There was no messiness in his life, no loose ends. Everything was carefully considered and perfectly planned. And then the illusion crashed to the earth. His personal interpreter, Ippei Mizuhara, got caught paying 4.5 million dollars to a bookie! There were only two real possibilities. Either the interpreter was running bets for Ohtani or the interpreter had embezzled the money from Ohtani. Fortunately for Baseball, it appears that the disheveled* Mizuhara stole the money and that Ohtani is not some modern day Pete Rose. But the carefully constructed media image of Ohtani has almost surely been ruined for good. He may be more of an idiot savant than a baseball buddha. Like most people who put all their energy into a single pursuit, other skills are seriously lacking (like the ability to judge people). It will be very interesting to see if Ohtani psychologically sublimates all this. In other words, he puts all his disappointment and energy into the one thing that has always rewarded him. If so, I predict Ohtani hits more than 50 HRs this year, breaking the Dodger’s single season team record.

*Every time I’ve ever seen Ippei Mizuhara, I always wondered about his hair. Was this a common Japanese hairstyle? Did he know it looked like he had never meet a hair stylist? Why was he so disheveled looking? But then my conscience would remember the old saying: “Never judge a book by its cover.” And I would feel slightly bad. But perhaps there is some truth in stereotypes? Can a stereotype even become a stereotype without any truth at all?

Some Players to Watch in 2024

But Ohtani and the Dodgers are hardly the only Spring Training daydream that is available. There is his teammate Mookie Betts’ transfer from the OF to 2B and then shortstop. Mookie has a reputation for being one of the nicest guys in baseball.* If he has the uber-competitive gene of most top athletes, Betts keeps it well hidden. But his position transfer actually revealed it briefly. When he was signed by the Boston Red Sox in 2011, Betts originally played second base (and some shortstop). But the Red Sox soured on Mookie as an infielder. By 2014, the year that he debuted in the Majors, Betts was just an outfielder. With his position switch back to the infield, Mookie revealed that he has always resented the Red Sox’ judgment of his infielding skills. It will be interesting to see who is right, the Red Sox or Betts. My money is on Mookie. Many great athletes are driven by grievance. It will also be interesting to see how Bryce Harper’s resentment of his contract works itself out. In one of the stranger storylines from 2024 Spring Training, Harper announced his desire to rework his contract [330 million dollars over 13 years]. With the top baseball players now making up to 42 million dollars a year, Harper is obviously feeling that his 25 million plus per season is inadequate. Of course, if Harper injures his back tomorrow and can no longer play, all that money is still going to be paid to him. And Bryce Harper has, shades of Don Mattingly, a history of back issues. His team, the Phillies, has done the right thing and basically ignored the demands of their best player. Harper’s response to Philadelphia’s refusal to engage was fascinating. He stated that he would remain productive deep into his 40s and was worthy of a raise. Both Betts and Harper now carry their resentments into the 2024 season. Unless injury unfortunately interferes, they are also both primed psychologically, like Ohtani, for great seasons.

*A woman that I know meet Mookie Betts out on the town when he played for Boston. She is an attractive woman and was studying dentistry at Tufts. She had no idea who Betts was (she began a conversation with me by asking: “Have you ever heard of this guy?”). She told me that he was a perfect gentlemen, talked about his long time girlfriend, and then paid for her and her friends’ drinks and hors d’oeuvres.

Some Things to Anticipate in 2024.

The psychology of Spring Training is all about anticipation. Which pitchers will take a step forward? Spencer Strider unveiled a new curve ball. Will he become the modern Sandy Koufax or Nolan Ryan? Yoshinabu Yamamoto is here in the Majors. Will he be the star that he was in Japan? Tyler Glasnow announced that his elbow actually felt good for the first time in years. Will he be able to pitch for a whole season without falling apart? The San Francisco Giants are giving the 100-mph flamethrowing-reliever Jordan Hicks a chance to transition to a starting pitcher. Will Hick’s new splitfinger pitch allow him to become the ace of the SF staff (or even just a good starter)? But there are negative anticipations too. Which pitchers will blow out their arms? Is Gerrit Cole going to need a Tommy John procedure? Will Kodai Senga’s shoulder heal? Of course, pitchers are far more volatile than position players. Among the position players, Spring Training is even more of a fresh start. Will Bobby Witt Jr. and Julio Rodriguez take yet another step forward from superstars to legends? Will Juan Soto, finally in his walk year, recover his Ted Williams type mojo and receive a long term contract? Will Cody Bellinger recover his 2019 MVP type form, have another good season like 2023, or sadly turn back into the pumpkin that he was from 2020 to 2022? Will Vlad Guerrero Jr. reverse the downhill slope of his career before he turns into the next Prince Fielder? Will Anthony Volpe be able to change his swing from a home run uppercut to a line drive machine gun? Will rookie Wyatt Langford rampage through the Majors as he has through the Minors? Will Joey Gallo hit more than .200 far away from the lights of Broadway? And on down the line to players that not only the biggest baseball nerd knows. When Spring Training finally ends, the answer to all these questions starts.

Teams have Psychology too

Of course, there is also the group psychology of the team itself to consider. Last year, the New York Yankees’ season was swamped by injuries and under-performance. But the institutional memory of the Yankees almost demands excellence. Will this group identity be enough to overcome their lost season? In other words, will the fact that they did not rise to what was expected cause them to work harder as a group to rebound? Giancarlo Stanton is probably the weathervane of this particular speculation. It will also be very interesting to see how the Yankees traditional rival, the Boston Red Sox, play out the year. The Red Sox have decided as a team to do the minimum to compete, hoping to just a catch a wave of over-performance to make a play-off run. During the off-season, it seemed like the Red Sox matched perfectly with free agent pitcher Jordan Montgomery. They needed pitching. Jordan’s wife attended college in Boston. But the BoSox just could not pull the trigger. No reason why was given. Was it because Montgomery’s conditioning will remind you of David Wells’ physique? But how does this affect team morale? Indications are that the core players of the Red Sox know the team is non-competitive from the top. It seems like this season for Boston may be much worse than is being projected [somewhere between 78-82 wins]. But the most interesting group psychology experiment for the 2024 season is being conducted by the St. Louis Cardinals. Ollie Marmol, the team’s manager in 2023, ran the Cards into the ground with a series of poorly thought-out personnel decisions and conflicts. Rather than firing Marmol, the Cardinals oddly doubled down by extending him. In the long history of Baseball, there are many examples of managers that lost control of their clubhouses [most famously, Ossie Vitt and the 1939 Cleveland Indians and Vern Rapp and the 1978 St. Louis Cardinals]. If the Cardinals collapse in 2024, will they finally fire Marmol?

Conclusion (or Play Ball!)

Watching the drama of applied human psychology play out on the field is one of the many joys of Baseball. But sometimes this psychology ends up playing out over the course of several seasons or even an entire career. For the 2024 season, the Atlanta Braves placed a bet on two potentially brilliant change-of-scenery moves. They traded for a young Jarred Kelenic, who had cracked into pieces under the pressure to be a superstar in Seattle, and old Chris Sale, who had broken apart from the workload of being Boston’s ace. Atlanta, already loaded with stars and superstars, obviously believes that, with all the pressure to be the leader of the pack removed, Kelenic and Sale can thrive. Only time will tell if this strategy turns into filet or dogfood. Of course, sometimes it is already clear if something is already just dogshit. Anthony Rendon, perhaps unwisely made it quite clear early this Spring what he thought about Baseball as an avocation. Long story short, Rendon said that he only played the game for the money. The Angels must have been thrilled. Rendon signed a seven year contract that runs from 2020 to 2026. The first four years, 2020 to 2023, have simply been brutal with Rendon usually injured, unavailable, and hostile. It will be a total miracle if, in the last three years from 2024 to 2026 (in which Rendon is making $38,571,479 dollars per year), he improves even one iota. It would be interesting to know how Branch Rickey, who loved Baseball with a religious fever, would have dealt with such a player. You could probably make some good money if you could place a bet that Rendon immediately retires when his contract is up in 2026. But Baseball will not care. By that time, we will know far more interesting things like whether Oniel Cruz and (his cousin by last name only) Elly de la Cruz, have transformed into the National League answer to Aaron Judge and Shohei Ohtani.

Brinksmanship

February 23,2024

It’s how you walk to the ATM. It isn’t whether the ATM exists, right? Scott Boras on the Baseball Owner’s deep pockets.

Diamond Dust [Number 1]

It is late February and five major free agents* have not yet signed with a new (or former) team. The one thing that all these men have in common is the same business agent: the indefatigable Scott Boras, who is possibly the most beloved and despised baseball agent of all time. For any long time Baseball fan, Boras, a stocky man with the demeanor of a pit bull, seems to be almost inevitable. His modus operandi is to negotiate for his baseball player clients as fiercely as possible, extracting every penny possible from whichever club owner will pay. For almost 40 years, almost every Baseball off-season has had a prolonged and torturous Boras negotiation as a major storyline. It seems like most of the players that he represents love him. On the other hand, most Baseball fans despise Scott Boras. He punctures their dreams that the players have team loyalties and Baseball is anything more than just a business. As for the Baseball owners, Boras is a very specific nightmare. He usually advises his clients to maximize their value in the free agent marketplace. Boras is not in favor of ‘hometown discounts’ or leaving any money on the table. His players routinely switch teams for large contracts. These tactics, negotiating right up to the brink, have been very successful for the players represented by Boras. But this off-season may be different. The Boras tactic of ‘Brinkmanship’ may have, at least for this season, met it’s match. It is late February. The spring training camps are open. And his five free agent stars still twist in the wind.

*Cody Bellinger [OF], Blake Snell [P], Jordan Montgomery [P], Matt Chapman [3B] and J.D. Martinez [DH].

One thing that you can surely say about Scott Boras is that he does actually love the game of Baseball. Born in November of 1952, Boras walked on to his college team, made the cut, and reportedly led his team in batting average [BA]. Drafted by the St. Louis Cardinals, he played in the Minor Leagues from 1974 to 1977 as primarily a second baseman. By 1977, Boras had made it to the Texas League where he hit for a .275 BA with 43 walks and 27 strikeouts in 265 at bats. Basically, Boras was a prototypical ‘scrappy’ second baseman. He had no real power but obvious contact skills with a very good eye at the plate. But that year was where his career ended, reportedly because of a knee injury. Could he have made the Majors? Possibly. In 1977, Boras was only 24. Many players do not come into their own until they are 25 to 30. If he got stockier and gained some power while refining his batting eye to draw 100 walks each year and also not slipped down the defensive spectrum, it possibly could have happened. But a much more likely outcome, if he had stayed in Baseball, was that he would have became a minor league manager or coach. Earl Weaver, the legendary Baltimore Oriole manager, was probably his ceiling.* Instead of pursuing this path, Boras went to law school, graduating in 1982. Before he even got his diploma, Boras was already representing Major League players. He then opened the Boras Corporation which he built into one of the largest sports agencies in the world. Fascinatingly, his business only represents Major League Baseball players, no athletes from any other sport. As far as Baseball goes, the Boras Corporation is the top sports agency, by far.

*Earl Weaver was a very similar Minor League Player to Boras. The Baltimore skipper was a scrappy second baseman who hit for a decent BA without any real power and drew a lot of walks.

How did Scott Boras and his corporation get to be so successful? Over time, he built his business into a full service organization for his players. The Boras Corporation offers marketing, conditioning, and psychological services to its clients. Interestingly, it does not offer investment advice or services. As that type of advice usually causes ‘conflicts of interests‘ between the agents and their clients, it indicates that Boras must have some ethical standards. But the actual basis of Boras’ success as a sports agent is much simpler. Boras quickly established a reputation for fighting to always get his clients the most money possible. He refused to let the Owners cry poor mouth.* He had no problems going directly to an owner to make a pitch, bypassing the front office. Boras developed (or already had) an aggressive, even bombastic, personal style. He used the press to publicize his efforts on behalf of his players. Boras had no problems with refusing to sign and holding out, long past what seemed to be reasonable, until he got all that could be gotten for his clients. This created a very interesting feedback loop. By getting them maximum dollars, he lured more and more Baseball players to his agency. These players came to Boras because they did not want to be cheated out of a single cent. The Baseball teams quickly realized that money was the primary driver of the player-team relationship for any client of Boras. For any player he represented, Boras was playing high stakes poker with the Club Owners and consistently winning. As he won over and over, the feedback loop strengthened itself. But all winning streaks almost always end if you keep playing.

*It is often stated that Boras animus against the Owners’ cries of poverty stem from his experience in the Minor Leagues. Considering that the Minors have often been compared to indentured servitude or chattel slavery, this may well be true.

Is this what is happening right now for Scott Boras’ big five 2024 free agents? It certainly seems like it is. To continue with the poker analogy, Boras has a very poor hand in 2024. Cody Bellinger is a former MVP who is coming off a very good year. But he had three terrible years in between his MVP year and 2023. If his shoulder gives out again, Bellinger will be worthless. Blake Snell has won two Cy Youngs Awards in 2018 and 2023. But, in every other year of his career, he has never been anywhere near the very best pitcher in baseball, posting average ERAs and walking too many men. Even in 2023, Snell issued the most bases on balls in the National League. Jordan Montgomery seems to be turning into a rotation mainstay and he has pitched pretty well for years. But his 10 and 11 won/lost record in 2023 was the very first time he ever had won in double digits. Despite a great 2023 post-season, Montgomery hasn’t ever impressed anyone with his conditioning. Matt Chapman began the 2023 season like a house on fire. Then he cooled off until he was virtually helpless. On the wrong side of 30, Chapman could reach the end of the line before the end of any multi-year contract. J.D. Martinez, who had a good comeback year in 2023, is currently 36 and will be 37 before the 2024 season is over. Despite having five flawed clients, Boras has spent almost the entire 2024 off-season endlessly negotiating for the absolute best deal possible. Now both he and his players are standing on the brink and staring into the abyss.

Scott Boras has made many enemies among the Baseball Owners and their front offices while endlessly out-negotiating them. It is also very obvious that quite of few of these people are enjoying Boras’ current discomfort. Will any of them break ranks to sign one of Boras unlucky big 5 free agents of 2024? The Owner and Front Office fraternity are going to be unhappy with anyone who gives one of Boras’ big five that contract that they are looking for. They will surely celebrate any team that gets one of Boras’ clients on the cheap. It will be very interesting to see how long they force Boras and his unfortunate five players to squirm. Will Boras learn anything from this free agent fiasco? Will he temper his use of contract brinkmanship in the future? Will he work harder to get the best fit for his players rather than simply the most money possible? It seems unlikely. People resist change. But, strangely enough, I wouldn’t bet against Boras. He certainly seems more capable of change than his Major League Baseball opponents. It will be very interesting to see what happens in the coming seasons.

Addendum #1:

The Boras Corporation actually represented 8 players going into the 2024 free agent market. There were the 5 elite players but also 3 other players who you would hardly call the ‘top’ of this free agent class. These 3 other players were: Rhys Hoskins, Sean Manaea, and Joey Gallo [shades of My Cousin Vinny!]. All three of these players were basically fungible. Of the three, Hoskins probably offered the most upside. But he had missed the entire 2023 season because of a severe knee injury. Manaea was a decent pitcher and could definitely fill a rotation spot. But, even at his best, he had never been a star and now was on the wrong side of 30. Gallo still had prodigious power. But he had batted under .200 for four consecutive seasons [.181-.199-.160-.177]. Despite their flaws, the Boras Corporation did very well for each player. Hoskins signed for 16 million in 2024 with a 18 million player option for 2025 and also 18 million mutual option 2026. Manaea signed for 14.5 million plus a 13.5 million dollar option for 2025. Gallo, who seemed to be headed for a non-roster invite to Spring Training, signed for 5 million in 2024 with an 8 million mutual option for 2025. It seems that, for each of these three players, the Boras Corporation identified an interested team and hammered out an agreement with that club before they could change their mind. Quite a difference from the negotiating strategy that they used for their big five.

Addendum #2:

In yet another attempt to shorten my posts, I tried to write one in a single day like some old school newspaper reporter under a deadline. It still wasn’t short enough. But I did get it done in just one day. For this style of post, I decided to title them with a “Diamond Dust” heading. This is hardly original to me. I saw it in an old newspaper. But I have claimed it as mine for now.

2024 Baseball Hall of Fame Election

January 21, 2024

Happiness Is Making Your Dreams Come True. Jourdan Dunn

1. Introduction

It’s that time of year, once again. On January 23rd of 2024, the Baseball Writers Association of America [BBWAA] will announce the results of their annual vote to let some more retired Baseball players into the Baseball Hall of Fame [BHOF]. These lucky players will be going in through the front door [the back door being the various shady committees where the dirty work of the BHOF is done]. In this post, I will look at each candidate’s worthiness through the lens of the: 1) Wins Above Replacement [WAR] and 2) Win Shares [WS] player evaluation systems. To determine whether any candidate is actually worthy under either of these two systems, I will be using the Lowest Common Denominator Method [LCDM] to evaluate each player’s WAR and WS scores. The LCDM tries to ensure that no player is elected to the BHOF who does not already have a better WAR or WS score than the worst player who should have been elected. After evaluating a player’s WAR and WS numbers by the LCDM, a discussion will be had for each player on the ballot about whether they are worthy, whether they could have been worthy with better luck, or whether they were never really good enough for election to the BHOF. We will also mention where each player is on the Ryan Thibodaux “Baseball Hall of Fame Vote Tracker” [BHFVT]. The BHFVT compiles already published votes ahead of the actual announcement and is invaluable in taking almost 100% of the fun out of the actual BHOF announcement of who is going to be inducted.

2. Player Evaluation Methods

What is the difference between the two player evaluation systems that will be used in this post? Bill James’ Win Shares [WS] method measures the bulk of a player’s career. Under this system, good hitting players with long careers are rewarded. In other words, it favors a long workman career offensively over a shorter but more spectacular career. Defensively, Win Shares favors the other eight men in the field over the pitcher. In fact, pitchers are so undervalued by WS that this system may have to be disregarded when considering if a pitcher is worthy of election to the BHOF. Although WS increases the defensive value of every positional player across the board by devaluing pitcher contributions, the defensive metrics used by the WS system are conservative. On the other hand, Wins Above Replacement [WAR] does not reward the bulk of a player’s career. It removes any credit for that part of a player’s value that falls below Replacement Value [RV].* By removing RV from a player’s career, WAR is able to more highly reward the short spectacular career while downgrading long bulk careers. Defensively, WAR does not seem to favor the hitters over their pitching brethren or vice versa. However, WAR seems to greatly reward what it measures as defensive excellence while heavily penalizing any inept fielding players. WAR, of course, has become the pre-eminent player evaluation tool. On the other hand, Win Shares is all but obsolete. But it is interesting to note the differences between the methods. If the Baseball Reference website had adopted WS rather than WAR as their main player evaluation tool, it is quite obvious that there would be some differences in the marginal players that get inducted into the BHOF.

*Replacement Value is a pre-determined value of WAR which could easily be produced by any fungible player grabbed off the Major League bench or out of the minor leagues.

3. The Lazy Man’s BBHOF Lowest Common Denominator Method

In past posts, I liked to use what I called the “Lowest Common Denominator Method” [LCDM] for analyzing whether a player was qualified for the BHOF by the WAR [Wins Above Replacement] system of player evaluation. The LCDM simply assumed that the BHOF had used career WAR to choose its members. In other words, the LCDM assumed that, if there are 300 Baseball players in the Hall of Fame, those players ranked from 1st thru 300th in career WAR. If a newly eligible player for the BHOF has a better WAR than that player ranked 300th, then that player deserves to also be inducted. In my “original” LCDM system, I found the lowest ranking BHOF member by ignoring Negro League players [as their career WARs are not fully realized], removing those players who were banned [for steroids, gambling, idiocy], and also disregarding the ineligible [still active or too recently retired]. After all this, I discovered that the LCDM player at that time was ranked 276th on the career WAR list. But this time, I am just going to be lazy. There are currently 343 men in the Hall of Fame and 270 of them have been elected as players. For the 2024 BBHOF election, the LCDM will simply be set at 270 with 271 to 343 constituting the grey area. The 270th best player by WAR is Jimmy Collins with a score of 53.3; and the 270th best by Win Shares is four guys tied at 279.7 [Ryan Braun, Lave Cross, Steve Garvey, and Fred Lynn]. If a player has more than 53.3 WAR and 279.7 WS, then he should be elected to the BHOF. If the player cannot meet either of these thresholds, he should not. If a player meets one but not the other, that is where things get interesting.

1) Adrian Beltre: 93.5 WAR [40th All Time]; 375.5 WS or so [79th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 99.0% of 179 votes [approximately 49.7% of the Ballots counted]. His 1st year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Beltre is well above the bottom lines for both WAR [40th vs. 270] and WS [79th vs. 270]. It is obvious that Beltre will be elected to the BHOF in 2024, almost unanimously, as he should be. At this point, only some type of ballot catastrophe could keep him out [“100 senile baseball writers forget to include Adrain Beltre on their ballots”…or something similar].

Comment: So far above the WAR and WS bottom lines for the BHOF that only some steroid abusing, wife beating, and/or nasty gambling allegations could have kept him out…but there are none. Adrian Beltre has one of the oddest career paths of any Hall of Famer. He debuted at 19 years old. At age 20, he had a very good first full year [Beltre would have easily been the Rookie of the Year if he not lost his rookie status the year before]. At the age of 21, he had an even better second full year. From 22 to 24, he struggled through injuries that would have derailed a lesser player. Then, at 25, he had his peak season, slugging as he never would again and leading the League in home runs, all in a free agent walk year.* From 26 to 30, Beltre played in a pitching-friendly park that seemed to bank the fire in his bat down from an inferno to just a campfire. From 31 to 38, he was Hall of Fame caliber player, year after year, with very little degradation of his skills until leg injuries derailed that 38-year-old season. At 39, Beltre returned to the game but was diminished to simply an average player and promptly retired after the season ended.

*In 2004, Adrian Beltre [48 HRs-121 RBIs-.334 BA-.629 SA] finished second in the National League MVP voting behind peak steroid Barry Bonds [45-101-.362 -.812] and ahead of monster seasons by Albert Pujols [46-123-.331-.657], Scott Rolen [34-124-.314-.598], and Jim Edmunds [42-111-.301-.643]. Does this count for Beltre as a steroid stolen MVP? Fate took both a Rookie of the Year award and an MVP award away from Beltre.

2) Joe Mauer: 55.2 WAR [250th All Time]; 305.0 WS [197th or so All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 83.2% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 1st year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Mauer qualifies for the BHOF under both the WAR [250/270] and the WS [197/270] systems. Given extra credit for catching, it makes perfect sense that he is a making a strong showing in his very first year. The BHOFT currently shows him with enough support to withstand the usual erosion of support contained in unpublished ballots. With half of the votes counted by the HOF Tracker, it will be an total upset if he is not elected in 2024.

Comment: It is almost a certainty that Joe Mauer will be elected to the BHOF on his first year on the ballot. Oddly, this result seems to have caught some sportswriters by surprise. However, Mauer is a catcher and, traditionally, that position gets extra credit for the brutal toll it takes on its practitioners. Mauer was on his way to being one of the most unique and very best catchers of all time (a too tall and lanky catcher who also won multiple batting titles) when a series of concussions forced him to play first base instead and shortened his career significantly. It probably also doesn’t hurt that Mauer spent his whole career playing for his hometown team while being a singularly wholesome & handsome looking man.

3) Todd Helton: 61.8 WAR [171th All Time]; 316.5 WS or so [167th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 82.2% of 179 votes [~49.7% of the Ballots counted]. His 6th year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Helton qualifies under both WAR and WS. After barely missing election in 2023, it looks like he is finally in this year. Like Mauer, he is high enough above the 75% line that the inevitable erosion of support from the voters who do not reveal their ballots will not be able to bring him down.

Comment: Todd Helton, after six long years of waiting, will finally be getting elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame. The only real question now is: why did it take so long? There are three usual options given: 1) some unproven steroid allegations during his career, 2) some post career DUI arrests, and 3) the fact that he played his whole career in Colorado. It may have helped Helton if he had played a few seasons out of Colorado’s thin air and proven that he could also hit at sea level. Many players have left Colorado and proven that there is a significant “bounce back” in their batting statistics. In other words, players in Colorado have trouble adjusting to other parks after hitting at a mile high altitude. This depresses their road batting and slugging averages while they play for Colorado but goes away once they leave the Rockies. On the other hand, Todd Helton had a higher batting and slugging average at home every single year of his career. However, WAR and WS, which adjust for park, both believe that he is qualified.*

*Just for fun you can add together Todd Helton’s road totals for the 2000 and 2001 seasons. You get a first baseman who hits .319, slugs .613 with 54 2Bs, 1 3B, 37 HRs, 94 runs, 121 RBIs, 91 BB, and 88 strikeouts while playing in a home park that probably suppresses this road production. Not bad.

4) Billy Wagner: 27.7 WAR [tied for 994th All Time]; 182.1 WS or so [who knows All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 78.5% of 179 votes [49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 9th year on the ballot.

Prognosis: The only real question left now for the 2024 Baseball Hall of Fame class is whether Billy Wagner will be elected. It is going to be very close but it looks like he will not make it. Even if he doesn’t get in this year, Wagner will probably be pushed over the finish line in 2025 by a “final-year-on-the-ballot” bump.

Comment: As a relief pitcher, Billy Wagner does not come close to qualifying for the BHOF under either WAR or WS. But it is obvious that the Hall of Fame voters give a lot of extra credit to a good relief pitcher. Basically, these voters seem to think that the high leverage situations faced by ace relievers should be used to multiply the relief pitcher’s WAR by two. The BHOF candidacy of Wagner illustrates that BHOF voters are basically doubling the career WAR of these top relievers. If he had been credited with twice his career WAR [27.7 x 2 = 55.5 WAR], Billy Wagner would have finished his career tied with three other men for 243rd in WAR for all time, comfortably under the bottom line of 270th. See also the Francisco Rodriguez comment.

5) Gary Sheffield: 60.5 WAR [183rd All Time]; 428.4 WS or so [notably 38th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 74.3% of 179 votes [~49.7% of the Ballots counted]. His 10th and last year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Sheffield is quite overqualified for the BHOF by both the WAR and (especially) the WS player evaluation systems. The steroid allegations against him have kept him out of the BHOF for his full 10-year term on the writer’s ballot. Even with a substantial bump in his 10th and final year, Sheffield is finally going to time out. His fate is now in the hands of the appropriate Hall of Fame committee. God help him.

Comment: WS has Sheffield rated as the 38th greatest player of all time. WAR ranks him 183rd. Basically, WAR alleges that Sheffield played in the field like a crippled water buffalo. WR would rate him higher if he had just been a DH for his entire career. But this makes no sense at all. If he would have been more valuable as a DH, is it the player’s fault that his team required him to play in the outfield? If a player decreases his value by playing out of position for his team, who gets the discredit? The misplaced player or the team? As for the steroid allegations, the best case scenario is that Sheffield is telling the truth: he was briefly involved with BALCO (Barry Bonds’ steroid supplier), mistakenly used a steroid cream, and only knowingly bought vitamins from BALCO. The worst case scenario would be that Gary Sheffield, feeling his baseball career winding down to its end, dabbled in steroids briefly with BALCO in his waning years. Even if the worst case scenario is true, Sheffield should be elected in a landslide. Baseball owners, led by their Commissioner Bud Selig, let steroids taint the game while they tried to illegally break the Players Union. After they failed despite canceling the 1994 World Series and damn near wrecking the sport, these same men were then happy to profit off the steroid fueled home run boom while the drugs inundated Baseball. The minute that Bud Selig was inducted into the BHOF (2017), Baseball lost all moral authority to punish the players who got mixed up in steroids before their 2004 ban.

6) Andruw Jones: 62.7 WAR [163rd All Time]; 275.7 WS or so [the 283th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 70.7% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 7th year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Other than the many steroid-tainted players, Jones probably has the most currently contentious BHOF case. WAR has him very comfortably over the 270th bottom line requirement, ranking him 163rd. But WS ranks him 283rd and believes that he is a marginal candidate. Of course, WAR has won the day as the player evaluation method of choice and it looks like Jones will get elected by the writers before his eligibility runs out. Although Jones will obviously not be elected in 2024, He still has three years of eligibility left and continues to make progress. It will help even more if all four men on the top of the ballot are elected this year, clearing the way for Jones to possibly get over the hump in 2025.

Comments: Whether you believe Jones is Hall of Famer or not depends a lot on how much faith you have in WAR’s defensive ratings. WAR believes that his defense was equal to 61.3% of his offense. Meanwhile, WS figures that his defense was equal to only 49.7% of his offense. WS sees Jones as a very great CF. But WAR sees him as perhaps the greatest centerfielder of all time. Jones had some unsavory personal incidents during his career (some 2001 strip club shenanigans & a 2012 domestic abuse allegation). How much these 2 issues have impacted his candidacy is unknown; but it seems like they have probably been responsible for keeping him out of the Hall for several additional years. If he does get elected, it will not be the worst thing in the world. He is right on the margin even by WS. There’s probably 50 or so Hall of Famers worse than him already. Of course, all this also completely ignores one indisputable fact: if Jones had simply kept himself in good shape after he turned 30, there would almost surely be no argument about his induction to the BHOF at all.

7) Carlos Beltran: 70.1 WAR [tied for 102nd All Time]; 368.7 WS or so [87th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 66.5% of 179 votes [49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 2nd year on the ballot.

Prognosis: It will obviously not be Beltran’s year in 2024. But 2025 is looking good after several other players come off the ballot. Beltran is overqualified for the BHOF by both WAR and WS but is still being punished by the writers for his role in the Astro’s 2017 sign stealing scandal.

Comment: Beltran makes a very interesting comparison with his fellow center fielder, Andruw Jones. Beltran clears the bar by a country mile under both of the ranking systems while Jones is a marginal candidate unless one accepts that WAR’s evaluation of him as the greatest center fielder of all time is not inaccurate. Beltran is being punished for possibly inventing an advanced sign stealing plan for his team but has otherwise always been considered a model citizen. Jones has no cheating accusations against him (though it could be argued that he “stole” his teams’ money by not staying in shape) but a couple of nasty personal blemishes. One of the problems with the moral judgments made by the Baseball writers who vote for the Hall of Fame is proportionality. Murder and jaywalking are both crimes. But one is a far greater crime. But it seems like the writers sometimes cannot tell the difference between Baseball crimes. Beltran, who has already been punished by losing the New York Mets’ managerial job, has already been properly chastised. Time to let him in.

8) Chase Utley: 64.5 WAR [tied for 144th All Time]; 288.9 WS or so [tied for 238th of All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 41.4% of 179 votes [~49.7% of the ballots counted]. His 1st year on the Ballot.

Prognosis: Utley is qualified for the BHOF by both WAR and WS, though WAR has him considerably higher by (perhaps) overvaluing his defense. The Hall of Fame tracker indicates that Utley will not come close to being elected in 2024. However, he is making a good showing in his 1st of 10 years on the Ballot. It seems like Utley’s election to the BHOF is eventually inevitable. It will just be a question of how long it takes.

Comment: In June 1997, when he was 18-years-old, Chase Utley was drafted in the 2nd round by the LA Dodgers out of high school. Rather than sign, he went to UCLA. In June 2000, Utley was drafted in the 1st round and signed by the Phillies. Utley marinated in the minors and then on the Phillie bench until finally playing his first full Major League season in 2005 at the age of 26. In a way, Utley is being punished for going to college. If he had signed with the Dodgers in 1997, there is a chance that he may have debuted in the Majors much sooner than he did, perhaps as early as 2000 or 2001 [his competition would have been the Dodger’s middle of the diamond banjo-hitters, Cesar Izturis and Alex Cora, for the most part]. If he was given back those four or five “lost” seasons at the beginning of his career, Utley’s bulk numbers would make his BHOF case much stronger. It doesn’t seem quite right to punish a man for getting an education. WAR finds that Utley’s defense is worth 33.7% of his offense while WS measures it as 31.8% That slight difference seems to be the main reason WAR ranks Utley 94 slots higher than WS.

9) Alex Rodriguez: 117.5 WAR [16th All Time!!!!!]; 492.0 WS or so [22nd All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 39.3% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 3rd year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Despite being completely over-qualified for the BBHOF and very obviously the best player on the ballot by both WAR & WS, ARod is doomed to twist in the wind until the 10-year-limit finally ends his candidacy. The year 2024 was number 3 on his 10-year-long road-to-nowhere.

Comment: Rodriguez is the most qualified player on the 2024 HOF ballot by a significant margin, leaving even Adrian Beltre in the dust. However, he is also a convicted steroid cheat from after the enforcement curtain came down. As such, he will spend eternity in the dustbin of Baseball history with Joe Jackson and Pete Rose. In fact, I would advocate the enshrinement of either Jackson or Rose long before inducting Rodriguez. It is interesting how time is washing away just how egregious and slimy his behavior was while he tried to escape any punishment at all for his sins.

10) Manny Ramirez: 69.3 WAR [108th All Time]; 408.6 WS or so [50th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 35.1% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 8th year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Overqualified for the Hall of Fame by both WAR and WS. Pretty much admitted that he took steroids throughout his career. Would he have Hall of Fame stats without the juice? Just two more years until he falls off the ballot into whatever purgatory holds the Chicago eight, Pete Rose, Clemens, Bonds, eventually Alex Rodriguez et al.

Comment: Other than Alex Rodriguez (and perhaps Gary Sheffield), Manny Ramirez is the most qualified hitter on the ballot (though Rodriguez was way more valuable defensively, of course). Ramirez is, also like ARod, not going to elected to the BHOF because he was caught using steroids after testing and punishment began in 2004. But unlike ARod, Ramirez simply admitted that he used the juice and accepted the consequences without dispute. On the other hand, Rodriguez lied, threw people under the bus, refused to admit guilt, and generally acted like a complete dirtbag while fighting the allegations. So why is this not reflected in their BHOF vote totals? Why has Rodriguez, now in his 3rd year on the ballot consistently polled better than Manny despite the fact that Ramirez had already spent 5 years on the ballot when ARod arrived? Like many other things about Manny, it’s a mystery.

11) Bobby Abreu: 60.2 WAR [tied for 190th All Time]; 357.3 WS or so [95th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 19.4% of 179 votes [49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 5th year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Despite being well over the qualification line for the BHOF by WAR (and quite over-qualified by WS), Bobby Abreu has made almost no headway to actually being elected. Now in his 5th year on the ballot, Abreu’s eventual election by the Baseball writers does not look good. He will probably have to wait until some BHOF committee re-evaluates him, in the distant future, when his statistics begin to outweigh his lack of pizzazz.

Comment: In the 1960s and 1970s, there was a prominent American rhythm & blues singer named Bobby Bland (“That’s the Way Love is” & “I Pity the Fool”) who had a long and fruitful career. But Bland is hardly as well remembered as his contemporaries Sam Cooke, Wilson Pickett, Otis Redding (& many others). I always think of Bobby Abreu as the Bobby Bland of Baseball. He did many things consistently well but never the monster season (or number one hit in Bobby Bland’s case) that would force someone to remember him. He was just there in the background, consistently excellent, but drawing only a little bit of attention to himself. While he was playing, I never once thought of Abreu as a Hall of Fame type player. But he was.

12t) Andy Pettitte: 60.2 WAR [tied for 190th All Time]; 226.2 WS or so [not even close All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 15.2% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 6th year on the ballot.

Prognosis: In 2024, Andy Pettitte will collect the highest number of votes for any starting pitcher on the BHOF ballot. And he will not even come close to being elected. His admitted use of Human Growth Hormone [HGH] seems to have scuttled his candidacy. He is 6 years in and making no progress.

Comment: Andy Pettitte is similar to two other pitchers on the 2024 ballot, Mark Buehrle and James Shields. All were workhouse starting pitchers, but Pettitte was surely the best of the three [before even considering his post-season work]. None of the three has really gotten any real support for the Hall of Fame [despite both Pettitte and Buehrle being completely qualified by the WAR system]. Pettitte, who is far more famous than either of the other 2 pitchers because of his long service as a New York Yankee and his post-season success, seems to be paying a heavy price for admitting he used HGH. Once again, it is a question of proportionality. HGH is definitely not steroids and Pettitte admitted that he was using it to heal an injury faster so that he could return to the field and earn all the money he was being paid. This is almost honorable. That the Baseball writers seem to be excessively punishing Pettitte for that is a disgrace. However, if that is not the reason for his lack of support, then one has to wonder what the BBWAA writers are thinking.

12t) Jimmy Rollins: 47.6 WAR [tied for 358th All Time]; 305.1 WS or so [tied for 194th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 15.2.% of 179 votes [~49.7% of the Ballots counted]. His 3rd year on the ballot.

Prognosis: If WS was the preferred metric, Rollins would probably be receiving much, much stronger support. He comfortably qualifies under WS. The WAR method is much more lukewarm on Rollins, not even rating him as someone who is a marginal Hall of Famer. His lack of WAR has him spinning his wheels so far in the annual ballots.

Comment: Rollins makes a very interesting pair with his long term keystone partner, Chase Utley. WS prefers Rollins over Utley for the BHOF. But WAR, the preferred metric, prefers Utley over Rollins. Of course, WS rewards bulk or, as some have phrased it, a player’s ability to post [show up and play]. It is easier to play well if you take some days off. But there is value in playing as much as possible too. Rollins played between 154 and 162 games 10 times in his career (including 7 straight years). On the other hand, Utley played from 154 to 162 games just four times. When evaluating players for the BHOF, you have to start with what you want to reward.

14) Omar Vizquel: 45.6 WAR [tied for 398th All Time]; 282.6 WS or so [tied for 258th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 10.5% of 179 votes [~49.7% of the Ballots counted]. His 7th year on the ballot.

Prognosis: The candidacy of Vizquel has been completely torpedoed by the revelations of martial discord and allegations of homosexual harassment. He has three more years until he falls off the ballot. That he stubbornly remains on the ballot seems to indicate that some BHOF voters are not bothered by wife beating or bat boy molestation.

Comment: Before the scandals, Vizquel was obviously headed to election. It would be interesting to know what would have happened if all this godawful publicity had come out after his election. Interestingly, like Jimmy Rollins, WS (which favors bulk careers) is very much in favor of electing Vizquel. But WAR doesn’t like him anywhere near the same.

15) Mark Buehrle: 59.1 WAR [201st All Time]; 220.6 WS or so [not known All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 7.9% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 4th year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Buehrle, who is qualified by WAR but not even close by WS (like most pitchers), continues to stagnate on the annual BHOF ballot. He is, in some ways, the Bobby Abreu of pitchers.

Comment: I always think of Mark Buehrle as a pitcher who came right out of the Rick Reuschel starting pitcher mold. Reuschel [who went 214-191 during his career] was a very large pitcher who worked fast, threw strikes, and kept the game moving along, Mark Buehrle [214-160] was also a large man who worked fast, threw strikes, and kept the game moving. Interestingly, both men won exactly 214 games but Reuschel lost many more. Despite all this, Reuschel was a better pitcher than Buehrle. Reuschel just played for much worse teams over his career.

16t) Francisco Rodriguez: 24.2 WAR [somewhere around 1000th All Time]; 168.3 WS or so [also about 1000th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 6.8% of 179 votes counted [~49.7% of the Ballots counted]. His 2nd year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Rodriguez will almost surely survive to be on the ballot for a third year, staying just above the minimum 5% threshold. But his candidacy has no traction. His chances of getting into the BHOF appear slim.

Comment: The candidacy of ace reliever Francisco Rodriguez serves as a very interesting bookend for ace reliever Billy Wagner’s case. If you just double his career WAR, Wagner qualifies for the BHOF. But if you double the career WAR of Rodriguez, he does not qualify [48.2 WAR would put Rodriguez in a tie with Bob Lemon for 341st place]. In other words, the double credit reward for the high leverage of an ace reliever’s work is not enough to push Rodriguez over the line. It remains to be seen if the Wagner/Rodriguez boundary holds going forward. Interestingly, if you double the Win Share [WS] total for Rodriguez, he would qualify. WS seems to reward ace reliever bulk work more than it does a starter’s bulk innings. I’m not sure why. So far, Rodriguez’ record 62 save season in 2008 does not seem to have had any impact on his candidacy. Unless it is the one thing keeping him on the ballot.

16t) David Wright: 49.2 WAR [329th All Time]; 266.1 WS or so [320th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 6.8% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 1st year on the ballot.

Prognosis: David Wright’s career was cut short by spinal stenosis with both WAR and WS having him right on the edge of the BHOF. It looks like he will have a “Don Mattingly” type time on the writers’ ballot. Mattingly, another player who had his BHOF career path cut short by back problems, lingered on the ballot for the full 10 years before shuffling off into Baseball limbo.

Comment: There was a great wave of third baseman at the beginning of the 21st Century: Adrian Beltre [debuted 1998]; Eric Chavez [1998]; Hank Blalock [2002]; David Wright [2004]; and even Evan Longoria [2008]. Wright may have been the greatest of all these third baseman, greater even than Beltre, if fate had just let him complete his career uninjured. However, like most of these third baseman, injuries derailed him. It would be interesting to know just how good Wright could have been absent the spinal stenosis that shortened and then ended his career. Note to self, write a post about this great wave of 3B.

18) Torii Hunter: 50.7 WAR [300th All Time]; 275.0 WS or so [285th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 4.7% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 4th year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Hunter does not qualify under either WAR or WS for the BHOF, though he is well into the grey area for both evaluations. In 2024, his luck seems to have run out. After surviving for 3 years, it looks like he will not make the 5% minimum to be back for his fifth try.

Comment: Torii Hunter makes a fascinating contrast with Andruw Jones. Both were well regarded centerfielders. WS has them as basically equal [Jones has a very slight edge 275.7 to 275.0]. But WAR has Jones as the far better player [62.7 to 50.7]. Their career paths couldn’t be more different. Jones came up in 1996 at 19-years old and starred in the World Series before even playing a full season. He played his first full season in 1997 and then was a star for the Atlanta Braves from 1998 to 2006. In 2007, just 30 years old, Jones had a (for him) poor season. And that was basically it. He played part-time, dogged by weight and injury issues, from 2008 to 2012 and his career was over at just 35. Hunter took a different path. He struggled in the minors from 1993 to 1997. In 1998, the 21-year-old Hunter had a decent year at Double-A. In 1999, the Minnesota Twins gave the 22-year old Hunter the CF job. He would start in the Major Leagues from 1999 until 2015 when he was 39. Hunter maintained his value exceedingly well. By WAR, his best seasons were 2009 [33 years old] and 2012 [36]. Hunter was always in shape, durable, and kept improving. In many ways, Hunter was the opposite of Andruw Jones. Off the field, Hunter had the reputation of a man of honor, depth, and focus. Which was also quite a contrast to Jones.

19) Jose Bautista: 36.7 WAR [tied for 641st All Time]; 229.2 WS or so [not very qualified All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 1.6% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 1st year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Bautista doesn’t qualify for the BHOF under either the WAR or WS systems. His first year on the ballot will be his last year on the ballot. He will not be making any spectacular bat flips on the Cooperstown lawn.

Comment: Jose Bautista had the back half of a BHOF career. If he had been a golfer, he would have played the first nine holes of his career like an absolute amateur and then played the back nine like one of the best ball strikers on the pro tour. It’s too bad that Bautista didn’t discover the timing mechanism that unleashed his formidable power in 2003 or 2004 rather than very late in 2009. If he had, Bautista would have probably accumulated 25 to 35 more WAR and had a very interesting, if not inevitable, BHOF case. You can combine the back end of Bautista’s career to the front end of Andruw Jones’ career to make one hell of a BHOF candidate.

20) Victor Martinez: 32.0 WAR [tied for 804th All Time]; 230.9 WS or so [not close All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 1.0% of 179 votes [~49.7% of the Ballots counted]. His 1st year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Martinez is not supported by either WAR or WS for induction into the BHOF. He was a very good professional hitter. If he was a beer, he would be Bud Lite to Miguel Cabrera’s top-of-the-line Bud. The year 2024 will be his first and last on the Hall of Fame ballot.

Comment: Victor Martinez was one of those players who had a monster year, completely out of context with the rest of their career, that was worthy of a Hall of Fame player. Many players have these types of years [Kevin Mitchell in 1989, 47 HRs-125 RBIs-.291, MVP]. But very few (if any) have this type of year in their mid-30s. In 2014, the 35-year-old Martinez hit 32 HRs-103 RBIs-.335 BA for the Detroit Tigers. He set career highs in HRs, BA, on-base percentage and slugging. He also had the best WAR of his career. His OPS+ was a very sparkling 172 [meaning he was 72% better than the average hitter]. The next best OPS+ in his career was just 131 in 2011. It goes without saying that, if the rest of his career had been much more like 2014, Victor Martinez would have had a one hell of a better case for the BHOF.

21t) Matt Holliday: 44.5 WAR [tied for 431st All Time]; 266.8 WS or so [313th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 0.5% of 179 votes [approximately 49.7% of the Ballots counted]. His 1st year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Both WAR and WS together do not see Matt Holliday as a BHOF member. This will be his first and only year on the BHOF ballot. But there is a non-zero chance that he still gets to go to Cooperstown. It will just be as the father of Jackson Holliday.

Comment: In 1998, the 18-year-old Matt Holliday signed with the Rockies and began playing in their minor league system. His minor league career was, to say the least, not particularly inspiring. By 2003, he had risen only to Double A, two levels below the Major Leagues, where he hit just 12 HRs while batting .253 and slugging .395. Despite this, the Rockies gave him their left field job in 2004; and he was off and running [14 HRs-.290 BA-.488 SA]. Of course, he played in a hitter’s park but this hardly explains both a two level jump and all that increase in offense . He was even better in 2005 [19 HRs-.307-.505], and then exploded in 2006 [34 HRs-.326-.586] and 2007 [36 HRs-.340-.607]. What happened to so quickly turn around Holliday’s career from 2003 to 2007? At this point, it is a puzzle. Unlike his former teammate Todd Helton, Holliday got a chance to prove that he could hit at sea level too. From 2009 to 2014, Holliday was a pretty potent bat for the St. Louis Cardinals. Perhaps because of his reserved demeanor, Holliday always struck me as a “Kevin McReynolds” type: someone who wasn’t getting exactly 100% out of their talent.* With the insane drive of a Ty Cobb, would Matt Holiday have been an inner circle Hall of Famer? Possibly, but he probably wouldn’t have been as happy.

*Kevin McReynolds was a star outfielder for the New York Mets (among other teams). He gave the impression that he would rather be anywhere other than a Baseball field.

21t) Bartolo Colon: 46.2 WAR [tied for 387th All Time]; 204.7 WS or so [just nowhere close All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 0.5% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 1st year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Bartolo Colon does not qualify for the BHOF under either the WAR or WS system. The year 2024 will be the only year that Bartolo Colon appears on the BHOF Ballot.

Comment: Bartolo Colon will go down as a hugely fun and interesting former Baseball player but an induction into the Hall of Fame is not in his future. His career path is actually fascinating [1997 to 2018, ages 24-45]. Basically he was a fireball throwing starting pitcher from 1998 to 2005. Then he was lost in the woods for awhile from 2006 to 2009. Then, he finished his career as a control artist starter from 2009 to 2016 (with his last two years, 2017 and 2018 spent proving that he no longer had it). Few pitchers have such a clearly delineated career as first a flame thrower and then a command kingpin.

23t) James Shields: 30.7 WAR [tied for 847th All Time]; 133.8 WS or so [God only knows where All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 0.0% of 179 votes [~49.7% of the Ballots counted]. His 1st year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Neither the WAR nor WS systems see Shields as a qualified Hall of Famer. He will have to settle for having the totally cool modern nickname of “Big Game James” [so few modern baseball nicknames are as good as the old school ones from 100 years ago].

Comment: During his career, James Shields did a partial “Don Sutton.” From 2007 to 2015, he was a good to very good workhouse starter. He was never really great (peak years of 16-12 and 15-10 in 2011 and 2012) but still very reliable. But pitchers like this get into the BHOF only if they do the full “Don Sutton” (over 20 years as a dependable Clydesdale). Neither WAR nor WS see Shields as a BHOF inductee on even his best day [or year].

23t) Jose Reyes: 37.4 WAR [tied for 620th All Time]; 255.5 WS or so [378th or so All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 0.0% of 179 votes [approximately 49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 1st year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Jose Reyes does not qualify under WAR or WS. His BHOF dream will die with this year’s ballot. In other words, this will be his only year on the BHOF ballot.

Comment: Jose Reyes, like many other players, started his career like he was on the highway to the BHOF. Between 2006 to 2008 when he was 23 to 25 years old, Reyes looked like a superstar in incubation. But then it just didn’t happen. Injuries sapped his speed and health, his power and plate discipline never developed, and his career petered out in his early 30s. But there was a BHOF dream there at one time.

23t) Brandon Phillips: 28.4 WAR [tied for 953rd All Time]; 209.0 WS or so [God only knows All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 0.0% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 1st and last year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Brandon Phillips is a Hall of Fame ballot consolation prize player. In other words, he is on the Hall of ballot simply so he can take pride in that fact. But 2024 will be his only year on the ballot.

Comment: Brandon Phillips was a very good second baseman. But neither WS nor WAR sees him as a viable Hall of Famer. A viable candidate for the BHOF under WAR should accumulate close to 50 Wins Above Replacement. In other words, ten seasons of 5.0 WAR would make the player viable. But realistically, the player should have some peak seasons of 7.5 or so WAR. Did Phillips ever come close to 7.5 WAR in a single season? No, his best year was just 4.9 WAR in 2011 and his career total of 28.4 WAR is only slightly more than half way to an actually viable BHOF case.

23t) Adrian Gonzalez: 43.5 WAR [tied for 456th All Time]; 286.4 WS or so [tied for 249th All Time]; HOF Tracker today: 0.0% of 179 votes [~49.7% of Ballots counted]. His 1st and last year on the ballot.

Prognosis: Gonzalez would have had a much better chance under the WS system (in which he qualifies) rather than the WAR system (where he is not close). With WAR ascendent, the HOF tracker has him currently voteless. He will not be on the 2025 ballot.

Comment: Absent injuries, Gonzalez could have certainly had a BHOF career. After his October 2010 shoulder surgery for a torn labrum, he was never the same hitter. He had one last great season [2011] by changing his swing from a pretty power hitting uppercut to a formidable line drive stroke before the continuing degradation of his shoulder sapped his might. Despite that 2010 surgery, Gonzalez was extremely durable, playing 156 or more games every season from 2006 to 2016. But then a herniated disk in his back crippled him during the 2017 and 2018 seasons and forced him into retirement. Gonzalez displays very interestingly the differences between the WAR and WS player evaluation systems. WAR, which values defense and peak highly, has Adrian Gonzalez [rated 456th] not even close to the LCDM line of 270th to qualify for the BHOF. But WS, which values offense and bulk, rates Gonzalez as one of 249th best players of all time, comfortably over the LCDM boundary. If WS rather than WAR was the chosen method of evaluation, it is likely that Adrian Gonzalez’s candidacy for the BHOF would have not been so quickly dismissed.

Conclusion

The 2024 Baseball Hall of Fame class will consist of: 1. Jim Leyland [already voted in as a field manager]; 2) Adrian Beltre [3B], 3. Joe Mauer [C]; 4. Todd Helton [1B]; and possibly 5. Billy Wager [relief pitcher]. For the Baseball Hall of Fame’s sake, it will be nice to see a nice big 2024 class. But it will be even nicer to just see a bunch of the worthy players cleared off the ballot, all at once, to make room for some other worthy players now buried on the ballot.

Breaking the 2024 BHOF Ballot Down by Categories:

1) Qualified by WAR & WS and being elected [3]: Adrian Beltre, Todd Helton, and Joe Mauer;

2) Not qualified by WAR or WS and possibly being elected [1]: Billy Wagner;

3) Qualified by WAR and WS and NOT being elected or removed from the ballot: [6] Bobby Abreu, Carlos Beltran, Manny Ramirez, Alex Rodriguez, Gary Sheffield, and Chase Utley;

4) Qualified by only WAR and NOT being elected or removed from the ballot: [3]: Mark Buehrle, Andruw Jones, and Andy Pettitte;

5) Qualified by only WS and NOT being elected or removed from the ballot [2]: Jimmy Rollins and Omar Vizquel;

6) Qualified by only WS but NOT being selected and dropped from the ballot: [1] Adrian Gonzalez;

6) Not qualified by either WAR or WS and NOT being dropped from the ballot [2]: Francisco Rodriguez and David Wright;

7) Not qualified by either WAR or WS and being dropped from the ballot [8]: Jose Bautista, Bartolo Colon, Matt Holliday, Torii Hunter, Victor Martinez, Brandon Phillips, Jose Reyes and James Shelds,.

My personal ballot [in order if only I had a vote]: 1) Adrian Beltre, 2) Gary Sheffield, 3) Carlos Beltran, 4) Joe Mauer, 5) Andy Pettitte, 6) Bobby Abreu, 7) Chase Utley. Arod and Manny Kept out by steroids.

Intrinsic Value [Rethinking Player valuation systems]

January 17, 2024

Baseball is 90 percent mental.  The other half is physical.  Yogi Berra

1. Introduction

On January 23, 2024, the Baseball Hall of Fame [HOF] will announce which players are being inducted into the 2024 HOF class [manager Jim Leyland has already been selected].  Until the announcement, most of the discussion about these inductions will concern two subjects: 1) how are the eligible players doing on Ryan Thibodaux’s Hall of Fame Tracker and 2) how do these eligible players measure up using the Wins Above Replacement [WAR] evaluation system.  While writing this blog, I have used the WAR method myself to evaluate players; even though I could not figure out a player’s WAR to save my life.*  This is, to say the very least, sub-optimal.  In this essay, I will look at the history of how WAR became: 1) so widely disseminated and 2) the pre-eminent Baseball player evaluation system, especially over Bill James Win Shares [WS] system.  Every Baseball player evaluation system has shortcomings.  If you are going to use such a method, an understanding of the system’s weak spots should be required.  As far as WAR goes, there are definitely some ghosts in the machine.  The flaws inherent in the WAR system may even be large enough to deny the qualified and elect the unworthy to the Baseball Hall of Fame.  Thus, knowledge of WAR’s defects should be a pre-requisite before using it to evaluate any player for any reason.

*Figuring Slugging Percentage: basic Baseball math.  Figuring WAR: Baseball physics.

2. A Brief History of Win Shares and WAR

In 2003, the baseball writer Bill James, the godfather of Sabrmetrics [applying the scientific method to Baseball], published a book titled Win Shares.  The Win Shares system was an all-encompassing player evaluation system.  In his book, James explained his system and then got to the fun part: ranking all the players.  Meanwhile in the 1990s, there was a Baseball annual published called the Baseball Prospectus [which was inspired by Bill James’ own annual Baseball Abstracts of the 1980s].  In these Baseball Prospectus books, Keith Woolner developed his own player evaluation system which he called VORP [Value Over Replacement Player].  In subsequent Baseball Prospectus annuals, the VORP system mutated into WARP [Wins Above Replacement Player] and then into WAR itself.  In the realm of ideas, these two player evaluation methods, Win Shares and WAR, competed in the early 2000s.  And WAR won this competition rather easily.  One of the main reasons that WAR became the preferred method for evaluating Baseball players had a lot to do with simple accessibility.  In 2009, the WAR system results were adopted by and included with every player’s statistical profile on the Baseball Reference website [baseballreference.com].  Baseball Reference had been founded in 2000 and, by 2005, had made all the printed Baseball Encyclopedias [BE] obsolete.*  From 2009 on, WAR was right there on the source where virtually every Baseball fan goes to get their statistical fix.  Meanwhile, the results of the Win Shares system were not readily accessible [though they could eventually be accessed on billjames.online].  Perhaps the first question to ask is: Did WAR win out because it was a better system than Win Shares or just because it was right there at your fingertips?

* The last MacMillan BE was published in 1996 and last Total Baseball BE in 2004.

3. Explaining Win Shares

Bill James believed any system for player evaluation needed to be grounded in actual results.  If the Boston Red Sox won 105 games in 1912, the players on that 1912 Red Sox team needed to each be credited with an individual share of those 105 wins.  For reasons that escape me, James then decided to triple those 105 wins so that the 1912 Red Sox players had 315 partial Win Shares to be split amongst themselves.  Using statistical formulas to measure each player’s defensive and offensive contributions, James then did precisely that: he credited each player on the 1912 Red Sox with their share of the 315 partial wins.*  Critics of the Win Shares system immediately pointed out that the players should have also gotten some discredit for the 47 losses suffered by the 1912 Boston Red Sox too.  James would later explain that the players did receive won-loss records, but these records were then simplified into a single number.  After all, a single number to rank players was the objective.  Bill James did his WS calculations for every Major League team throughout history.  By far the most important thing about this system was that you couldn’t see the sausage being made [which, of course, is also even more true of the WAR system].  When evaluating Baseball players, the offensive side is the much easier task.  For the most part, each batter hits and produces runs without any help [disregarding the small gray areas of driving runners in, sacrifice outs, intentional walks and so forth].  In Baseball, batting or offensive contributions are easy to measure.  But the defensive side is quite a bit harder.  How much of pitching is just team defense?  How much of defense is just good (or bad) pitching?  How much defense is simply illusions of the park, defensive schemes of the team, whether the pitcher is left-handed or right-handed, player positioning, catcher framing, elective plays, etc?  Perhaps the best recommendation of them all for the Win Shares system was Bill James apparently life-long obsession with quantifying Baseball defense.

*Tris Speaker led the 1912 BoSox with 51 Win Shares [or 17.0 full Wins].  Smokey Joe Wood was second with 44 [or 14.67 full wins].  But the WAR evaluation methods disagrees and lists Smokey Joe first with 11.1 WAR followed by his good friend Speaker at 10.4.

4. Win Shares Evaluated: The Problem of Luck

However, the Win Shares method had a very large problem buried in its calculations.  The basic flaw of Win Shares as a Baseball player evaluation tool can be demonstrated with a hypothetical.  Imagine that the exact same player performs for two different teams.  Just for fun, imagine that this player is the star of each of these teams [bats .300, hits 30 homers, drives in 100 runs].  Both teams score 700 runs but also give up 700 runs during a 162-game season.  The Pythagorean theorem tells us that each of these teams should have finished with a record of exactly 81 wins and 81 losses.  But what if one of these teams gets lucky?  Despite scoring exactly as many runs as they gave up, the team finishes with a record of 90-72.  Meanwhile, the other team is unlucky and ends the season at 72-90.  Random variations like these happen during Major League seasons all the time.  Win Shares, which ties player value to the exact number of wins that his team gets, will conclude that the exact same player on these two teams is worth a completely different amount.  In fact, the player on the lucky team will be judged to have been 25% better than the exact same player on the unlucky team.*  This is nonsensical on both a player evaluation and/or single season level.  It is the exact same player and his value is only fluctuating by chance.  But the accuracy of the Win Shares system obviously improves over multiple seasons and longer careers.  Over time, luck washes out and Win Shares should become more and more accurate.  Basically, Win Shares is a player evaluation system which is not very good at evaluating single seasons or short careers; but improves steadily over time with more seasons and longer careers.  Strangely enough, I would have more faith in Win Shares evaluation of Willie Mays entire career rather than any single season.

*In other words, the same exact player such as our 30HR/100 RBI/.300 star, would be given different Win Share amounts depending on the team’s finish: 24 WS with the 72-90 team, 30 WS with the 81-81 team; 37.5 WS with the 90-72 club.  But, in each case, he is exactly the same player.

5. Another problem with Win Shares

And there is another major problem with Win Shares.  Unlike the problem of random luck explained above, there have been (as far as I know) no articles addressing this flaw anywhere.  Win Shares seems to underrate pitchers badly.  This doesn’t necessarily mean that Win Shares is wrong in its evaluation of pitchers.  But Win Shares evidently believes that pitchers are worth far less than the WAR system or the most basic Baseball player evaluation system of them all, the Hall of Fame.  In the Baseball Hall of Fame right now, 343 people have been elected.*  This breaks down as 84 pitchers, 186 position players, 40 executives, 23 managers, and 10 umpires.  In other words, the Hall of Fame believes that 84 of the 270 best Baseball players of all time were pitchers [31.1%].  Of the top 270 players rated by WAR, 88 are pitchers [32.6%].  By WAR standards, the Hall of Fame seems to have a very slight bias towards hitters over pitchers.  But it is also within any reasonable standard of random variation.  Then we have Win Shares.  Of the top 270 players rated by Win Shares, only 49 players are pitchers [a meagre 18.1%].*  The question of whether WS is correct in downgrading all pitchers is beyond my mathematical capability.  But, to say the least, it certainly feels completely wrong.  On top of that, WS also seems to heavily favor pitchers from long ago and far away over their modern brethren.  So, the question becomes: Why does the Win Shares system underestimate pitchers so badly and penalize modern pitchers even worse?

*It would be 50 pitchers if you counted John Ward, but Ward is not counted as a pitcher by either the Hall of Fame or WAR system.  Of course, there is no easily accessible list of the current career WS leaders, so I may have missed a pitcher (or two at most).  But, even if I did, the poor showing of pitchers in the WS system would still be remarkable.

6. Win Shares and the Question of Defense

The only way Win Shares can underestimate Pitcher Value [PV] would be to minimize the pitcher’s share of defensive credit.  On the most basic level, the game of Baseball is 50% offense and 50% defense.  One is the ying to the other’s yang.  Offensive credit is easy to give.  The production of offense in Baseball is easily broken down into individual units.  But defense in Baseball is always a team effort that begins with the pitcher.  Defensive credit is almost always shared.  For an example, a pitcher throws a good pitch in on a batter’s hands, breaks his bat, and induces a weak pop-up.  The pop-up could be easily caught by the second baseman.  But the shortstop runs over, calls for it instead, and elects to make an easy catch himself.  Who gets credit?  Obviously, the pitcher should get the lion’s share for this play.  But what about the shortstop and second baseman?  In many cases, defensive plays are elective plays.  How do you cut up defensive credit for elective plays?  In another example, the pitcher gives up an absolute rocket and the centerfielder makes an outstanding play running it down.  Who gets credit on this play?  In this case, it’s the center fielder, not the pitcher, that should get the lion’s share of the credit.  Every Baseball player evaluation system must decide how to apportion defensive credit, especially between pitchers and all other defensive players.  Justin Verlander, the most accomplished of all the currently active pitchers, ranks exactly 63^rd by WAR right now, but just 306^th (more or less) by Win Shares.*  WAR credits Verlander with being an inner circle Hall of Famer.  Win Shares believes Verlander to be a very marginal HOF candidate.  Does that WS result feel correct?  It certainly feels wrong to me.  If it is incorrect, there is very obviously a defensive apportionment problem with the WS system.  WS may have shifted too much credit for the defense from the pitchers to the other players.  It also means that all the other players, except for the pitchers, have had their defensive value increased across the board.  It is also not the only problem with the WS defensive evaluation scheme.  Every Baseball player evaluation system has to also address the Timeline problem.

*The source for career Win Shares is the Bill James website.  To put it bluntly, the Win Shares finder there is a mess.  Everything from rampant mathematical mistakes to more serious errors like the two different Elmer Smiths having their careers combined.  Verlander may actually be 307^th or even 308^th (I compiled the career WS list as carefully as I could but who knows).

7. The Pitching Timeline Problem

Throughout the history of Baseball, starting pitchers have thrown harder and harder and, because of this fact, have also hurled less and less innings.  In the 19^th Century [1871-1899], starting pitchers threw hard but probably almost never threw all out.  Some pitchers would throw over 500 (even 600) innings in a season.  But they still needed to save their arms.  It would be fascinating to know how hard they threw.  Were they consistently over 80 miles per hour [mph]?  They were obviously throwing hard enough that the distance from the pitching box [later mound] was twice moved back by about 5 feet.  In 1893, the traditional distance of 60 feet and 6 inches from pitching rubber to home plate was established.  Innings pitched [IP] fell below 400 and continued to drop.  In the early 20^th century, there were obviously starting pitchers who threw above 90 mph.  But they paced themselves, throwing hard in a pinch.  However, as innings continued to drop, these pitchers threw harder more consistently.  By the end of the 20^th century, pitchers could lead the league with only 250 IP or so.  In the 21^st century, the League leading totals of IP dropped even further to just over 200 IP.  Now, virtually every pitcher (starting or relieving) is throwing the ball as hard as humanly possible all the time, even over 100 mph.  Were the “Old-Innings-Eating” pitchers of yesterday more valuable than the “Better-to-Burn-Out-than-Fade-Away” flamethrowers of today?  By WAR and Win Shares, the ancient pitchers are evaluated as much more valuable than any modern pitcher.  But the fact is that those ancient pitchers relied much more on their defense than today’s hurlers.  A modern ace, such as Jason Verlander, deserves a much greater percentage of the defensive credit for his pitching than a 19^th Century Hall of Famer like Charles Radbourn.  In other words, modern pitchers are most surely getting shortchanged because the pitcher’s percentage of the defensive credit should not be constant over time.  Of course, in evaluating any large group of Baseball players, there will always be timeline issues    .

8. Explaining WAR

WAR is a complex statistical calculation that assigns each player a value after making determinations of that player’s contributions on Offense [batting] and Defense [pitching and fielding] and then subtracting the Replacement Value [RV] both offensively and defensively.  The replacement value is yet another determined number and represents how much value a completely fungible or replaceable player would have.  Once all these calculations are made, WAR adds up the player’s offense and defense for a season or a career, subtracts the replacement value, and gives the player his seasonal or overall score.  In WAR, unlike Win Shares, it is possible to get a negative score (the player is worse than some random minor league players that could replace him).  Of course, all this needs to be taken on faith.  The inventors of this system are not even letting anyone how what is in the sausage much less how it is being made.  In fact, WAR is separated into offensive and defensive WAR on Baseball Reference.  But you cannot just add these two figures up to get the overall WAR.  Each figure includes a duplicated RV.  It is almost like they don’t want anyone to check their work.  The calculations underlying WAR are based on formulas that make the assumption that certain truths are unchangeable [such as replacement value and the value of the defensive spectrum, i.e. which positions are more or less valuable].  However, there is a problem with codifying your formulas about Baseball.  Baseball mutates over time.  The Replacement Value and the defensive spectrum valuations are not applicable throughout the ages and eras of Baseball.  This can be a major problem with the system.

*Third Base is the position usually used to illustrate how positional RV changes over time.  In the early days of Baseball, third baseman needed to be quick and agile to field the numerous bunts of the time.  Basically, they were good fielding players with the arm but not the range to play shortstop.  But as home run hitting took over the game, bunting went all but extinct.  Third basemen became players with the arm to play right field but athletic enough to also play the infield.  The Replacement Values for these two sets of talents are completely different.

9. WAR Evaluated: The Problem of Compounding Errors

Basically, the main problem with WAR is the problem of Compounding Errors [CE].  WAR has so many calculations that, if the inherent errors do not cancel each other out, these flaws can compound each other and arrive at a truly odd result.  The problem of these Compounding Errors is pretty much entirely on the Defensive side.  The Designated Hitter penalty is a good example of one of these CEs.  Of course, Designated Hitters [DH] hit for the Pitcher and do not play the field.  They have no defensive value at all.  Because of this, WAR gives the DH position a massive penalty, assuming DHs need to hit a ton to justify their value.  But, in real life, the DH is a much harder job than it looks.  Players with the proper focus to be DHs are hard to find.  Usually, First Basemen [1B] hit better than DHs.  But 1Bs are not penalized by WAR as badly as DHs.  Over a career, this penalty compounds and a career long DH would be completely undervalued next to an equivalent 1B.  WAR also seems to overvalue the top of the defensive spectrum (CF, SS and 2B, ignoring catchers).  WAR’s undervaluing of poor defensive players and overvaluing of good defensive players can be demonstrated by two outfielders of this year’s HOF ballot.  Gary Sheffield was admittedly not the best outfielder.  But WAR compounds his poor defense until arriving at the odd conclusion that he is twice as bad as a normal DH.  Meanwhile, Andruw Jones, a great centerfielder [CF] who got fat and lost his range mid-career, rates as the best CF of all time.  Although personal opinions make for bad arguments, I watched both men play often.  I don’t remember Sheffield as the equivalent of a cripple in a wheelchair playing Baseball.  I also don’t remember Andruw Jones, even at his peak, as the Baryshnikov of the outfield.  He was very good until he gained the weight.  But I never thought that he was incredibly better (or even better) than other CFs that I watched such as Paul Blair, Garry Maddox, Jim Edmunds, or Kevin Kiermaier.  But WAR has, for better or for worse, adopted calculations that will excessively penalize poor defense and unreasonably overvalue good defense.  Over a long career, this difference can compound and lead to some truly odd player evaluations.

10. WAR and another Defensive Problem

Other than Compounding Errors, there is another problem with Defense that needs to be addressed.  Defensive value is often credited to a player although the player himself basically does not deserve it.  An example would be the recently banned (or curtailed) shift.  In the classic shift, an infielder is shifted onto the other side of the infield or into the opposite-side outfield between the outfielders and the infield.  Basically, the shift is designed to thwart pull happy hitters.  A shifted infielder will generally make far more plays than an unshifted infielder.  Player evaluation systems will then credit this infielder with all these extra plays; and he will seem to be a much more valuable player.  But is it an individual or a team value?  If the same exact player plays for a team that refuses to shift, does the player lose value?  Is he a worse player?  The answer would seem to be No.  His “intrinsic value” as a Baseball player has not changed but his team value has risen.  Another example would be the art of “pitch framing” by catchers.  Some catchers, by the way they receive the ball, can trick the umpire into calling borderline balls as strikes.  Is this valuable to the team?  Absolutely.  But is it an “intrinsic value” for catchers?  No, it is an umpire weakness.  Relatively soon, the art of pitch framing will probably be all but extinct after the Major Leagues adopt video reviews of strike calls.  An “Intrinsic Value” cannot simply be erased.  And then there is the problem of “elective defense.”  Imagine your team has a great center fielder [CF].  This CF gets great jumps on the ball.  He glides over to catch the ball.  Many of these balls could be caught by either the right [RF] or left fielder [LF].  But, because this CF is the best outfielder on the team and is also considered the “captain” of the outfield, the CF consistently calls off the RF and/or LF and “elects” to catch the ball.  Under Player Evaluation Systems, the CF gets all the extra credit for this “elective defense.”  But does the CF deserve credit for these plays?  On a team with a bad CF, these plays still get made, just by the RF or LF.  In other words, a lot of defensive credit needs to be taken with a grain of salt.

11. Intrinsic Value

A decent Baseball Player Evaluation system should take these types of Defensive Value caveats under consideration.  Defense is a team, not an individual value.  Teams can even make choices that directly “devalue” their players under these evaluation systems.  Last season [2023], there was a classic example of this type of situation.  The St. Louis Cardinals promoted their prize rookie, Jordan Walker, to the Major Leagues.  Walker had been a third baseman for his entire career but was blocked in St. Louis by Nolan Arenado, a probable future Hall of Famer.  The Cardinals decided to move Walker to the outfield and let him play right [RF].  A decent hitter, WAR credits Jordan with 1.6 WAR on offense.  But, with very little experience in the outfield, Walker was brutal out there in the sun field.  On defense, WAR gives Walker a negative 2.1 WAR.  In other words, a team decision made Walker a below average player according to WAR.  If the Cardinals had posted Walker at third base [3B], it is very likely that Walker would have had a positive defensive WAR and been, by the Player Evaluation system’s estimation, a much more valuable player.  Walker’s WAR system rating definitely devalued hum but his “intrinsic value” as a Baseball player remains.  The great Pete Rose is another player whose value is underrated in this way.  Rose began his career as a 2B [1963-1966].  Then he played LF [1967, 1972-1974] and RF [1968-1971].  He moved to 3B [1975-1978] before finishing out his career as a 1B [1979-1986].  By WAR, Rose was about average at 2B, poor in RF, good in LF, brutal at 3B, and then washed up at 1B.  In each case, Rose switched positions to help his team.  But WAR gives him no credit for this.  According to WAR, the versatility of Rose is not an asset.  It is obvious that WAR would consider Rose a more valuable player if he had just played 2B or LF for most of his career.  Perhaps someday a Player Evaluation system will be designed that can measure a Baseball Player’s Intrinsic Value and the credit Pete Rose for his versatility.  But, until the supercomputer capable of making these calculations is invented (and programmed), Intrinsic Value will just remain the ideal.

12. Conclusions

Every Baseball player evaluation system has its flaws.  Win Shares bases its evaluation method on games won during the season.  Because simple luck can play a large part in this annual total, individual player Win Share totals for each single season can contain large errors.  However, the Win Shares system improves its accuracy as more and more seasons of any player are included, and luck washes out.  Win Shares also has the problem of devaluing pitcher’s contributions to the team across the board.  Every pitcher, but especially modern pitchers, are not credited with their full value.  This missing defensive value is spread out among the rest of the team’s players.  In other words, the defensive value given to every player, except the pitchers, by the Win Shares system should be reduced.  On the other hand, the WAR system for evaluating Baseball Players is almost surely better at judging individual seasons.  But WAR uses set formulas to generate its player evaluations and some of these formulas are off by a degree or two.  In some cases, the errors in these various formulas compound with each other and the player career evaluations can get completely out of whack.  It is also apparent that WAR over zealously rewards good to great defensive players while punishing poor to bad defensive players like they stole WAR’s wallet.  Someday, a properly programmed computer will be able to correctly value Baseball players.  Until that time, it is probably best to simply use every available tool to look at each player.  But it may already be too late.  The WAR system is ascendent and the Win Shares system is about to be throw on the ash heap of history.*  On January 23, 2024, several Baseball players may be elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame because their WAR score is good although their “Intrinsic Value” is not quite as high.  It’s a damn shame.

*The Win Shares system seems to be going the way of the dodo bird.  Bill James just published his last “Bill James handbook” annual [the 2024 Walk-Off Edition].  His Bill James Online site, the only place, as far as I know, to get updated Win Share information, is shutting down (James seems to be retiring).  Win Shares has conceded the field to WAR.

NEXT POST: Evaluating the 2024 Baseball Hall of Fame Candidates by using a combination of the WAR and Win Shares Player Evaluation Systems while trying to also consider the Player’s actual “Intrinsic Value.”

FUTURE POSTS: Exploring the concept of Intrinsic Value: 1) Who was a better player, Joe DiMaggio or Stan Musial, and 2) Who was best player out of David Ortiz, Manny Ramirez, and Gary Sheffield?

Showtime Baseball Style

January 7, 2024

Glory lies in the attempt to reach one’s goal and not in reaching it.  Mahatma Gandhi

1. Introduction

A literal ton of articles have discussed pitcher and designated hitter Shohei Ohtani’s move from the Los Angeles Angels of the American League [AL] to the Los Angeles Dodgers of the National League [NL].  This will be yet another one.  However, almost a month has passed since he signed on December 11, 2023, and that may be enough time to gain a little perspective.  To start, this article will discuss the Ohtani transaction from the viewpoint of the Dodgers themselves.  Next, the article will discuss what the financial aspects of Ohtani’s new contract reveal about him.  Finally, the article will speculate on the future implications of the Dodgers’ acquisition of Ohtani, who is currently the best Baseball player in the world .  Hopefully, this article will give the reader a fresh viewpoint.  Regardless, much of this article will still probably just being going over the same ground that so many other articles have already covered.  But angry people need to vent, happy people need to laugh, and most Baseball fans need to talk about Shohei Ohtani.

2. The Los Angeles Dodgers trample the Angels

One aspect of the LA Dodgers’ signing of Shohei Ohtani that has not really been discussed is the ramifications on the Los Angeles Baseball economy.  The Dodgers and the Los Angeles Angels share the same metropolitan area and fight each other for market share.  Every potential Dodger fan is also a potential Angel fan.  While having a winning team is surely the single most important factor in a team’s portion of their local Baseball market chunk, the next most important factor is probably having superstar players that fans can identify with, root for, and most importantly buy branded merchandise from the teams that bears the player’s names.  As far as simply winning goes, the Dodgers are currently wildly successful [13 straight winning seasons lasting from 2011 to 2023 with no end in sight].  The Angels?  Not so much.  But the lackluster Angels have had two superstars that the Dodgers could not match, Ohtani and Mike Trout.  It has been apparent for several years [since 2019, at least] that the Dodgers have been thinking about, coveting, and planning to sign Ohtani when he became a free agent after the 2023 season.  Literally, the Dodgers have been salivating over getting a share of the merchandising and marketing bonanza if they could sign Ohtani. Hopefully, ten years from now, some enterprising journalist or financial analyst will write an interesting piece on just how the Dodgers were able to capitalize on the Ohtani brand.

During this time, every Dodger personnel move [free agent decisions, luxury tax considerations, and rookie usage] has been evaluated as possibly being related to their eventual acquisition of Ohtani.  Of course, this could have just been normal sportswriter hyperventilation.  But good sportswriters are usually tied into the zeitgeist of the teams that they cover.  There was so much smoke about the Dodgers’ desire to sign Shohei from the Dodger writers that there had to be a raging fire somewhere in the Dodger organization.  But it can’t be emphasized enough that the Dodgers knew that signing Ohtani would also be a metaphorical stake into the LA Angels’ heart.  Like Van Helsing hunting Dracula, the Dodgers knew how they wanted their pursuit of Ohtani to end [with a stick through the Angels’ heart].  The LA Dodgers also appear to be aware that Major League Baseball [MLB] is evolving into 3 different classes of teams: 1) some clubs that are perennial winners, 2) other clubs that alternate between winning and losing cycles, and 3) a few clubs that are the perennial losers.  In this probable future, the perennial losers will grow the superstars for the perennial winners to eventually acquire.*  It is in the LA Dodger’s best interest for the LA Angels never to be a perennial winner.  By taking Shohei Ohtani away from them, the Dodgers took a large step towards making the Angels a permanent second class citizen in their own home city.

*If the Players Union can get the Major League service time requirement down from six years to five or less years, this process will be accelerated.

3. The Pacific Rim of Baseball

Of course. the Dodgers were reportedly interested in signing Shohei Ohtani both when he signed in 2013 with the Nippon Ham Fighters of the Japanese Pacific League [JPL]; and in 2018 with the Los Angeles Angels of the AL.  But each time, Ohtani made his decision to sign on which team would allow him to pursue his double duty dreams [pitching and hitting].  To do that, Ohtani needed to a team that could use a designated hitter [DH].  Since the National League did not adopt the designated hitter rule until 2022, the Dodgers were out of luck both times.  But it was apparent for years that the DH was coming to the NL.  Major League Baseball [MLB] was just holding the implementation of it hostage as a negotiating chip against the Players Union.  After the Covid pandemic forced the NL to temporarily adopt the DH in 2020, the permanent adoption of the DH rule by the NL was inevitable.  When it finally happened, the Dodgers’ dreams of acquiring Ohtani actually became possible.  But it also became possible for the LA Dodgers to realize dreams that went back before Ohtani was even born. In the 1960s and 1970s, the two greatest untapped resources of Baseball talent in the world by MLB were Cuba and Japan.  Omar Linares and Sadaharu Oh, two the greatest players of all time, played out their careers without ever appearing in the MLB. The Dodgers, who traveled often to Japan to played series against teams there, were well aware of the quality of the Japanese Major Leagues.

Of course, the Dodgers had been heavily recruiting Latin players since the 1950s.  But in 1980, Dodger owner Peter O’Malley also committed his team to heavily recruiting players from the Pacific Rim [Japan, Korea, Taiwan].  In many ways, the Pacific Rim players were even more important to the Dodgers than low-cost Latin talent [except perhaps players of Mexican origin like Fernando Valenzuela].  The Dodgers are basically a Pacific Rim team themselves [along with the Angels, Padres, Giants, Mariners, and the sad A’s until they move to Vegas].  The Los Angeles metropolitan area has the largest Asian population of any United States city [about 1.5 million in 2020] and largest population of Japanese origin in the continental United States [about 180 thousand].*  It was obvious that a Baseball player of Asian origin would be a perfect fit for the Dodgers. O’Malley’s attempts to procure players from the Pacific Rim eventually bore fruit. In 1994, the LA Dodgers signed Chan Ho Park, the first Korean star player in the MLB. Then, in 1995, they also signed Hideo Nomo, the first true Japanese star player.  The Dodgers were committed to cornering the market for Pacific Rim players and had made a great start. They had set themselves up to be the first choice for future Asian Pacific Rim players.  By location and fan base and ownership, the advantage was all theirs.  But then the Dodgers threw it all away. 

*San Francisco is second with 66 thousand, New York third with 56, and Seattle fourth with 53. The Honolulu, Hawaii, metropolitan area has reportedly about 200 thousand or so residents of Japanese origin.

4. The Dark Days of Dodger Baseball from 1998 to 2012

In 1998, Dodger Owner Peter O’Malley sold the LA Dodgers team to Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation.  O’Malley stated that he was selling because he was worried about Estate Taxes [at present in 2024, he is still reportedly alive and no Estate Taxes have come due]. O’Malley really sold the Dodgers in a fit of petulance.  He was upset by the continuing ugliness between the Owners and Players after the Player’s strike in 1994 and 1995 [which was pretty much completely the Owners’ fault for trying to break the Players Union].  The LA Dodger family mystique that O’Malley liked to cultivate had gone pretty sour for him.  Simply as a business decision, Peter O’Malley’s sale of the team was remarkably foolish [like most such judgments made emotionally].  Because of wounded pride or hurt feelings, O’Malley sold away an asset that any astute businessman would have died to hold onto. In 2012, when the Dodgers once again went up for sale, O’Malley would try to buy the team back.  But he did not have the funds any more to buy it just by himself. The consortium that he put together was quickly outbid. O’Malley’s foolishness cost his family several billion dollars. But even more importantly, O’Malley’s ill-considered decision to sell the Dodgers in 1998 also threw away all of his own good work mining the Pacific Rim for talent.

From 1998 to 2004, the LA Dodgers were owned by the News Corporation.* Murdoch’s company bought the team as part of a larger struggle with TBS [Turner Broadcasting System] for Baseball content.  In 2004, the LA Dodgers were sold by News Corp to con-artist and grifter named Frank McCourt who was approved by Baseball Commissioner Bud Selig himself.  There is a very interesting article to be written about some of Selig’s strange choices for his fellow owners during his tenure, but this is not it.  McCourt bought the LA Dodgers with MLB credit, proceeded to squeeze the franchise for every cent, and then cashed out for an undeserved fortune in 2012 (while under extreme pressure from Selig to sell). Both the News Corporation and Frank McCourt had one thing in common.  Neither had any long-range vision for the team. While they owned the club from 1998 to 2012, the Dodgers missed out on the cream of the crop of the first great wave of Baseball talent coming over from the Japanese Major Leagues (Ichiro Suzuki, Hideki Matsui, Masahiro Tanaka, et al). By 2012, when the Guggenheim Group purchased the LA Dodgers from McCourt, the team’s once great advantage in signing Pacific Rim talent had evaporated. Although some of their decisions have not been stellar (Trevor Bauer), the overall record of the franchise under the Guggenheim stewardship speaks for itself.  No one has been accusing the Guggenheimers of lack of vision. Now, their signing of the Japanese version of Babe Ruth may be just the capstone of their management.  With it, the Guggenheimers have taken a giant step towards cementing the Los Angeles Dodgers’ status as perennial winners and re-established the Dodgers as the primary destination for Pacific Rim players.

*Just like O’Malley, News Corp would sell the LA Dodgers right before Baseball franchise values exploded upwards. Rupert Murdoch may know the newspaper business but his acumen in the business of Baseball was non-existent.

5. The Contract of Shohei Ohtani

In many ways, Shohei Ohtani’s new contract with the Dodgers is unlike any other sports contract ever signed.  The 2 million dollars a year from 2024 to 2033 and then 68 million dollars a year from 2034 to 2043 is as unique as Ohtani himself.  Even more unique is that it became obvious that Ohtani and his representatives designed the contract themselves and then presented it to the teams that Ohtani was actually considering [the LA Dodgers and Angels plus the San Francisco Giants].*  MLB calculated this odd contract, for luxury tax purposes, as exactly 46 million dollars a year for 10 years in current value.  Interestingly, the Players Union calculated it as 43.5 million a year in current value.  Basically, Ohtani and his reps seemed to have just decided to top the highest average annual pay ever [43 and a third million dollars a year for 2 years to Justin Verlander and 3 years to Max Scherzer] and then pair that with the length of contract [10 years or more] usually given to drive that average annual amount down.  Not coincidentally, the contract also topped, by either the MLB or the Player Union calculations, the largest amount of total dollars ever of any MLB contract previously given out [to Ohtani’s former teammate Mike Trout for 426.5 million over 12 years]. Most importantly, all the deferrals until 2034 to 2043 in Ohtani’s contract will help free up the Dodgers to spend more in an attempt to absolutely dominate during his actual playing career with the Dodgers from 2024 to 2033. Ohtani claimed that winning was, by far, the most important thing and then, incredibly, structured his contract to back up those words to the hilt. You have to respect that.  

*Actual Contract Math: 2 million from 2024-2033 not discounted; 68 million deferred from 2034-2043 with a discount rate of 4.43% which equals a present day annual value of $44,081,476.50 per year.  Adding back the 2 million gives a contract of $46,081,476.50 per year for 10 years with a Total Contract Value of $460,814,764.97 dollars.

Another prime consideration in Ohtani’s strange contract seems to have been the California State Income Tax, currently the very highest in the United States at 13.3% for all income over one million dollars a year [and heading to 14.3% in 2024].  Under a US Federal Statue that prohibits States from taxing deferred payments if they last for at least 10 years and the recipient no longer lives in the State, Ohtani and his reps crafted a contract that will allow him to possibly collect those 68 million dollars a year from 2034 to 2043 and also not have to pay a single dime of that exorbitant California State Income Tax (provided he does not live in CA during that time).  If he moves to a some place like Florida or Texas with no State Income Tax at all during those years, it will be the same as if Ohtani had stashed his 46-million-dollar paycheck in a tax-free fund that returns 13 to 14 percent.  This is one hell of a return in a world where financial analysts will tell you that a 10 percent annual return is fantastic.  Interestingly, no one has yet weighed in on whether Japan itself would tax the 2034-2043 deferred payments if Ohtani returns to his Homeland.  If he wanted to finish his Baseball career in Japan after the Dodger contract runs out after the 2033 season, would it cost Shohei Ohtani any money?  Someone needs to look at the Japanese Income Tax Code.  But, for some reason, I believe the answer is: “No.” If anything, Shohei Ohtani has consistently shown that his preparation is completely on point.

*Sportswriters have indicated that Toronto might have also been given a chance to consider Ohtani’s terms.  But that seems as unlikely as the false ‘Ohtani plane ride to Toronto to sign’ story.

6. The Tao of Shohei Ohtani

What does all this say about Shohei Ohtani?  Nothing that is not already known.  He is intelligent, smart, driven and extremely methodical.  He seems to put in the work to not only to develop his talent, but also to structure his life.  Before he even signed with the Dodgers, it was hypothesized that Ohtani preferred to stay on the West Coast because it would keep him closest to his Homeland.*  Considering that he almost surely only gave Pacific Rim teams a chance to match the LA Dodger contract, this was almost certainly true.  After his LA Dodger contract was signed, it was reported that Ohtani could take just 2 million dollars a year while deferring 68 million annually because he already makes 40 to 50 million dollars a year in endorsements.  If he truly makes that much in endorsements (or even one half of that), Ohtani had an even greater reason to stay in Los Angeles, the media capital of the United States [if not the World].  How much more in endorsements will Ohtani make if he is the member of a Los Angeles Dodgers Super Team that makes annual play-off appearances?  How much more if they win multiple World Championships? Every aspect of Shohei Ohtani’s career has been methodically planned out. It is apparent that he took all this into consideration too. For years, it has been reported that Ohtani would eventually sign with the Los Angeles Dodgers. It was inevitable because it made too much sense. But, in the real world, things that simply make too much sense often do not come to pass (such as Bryce Harper to the Yankees). The Tao of Shohei Ohtani seems to be a Baseball life that makes perfect sense.

*Los Angeles is 5477 miles away from Tokyo, Japan. Both San Francisco and Oakland [5138 miles] are closer, but Seattle [4782 miles] is actually the closest. San Diego is even further away [5582 miles].

But the most important takeaway from Shohei Ohtani’s contract negotiations is that the man must have an almost unshakeable belief in himself.  His belief in himself is evidently so strong that money seems to have never his primary motivation.  Ohtani seems to believes that, if he simply pours his heart & soul into performing on the field, the money will follow.  When he signed his first Baseball contract in Japan, Ohtani’s firm belief that he could be a double duty player, both hitting and pitching, was essential to his choice of a team. When Ohtani came to the United States, he once again chose the team that would allow him to be a double duty player.  By coming over early, Ohtani forfeited the chance to make millions from the established posting system and had to accept the MLB minimum salary.  Basically, Ohtani then used his initial team in the MLB as an apprenticeship. Once he had conclusively proved that he could be a two way superstar, Ohtani moved on.  And now he has reached Baseball Nirvana.  The best player in the world is playing for an organization that will surround him with players that can help him to repeatedly get to the greatest Baseball stage of all, the MLB World Series.  If there is a God in heaven and he or she loves Baseball, this will all work out for Ohtani. He must believe that it will work out because everything has always worked out before. Possibly the only thing that could derail this Ohtani dream is if his team does not hold up it’s end of the bargain by not trying to surround Shohei with the teammates that he needs. The LA Angels, to their credit, did try to do this. They simply failed. It is already becoming apparent that the LA Dodgers will not fail. In fact, it is very likely that Ohtani is going to now spend his prime as the best player on a team with a good chance to go down in history as legendary.

Some of the Shohei Ohtani’s actions can only really be understood with a basic knowledge of Japanese Baseball [and/or culture].  While Americans love their sporting contests, Football reigns very comfortably as the number one American sport, and Basketball and Baseball compete for a distant second place (a competition that Baseball has been losing).  It is a far cry from 100 years ago when Baseball was unquestionably the supreme American sport and was called the National Pastime with good reason.  In Japan, there is not this problem.  The Japanese have two main sports, Baseball and Sumo.  And Baseball is pretty much clearly number one.*  In a way, the Baseball players and pitchers coming out of Japan are throwbacks to the men who at one time existed here.  The very best Japanese players, such as Ichiro Suzuki and Shohei Ohtani, live and breathe Baseball in a way that American professional athletes are probably now incapable of doing.  That the current best Baseball player in the world came out of the Japanese Baseball ecosystem was almost inevitable. One of the most unusual aspects of Shohei Ohtani’s signing of his LA Dodger contract was that he also reportedly presented the exact same contract to his former team, the LA Angels, and asked them if they would match it. But, even if the Angels had said yes, it is almost certain that Ohtani would have turned them down. His offer of the same contract to the Angels was meant as a sign of respect. Interestingly, the Angels seemed to understand the gesture and politely declined to match the Dodger offer. But this was a very Japanese thing for Ohtani to do.

*Robert Whiting’s wonderful seminal books on Japanese Baseball culture, The Chrysanthemum and the Bat and You Gotta Have Wa, still stand as probably the best introductions to Baseball in Japan.

7. What the Future Holds for Ohtani

Ever since he arrived in the Major Leagues, Shohei Ohtani has continued to improve.  He closed the holes in his swing, becoming ever more dangerous.  He has refined his pitching repertoire, becoming ever more unhittable.  But was 2023 his apex?  It is inevitable that Ohtani will not be as valuable in 2024 as he was from 2021-2023.*  In 2024, he will only be hitting, not hitting and pitching.  On July 5^th of 2024, Ohtani will turn 30 years old.  Common wisdom holds that the typical baseball player peaks when he is 26 to 27 years old and then slowly declines until he is about 30 years old; before rapidly declining in his later 30s. Few Baseball players last until they are 40 years old [or older]. But Ohtani is anything but typical.  The year 2022 was Ohtani’s best year as a pitcher.  The year 2023 was Ohtani’s best year as a hitter [and overall].  Can he improve offensively in 2024?  Ohtani will be able to focus solely on his batting this year.  Of couse, Ohtani will also begin 2024 less than one year removed from his second Tommy John procedure.  As Philadelphia Phillies star Bryce Harper showed in 2023, recovery from Tommy John surgery can rob a hitter of his power for quite some time.  It will be interesting to see if this is the case with Ohtani.  A conservative prediction would probably state that it is likely that Ohtani’s power (his home runs and slugging percentage) will go down in 2024 while his on-base skills (walks and on-base percentage) will go up.  A more optimistic projection will have Ohtani breaking the LA Dodgers’ single season home run record [49] while also becoming the first Dodger to hit 50 or more home runs in a season. In any event, it will be fascinating to see him bat in the heart of the Dodger’s line-up.

*2021-2023 Ohtani Total WAR: 2021-9.0 [batting 4.9 and pitching 4.1]; 2022-9.6 [3.4 batting and 6.2 pitching]; 2023-10.0 [6.0 batting and 4.0 pitching]; but, if injuries had not ended his 2023 season early, Ohtani was on pace for about a 12.0 WAR season.

But the real fun will start in 2025.  If Ohtani is healthy, there is a chance that he may turn in one of the greatest seasons of all time. In fact, if his health holds, Ohtani may just peak anywhere between 2025 and 2029.  Of course, there is a chance that Ohtani will spend the late 2020s declining like a normal player. But there have been many position players who, for one reason or another, continued to improve into their early 30s [Honus Wagner and Joe Morgan, for example].*  Even more pitchers have continued to improve in their 30s.  The flamethrower Randy Johnson peaked from 1999 to 2002 when he was 35 to 38.  Is there any reason to believe that Ohtani could have a late career renaissance like Joe Morgan or Randy Johnson (or both)?  The answer to that question is obviously yes (though that doesn’t mean it will happen, just that it might).  What Ohtani is doing, juggling a career as a pitcher and a hitter is tremendously hard.  Time spent perfecting his pitching takes away time perfecting his hitting (and vice versa).  Ohtani reportedly eats, sleeps, and dreams Baseball.  It seems like there is a good chance that he still has some room to improve. In fact, he was still improving in 2023. How great a season could Ohtani actually have if he does continue to improve for awhile? Ohtani has already had 6 Wins Above Replacement [WAR] seasons as both a hitter and as a pitcher [not the same season though]. If he peaks together a 12 WAR season would be inevitable. But perhaps he could go even higher, maybe even much higher. It is unlikely but only time will tell.

*Morgan spent his early career battling both injuries and a manager who he thought was a racist [Harry Walker].  Traded to Cincinnati, Morgan learned to re-love Baseball from his teammate, Pete Rose, and had a ferocious peak at the late age of 32.

What the Future Holds for the Dodgers

The signing of Yoshinabo Yamamoto, who has been the best pitcher in the Japanese Major Leagues from 2021 to 2023, shows that the LA Dodgers now have an advantage, probably a great one, in any future attempts to sign the very best Japanese players.  Yamamoto himself, while admitting that he would have probably signed with the Dodgers in any case, did also state that the opportunity to play with Shohei Ohtani was a consideration (and it certainly helped that Shohei went out of his way to make Yamamoto feel welcome).  However, the most interesting thing, by far, about Yamamoto’s signing was that he obviously solicited offers from other teams [the Mets, Yankees, and Giants in particular]; and then gave the Dodgers the opportunity to match the best offer.  In fact, the Yankees offer was probably superior to the Dodgers’ offer.  The Dodgers seem to have sealed the deal by offering the reverse of the Ohtani’s deal.  Instead of deferring money, the Dodgers paid Yamamoto an upfront bonus of 50 million dollars [which also reportedly escapes the very onerous California State Tax].  If many of the future Japanese star players who come over also give the Dodgers the opportunity to match any offer, this will give the Dodgers an enormous advantage.  Who wouldn’t prefer, all things being equal, to play on the team that employs the “Babe Ruth” of Japan? In the very near future, two more great Japanese superstars [players with Hall of Fame caliber talent] will almost certainly be posted to play in the MLB. If the Dodgers sign both of these players, pitcher Roki Sasaki and home-run hitter deluxe Munetaka Murakami, the Dodgers may be renamed the Japan Giants or Tokyo Dodgers.

But the Dodgers still have to hold up their end of the bargain.  The Dodgers need to field a winning team.  After signing Ohtani, they immediately signed Yamamoto and also front-line starter Tyler Glasnow [to an extension of 5 years for 136.5 million dollars].  Of course, Glasnow is a risk due to his injury history. But the injury risk is counterbalanced by his tremendous upside.  Like Ohtani, Glasnow recently had a Tommy John surgery [2021].  His return in 2023 from the surgery was delayed by an oblique issue too. But Glasnow still managed to reach a career-high in starts (21) and innings (120).  Interestingly, Glasnow claimed in his initial interviews after the Dodger signed him that his elbow, which had been bothering him for basically his entire MLB career, finally felt whole.  If that is true, there is a actual chance that Tyler Glasnow will be the LA Dodgers’ best pitcher going forward.  In multiple ways, the signings of both Yamamoto and Glasnow are almost as important as the signing of Ohtani himself.  The Dodgers have announced that, not only do they have the Babe Ruth of Japan playing for them, they will go the whole nine yards to give him the supporting players that he deserves.  They seem to be intent on becoming a modern version of the 1927 New York Yankees (or maybe just the Yankees of the late 1990s).  Currently, the All-Time Baseball record for consecutive 100 or more win seasons is three, held by multiple teams. The Dodgers have won 100 or more games in 2021 [106], 2022 [111], and 2023 [100]. In 2024, the LA Dodgers are probably even money to become the first team to win 100 or more games in four consecutive seasons. And then five in 2025.

Postscript #1: The Elvis Moment

Perhaps the best thing about Shohei Ohtani’s signing with the LA Dodgers was his channeling of an American icon, Elvis Presley.*  With the LA Angels, Ohtani’s uniform number was 17.  But in 2023, relief pitcher Joe Kelly wore that number for the Dodgers.  Ashley Kelly, his wife, posted on their social media an offer to give her husband’s number to Shohei if he signed with the Dodgers. She even [one would assume jokingly] offered to rename her baby, Kai, to Shokai.  When Ohtani finally did sign with the Dodgers on December 11, Ashley proceeded to post an Instagram video of her throwing Kelly’s old number 17 uniforms onto their front lawn. She also drew a “Kelly 99” on the back of his shirt with a sharpie. Under this obvious pressure, Joe Kelly agreed to give up the uniform number 17 and took 99 instead as his new one. Then, on December 23, 2023, Shohei Ohtani had a brand new Porsche delivered to a flabbergasted Ashley as as a token of his appreciation and Xmas present. It may be impossible to root against Ohtani.  

*Elvis reportedly gave away a lot of automobiles during his life, but probably his most famous gift of a car happened in July 1975.  He was shopping for cars in a Memphis, Tennessee, Cadillac dealership.  A young black woman named Minnie Pearson walked by and was admiring the cars on display.  Noticing her looking, Elvis bought her a brand new white and gold Cadillac that retailed for $11,500. Of course, Elvis may have been as high as a kite when he did this. Ohtani was presumably sober.

Postscript #2: Memories of McGraw

The Dodgers pursuit of great Asian and Mexican players to give their large fan bases of those respective LA populations someone that they can identify with is reminiscent of New York Giants’ manager John McGraw’s [from 1902-1932] career long search for a great Hebrew player that would bring the large New York City Jewish population out to the Polo Grounds.  Unfortunately, McGraw had no luck at all fielding such Jewish players as Moses Solomon, the Rabbi of Swat. And, in an irony that still makes one laugh, McGraw then passed on the greatest Jewish player of the era (and possibly all time) when Hank Greenberg showed up for a tryout. The LA Dodgers, with Fernando Valenzuela and Hideo Nomo and now Shohei Ohtani, have not been so unlucky.

Postscript #3: The Dodgers sign Teoscar Hernandez [January 8, 2024]

One day after this post was published, the Dodgers continued their “Dr. Evil” plan to conquer the Baseball World by signing Teoscar Hernandez. At his best in 2021, the 28-year-old Hernandez hit 32 home runs, drove in 116 RBIs, and batted .296 while playing for the Toronto Blue Jays. With 2023 being his last year before achieving free agency, Toronto traded him to Seattle before the season started. Under pressure to perform and now playing in a new city and in a notable pitching park, Hernandez had a down year [26 HRs, 93 RBIs, and a .258 BA while striking out a whopping 211 times, up from his previous high of 163 during 2018, his first full season]. Interestingly, Hernandez struck out 107 times at home and 104 on the road but slashed just .217/.263/.380 [BA-OBP-SA] at home and .295/.344/.486 on the road. It is pretty obvious why the Dodgers signed Hernandez. They needed a powerful right-handed hitter to balance their majority left-handed line-up [Hernandez smacked lefties to the tune of .287/.307/.510 in 2023 and has swatted them at a .275/.329/.557 pace for his career]. They obviously figured getting him out of Seattle’s Kingdome #2 would not hurt.* Oddly, the Dodgers signed Hernandez to just a one year deal. It seems like a two year deal [or one year deal with options] would have lifted some of the pressure to perform that may have fueled his 211 strikeouts in 2023. But the Dodgers may believe that they are better suited to deal with the psychology in any case. Best case scenario: Hernandez repeats his 2021 stats in 2024. Worst case scenario [un-injured]: Hernandez repeats his 2023 season stats in 2024 and the Dodgers collect a draft pick for him and move on in 2025. Either scenario is probably a win for the Dodgers. More importantly, the Dodgers continue to uphold [to the extreme] their end of their bargain with Shohei Ohtani to build a Superteam around him.

*Branded Safeco Field at first and now as T-Mobile Park for the money.

2023-2024 Franchise Review Wrap-Up

December 16, 2023

Though no one can go back and make a brand new start, anyone can start from now and make a brand new ending. Carl Bard

Introduction

This Post will basically wrap up the series of franchise reviews and essays that I attempted in 2023. The teams are listed in order of their 2023 records despite the fact that they were originally being done in order of their 2022 records.

1. Atlanta Braves [2021 World Champions]

2021 Record: 88-73; 2022 Record: 101-61; 2023 Record: 104-58 [First Half: 54-27; Second Half 50-31].

Comment: The Atlanta Braves’ regular season juggernaut continues to roll. The Braves have signed virtually their entire core of young stars (except for Max Fried) to long term contracts. Now they are playing with house money, so to speak. Their first move in the 2024 off-season was quite brilliant. They declined their option to resign 32-year-old left fielder Eddie Rosario, who was their least valuable regular. Then they traded for 24-year-old Jarred Kelenic, a tarnished outfield prospect who has possibly significant upside. Along with Vaughn Grissom, a 22-year-old second baseman who the Braves plan to try in the outfield, this gives them two good options to replace Rosario. Basically, if they had just one more front line starting pitcher, the Braves would be scary good. Even without that ace, the Braves are almost, baring catastrophe, sure to win 100+ games in 2024. With yet another ace, the Braves would have to be the overwhelming favorites to win the 2024 World Series. The only thing that can derail the Braves is probably jealousy. Sooner or later, one or some of the Braves’ players is/are going to get upset about how underpaid they are. Ronald Acuna Jr., who is worth 40 or more million dollars a year on the open market, is getting 17 million dollars a year……..for the next five straight years (assuming the Braves pick up the team options in 2027 and 2028. Sooner or later, that has got to burn. Success Cycle Position: Holding at the Top.

Published Essay [Post# 29; 3rd of 4 actually posted]: How intelligent was the Atlanta Braves decision to tie up their core players long term way before they (hopefully) reach their prime? The conclusion was that it was extremely smart, which seems self-evident.

2. Baltimore Orioles

2021 Record: 52-110; 2022 Record: 83-79; 2023 Record: 101-61 [First Half: 48-33; Second Half: 53-28]

Comment: With Jackson Holliday being added to the Orioles’ collection of young talent, the Orioles are probably not returning to the second division any time soon. The Orioles may be a much better team in 2024 [with another year of experience for their core & the return of John Means to their pitching staff] but still come nowhere close to their 101 win total in 2023. In 2023, the Birdos went 30-16 in games decided by one run and 11-6 in extra innings. The team’s expected record was just 95-67 (which is still pretty good). But it is not hard to envision the team being even better (pitchers John Means and Grayson Rodriguez step up and shortstop Holliday delivers immediately). If it happens, the club could win 90-100 games and, depending on luck, still have improved over 2023. The young Orioles seem to be a very likeable team; it is unfortunate that their owner, technically Peter Angelos but in reality his nepo son John Angelos, seems to be a complete douchebag. In the middle of the Orioles’ breakout year, he decided to shake down the city of Baltimore for a new Stadium/Retail area and lied that he would not be able to pay all these suddenly successful players. Hopefully the City of Baltimore tells this jerkwad to go pound sand. Success Cycle Position: Still rising to the top despite 101 wins.

Unpublished Essay: Is Adley Rustchman the most likely future Hall of Famer from the current Major League catching corps? Where have all the Johnny Bench type catchers gone?

3. Los Angeles Dodgers

2021 Record: 106-56; 2022 Record: 111-51; 2023 Record: 100-62 [First Half: 46-35; Second Half: 54-27].

Comment: Can the Los Angeles Dodger’s streak of 100 win seasons survive the complete decimation of their pitching staff? Is this the curse of Trevor Bauer? Has any MLB team ever basically lost their complete starting core to injury (or other circumstances) during a single season? It is a miracle that the Dodgers still won 100 games (on the nose). In fact, they had the best second half record in 2023; before collapsing in the play-offs. It was like watching a winded marathon runner fall down with the finish tape in sight. Interestingly, the Dodgers’ entire 2023-2024 off-season seems predicated on whether the great pitcher/DH Shohei Ohtani will end up doing what seems like the most completely logical thing to do: sign with the crosstown Dodgers, sticking it to the doomed Los Angeles Angels, while maintaining Ohtani’s easiest access to his motherland, Japan. It seems to make way too much sense to not happen, except for the fact that the Dodgers desperately need pitching and Shohei cannot throw the ball in anger again until 2025. Will the Dodgers become the first team to win at least 100 games in a season four straight years? The odds right now have to be a quite a bit less than 50/50 for another 100 victory year. Success Cycle Position: Trying to fight off the downward slide from the Top.

*After writing this part of the post, Shohei Ohtani did sign with the LA Dodgers on December 9, 2023. Their position on the Success Cycle is officially upgraded to: Trying to get through 2024 until returning to the Top of the Cycle.

Published Essay [Post #25; 1st of 4 already posted]: An essay in 2 parts about the Dodgers; Part #1 -The history of Super Teams or will the Dodgers be the firs team to win 100 or more games in 4 straight seasons; and Part #2 – When will a LA Dodger hit 50 home runs in a season.*

*If life is good, Shohei Ohtani will almost certainly become the first Dodger to hit 50 HRs.

4. Tampa Bay Rays

2021 Record: 100-62; 2022 Record: 86-76; 2023 Record: 99-63 [First Half: 54-27; Second Half: 45-36].

Comment: One has to wonder how much longer the Tampa Bay Rays team can continue to defy gravity and usually field a winning team. From 2008 to 2013,* the Rays finished above .500 [after starting their team history with 10 straight losing seasons from1998 to 2007]. Then Tampa Bay fielded 4 more losers from 2014 to 2017 [though twice finishing just 80-82]. Currently, the Rays are on another six consecutive years winning streak [2018-2023]. They are definitely a smarter organization than most of the other Major League teams. But the Rays are not the Dodgers or Yankees. The Rays do not have the financial resources to buy top-of-the-line free agents or cover over their mistakes. The brain drain out of the Tampa front office is almost constant (of course the Dodgers are run by a Ray Alumni). Sooner or later, it seems that the organization will make a misstep and the club will crash down. Perhaps the current Wander Franco debacle is the warning bell for the end of this near constant success cycle? One of the odder stories of 2023 was the Tampa Bay Rays announcing that they were going to stay put and build a new stadium & entertainment area right where they are in St. Petersburg (following the very successful models of the Atlanta Braves, St. Louis Cardinals, and other teams). But this came after years and years of saying that their present stadium site was completely hopeless and they needed to move. The lesson seems to be that no one should ever believe a single thing a Major League club says when they are trying to get hundreds of millions of dollars gifted to them by their local government. Success Cycle Position: Teetering on the edge of a downhill crash.

*Curiously, the Rays first winning season, 2008, coincided with dropping the Devil from their team name, becoming just the Rays rather than Devil Rays.

Unpublished Essay: The usually sad history of the modern practice of signing young players with very little to no Major League service time to a long-term contract [or was signing the Wander Franco a mistake?].

5. Milwaukee Brewers

2021 Record: 95-67; 2022 Record: 86-76; 2023 Record: 92-70 [First Half: 43-38; Second Half: 49-32.

Comment: Bud Selig, owner of the Milwaukee Brewers from 1970 to 2004, usually maintained that the Milwaukee team could not compete because of the way Baseball’s finances were structured. Rather than figure out a way to run the Brewers so that they could compete, Selig became the Commissioner and reorganized the economic structure of the Major Leagues so that: 1) any poorly run team could be profitable without even competing; and/or 2) any team that was efficiently run could at the very least compete with a boom or bust strategy [i.e. building up a strong core to compete and then tearing the core down when it aged out of being competitive]. Mark Attanasio, the man who succeeded Selig as the Brewer owner, has played this game pretty well. His team has usually had a winning record [11 seasons over .500, 7 seasons under .500, and 1 season of 81-81]. Does he still send Selig thank you cards? At the present, it would most probably be best for the Milwaukee Brewers to go into a rebuilding phase. Every really good team needs to be built on the backs of a few superstars. Milwaukee’s two best players, Christian Yelich and Corbin Burnes, are both no longer building blocks for the Brewers. It is very unlikely that Yelich will ever regain his 2018-2019 MVP form; and Burnes will be a free agent in 2025 and the chances that he resigns with the Brewers are slim and none. Success Cycle Position: Obviously on the Downhill slope, do they try a soft reboot or a full rebuild?

Unpublished Essay: Was part of Bud Selig’s legacy the complete erasure of Anti-Semitism in Baseball (well, maybe not complete as Anti-Semitism always seems to be lurking)? In other news, Baseball has gone Hollywood.

6t. Houston Astros [2022 World Champions]

2021 Record: 95-67; 2022 Record: 106-56; 2023 Record: 90-72 [First Half: 44-37; Second Half: 46-35].

Comment: The Astros made a spirited try at defending their crown but finally lost to the eventual Champion Texas Rangers. Will this be the true beginning of a New York Yankees/Boston Red Sox or Los Angeles Dodgers/San Francisco Giants franchise blood feud? Probably not. The Rangers still seem to be on the way up while the Astros are probably on the way down. But Astro owner Jim Crane will surely try to gear his Astros up for yet another run for the Roses in 2024. Jose Altuve [34 in 2024] and Alex Bregman [30] are in the last years of their contracts. Jose Abreu [37 in 2024] and Justin Verlander [41 in 2024] are past their expiration date. But, even if all these players leave or retire, the Astros will still have a formidable hitting core [Jordan Alvarez, Kyle Tucker & Yanier Diaz] going forward. Of course, much of whether the eventual rebuild and reset will simply rely on pitcher attrition. The great pitching staff of the 2022 World Champions broke down quite a bit in 2023. Christian Javier was no longer an ace; Framber Valdez lost his mojo mid-season after throwing his no-hitter; and the relief pitchers were no longer the it’s lights out crew of the previous year. It will also be interesting to see if the retirement of Dusty Baker has any noticeable effect in 2024. Whether it does or not, the fact that the Astro’s 2022 World Championship propelled Johnnie B. Baker into the Hall of Fame without any question marks will still stand. One last thing (simply from a Baseball fans’ perspective), it would be wonderful if Yordan Alvarez [27 in 2024] could play a full season uninjured. Success Cycle Position: Orbit slowly decaying, atmospheric reentry imminent, eventual soft landing or complete crash coming, but which is debatable.

Published Essay [Post#28; 2nd of 4 actually posted]: What kind of writer puts three different subjects (1. Astros’ Corporate culture, 2. Hall of Fame chances of Jose Abreau, and 3. Dusty Baker’s Clubhouse influence) into what was just supposed to be a short essay?

6t. Philadelphia Phillies

2021 Record: 82-80; 2022 Record: 87-75; 2023 Record: 90-72 [First Half: 43-38; Second Half: 47-34].

Comment: If there is a God in Heaven, the Los Angeles Angels will trade Mike Trout to the Philadelphia Phillies. And then Trout will sip from the elixir of life and once again begin playing 150 games or so per season, bringing multiple Championships to Philadelphia [Trout grew up in the New Jersey suburbs of the Philadelphia metropolitan area]. Trout or no Trout, Dave Drombowski will probably find a way to eventually bring a World Championship to the Phillies. In some ways, he is the most interesting General Manager in the Game. He has a vision of the type of position players that he wants, the type of pitching staff that he wants to build, and a single minded focus on building the team without worrying too much about making mistakes. Drombrowski will keep throwing shit against the wall until it sticks. It remains to be seen whether one of the odder news stories of the off-season have any effect on the team chemistry. That would be Bryce Harper’s odd bitching and moaning about his contract status. Harper has obviously had second thoughts about his strange signing of an extremely long contract with no opt-outs that right now seems to undervalue his services substantially. Of course, if his career ends today or tomorrow, there will be no give backs to the Phillies either. One wonders who does his publicity? Better that those complaints were lodged privately, not publicly. The Phillies, at least, seemed to have done the intelligent thing and simply ignored them. Success Cycle Position: Still bubbling under the Top, waiting for the magic to strike.

Unpublished Essay: Has Dave Drombrowski outsmarted the the philosophy of Moneyball; or is he simply applying it (seeking undervalued assets) in his own way (or is it just that nobody can really value defense correctly)?

6t. Texas Rangers [2023 World Champions]

2021 Record: 60-102; 2022 Record: 68-94; 2023 Record: 90-72 [First Half: 49-32; Second Half: 41-40].

Comment: The 2023 World Champion Texas Rangers had their season unfold like a play. In the prologue, the mood was grim as the lead actor went down with an injury that would knock him out for the duration. In the first act, the play was a roaring success, the toast of Broadway. In the second act, the club struggled mightily and was briefly upstaged by another long-running and far more popular play which seemed primed to take the post season awards. In the third and final act, the acting company roared back to sweep the awards and spit in the faces of their critics. How good would the Rangers have been if Jacob DeGrom had been able to pitch? In 2024, they will finally get their ace on the mound (but for how long, no one knows). Perhaps in 2024, the Rangers may finally get some good news on Jack Leiter and/or Kumar Rocker [drated #2 overall in 2021 & #3 overall in 2022 respectively]. Regardless, the Rangers may be even better in 2024 simply by having their best player, Corey Seager, and best rookie, Evan Carter, play the entire season (not to mention Josh Jung). And, of course, that doesn’t even mention Wyatt Langford (#4 overall in 2023) and blasting away in the minors like it is his mission to debut in the Majors within just a year of being drafted. The Ranger’s future certainly seems bright. On the other hand, if you are not so impressed by the Ranger’s success, you can always watch the Documentary: Throw a Billion Dollars from the Helicopter. This film shows the Government of Arlington County, Texas, simply giving away, supposedly without any pay-offs or promptings, a new stadium to the Texas Ranger owners in 2020. Success Cycle Position: The Rangers are peaking while their opponents are fading. With a little luck, the Rangers will rule the AL West for the next five years or so.

Unpublished Essay: Are there limits to how many strikeouts one pitcher can throw or how many home runs one batter can hit (or can a Baseball player strike out more than 400 hitters or bash much more than 60 home runs in a season)?

9. Toronto Blue Jays

2021 Record: 91-71; 2022 Record: 92-70; 2023 Record: 89-73 [First Half: 44-37; Second Half: 45-36].

Comment: The Toronto Blue Jays are very much on the clock. The team’s two home grown star players, Bo Bichette and Vlad Guerrero, Jr. will both be free agents after the 2025 season. The Jays were unable to sign either of them to long-term team-friendly contracts early on in their careers. Since both players are the sons of former Major League stars, this is pretty understandable. They will, almost surely, be maximizing their value in the free agent marketplace of 2026. Thus, the Blue Jays have the next two seasons, 2024 and 2025, to make hay while the sun is still shining. Toronto seems to be a well-run team. After coming up with two potential superstar players in Guerrero and Bichette, the Blue Jays proceeded to construct a very good team to support them. The Jays did this the old-fashioned way: some good trades but mostly by free agency. Of course, the free agents that Toronto signed to add to their 2 homegrown stars and put them over the top (George Springer, Kevin Gausman, Brandon Belt, Chris Bassitt, Whitt Merrifeild, Yusei Kikuchi, Hyun Jin Ryu et al) are all on the down slope of their careers (and now 3B Matt Chapman is gone). At this moment, the Blue Jays need to go all in and take their shot at the Gold (and the Jays obviously know this as their failed pursuit of Shohei Ohtani shows). Hopefully, they get one really good post-season run going in 2024 or 2025 because they may face the abyss in 2026 (after Bichette and Guerrero leave and their supporting free agent core’s careers begin to time out). Success Cycle Position: The time is now and the Blue Jays know it (and it would really help if Vlad Junior returned to form).

Published Essay: Is Vlad Junior on the road to ruin? A history of hefty players going from Dave Orr to Prince Fielder to Vlad Junior himself.

10. Seattle Mariners

2021 Record: 90-72; 2022 Record: 90-72; 2023 Record: 88-74 [First Half: 39-42; Second Half: 49-32].

Comment: Since their first season in 1977, the Seattle Mariners’ franchise has been blessed with some of the greatest Baseball Players of modern times (Ken Griffey Jr., Ichiro Suzuki, Alex Rodiguez [A-Rod] and Randy Johnson at the top, but also Edgar Martinez and Felix Hernandez). Despite all of this talent, not a single Mariners team has ever even appeared in a World Series. If there is any justice, that fate will not befall Julio Rodriguez [J-Rod?], the franchise’s latest superstar. Rodriguez will play the 2024 season at just 23 years old. His 2023 season looked a lot like is rookie season, 2022. In fact, it doesn’t look like he improved at all. But under the hood of his 2023 season, there is some proof that J-Rod actually has a chance to be just as good as Griffey Junior, Ichiro, or perhaps even A-Rod without steroids. Basically, Julio had a mediocre season in 2023 except for a blazing hot month of August that brought his statistics in line with his 2022 rookie year. Hitting just a mediocre .245 in the rest of 2023, Rodriguez was on nuclear fire in August, hitting for a .429 batting average and a .724 slugging percentage. At one point, Rodriguez even had 17 hits in four games, making only 5 outs. After the All Star break, Julio actually had a .308 BA and a .578 SA. If Rodriguez could simply maintain those post-All-Star stats for a whole season, he will be a superstar and one of the top players in all of Baseball. But his insane August 2023 numbers imply that there is even more in the tank. And the way to unlock all this talent is already apparent. All Julio Rodriguez needs to do to totally harness his talents is to learn to control the strike zone. Of course, that is easier said than done. The history of Baseball is littered with the career corpses of batters who could not improve their strike zone recognition even one little bit. Success Cycle Position: Waiting for Julio to blossom while they should be building his veteran support.

Unpublished Essay: Would Ichiro Suzuki have broken Pete Rose’s career hits record if Ichiro had played his whole career in the States?

11. Minnesota Twins

2021 Record: 73-89; 2022 Record: 78-84; 2023 Record: 87-75 [First Half: 40-41; Second Half: 47-34].

Comment: Just five seasons ago [2019], the Twins exploded on the AL Central, improving from 78-84 to 101-61 in Rocco Baldelli’s first year as the Minnesota Field Manager. The Twinkies were a great hitting team, bashing a record 307 homers that year (though that was the top rabbit ball season of all time). The core was young and the farm was good. The Twinkies seemed to be entering into an extremely competitive phase. In the covid wiped out season of 2020, the Twinkies were still good, finishing 36-24 (.600 Pct) which translates into a normal record of about 97-65. But then this emerging Twinkie Dynasty seems to have swerved off the road, got lost in the grass, and run out of gas. What happened? Some Young players did not develop [Gabe Kapler and Miguel Sano]. Injuries were a large part of it [Byron Buxton]. Some core players were already old [Nelson Cruz]. Players were traded away [Eddie Rosario, Mitch Garver and, of course, Luis Arraez]. Various players arrived, added very little, and then left [Andrelton Simmons and Joey Gallo]. The pitchers were pretty much just average when the team needed an ace [which trading Arraez finally got them). After two seasons of wallowing in the second division, the Twinks had a good year last year by simply signing enough player depth to cover for their injury prone regulars. The question now is: where do the Twins go from here? Their opportunity to take over the AL Central in 2021 and 2022 is gone. Do they contend or rebuild? The team has it’s new superstar (Carlos Correa) and ace (Pablo Lopez) to build on. And, of course, they play in the mediocre AL Central. The Twins should be all in. Success Cycle Position: Should be going for the Gold but the Twinkies usually find a way to trip themselves up.

Unpublished Essay: Can just reading consistently about another Baseball team than the one you grew up rooting for make you a fan of that team? As they say, your mileage may vary but my Twin train was nothing but flat tires. [The Miami Marlins essay is the companion piece to this one.]

12t. Arizona Diamondbacks

2021 Record: 52-110; 2022 Record: 74-88; 2023 Record: 84-78 [First Half: 48-33; Second Half: 36-45].

Comment: The Diamondbacks, much like the Texas Rangers team that they played and lost to in the World Series, faded badly down the stretch. If they had played their first half like their second half, the Serpents wouldn’t have even made the playoffs [72-90 pace]. For some reason, 2023 was a bad year for momentum. That being said, Arizona may be much better in 2024. Their superstar in waiting, Corbin Carroll, will have another year of growth. Their once and future shortstop Jordan Lawler will play the whole season. Brandon Pfaadt may mature into a third ace pitcher for the team. Perhaps even Druw Jones [#2 overall pick in 2022] will begin to show signs of life. No matter how you slice it, they have come a long way since the club’s 2021 disaster. All that being said, I rooted hard against the Diamondbacks in the World Series for one simple reason. The Snakes, formed in 1998, amazingly won the World Series just three years later in 2001 (perhaps even more odd, the Serpents went 65-97 in their first year of existence and then improved to 100-62 in their 2nd season). This early success seemed unwarranted (even though, for the last 20 years, the Snakes have been basically mediocre). On the other hand, the Texas Rangers had never won a World Series in their existence (in Texas or their previous existence as the second Washington Senators team from 1961 to 1971). For just this reason, I rooted for the Rangers. Success Cycle Position: Trending up to regular contention absent injuries or stupidity.

Unpublished Essay: Is Baseball being taken over by the godchildren of Roy Campanella? Biracial Baseball players are becoming an ever larger part of Baseball demographics.

12t. Miami Marlins

2021 Record: 67-95; 2022 Record: 69-93; 2023 Record: 84-78 [First Half: 47-34; Second Half: 37-44].

Comment: The primary story of the Miami Marlins’ 20223 season was how the team had made the progressive move of hiring a female General Manager to run the organization, Kim Ng. This hiring had to be rated as an unqualified success. The Marlins improved from 69-93 to 84-78 in her two years at the helm. Then things got weird. Rather than bask in the glory of not only being the first Major League team to be run by a female GM but to have that GM do well, the Marlins effectively demoted her for a her good work. Of course, Kim Ng could have continued as the Marlin GM, but she was going to be demoted nevertheless. Way back in the beginning, Baseball team owners directly ran their teams. Then some of these owners hired Managers to help them run the club. Sometimes the Manager (also called the Captain) was just a player who ran the team on the field. But sometimes these Managers were businessman who also did the scheduling, collected the money, and moonlighted as field Managers. In time, this was all sorted out to the modern hierarchy of Owner, General Manager, and Field Manager. Recently, however, there has been yet another division of Duties. Many Major League teams are now are set up with an Owner, the President (of Baseball Operations), the General Manager, and a Field Manager. Under this structure, the President of Baseball Operations (or whatever) actually is the General Manager and builds the team. The General Manger no longer builds the team but still does all the grunt work that GMs have always done (basically the paperwork). To her credit, Kim Ng resigned the minute she knew that the Marlins were bringing in a President of Baseball operations for 2024. Success Cycle Position: Hopefully headed right back to the bottom where they belong.

Unpublished Essay: How do I hate thee? For the entire existence of the Miami Marlins franchise, they have have been the closest Major League team to my home. Despite this, the Miami Marlins have always been, no contest, my least favorite team. In 2023, they gave me one more reason to despise them.

14. Chicago Cubs

2021 Record: 71-91; 2022 Record: 74-88; 2023 Record: 83-79 [First Half: 38-43; Second Half: 45-36].

Comment: The Cubs are making steady progress climbing back up the hill of success. Their is a good chance that they will make the playoffs in 2024 (they played at a 90-72 pace in the second half). Of course, the Cubbies compete in the National League Central and, ever since the adoption of the three division set-up by both Leagues [East, Central, West], the two Central divisions usually have been the weakest. Except for perhaps the St. Louis Cardinals, no Central Division team in either League has been able to build anything resembling a dynasty. The main reason for this appears to be the owners of these Central Division clubs. Overall these owners seem to be both more conservative and also cheaper than their Eastern and Western Division brethren. Although the Cubs are once again on the path that led to their 2016 World Championship, the question will once again be whether the Cubs’ owners, the Ricketts family, will pay to maintain the team at altitude. A good litmus test for this question will be if the Cubbies resign Cody Bellinger. Bellinger was the best hitter on the 2023 Cubs but comes with substantial risk. Are the injuries that wrecked his career from 2020 to 2022 really healed for good? Was his 2023 season his new talent level or is their any chance that he could return to his 2019 MVP form [47 HR, 115 RBI, .305 BA]. A conservative club signs Bellinger like the Cubs did in 2023 (one year prove-it-to-me contract). A club going for broke signs a player like Bellinger for the long-term. Something tells me that, when the Cubbies look at Cody Bellinger, they see Kris Bryant (and his completely disastrous contract for the Rockies). Success Cycle Position: Rising towards the Top but in a balloon ready to pop.

Unpublished Essay: How good can outfielder Seiya Suzuki be now that he has established himself in the Major Leagues? Many Japanese pitchers have made the transition but few Japanese position players have.

15t. Cincinnati Reds

2021 Record: 83-79; 2022 Record: 62-100; 2023 Record: 82-80 [First Half: 43-38; Second Half: 39-42].

Comment: Like the Chicago Cubs, the Cincinnati Reds are poised in 2024 to jump back into contention. Also like the Cubbies, they play in the weak NL Central. And, like their AL Central Counterpart, the Cleveland Guardians, the Baseball Gods just gifted an undeserved high Draft pick on the Reds for 2024. It must just be an Ohio kind of year (the Reds will pick at #2 when they should have picked 13th and the Guardians, who got the #1, should have picked 9th). The nuts and bolts of another Big Red Machine are here; they just have to be assembled properly. Without question, there is one huge difference. The Big Red Machine of the mid-1970s never had a potential pitching ace like Hunter Greene. Of course, it is also quite unlikely that these Reds will approach the savagery of the Big Red Machine’s offensive attack. The year 2024 will also almost surely be the first year since 2007 without Joey Votto on the roster. As Baseball History unfolds, the likelihood of a player spending his whole career with just one team recedes. Is this really a bad thing? Baseball, after all, is a job for the players at its core. Nobody would put in the amount of time and effort it takes to perform in the Major Leagues without pay. It is certainly a bit old-fashioned to hope that Votto and others like him never have to move. So why does it feel right and would you want to reward it somehow? Success Cycle Position: Trending up with the sky as the limit and the hard ground as a floor.

Unpublished Essay: Does Elly de la Cruz (or perhaps Oneil Cruz) represent the ultimate whippet-thin but also wiry-strong Baseball position player (an essay about players in the field with zero percent body fat)?

15t. New York Yankees

2021 Record: 92-70; 2022 Record: 99-63; 2023 Record: 82-80 [First Half: 45-36; Second Half: 37-44].

Comment: The hysteria that followed the Yankees mediocre 2023 season was certainly a sight to behold. Despite being plagued with injury after injury, the Yankees fought through the first half of 2023 in good shape (on their way to a 90 win season and probable play-off berth). However, in the second half, the continuous flood of even more injuries capsized the H.M.S. Yankee. Outfielder Jasson Dominguez was the perfect 2023 Yankee. This top prospect, called up to try to salvage the season, played fantastically well until almost immediately blowing out his elbow and requiring “Tommy John” surgery. A normal team would just write a season like this off and hope to rebound the next year. But these are the Yankees. They won’t be able to shrug it off. In some ways, this disastrous season is bad luck for other teams. The Yankees will double down now, and probably sign both a top-flight pitcher and hitter. With normal luck, this would already be a good team. With reinforcements, the Yankees will be, once again, the Yankees.* The Yankees, like few other teams (Dodgers, Mets, Red Sox, probably both Chicago teams) need to adopt a modern strategy that makes them continuously successful. In other words, the Yankees should treat the lesser teams in the Major Leagues like their farm system. Use free agency to collect the other teams home grown stars and superstars so that the Yanks never have a losing season. If they had been all in on this strategy recently, the Yankees would probably have Bryce Harper in their line-up too (maybe a run at Mike Trout is now in the cards too). Success Cycle Position: Returning to the Top, their normal position.

*Two days after this was written, the Yanks traded for supposed outfielder but fantastic hitter Juan Soto. Who’s next: Yoshinobu Yamamoto, the ace of Japan?

Unpublished Essay: What are the chances that Aaron Judge’s 10 year contract has a happy ending (or a history of how really tall Baseball players, hitters not pitchers, age)?

15t. San Diego Padres

2021 Record: 79-83; 2022 Record: 89-73; 2023 Record: 82-80 [First Half: 37-44; Second Half: 45-36].

Comment: With the death of the Padres’ owner, Peter Seidler, it is obvious that the Padres will have to reset. However, the late Mr. Sielder should be given his proper due for trying to go out in a blaze of glory. One assumes that the Padres planned to spend every dime that they received in 2023 and that they included the projected revenue from a good post-season run (and possibly even World Series appearance) in their budget. Of course, the Friars were a complete disappointment in 2023 and didn’t even make the play-offs. After the season, the Padres were forced to take out a 50 million dollar loan. There is probably a good chance that the projected revenue from a deep run into the play-offs was about 50 million dollars. Peter Seidler, we salute you. The loading up of mercenary baseball talent by the 2023 Padres to make a run at a World Championship reminds me of the 1997 Florida (now Miami) Marlins. But the Marlins actually won the World Series that year. Perhaps the difference between the two teams was the GMs who collected the talent. In 1997, the Florida GM was Dave Drombowski, a man who seems to have the odd talent of building cohesive teams with a distinct competitive identity. For the 2023 SD Padres, the GM was one A.J. Preller who seems to have the team building skills of any cold-blooded management consultant. Another major difference was the Owners. Florida was owned by Wayne Huizenga, basically a corporate thug executing a cold blooded strategy; while the Padres were owned by Peter Seidler, who wanted to give his city a trophy before he died. That the bad guy won while the good guy failed utterly makes you question the existence of God himself. Success Cycle Position: Probably into the Abyss though that doesn’t preclude the possibility of a 90-72 season leading up to an appearance in the 2024 World Series.

Unpublished Essay: Should Yu Darvish’s combined Japanese/Major League statistics qualify him for the Baseball Hall of Fame (or a history of Japanese pitchers in the Big Leagues)?

18. San Francisco Giants

2021 Record: 107-55; 2022 Record: 81-81; 2023 Record: 79-83 [First Half: 45-36; Second Half: 34-47].

Comment: The National League San Francisco Giants have been stuck in the middle for the last two years (along with the American League’s Los Angeles Angels and Boston Red Sox). In modern Baseball, teams are either competing or tanking. Being stuck in the middle is like being stuck in Hell. The team can either compete to appease the fans or rebuild to compete. To go 81-81 or so, year after year, is the epitome of bad strategy. Since 2018, the SF Giants have gone 73-89 [2018], 77-85 [2019], 29-31 [covid 2020], 81-81 [2022], and 79-83 [2023]. But, in 2021, the Giants went an incredible 107-55, one of the greatest stone cold fluke Baseball seasons of all time. For the last two seasons [2022 & 2023], the Giants have tried to recapture that 2021 magic. But the alchemy of that year, players up and down the roster having career years maybe because they were well rested from the covid canceled 2020 season, was gone. Even having said that, the Giants did recapture some of the magic briefly in 2023. The team was on it’s way to a 90-72 record at the end of the first half before collapsing in the second half. Interestingly, the club decided to keep the GM who constructed these teams (Farhan Zaidi) rather than the Field Manager (Gabe Kapler) who got the last dregs out of their talent. Time will tell if that was a good choice. Success Cycle Position: Still stuck in the middle, attempts to land a superstar to lead them out of the wilderness have failed.

Unpublished Essay: How do you best handle an older Ballplayer? The king of all my unpublished essays has to be the one on the effects of aging; inspired by the improbable 2021 San Francisco Giants’ season.

19t. Boston Red Sox

2021 Record: 92-70; 2022 Record: 78-84; 2023 Record: 78-84 [First Half: 40-41; Second Half: 38-43]

Comment: There are currently quite a few Baseball teams owned by financial investment businessmen types (basically hedge fund managers). The Boston Red Sox owner, John Henry, was one of the first (if not the first). The Red Sox, for the last several years, have been run in a hedge fund manner (attempting to extract maximum value from minimal investment). The result has been two identical 78-84 last place finishes in the American League East for 2022 and 2023. The team philosophy seems to be to sign a random bunch of talent, hope that luck ignites them to a great season (which actually happened in both 2013 and 2021 for Boston) and then reset to try it again if that doesn’t work. But counting on getting lucky may not be the best strategy. The Red Sox explicitly hired Chaim Bloom, their General Manager from 2020 to 2023, to rebuild the team’s tattered farm system while also trying to put together a Championship team from random scraps. For hedge fund managers like John Henry, trying to game the system, acquiring talent by being smarter than the other teams and winning on the margins, is second nature. There were some indications that Bloom was actually pulling the first part of his mandate off. The BoSox system, other than a lack of pitchers, is in much better shape. But the patience of the fans, and the club itself, wore off and Bloom got the ax. Now his successor gets to begin with a good farm system and a mandate to spend money to make money. It hardly seems fair. Success Cycle Position: Trying to avoid the most dreaded outcome: Stuck in the middle, not going up or down.

Unpublished Essay: Would only drafting position players be a viable draft strategy? Since pitchers’ careers get derailed by injuries far more often than position players, a team could theoretically use its draft picks only on hitters and use the excess hitting talent produced to trade for established pitchers (while also building their pitching staff through free agency).

19t. Detroit Tigers

2021 Record: 77-85; 2022 Record: 66-96; 2023 Record: 78-84 [First Half: 35-46; Second Half: 43-38]

Comment: The Detroit Tigers, like the Chicago Cubs, are another team on the upswing. Their second half record [for a 86-76 pace] seems to indicate that the Tigers may have a winning record in 2024, their first since 2016. They are finally rid of the dead weight of Miguel Cabrera’s career. The club has several hitters who may make a leap forward [Riley Greene, Spencer Torkelson, Kerry Carpenter] and pitchers with promise [Tarik Skubal, Matt Manning, and Reese Olsen] with a bunch of talent bubbling in their farm system [led by outfielder Max Clark]. A return to some semblance of career norms by the highly-paid, but completely underperforming, shortstop Javier Baez would help too. One of the interesting facets of being a long-term Baseball fan is that the depth of your knowledge about other teams, rather than the club whose flannels you actually root for [Red Sox], can give you somewhat of a rooting interest in that other team too. For instance, I would prefer that the Detroit Tigers, with their long and storied history, do better than a team such as the Colorado Rockies, Miami Marlins, or the Arizona Diamondbacks (all created within my lifetime). Success Cycle Position: Coming back into Contention as long as injuries and bad luck don’t drive them into the ditch.

Unpublished Essay: Has any Major League Baseball team lost more potential dynasties than the Detroit Tigers (looking back at the Cobb Tigers, the 1960s Tiger clubs, and the Tiger teams of the 1980s).

21t. Cleveland Guardians

2021 Record: 80-82; 2022 Record: 92-70; 2023 Record: 76-86 [First Half: 39-42; Second Half: 37-44].

Comment: The Cleveland franchise has come a long way since the film Major League used them to represent ineptitude in the 1980s. In the 1990s, the club had a decade of success when the Cleveland farm system churned out great hitters like popcorn. After a relatively quiet decade+ from 2002 to 2012 (with just two 90 win seasons), Cleveland had quite a run of success from the years 2013 to 2022 [9 winning seasons and one year of 80-82, 6 seasons with over 90 wins, one with over 100, and a 2016 World Series appearance in which they lost to the Chicago Cubs. The two constants in this run of excellence were 3B Jose Ramirez and Manager Terry Francona [In Francona’s first year, 2013, the team improved from 68-94 to 92-70]. But, in 2023, Francona retired and the team had their worst season since 2012. Although Cleveland still has a pretty good team, they are lacking one crucial component: power hitting. It would seem like the team was primed to go through a down cycle. However, luck may just be on Cleveland’s side. Under the old Draft system, Cleveland would have picked 9th or 10th in 2024. But, under the new Draft system, Cleveland has come up aces and, with extreme good fortune, gets to choose first. As one of the more likeable Major League franchises, it will be good if they get to pick the Big Bopper of their dreams. Success Cycle Position: Obviously on the Down Side but perhaps with a quick bounce back.

Published Essay: Should you try to erase the past in retrograde (or how does the Cleveland franchise name change from Indians to Guardians look one year later? Should Sports teams bow to the politically correct undertow of current culture?

21t. Pittsburgh Pirates

2021 Record:; 2022 Record:; 2023 Record: 76-86 [First Half: 39-42; First Half: 37-44].

Comment: The Pirates blasted out of the gate in 2023, going 20-8 in their first 28 games. Then they slowly fell back to Earth, finishing 56-78 to arrive at their final record of 76-86. This was their 20th losing season (out of 24 years from 2000-2023) in the 21st Century. It must be a hopeless feeling to root for the Pirates. But there could be good things coming. Pitcher Paul Skenes (the #1 overall 2023 draft pick) is on his way. Second baseman Termarr Johnson (#4 overall in 2022) is certainly interesting (.244 BA but 18 HRs and 101 BBs in 105 games for a .422 on-base percentage). He seems to be some mutant form of Joe Morgan. And Henry Davis (#1 overall in 2021) has established himself in the Major Leagues. If two of these three players become superstar players & also franchise cornerstones, the Pirates may finally become relevant again (the Buccos have the #9 pick overall in 2024 too). Until then, the Pirates can bring back Andrew McCutchen for yet another year in a feel good move. The Bucs have a bunch of players who could be a pretty good supporting cast for some superstars [such as shortstop Oneil Cruz, who could still become a superstar himself, third baseman Ke’Bryan Hayes, OFs Bryan Reynolds & Jack Suwinski, and pitcher Mitch Keller. Success Cycle Position: Definitely on the upswing to contention. But will the Pirates follow the Atlanta Braves model and sign any of this talent to team friendly contracts? Only time will tell…but past Pirates decisions about large contracts do not lean toward hope.

Unpublished Essay: Which Major League Baseball team, so far, has been the worst of the 21st Century? The Pittsburgh Pirates have a good argument that its them. Where do they go from here? A look at their own past (and also the City of Pittsburgh itself) may help. [Companion essay to Kansas City Royals.]

23. New York Mets

2021 Record: 77-85; 2022 Record: 101-61; 2023 Record: 75-87 [First Half: 36-45; Second Half: 39-42].

Comment: New York Met Owner Steve Cohen made his money as a successful Hedge Fund manager. The 2023 season illustrated that Cohen, as he should, understands the financial concept of ‘Sunk Costs’ [i.e. money that has already been spent & cannot be recovered by throwing more money at the problem]. After signing two ancient (by Baseball’s reckoning) pitchers to try to lead the New York Mets back to the Promised Land (play-offs), Cohen did a complete about face when it became apparent that the Mets weren’t going to make it. With the jettison of Billy Eppler as GM and the hiring of David Stearns to run the team, it is apparent that the NY Mets have gone into long-term strategy mode. With a very committed owner and a presumably talented front office, the Mets reset should be short. Eventually, Steve Cohen will open his wallet and once again go for broke to bring a pennant. But it certainly doesn’t feel like 2024 will be the year. Success Cycle Position: The Mets are probably in a short term trough.

Published Essay [Post #31; 4th of 4 actually posted]: What makes for a great Baseball team owner from the fans’ perspective (or is Steve Cohen currently the best Major League Baseball owner)?

24. Los Angeles Angels

2021 Record: 77-85; 2022 Record: 73-89; 2023 Record: 73-89 [First Half: 44-37; Second Half: 29-52]

Comment: With the loss of Shohei Ohtani, the Angels should now go into full tank mode. Odds are extremely good that the 2024 season will be a 100 loss year for the LA Halos. Whether the team keeps or trades their remaining star, Mike Trout, will indicate whether the Angels understand their need to rebuild. In all probability, the Angels will not trade Trout because being stuck in the middle, too good to fail but not good enough to succeed, has been a team mantra for quite some time. Strangely enough, the dumping of seven players on the waiver wire at the end of 2023 would normally be considered a good sign. It got the Angels under the Luxury tax and cleared the decks. It was an unusually intelligent and savvy move for this franchise. But they have already stated that they will definitely not be trading Trout this off-season. Of course, the history of Baseball is littered with similar proclamations that proved to be completely false. But the very statement shows that the Angel front office has not learned a thing. They didn’t trade Ohtani when they should have and will not trade Trout before all his value is gone either. Even if Mike Trout returns in 2024 and plays 150 games or so, he will just be leading the team to another 70 or so loss season. While good for Trout, it will just keep the Angels on the endless treadmill of mediocrity. Success Cycle Position: The Angels are stuck in Neutral when they should be racing to a full rebuild.

Unpublished Essay: Who were Baseball’s greatest athletes decade by decade? Not necessarily the best at playing Baseball, but the most naturally physically gifted specimens of each ten year bloc.

25t. St. Louis Cardinals

2021 Record: 90-72; 2022 Record: 93-69; 2023 Record: 71-91 [First Half: 34-47; Second Half: 37-44].

Comment: The St. Louis Cardinals have apparently decided to test whether Baseball’s front office strategies from before the Moneyball revolution should be brought back. A few years back, the Cardinals were on the cutting edge of modern Baseball analytical strategy. Among others, the Cardinals employed Jeff Luhnow (who went on to be the architect of the Houston Astros dynasty). But the General Manager of the team was John Mozeliak, a man without the now customary background in analytics. In 2015, the Cardinals were basically accused of corporate espionage (hacking into Jeff Luhnow’s Astro Database). Since that scandal, the Cardinals, under Mozeliak, have seemed to completely distrust the analytic side of Baseball. The team has double-downed on “Old School Baseball” philosophies such as trusting veterans and experience and mistrusting youth. During 2023, the Cardinals’ mismanagement of their best prospect, Jordan Walker, was epic. Their 2023/2024 off season moves so far, signing three mid-thirty starting pitchers to solve their rotation problems, go against the grain of modern Baseball thought. Of course, this doesn’t mean that it won’t work. Perhaps the Cardinals aging core has one last great race in them. But no one should bet on it. Success Cycle Position: On the downhill side, fighting the pull of the inevitable tide.

Unpublished Essay: What are the consequences of undervaluing the talent in your farm system (or are the modern St. Louis Cardinals following this ancient road to the basement or do they have enough talent in their farm system that they can survive this level of stupidity)?

25t. Washington Nationals

2021 Record: 65-97; 2022 Record: 55-107; 2023 Record: 71-91 [First Half: 33-48; Second Half 38-43].

Comment: The Nationals had one hell of a run from 2012 until 2019. Despite losing four times in the National League Division Series [2012, 2014, 2016 and 2017], the Gnats finished off their success cycle in style by capturing the 2019 World Championship. But then the Nationals crashed back to Earth. They are currently well into their rebuild. Now it is just a question of getting lucky with the talent (having your prospects develop, making some very wise free agent signings, and not doing anything wasteful or stupid). But this team will never again get as lucky as it did when it kicked off their 2012-2019 run by receiving two straight Number One Draft picks [in 2009: Steven Strasburg; in 2010 Bryce Harper]. They are going to have to get along with the 2022 #5 [Elijah Green, not looking too good yet]; 2023 #2 [Dylan Crews, looking pretty good so far], and the 2024 #10. The Players Union’s restructuring the Draft, beginning with the 2022, has definitely hurt the Nationals. Under the old system, Washington would have selected #1 in 2023 and #5 in 2024. However, if outfielder Dylan Crews and pitcher Mackenzie Gore both reach their potential, Washington will have effectively replaced Harper and Strasburg. Of course, that’s a very big if. Success Cycle Position: Once again on the way up.

Unpublished Essay: What do you do when all paths lead to perdition? The Washington Senators would have almost surely crashed and burned even if they had kept their core after their 2019 World Championship.

27. Chicago White Sox

2021 Record: 93-69; 2022 Record: 81-81; 2023 Record: 61-101 [First Half 34-47; Second Half 27-54].

Comment: The 2023 Chicago White Sox had perhaps the most complete reset year in Baseball. The season was such a disaster that they fired a seemingly entrenched front office. They fired the field manager. And they threw most of their veteran players into the abyss (trades, releases, and free agency). But there was one constant. The Owner Jerry Reinsdorf survived the purge. One gets the impression that Reinsdorf is one of the last dinosaur owners. He sits in his office and remembers the old days when the owners tried to break the Players’ Union. He doesn’t believe in all this ‘Moneyball’ analytical stuff. And he truly believes in a old style patronage system (i.e. he will be endlessly loyal to his employees as long as they kiss his ass). But in 2023 all this went out the window and Reinsdorf burned down the house for a rebuild. It seems pretty odd now that, just a few years ago, the White Sox seemed to be cresting up to the apex of a success cycle and would possibly rule the American League Central for at least four or five years. By all rights, the White Sox should rule the Central simply by being the division’s financial powerhouse. Instead, the team complied losing records from 2013 to 2019 before their brief fling with contention in 2021 & 2022. Maybe a total rebuild was in order. But Reinsdorf is still there. Success Cycle Position: Trapped in the Back Row, stuck in neutral after entering a Gran Prix.

Unpublished Essay: Were the Chicago Black Sox (the 1919 World Series team that threw the World Series) actually underpaid (or an essay wondering if the ghost of Charlie Comiskey still haunts the White Sox franchise).

28. Colorado Rockies

2021 Record: 74-87; 2022 Record: 68-94; 2023 Record: 59-103 [First Half: 31-50; Second Half: 28-53].

Comment: At this moment, the Colorado Rockies seem to be the most poorly run Baseball team in the Major Leagues. The team’s owner, the appropriately named Dick Monfort, seems completely clueless, his general managers (first Jeff Bridich 2015-2021 and then Bill Schmidt 2022-2023) seem pretty hapless, the players are basically useless (represented best by the ridiculously overpaid Kris Bryant), and the farm system is almost totally hopeless (rated as the worst or close to the worst farm system by most media outlets). It is probably even money that the Colorado Rockies will finish 2024 with the worst record in the Majors. In the second half of 2023 season, the Rockies finished with a worse record than either the Royals or Athletics (see below). But the Chicago White Sox, in total freefall, did manage to be even worse, finishing a horrid 27-54 to the Rockies 28-53. Maybe the only ray of sunshine for the Rockies is the fact that they hold the #3 draft pick in the 2024 Annual Amateur Baseball Player Underpayment Sweepstakes. Success Cycle Position: Lying on the Floor in a coma watching ancient “I’ve fallen and I can’t get up” commercials.

Unpublished Essay: If you could pick between 1) being happy despite being totally incompetent or 2) being miserable while being totally incompetent, which would you choose? The Colorado Rockies would be a lot more fun if they just embraced their inner self (i.e. hit home runs like crazy).

29. Kansas City Royals

2021 Record: 74-88; 2022 Record: 65-97; 2023 Record: 56-106 [First Half: 23-58; Second Half: 33-48].

Comment: The Kansas City Royals rebounded with a much better record in the second half of the 2023 season. There is some hope. In Bobby Witt, Jr., the team has a star player who may become a superstar. The KC Royals have some other young players who could mature into stars. They also seem to have, completely out of the blue, developed an ace pitcher in Cole Ragans [if his ligaments hold together]. However, KC has, other than Ragans, almost no decent pitching at all. If they can just come up with a few pitchers who can give them some decent bulk innings, the Royals may improve quite a bit in 2024. Interestingly, the KC Royals have been trying the opposite strategy of the Boston Red Sox. They have been using their top draft picks on pitchers (while the BoSox have been going after hitters). So far, it’s been a disaster for Kansas City. At this point, the Royals have just started down the yellow brick road back to contention. But there are promising signs. It will be interesting to see if the 2023 Royals’ disaster ends Zack Greinke’s career [after a brutal 2-15 season as a starter for shipwrecked KC]. It seems like a team could benefit from using Greinke as a reliever/pitching coach. Success Cycle Position: Lying on the Bottom but starting to crawl back to contention.

Unpublished Essay: Should a Baseball team attempt to establish a consistent identity over time (or should the Royals embrace their past to move into the future (an enlightened owner, the speed of artificial grass, and perhaps even the legacy of the Kansas City Monarchs)? [Companion essay to the Pittsburgh Pirates.]

30. Oakland Athletics

2021 Record: 86-76; 2022 Record: 60-102; 2023 Record: 50-112 [First half: 21-60; Second Half: 29-52].

Comment: The fix is in. For some reason, Major League Baseball really wants the Oakland franchise to move to Las Vegas. They want it so much that MLB has waived the normal relocation fee [around 300 million dollars or slightly more than 10 million for each of the other 29 teams]. Apparently the League envisions that the synergy between Baseball and Gambling will produce much more than this amount for each and every team. Somewhere in heaven [or possibly hell], Kennesaw Mountain Landis is spinning in his grave. On a team level, the Athletics are pulling off a good old fashioned tank [playing badly to collect high draft picks]. When they finally get to Vegas, the team may even be good again. Interestingly, the Players Union’s modifications of the Draft system to prevent teams being rewarded for tanking have, for now, probably hurt the Athletics the most. Despite having the worst record in 2023, they will pick 4th rather than 1st in 2024 (after dropping to 6th in 2023 after finishing in a three way tie for the 2nd worst record in 2022). Since Tanking was one of the many Moneyball strategies widely adopted and Moneyball was focused on Oakland, it almost feels appropriate. Success Cycle Position: On the bottom, trying to rebuild (or is there any Billy Beane magic left).

Unpublished Essay: Will the Oakland Athletics change their name to the Las Vegas Orphans? Many teams have relocated, but usually just once. Only the Athletics have relocated again, and again, and now yet again [this will be their third relocation]. Somewhere, the ghost of Connie Mack is moaning.

My Baseball Blog Reconsidered

November 27, 2023

Success is not final, failure is not fatal: it is the courage to continue that counts. Winston Churchill

It has been four months since I last posted on my blog.* The 2023 Baseball season has come and gone with the Texas Rangers winning the World Series over the Arizona Diamondbacks. My last post was way back in July 2023 and was basically a mid-season wrap-up. After that post, my normal life, among other things, got in the way of any more posting. The “other things” basically break down into the following 4 categories:

*Actually 4 months and 19 days but who is counting other than me?

1. Lack of Brevity

I can’t seem to write a short post or resist biting off more than I can either chew or swallow. To practice writing short posts, I came up with the idea of writing a short article about each Major League team. This ending up with me writing 30 long essays simultaneously. Not one of my brighter ideas. Instead of writing a bunch of short snappy posts, I got endlessly bogged down in 30 separate essays and couldn’t really complete anything. I did publish 4 posts of these “2023 Franchise Reviews” at a rate that would have finished the last post sometime in 2025 or so. The solution to this lack of brevity seems pretty obvious: no more planning a whole bunch of posts, just post about whatever random baseball stuff is currently interesting me.

2. Joe Posnanski

Of course, the problem with that is Joe Posnanski. I love Joe Posnanski. If I could write about Baseball as well as Joe Posnanski, I would be a happy man. I subscribe to his blog. I even bought his book (Baseball 100) and had him inscribe it for me (though I now completely regret that, and I should have just picked it up cheaply from Amazon or some other crummy bookseller). But I also hate Joe Posnanski (of course, hate is probably too strong a word. I feel that I would like him if we actually met).* Over the past year, there have been many times that I was inspired to write a short Baseball post. But then I open my Joe Posnanski email blog link to find: that Mr. Posnanski has just written a post about the same subject that is clearer, better written, and much funnier than anything I was going to produce. Maybe hate is not too strong a word. Once again, the solution is obvious. Just throw up posts about whatever I am currently digesting (about Baseball, I mean).

*Bill James and Joe Posnanski would probably be tied as my two favorite Baseball writers. But I have always felt that, if I actually met Bill James, the chances that I would like him are slim. But life is funny. Perhaps we would get along famously if stuck in an elevator together (or some other unlikely scenario) while I would not be able to stand Joe in the same situation. Who really knows?

3. Rabbit Holes

Yet another problem I have with writing posts for my Baseball Blog would just be “Rabbit Holes.” Recently I was working on the “2023 Franchise Review” for the Oakland Athletics. The A’s will be moving from their Oakland home to Las Vegas sometime in the near future. In the history of Baseball, there have been many other franchise shifts like this. However, the A’s are the ‘skipping stone’ of Baseball teams. This will be their third move. But I had a hard time really focusing on this A’s post. I went down one rabbit hole about recent Baseball retirements. I read a biography of the great Sam Crawford who played for the Detroit Tigers way back in the days of Ty Cobb (going down down multiple rabbit holes in the process). And those would just be the main Baseball rabbit holes while also trying to write about the A’s. Every time I get a SABR Bulletin in my inbox, there is, at the very least, some small rabbit hole awaiting. The solution to my third problem is pretty much exactly the same as the first two. I should just quickly write up my rabbit hole reveries.

4. Who Cares?

And finally there is one final and completely separate problem (from the first three). As far as I know, no one is reading any of this. My motivation to write a post for my Blog often takes second or third or fifty-first precedence to such things as: spending time with my children or simply goofing off. It’s hell to be retired and also quite sweet all at the same time. But I promise myself, if to absolutely no one else, to do better.

Now that I’ve finished with this exercise in one hand clapping, I’ll actually try to start my next actual Baseball Blog post. It will be a wrap-up of my previous 2023 Franchise Review series and my very last actual post: “2023 Mid-Season Review” way back on July 8th, 2023 [#32]. Hopefully, this post will come out both quickly and be published before the year ends. After that, I will just post about whatever random Baseball stuff catches my fancy.

JHR

2023 Mid-Season Review

July 8, 2023

If you find yourself stuck in the middle, there is only one way to go: forward. Richard Branson

This post will be a random collection of thoughts on each Major League team with the 2023 season at its halfway point. One of the beauties of Baseball is the ebb and flow of the game. Batters catch fire and cool off. Pitchers find a groove and pitch lights out… then lose it and get rocked. Teams leap forward and recede. Often there is a rhyme and reason for all this. Batters catch fire because they face pitchers that they hammer and cool off because they face pitchers that have their number. Teams go on winning streaks after playing weak opponents and then recede when the competition is stiffer.* Pitchers? Who the hell knows what is going on with pitchers. There is a beauty to this ebb and flow of the game that deepens your appreciation for it over time.

*McGraw’s 1916 New York Giants hold the Major League record for consecutive victories at 26. If recollection serves, all 26 games were played at home in the Polo Grounds of New York against teams from the bottom half of the standings.

1a. Atlanta Braves [54-27 after 81 games, exactly halfway through the season]: On pace to win 108 games in 2023 and with a set line-up for the foreseeable future, the Braves, already a good team, have changed into a juggernaut. They may win 100+ games for the next five (or more) years if the young core stays relatively uninjured and the pitching hold ups. The Atlanta Braves of the 2020s may make the great Braves of the 1990s teams look like total underachievers. They already have one World Series Championship under belt (2021). Already probably the best hitting team in the Major Leagues, the Atlanta Braves seem to be mutating into the most ferocious offensive team since the Cincinnati Big Red Machine of the 1970s. If their young players continue to develop along a normal growth path, they may be even better than that legendary team. There is no Atlanta Brave equivalent to the light hitting Cesar Geronimo of the 1975 and 1976 World Champion Reds. All these guys can all hit.

1b. Tampa Bay Rays [54-27]: Also on pace to win 108 games, the TB Rays are a different animal than the Braves. Other than Wander Franco, their best player, they have not locked up their core players. But the analytical processes that keep Tampa Bay fielding good teams year after year are still in place. The only difference this year is that the Rays are having good luck. Their core players are performing well and team is, for the most part, injury free. If you field a team that should win 90 games, year after year, the team will in some years win 100 games through good luck and in other years win just 80 games or so because of bad luck, injuries, and sub-par performance. You have to wonder how long Tampa Bay can keep doing this. Almost all the other Major League teams want to be like the Rays and the talent drain out of that front office has been ferocious. Of course, what most of these other “copycat” teams admire the most about Tampa is that they field a good team on the cheap. The smart part is much harder to duplicate.

3. Texas Rangers [49-32]: Doubling down, in life or in poker, usually doesn’t work. It goes against the theory of sunk costs (i.e. tossing more good money into bad investments while refusing to cut your losses). After finishing with a brutal 60 and 102 record in 2021, the Rangers thought that they were close to contending in 2022. Despite signing top free agents 2B Marcus Semien and SS Corey Seager to help put them over the top, they only improved to 68-94. Throwing caution to the winds, the Rangers then signed top free agent Jacob deGrom and three time World Champion manager Bruce Bochy to lead them in 2023. The decision to redouble their efforts has completely paid off for the Rangers (despite the fact that their decision to outbid everyone for deGrom is not looking good at all). It’s easy to root for a team that (after being severely beaten) picks itself up, dusts themselves off, and tries twice as hard.

4a. Arizona Diamondbacks [48-33]: For the 2023 season, the Major Leagues adopted a slew of rules to speed up the game. It was surmised that these rule changes would benefit the young and gifted and be to the detriment of the old and slow. With less time to think, quick reaction times are emphasized. The Arizona Diamondbacks would be shining example of this hypothesis. If they keep this pace up (so to speak), they will go from 74-88 to 96-66 (and into the play-offs). Much of this upsurge is due to the first full year of play by Corbin Carroll, already the team’s best player. If you squint your eyes, you can imagine Carroll (who is listed as being just 5 feet and 10 inches tall and only 165 pounds heavy, as one of the many great players from the olden days of baseball who were about his size. The average modern baseball player is just a littler bit smaller than the legendary Babe Ruth (who was considered a giant man during his time and nicknamed Big Fella among other things). With Jose Altuve, Carroll is living proof that the sheer size of modern players does not automatically make them better than those who played long ago.

4b. Baltimore Orioles [48-33]: The Orioles and the Nationals share a Regional Sports Network [RSN]. The Orioles are the majority partner in this RSN. This set-up is hardly by choice on the Nationals part. When the sad sack Montreal Expos moved to Washington in 2005, Peter Angelos, the Orioles’ owner and a famous lawyer, threatened litigation if he was not recompensated for the Nats invading his “territory.” Bud Selig, then the commissioner of Baseball, caved and gave away the Nationals TV rights to the Orioles RSN. He could do this because, at that time, the Expos were under control of Major League Baseball, not any individual owner. Faced with a delicate situation that needed serious negotiation, Selig simply gave away the whole farm. Incredibly, he gave away the Nationals RSN TV rights… in perpetuity! Why didn’t Selig just give them for 10, 20, 30, or 50 years (or Angelos’ lifetime). Why did he give them away forever, thus creating an endless problem. In any event, there is a on-going lawsuit by the Nationals against the Orioles. Recently, it was decided that the Nationals had short-changed (cheated) the Nationals out of 100 million for the years 2012-2016. Two more lawsuits (for 2017-2021 and 2022-2026) are underway. Bud Selig is rightly remembered for the greedy owner lockout of the players that canceled the 1994 World Series. But it is hardly the only black eye on his record. It is nice to see the Orioles have a good team again; but it is hard as hell to root for any team owned by the Angelos family.

6. Miami Marlins [47-34]: The Marlins have always seemed to be an incognito team, lacking any real identity. The team has been owned by a succession of pretty scummy owners. The early history of the team is almost bizzare. From the formation of the team in 1993 until 2003, the Miami Marlins had only two winning seasons, 1997 & 2003. In both years, the team won the World Series. From 2004 to 2009, the club treaded water, not really bad but not really good either. From 2010 to 2022, the Marlins had losing seasons every year except the covid aborted 2020 season (in which the team went 31 and 29 and surely would have finished with a losing record if the season had been completed). Perhaps, this year marks a resurgence to relativity for the club. In my opinion, they shouldn’t be taken seriously until they change their name to something better. How about Miami Knights (which could translated into Spanish as the Miami Caballeros)? All this being said, the Marlins will probably win their 3rd undeserved World Championship this year just out of spite.

7. Los Angeles Dodgers [46-35]: The Dodgers are right in line for a 90-95 win season despite an avalanche of injuries to their pitching staff. Considering the fact that they are rebooting their team (not going all out to win and giving a lot of rookies a chance to contribute), the Dodgers still appear to be headed for the playoffs. Given a year to break in their rookies, the Dodgers should be set for 2024. If they sign Shohei Ohtani as a free agent after this season, the Los Angeles Dodgers may well become the West Coast version of the Braves’ East Coast super-team. Obviously, the LA Dodgers have to be considered the front-runner for the services of Ohtani. And the team certainly seems to have positioned themselves to go after Ohtani. A recent poll revealed that most of the players in the Majors believe that Ohtani will end up with the LA Dodgers. So why does it feel like that the odds of Ohtani ending up with the Dodgers seem like slim and none?

8a. New York Yankees [45-36]: The Yankees are a collection of old and injury prone players. Lately, every Yankee season seems to turn into some sort of death march with the team trying to massage their creaky players over the finish line. The talent is there to claim a championship but the good health, and will power from the executive suite, is not. The patience shown Anthony Volpe, the team’s struggling rookie shortstop has been a little eye-opening. The Yankees have kept on playing Volpe through his slumps and calls for his demotion by all the media’s shouting heads. Volpe, given this long leash, seems to have finally turned the corner. The last time that the Yankees were patient with their rookies, the team was ultimately rewarded with their 1996 to 2000 dynasty. Of course, the one major difference this time is that Hal Steinbrenner is not George. Unlike his father, it is hard to picture Hal going balls to the walls to win a Championship.

8b. San Francisco Giants [45-36]: The Giants have been trying to play chess while the rest of the National League is playing checkers ever since Farhan Zaidi became the team’s general manager. In 2021, the Giants went 107-55 when all their moves came up aces. In 2022, the team ended up playing tic tac toe instead of chess and wound up 81-81. This year, it seems like Zaidi’s strategies are working once again, though not as well as in 2021 (which was a unique season). So what is San Francisco doing? Basically, the team seems to be trying each year to deepen and then absolutely maximize its Major League talent. All teams do this to some extent. But the Giants are all in. The Giants use analytics to try to always get the best pitcher/batter and batter/pitcher match-ups possible. They platoon. They try to have deep depth so they can rest their players. Their new age manager, Gabe Kapler, is a bodybuilder and mental guru. The Giants have the largest coaching staff in the game to ensure that the players have access to any help necessary. The team is built in a very liberal and progressive, one could even say granola way. In other words, the Giants perfectly represent the city of San Francisco itself.

10a. Houston Astros [44-37]: The bloom is off the rose for Houston. In 2022, their deep and excellent pitching staff led the Astros to victory in the World Series. Like many pitching staffs throughout baseball history, the Astros are now paying the price. Pitching, more than any other baseball act, wears and tears at its practitioners bodies. Pitching staffs that excel one season tend to fall apart, either slightly or completely, the next. The Astros waxed their way all the way to a 2022 World Championship. The Astro pitchers are now waning because of minor aches and major injuries. Of course, the disastrous signing of Jose Abreu to bolster the offense has not helped. This signing signaled a disturbing trend in team philosophy. They were investing in assets that were already fading. It seemed like a something that was going to be a problem somewhere down the line for Houston as Abreu got deeper into his 30s. No one (as far as I know) predicted Abreu’s immediate and complete face plant. It will be interesting to see if he will rebound at all in the second half of the 2023 season. The Houston Astros are old and the now Grim Reaper is at the door much earlier than expected.

10b. Los Angeles Angels [44-37]: Mike Trout is now clearly on the down slope of his career. Basically, he was the best player in Baseball from 2012 (his first full season) until 2019. His peak had two stages: 1) 2012 to 2016 and 2) 2017 to 2019. In the first stage, Trout was very much an everyday player (appearing in 157 to 159 games every year from 2013 to 2016). In 2017, he morphed into an even better player and would have hit well over 40 HRs (or even 50) every year if he could have just stayed healthy. His control of the strike zone peaked and he actually walked more than he struck out in 2017 and 2018. But during his 2017 to 2019 stage, he simply could not stay on the field for a full season, playing 114, 140, and then 134 games. Since his peak years ended in 2019, he has slowly and then suddenly lost control of the strike zone while being even more injury prone [just 36 games in 2021]. In 2022, he walked 56 times while striking out 139 times in just 119 games. In 2023, he has 45 BBs and 103 SOs in 81 games. With Mike Trout clearly in accelerated decline, the Angels will be even more brutal in 2024 if they do not resign Shohei Ohtani.

*Note: this was written on July 3, right before Trout broke the hamate bone in his left hand, pretty much wrecking the rest of 2023 for him.

10c. Toronto Blue Jays [44-37]: The Blue Jays may be the poster child for the nepotistic flavor of modern baseball. Many MLB teams feature the children of former Major Leaguers (or even grandchildren). But the Jays have the sons of two Hall of Famers (Craig Biggio and Vlad Guerrero) and the son of a player who once year lead the National League with 40 HRs, 128 RBIs, and a .620 SA (Dante Bichette Sr). Strangely enough, the son of the non Hall-of-Famer (Bo Bichette) probably will end up the best of the three. Cavan Biggio will end up the worst; and Vlad Guerrero Jr. seems likely to end up the second coming of Prince Fielder (also a son of a former Major League home run and RBI king, Cecil Fielder). Prince, of course, peaked at 23 (50 HRs) and 25 (141 RBIs). He was out of baseball at the age of 32.

13a. Cincinnati Reds [43-38]: Elly De La Cruz was listed near the top of most pre-season prospect lists. These prospect lists cited his lack of selectivity at the plate as his only drawback while noting that he probably had the highest potential ceiling of any prospect. Other than selectivity, these prospect lists talked about: 1) his absurdly quick bat; 2) his ridiculously strong throwing arm, 3) his otherworldly running speed; and 4) his light tower power. Now he is in the Major Leagues and it is hard to keep your eyes off him. He is all that was claimed and more. The fact that all these gifts are wrapped up in a 6 foot 5 inch/200 pound frame make it even better. Not since McGwire and Bonds in the 1990s has Baseball had two players who I would literally stop everything just to watch their at bats. But Ohtani and Cruz are even better than McGwire and Bonds (in a way) because their ridiculous gifts are much greater than just hitting home runs. If Cruz ever bulks up and keeps this bat speed (and gets much more selective), he could be Barry Bonds 2.0; but playing infield with an outrageous throwing arm. The possibilities are currently endless.

13b. Milwaukee Brewers [43-38]: It is nice to see that Christian Yelich has had a bit of a dead cat bounce. From 2013 to 2017, he was a very good outfielder. In 2018 and 2019, he suddenly changed into a MVP candidate, hitting 36 and then 44 HRs respectively. Of course, the year 2019 was the peak of the rabbit ball and, after 2019, the ball was deadened. But the rabbit ball simply cannot explain Yelich’s power explosion in 2018 & 2019 or batting collapse from 2020 to 2022 (14 HRs in 154 games for 2022). Yelich was bothered by many injuries during his collapse and apparently these bruises changed his swing. In 2023, Yelich has returned to his pre-MVP candidate good outfielder form. In fact, Yelich has been steadily improving as the 2023 season has progressed. If this continues, Christian Yelich will have his best season since his 2018-2019 peak. Cody Bellinger of the Cubs, whose career has oddly mirrored Yelich’s ups and downs, is also having a badly injured feline rebound too.

13c. Philadelphia Phillies [43-38]: The Phillies are one of the most entertaining Major League teams. General manager Dave Dombrowski collected a bunch of defensively challenged sluggers, best represented by Kyle Schwarber, to try to win a Championship. The team got all the way to the World Series before losing to the buzzsaw that was the 2023 Houston Astro’s pitching staff. This anti-modern analytics (i.e. Moneyball) strategy is quite interesting. Moneyball is all about quantifying values for every physical action on the baseball field, both offensively and defensively, and then finding those areas that are under-valued. Did Dombrowski find a Moneyball edge in Moneyball itself? In other words, did he figure out that Moneyball was quantifying some baseball values incorrectly and exploit them? Did he Moneyball the strategy of Moneyball? It certainly seems like he did.

16a. Boston Red Sox [40-41]: There are usually two different types of Baseball teams: Contenders and Pretenders. The contenders were teams actively trying to win the pennant… while the pretenders were not. The current Red Sox club seems to be a new hybrid: a pretending contender or contending pretender. Under this strategy, the team gathers together enough talented players that, if they all have good or great years, the club will suddenly become a surprise contender. If the talent base has injuries or off years, the team will wallow as a pretender. This strategy may have had its origin in the Red Sox’s 2013 and 2018 seasons. In 2013, the Red Sox, coming off a 69-93 record in 2012, put together a random collection of talent. These players all had good years and rampaged all the way through the season (97-65) to a very improbable World Series Championship. In 2014, the very same players collapsed, finishing 71-91. In 2018, a very good team (93-69 in 2017), coalesced and incredibly went 108-54 before winning another World Series. In 2019, they busted, ending up at 84-68. With the two World Series under their belt because of this boom or bust strategy, the Red Sox seem to have completely adopted it. Unfortunately it’s already apparent that 2023 will be another contending pretender year.

16b. Minnesota Twins [40-41]: There is an old joke that goes: What walks on four legs in its youth, two legs in its prime, and three legs in its old age. The answer, of course, is man (crawls as a baby, then walks normally, uses a cane in old age). But what if the baby never becomes a man? What if there is no prime and the baby goes straight to old age? There is a child development term to describe this lack of evolution: Failure to Thrive. For some reason, the Twins have a bunch of players who have failed to thrive (Byron Buxton, Miguel Sano, and Max Kepler in particular). Kepler would seem to be the poster child for this problem. All his analytics are good…. except that he continuously hits the ball hard on the ground. Launch angle? We don’t need no stinking launch angle. It’s been years now and no one has addressed it. I sincerely hope Max goes to the Dodgers or some other savvy organization before its too late.

18a. Cleveland Guardians [39-42]: It is interesting how some teams are able to keep a consistent identity over time. For instance, the NY Yankees have pretty much maintained their “Bronx Bombers” identity ever since they bought Babe Ruth from Boston. The Cleveland Indians, for the longest time (1901 to 1959), fielded consistently good, sometimes great, teams. In those 59 years, the club had 42 winning seasons and only 17 losing years [no .500 years]. From 1960 to 1993, the Indians were consistently mediocre. They were often terrible and sometimes good, but never contenders. Their constant also-ran status led to the Indian’s reputation as a perennial loser being memorialized in the movie Major League. In the 1990s, the Indians reemerged as a powerhouse with an amazing collection of sluggers (Albert Belle, Manny Ramirez, Juan Gonzalez, Jim Thome). Now, in a Jeckyll and Hyde twist, the Indians have been renamed the Guardians and are channeling the Deadball era of Baseball. It is amazing that any modern team could have a team with two regular outfielders that will not hit 10 home runs, or anywhere close to 10 home runs, in a season.

18b. Seattle Mariners [39-42]: The Seattle Mariners have had two all-time top 100 players start their careers with the club. First there was Ken Griffey. But Griffey only played half his career with the Mariners. He eventually forced his trade to his hometown team, the Cincinnati Reds. As soon as he joined the Reds, Griffey’s career went in a tailspin. Injuries and a lack of desire to stay in shape led to ineffectiveness. The Mariners dodged a bullet by letting Griffey go. The second all-time top 100 player was Alex Rodriguez. But Rodriguez did not even play half his career in Seattle. Once again, the Mariners dodged a bullet. Rodriguez did not turn into a pumpkin like Griffey. Through the use of steroids, Rodriguez was a great player for a long time after leaving Seattle. But the steroids led him down a dark and ugly path. Now the Mariners have another potential great player: Julio Rodriguez (though he probably not be an all-time top 100 player unless he improves quickly and then suddenly). Here’s to hoping that the second half of his career doesn’t die like Griffey’s long fade or twist in the wind like A-Rod’s syringe fueled nightmare.

18c. Pittsburgh Pirates [39-42]: In the 1970s, the Pirates had an identity that no team could probably get away with now. They were the blackest team in the Majors (i.e. African and Latin black players, not the color of their uniforms or something). Famously, they fielded the first all Black line-up in 1971. This was very much in contrast with the other Pennsylvania team (the Philadelphia Phillies) which had a blue-collar redneck (i.e. white) reputation. This identity peaked and culminated in the Willie Stargell led “We are Family” 1979 World Championship Pirates team. In 2022, the Tampa Bay Rays had the very first All-Latin player line-up on September 15 (which was Roberto Clemente day). Which all-something line-up will be next? All-White (by racist default), All Black, and All Latin have all now been done. When will the first All-Asian line-up happen? Perhaps when the Tokyo Giants join the Majors in 2055? But, more seriously, the Pirates have the #1 pick in the 2023 Major League draft. Can the team finally turn around its long recent history of simply being an incubator for other team’s stars and get an identity of it’s own again?

21. Chicago Cubs [38-43]: One year ago, the Chicago signed Seiya Suzuki out of Japan. Playing regularly in the Cubbies outfield, Suzuki has now struggled through one and a half years in the Major Leagues. This year, the Boston Red Sox signed Japanese outfielder Masataka Yoshida out of Japan. From 2019 to 2021, Suzuki hit for OPS marks of 1.018, .953, and 1.073 in Japan respectively. On the other hand, from 2020 to 2022, Yoshida had consecutive OPS marks of .966, .992, and 1.008 in Japan.* Comparatively, Yoshida hit for a slightly better BA (batting average) with greater plate discipline in Japan. But Seiya Suzuki had much greater power. So far, Yoshida has been a much better hitter in the Majors than Suzuki. Why is this so? Suzuki has had some injuries. But so has Yoshida. It may simply be mental. Yoshida seems to truly love playing in the Majors. He met his idol (Bryce Harper). It has been reported that Yoshida has planned to come over for years. Suzuki? It seems like his primary reason may have simply been the pay. For many years, Japanese pitchers have had more success than Japanese hitters in the Majors (except Ichiro & Hideki Matsui). Pitchers, by and large, are a confidant group. It may be that the largest part of coming to America for Japanese players is psychological rather than talent related.

*OPS combines two very disparate statistics: OBP (On Base Percentage) and SA (Slugging Percentage), but is a handy way of representing offensive production.

22. San Diego Padres [37-44]: In baseball, all things usually even out. At the end of the year, the great hitters and pitchers have compiled their stats. The players hitting .400 for half a year have been brought back to earth. Unless injuries have crippled them, player performance remains steady, advancing and receding with age. In other words, the Padres have too much talent to continue to wallow in the second division like they are now. But nothing is a given. Up until now, the Padre’s 2023 season has been beset by injuries and under-performance. There is no guarantee that it will turn around. But, in all likelihood, it will. If someone wants to bet you that the Pads will not improve upon their 37-44 first half record, you should probably take that bet.

23. New York Mets [36-45]: Yet another example of the fickleness of the Gods of Baseball. Almost everything went right for the Mets in 2022. Starting with the injury that sidelined their star closer (Edwin Diaz), most things have gone wrong for the Mets in 2023. Of course, pitching is a much more fickle talent than batting. After the 2022 season, the NY Mets had some pitching choices to make. They kept one of their aces, Max Scherzer. The Mets let their other ace, Jacob deGrom, go. They keep only Carlos Carrasco from their back end starting depth, letting Chris Bassitt & Taijuan Walker go. They kept their sixth and seventh starters, David Peterson & Tyler McGill, hoping both could step up. The Mets signed future Hall of Famer Jason Verlander to replace DeGrom and signed Japanese star Kodai Senga for backend depth. Realistically, they did not really make any mistakes. Perhaps the Mets could have tried harder to sign Bassitt and Walker to maintain their remarkable starting depth. But letting DeGrom go turned out to be a blessing as his rotator cuff soon blew out again. Like the Padres above, the tide has been against them. Will the tide turn for the Mets before the season ends? There is an awful lot of talent on this team. It’s more likely than unlikely.

24. Detroit Tigers [35-46]: It’s amazing that the Tigers continue to let Miguel Cabrera soak up at bats simply because they have to overpay him. Cabrera hasn’t been worth his salary since 2017. From 2017 to 2021, the argument could have been made that there was a (slim) chance that Cabrera had one last blast-from-the-past left in him. After all, Albert Pujols, after being just a pale shadow of his one-time greatness from 2017 to 2021, found the fountain of youth in 2022 and went out with an astonishing finishing kick. But Albert Pujols showed up for Spring Training in 2022 in the best shape that anyone had seen him in for years. Miguel Cabrera, who has been showing up with a double chin for many years, showed up for 2023 with a triple chin. The Tigers cannot be taken seriously until this man no longer plays for them (or they at least nail him to the bench and maybe pinch hit him every blue moon just for the fun of it).

25a. Chicago White Sox [34-47]: The hiring of the elderly Tony LaRussa to be the White Sox manager in 2021 seems to have completely derailed the White Sox organization. To be fair, LaRussa did lead the Pale Sox into the 2021 post season (where they were quickly eliminated). But 2022 was a disaster and the Sox, who looked like they could become a perennial contender, probably now should be torn down and rebuilt. However, it is good to see Luis Robert, the latest in a long line of Cuban sluggers, finally fulfill his 40 to 50 HR per season promise. This team seems to be living proof on how fast the sun can set on a contender.

25b. St. Louis Cardinals [34-47]: There seems to something gone wrong with the Cardinals organization. From 2000 to 2015 or so, there were indications that the Redbirds were a blend of the best of both the vintage traditional way of running a baseball team and the modern analytical approach of Moneyball. From 2003 to 2011, the Cards employed Jeff Luhnow as their nerd stats guy. He then left to run the Astros. In 2015, the Cardinals were investigated by the FBI for hacking into the databases of the Luhnow’s Astros. An analyst for the Cardinals, Chris Correa, went to jail. In 2017, Major League Baseball fined the team two million dollars and took away 2 draft picks for what happened. The reaction of the Cardinals to all this may have been to lean back into tradition and jettison the analytics. The current GM of the club, John Mozeliak comes from a traditional scouting background. The current field manager, Oliver Marmol, has gotten quite a bit of bad press for acting like an embarrass-the-player old-school manager. And the Cardinals have hemorrhaged talent in a series of horrible talent decisions (trades or releases of Randy Arozarena, Zac Gallen, Sandy Alcantara, Adolis Garcia, etc). It may be time for the consultants to come in and clean house.

27. Washington Nationals [33-48]: Since the Washington Nationals won the 2019 World Baseball Championship on the once strong right arm of Stephen Strasburg, their fate has pretty much paralleled the ruin of that appendage. Possibly the most interesting thing about this season for the Nationals will be the Major League Draft. In a way, the 2023 Major League Draft will be a very interesting echo of history. In 2009 & 2010, Washington had consecutive #1 draft picks. With these picks, the team choose Stephen Strasburg and Bryce Harper respectively. Rule changes have made it impossible for that to happen again [i.e. a team getting the #1 pick of the draft two years in a row]. But this year, Washington has the #2 draft pick in an incredibly loaded draft class in which the consensus #1 and #2 picks will be either a pitcher (Paul Skenes) or an outfielder (Dylan Crews). Which will the Nationals begin the rebuild with? This time the Nats have no choice. They will have to just take whoever is not picked by the Pirates (who hold the #1 pick).

28. Colorado Rockies [31-50]: The worst type of Baseball team to root for is one with a dreadful Major League team and a terrible farm system. It’s just a very hopeless feeling for a fan. The Rockies have one true former star on the roster, Kris Bryant, and he kind of symbolizes the whole team. At one time (2015 to 2017), Bryant looked like a future Hall of Famer. Now he is getting by on just the dregs of his talents and a bloated paycheck. The gloom that surrounds the Rockies even extends to the 2023 draft. In the deepest draft class in a long time, the Rockies don’t even get a top pick. They have the #9 choice, which is still good, but hardly what they need. They need a #1 or a #2.

29. Kansas City Royals [23-58]: Using the Pythagorean theorem to predict a team’s winning percentage, the KC Royals are nowhere near as bad a team as the doomed Oakland Athletics.* But their records are quite similar. Kansas City is a team in transition: out with the old, in with the new. Baseball is often like this, players coming and going like ships in the night. It will certainly be sad to see Zack Greinke, currently having what looks like his final season, go. By any standard, Greinke has been one of the most fascinating players of the last 20 years. Probably the most compelling reason to watch the Royals right now is the start of Bobby Witt, Junior’s career. For some reason (maybe the flowing hair), Witt brings to mind Robin Yount. Hopefully, for the Royals, Witt has a career as good as the former Milwaukee Brewer star and Hall of Famer.

*The formula is: (Runs scored squared) divided by (Runs scored squared +runs allowed squared).

30. Oakland Athletics [21-60]: On course to lose 120 games in 2023 (and tie the Major League record for losses in a single season), the Athletics have the worst record in the Major Leagues entirely on merit. But the team has also provided proof of the complete uniqueness of baseball. After beginning the season with a pitiful 12-50 record, Oakland won an amazing seven [7] straight games. In what other sport could a team this bad suddenly rip off 7 victories in a row? Since that streak, the Athletics have returned to form, immediately losing 8 games in row after their winning streak ended. Apparently this will be the Athletics last season in Oakland before they are relocated to Las Vegas. Here’s hoping they can go out of town taking down the New York Mets 1962 record of 120 losses.