Post #14

My 100 Greatest Baseball Players of All-Time List.

Be not afraid of greatness. Some are born great, some achieve greatness, and others have greatness thrust upon them.” William Shakespeare

March 11, 2022

The slang term “Bucket List”* [a list of things that one wants to do before they die] is derived from the slang term for dying: “Kicking the Bucket.” On my list of things to do before I depart this life has always been to figure out my own personal list of the 100 Greatest Baseball Players of All-Time. This post is the beginning of that undertaking. Hopefully, it will end with one more thing off my list. I will begin by discussing the history of “100 Greatest Baseball Player Lists.” Then I will lay out the ground rules for creating my own list. Of course, I do not promise to absolutely abide by these rules. You should never put on a straightjacket willingly. But, if I do break my own rules, I will hopefully have a good reason and even better explanation. After formulating the rules, I will finally get to the fun part: beginning to create the top 100 list itself in a future post.

*Could the Slang term of a Slang term accurately be called the Son of Slang?

The 1981 Ritter & Honig Glorious 100

Debating the relative greatness of baseball players is a pastime as old as the game itself. But making a list of exactly the 100 greatest players seems to be a somewhat more recent development. In the year 1981, Lawrence Ritter and Donald Honig published their book: “The 100 Greatest Baseball Players of All-Time.” This caused many other baseball writers to think to themselves: “I wish I had thought of that book title first.”* At that time, Ritter was already a very famous baseball author. In 1966, his baseball book: “The Glory of their Times” had climbed the best-seller lists. For his book, Ritter had traveled around and interviewed old baseball players. The resulting tome was a glorious exercise in baseball nostalgia. Some of it was even true. In the 1970s, Donald Honig picked up where Ritter left off. He wrote “Baseball when the Grass was Real” and several other books of baseball interviews. Then Honig convinced Ritter to collaborate with him to write the 100 Greatest Baseball Players of All-Time book. For this book, Honig and Ritter used no formal procedure to pick their 100 players. They simply rounded up the usual suspects and then threw in a few other guys too. The resulting list was met with some criticism, disbelief and a little derision. Ritter & Honig quickly reissued the book in 1986 to fix some of the more obvious issues.

*That very same year (1981), New York Sportswriter Maury Allen also published his own personal list of the 100 Greatest Baseball Players. Allen simply named his book: “The Baseball 100” and watched Ritter & Honig’s book steal the glory. No one ever asked Maury Allen to reissue his book.

One problem was that Ritter & Honig included some active players who were still in mid-career. The authors made the assumption that the careers of these players would continue on the same trajectory. Unfortunately, a whole bunch of these players (Steve Garvey, Dave Parker, George Foster, Jim Rice, and Fred Lynn) did not hold up their end of the bargain. They swerved off their career paths, ended up in various ditches or the tall grass beside the road, and never arrived at the destination. Another problem Ritter & Honig encountered was sharp criticism over the inclusion of some “shooting star” type players. These baseball meteors began their careers like future All-Time Greats (Pete Reiser, Herb Score, Joe Wood), but then their careers crashed and burned soon after reaching altitude. In the introduction to the book, Ritter & Honig anticipated this criticism. They claimed that players who could have been great deserved representation on their list too. To be blunt, this rationalization for including these players made no sense at all. The list was for the 100 All-Time Greatest Baseball Players, not for anyone who would have been on it with a little better luck. Yet another problem was the exclusion from the list of any player whose career was primarily in the 19th Century. Ritter and Honig did include Honus Wagner and Cy Young, whose careers bridged the centuries; but Cap Anson, arguably the greatest Player from the previous century, was absent. However, all these assorted problems paled beside the list’s two main dilemmas.

The Main Problems with the Glorious 100

First, Ritter & Honig did not include a single player whose career was spent mostly or totally in the Negro Leagues. There was no Satchel Paige, no Josh Gibson, on the list. Considering that the Baseball Hall of Fame had just spent the 1970s electing a symbolic team of Negro Leaguers, this omission seemed strange. Ritter & Honig did put an explanation for this odd oversight in the book’s introduction. They explained that they had excluded the Greatest of the Negro League Players because: “we are unable to document what we know to be true.” Considering that their list was not even ranked (which would have supported a lack of statistics to accurately rate argument), this statement was basically nonsensical. They had included Players on the list for what they may have accomplished in a perfect world. To exclude the Negro League Players after that was ridiculous. Ritter & Honig could have included both Paige and Gibson to represent the Negro Leaguers. They could have just gone crazy (for that time) and included the entire 1970s Baseball Hall of Fame Negro League “dream team” as a protest against discrimination. Instead, Ritter & Honig just dropkicked the issue. They did not include a token Negro Leaguer. They did not bend over backwards to right a wrong. To their discredit, Ritter & Honig simply ignored the Negro League Players other than their single paragraph of explanation for this neglect. But even this was still not the worst misjudgment in the Ritter & Honig 100 Greatest Baseball Players book.

For some reason, they included Hal Chase on their list. In his defense, Chase was often considered one of the best first baseman of all time while he was playing. On the other hand, he was also involved in basically every gambling scandal that plagued Major League Baseball during the 1910s. In 1919, this ongoing corruption resulted in gamblers bribing players of the Chicago White Sox to throw the World Series. Although he was not directly involved in the worst Baseball Scandal of All-Time, Chase was able to profit handsomely from it through insider information from his gambling associates. In the aftermath of this crime, he was permanently banned from Baseball for being a crook and all-around bad influence. While he was a good but not great player, Chase’s credentials for inclusion on any 100 Greatest Baseball Players of All-Time list are slim and non-existent. To be fair, Shoeless Joe Jackson, a member of the banned 1919 Black Sox, was also on the Ritter & Honig list. But the difference between Jackson and Chase is the difference between a man who fell into the cesspool and the person who created and filled the septic tank. Jackson was not a career criminal. He was just a gullible man too weak to resist the peer pressure that cost him the twilight of his career and his reputation. Jackson was also, without any doubt, statistically over-qualified to be on any list of the 100 Greatest Baseball Players. Chase was not. Why Ritter & Honig chose to include the underqualified and completely corrupt Hal Chase on their top 100 list remains a mystery.

The Glorious 100 Get Revised

In 1986, when they revised their 100 Greatest Baseball Players book, Ritter & Honig removed and replaced seven players. The seven players deleted from their list were the doomed Hal Chase (of course), Chief Bender, Jimmy Collins, George Foster, Fred Lynn, Tony Oliva, and Dave Parker. They added seven of the best players left out of the first printing: Ferguson Jenkins, Eddie Mathews, Nolan Ryan, Harmon Killebrew, Willie McCovey, Willie Stargell, and (arguably) Rollie Fingers. Ritter & Honig did not remove Herb Score, Pete Reiser, or Joe Wood. You had to admire them for sticking to their principles, no matter how odd or wrong-headed. Of course, all this criticism may make it seem like the Ritter & Honig list of the Greatest 100 Baseball Players is worthless. However, even considering their lack of methodology, it should be admitted that Ritter & Honig actually did a pretty good job considering the limitations of the time and the form. They pretty much got all of the top 50 Baseball Players of All-Time on their list. It only got strangely squiggly down near the bottom. The book was actually a lot of fun and it started a very interesting conversation: “Who were the actual 100 Greatest Baseball Players of All-Time?”

The 1986 Bill James Historical Abstract List

In 1977, the Ubiquitous Bill James [UBJ] published his first annual “Baseball Abstract” book. James used these annual books to analyze baseball statistics from the previous season in a scientific manner. He would also throw in some interesting essays about players, teams, and baseball in general. He continues to write about Baseball today and is certainly the most famous Baseball writer alive (and probably dead too). I usually like to refer to him as the Ubiquitous Bill James [UBJ]; because, if you think up an interesting subject for a baseball discussion, you soon find out that he has already written a book, an essay, or an article about it. But his career started with his annual abstracts. In 1986, UBJ took the obvious next step and wrote: The Bill James Historical Abstract of Baseball. In this book, UBJ applied his scientific method of analyzing Baseball across the entire breadth of its history. A good part of the Historical Abstract rates the best players at each individual baseball position. At the end of this positional rating section, UBJ included his list: The 100 Greatest Players of this Century. Because he was ranking these 100 players by scientific and statistical methods, UBJ expressed his regrets that he could not include 19th Century or Negro League players because he felt that too much evidence was missing to properly evaluate these two groups. Even with this restriction, the adoption of a methodology to create the list was a great improvement over the seat of the pants approach taken by Ritter & Honig.

In his 1986 Historical Abstract, UBJ asked a very interesting question that has pretty much never been raised again: When you inquire who are the Greatest Baseball Players, do you mean by career value or by peak value? For instance, Don Sutton won 324 games in the Major Leagues and Sandy Koufax won just 165 games. Both played primarily for the Dodgers (Koufax, of course, played only for the Dodgers). By games won, Sutton would seem to have had twice the career that Koufax had. But the kicker to all this is that Koufax, at his peak, was a much much greater pitcher than Sutton. Koufax had four straight years (1963-1966) that tower over any year from Sutton’s career like Mount Everest over some random hilltop. Who had the better career? Were Sutton’s twenty years of solid pitching worth more than four years from the “Left Arm of God” (Koufax’s actual nickname)? To answer this puzzle, UBJ created two separate lists of the 100 Greatest Baseball Players. One list for peak value and then one for career value. However, there was a significant issue with peak value. How do you define a Baseball Player’s peak value? Is it simply his best season? Or is it his best two or three or four or more years? Do his peak seasons need to be consecutive? If not continuous, how many years apart can they be? What if they are a decade apart? With so many possible peak season(s) definitions, the inevitable conclusion was reached. Career value should be used to make 100 Greatest Baseball Player lists. Ultimately, UBJ’s initial attempt at creating his top 100 Baseball Player list had all the usual problems of any first draft: it created more questions than answers.

The 1998 Sporting News 100

In 1998, the Sporting News decided to release its own 100 Greatest Baseball Players list. Founded in 1886, the Sporting News [TSN] outlasted its two early rivals, the New York Clipper and the Sporting Life newspapers, to become, by the 1920s, the only remaining national baseball newspaper. TSN styled itself as the “Bible of Baseball.” For many years, the annual Sporting News Baseball Guides and Registers were the primary source for all baseball statistics. But, by 1998, TSN was on its last legs. The cable channel ESPN had replaced TSN as the primary source of news about baseball. Within a decade, TSN would be pretty much washed away by the tides of time. But before they went, TSN gathered twelve of their long-term Baseball editors to vote for the Greatest Baseball Players of All-Time. In its own way, the list was a fitting coda to the newspaper that had covered Baseball for well over a century. Because of its selection process, the TSN 100 Greatest Baseball Players list was basically a popularity contest. In many respects, the 1998 TSN list could be labeled the “Baseball Establishment” view of the 100 Greatest Baseball Players of All-Time. Despite this, it is actually not a bad list at all. It is notable for including some of the Star Players from the Negro Leagues. Considering that TSN had always been a very conservative voice in the Baseball World and originally opposed integration, it was nice that they exited stage right with a note of grace. Their list is a testament to how the 100 Greatest Baseball Players of All-Time were popularly viewed at the end of the 20th Century.

The 2001 New Bill James Historical Abstract List

In 2001, the Ubiquitous Bill James [UBJ] published his: “The New Bill James Historical Abstract.” Despite the title, UBJ had almost completely rewritten his 1986 book. In between versions, James had developed new methods to rate players, in particular his Win Shares [WS] formula. Using his new equations, UBJ revamped his 100 Greatest Baseball Player list. At the very top of the list, nothing had changed. Babe Ruth was still rated at number one and the great Honus Wagner at number two. Some of the more extreme positions from his earlier list were moderated (for example, the rankings of Rogers Hornsby and Nap Lajoie rose). Most importantly, Bill James, to his credit, became the first baseball writer or historian to try to rank Negro League Players in their actual places rather than just as token inclusions. UBJ placed Oscar Charleston at #4 and Josh Gibson at #9. All in all, James placed twelve players whose careers had been pretty much completely obscured by the Color Line in his top 100. His reasoning for doing this was completely logical. He also admitted that he felt he may have been too conservative. UBJ even listed several players from the Negro Leagues whose exclusion from the list troubled him. At that time (now 20 years ago), almost all of the statistics that are presently available for the Negro Leagues were non-existent. His inclusion of all the Negro Leaguers in his list looks prescient today. UBJ’s 100 Greatest Baseball Players list from his 2001 Historical Abstract was a vast improvement over his 1986 list. In my opinion, it was a good way to start the 21st Century.

The 2021 Joe Posninski’s Baseball 100

In 2021, Joe Posnanski published his list of Baseball’s 100 greatest players. He first wrote this list for the internet website: “The Athletic.” Posnanski wrote an essay for each individual Baseball Player on his top 100 list. Then the website published them, counting down from 100 to 1, until they were all done. After the website finished posting his work, he had all 100 essays collected in book form titled: “The Baseball 100.” To create his list, Posnanski used the statistical formula “Wins Above Replacement” [WAR] to help build the basic structure of the list. But then he moved the Players around like chess pieces to fit into his own idiosyncratic fancies. Willie Mays was rated number one over Babe Ruth to emphasize that baseball post-integration was harder than pre-integration. There were two number 20s but no number 19 in condemnation of the 1919 Black Sox Scandal. Jackie Robinson was listed at #42 for his uniform number. Joe DiMaggio was listed at #56 for his hitting streak. Sadaharu Oh, basically the Japanese Babe Ruth, made the list. In other words, it was a good fun list. Posnanski, who wrote the biography of Negro League legend “Buck” O’Neil, did not leave the Negro League Players out. He included nine Negro League Players on his list. In many ways, Posnanski’s list was an updating of the Bill James list from 2001. One way of looking at this list would be to consider it the anti-Establishment or opposition view of Baseball history. Almost like a counterpoint, the website ESPN, representing the ‘Establishment’ view of the history of Baseball would soon formulate their own list.

The 2022 ESPN Greatest 100 Baseball Players of All Time List

In February of 2022, ESPN published on their website their own 100 Greatest Baseball Player list. Following in the footsteps of 1998 Sporting News list, this list employed a number of ‘baseball experts’ to sift through the potential 100 Greatest Baseball Players of All-Time. Basically these experts voted in a series of face-offs between individual players until the list was winnowed down from number 100 to number 1 (Babe Ruth). This process, consisting of hundreds or perhaps thousands of votes, actually seems to be very over-complicated. It is a procedure that seems guaranteed to deliver all the problems of groupthink and none of the advantages of a coherent methodology. In other words, it is a good example of typical establishment consensus. In the old Indian Fable of the six blind men and the elephant, each blind man thinks he knows what he is touching (a snake, spear, fan, tree, wall and rope). But none know that it is actually an elephant. This is the problem of such a consensus. Maybe they all get together and guess that it is an elephant. Or maybe their guess is totally off-base. As an establishment example of a 100 Greatest Baseball Players of All-Time list, this is a perfectly good follow-up to the 1998 Sporting News list. As an actual list of the 100 Greatest Baseball Players of All-Time, it veers off the path into the gutters pretty quickly.

My Own Greatest 100 Baseball Players of All-Time List

On the theory that anyone can do it, I have decided to compile my own list of the Greatest 100 Baseball Players of All-Time. Considering how many top 100 Baseball Player lists have already been published, the obvious question would be: Why do another one? For one thing, my list should hopefully have a much better representation and also ranking of Blackball Players. With the available information now, Players who toiled behind the “Color Line” can be listed in a reasonable approximation of their actual career value [Blackball is used rather than Negro Leagues for the simple reason that those Leagues don’t cover the entire era of segregation]. To truly look at the Players who didn’t get a chance due to the color of their skin, you must go all the way back to 1876 when Bud Fowler began lacing up his cleats. You cannot just go back to 1920 when the great Andrew ‘Rube’ Foster founded the first Negro Major League. Hopefully, in the end, my Greatest 100 Baseball Players of All-Time list will be closer than any previous list to the actual truth. Of course, that is a tall order and perhaps it will end up just being another person’s opinion. However, even if my list is no better than anyone’s else, there may still be worth value in its compilation. It is possible to sift diamonds out of the sand if you are in the right place.

My Process for the List

In the process of creating my own top 100 list, I also intend to simultaneously create three other lists. The first list will be the top 100 Baseball Players from the pre-integration Blackball teams. The second list will rank the 100 Greatest Baseball Players from Organized Baseball (both the Major and Minor Leagues) before integration. The 3rd list will be the 100 Greatest Baseball Players from after integration. Next the first two lists will be combined, to create a single pre-integration list. Finally, the pre-integration and post-integration lists will be combined to actually produce a combined 100 Greatest Baseball Players of All-Time list. My final 100 Greatest Baseball Players of All-Time list will try to alternate Players chosen from the pre-integration list [from 1871 to 1945] and Players from the post-integration list [1946-2020]. In other words, I will try to pick a Player from the 75 years before baseball was finally integrated to match each Player chosen from the 75 years after baseball desegregated. Of course, this will simply be a guideline. The main guideline will always be to follow the evidence where it leads.

If this procedure works correctly, there will be about 50 Baseball Players from before integration [1871-1945] and 50 Baseball Players from after integration [1946- 2020] on the final list. In other words, there will be around 50 Players total from Organized White Baseball and Independent Black Baseball before integration on the final list. However, it obviously cannot be an exact 50-50 split between these two classes of pre-integration Players. Organized White Baseball was up and running years before the Negro Leagues. It took a little while for the African-American contingent to get coordinated and especially get all their talent out of the Deep South. But I believe that my final list will probably have about 20 Blackball Players from before integration on it. None of the previous Greatest 100 Baseball Player lists already published have ever included that many Blackball Players on it. Usually, the inclusion of Players from behind the Color Line has been haphazard at best. I am certain, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that Bullet Rogan and Jud Wilson belong on any 100 Greatest Baseball Players of All-Time list (especially Rogan). But the only list that ever included Rogan was Joe Posnanski’s The Baseball 100, which placed him at number 94. Any really serious evaluation of Wilber (Bullet) Rogan will probably conclude that he is one of the 50 Greatest Players of All-Time at the very least. It goes without saying that Rogan should be in a top 100.

Why do I conclude that any list of the 100 Best Baseball Players should have about 20 Blackball Players on it? If 50% of all the Hall of Fame Players right after integration came from the Negro Leagues, then that percentage is most probably accurate right before integration too. But was it always this 50%? I believe the answer to that question is: “No, it reached 50% between 1910 and 1920.” If that is true, and it also steadily increased from 0% when professional Baseball began in 1871, then simple math concludes that about 20 of the 50 Hall of Fame Caliber Players from before integration should have come from behind the “Color Line.” It could be claimed that this is over-compensating to correct an ancient wrong. But I don’t believe it to be so. The pursuit of justice may make amends for past transgressions, but the pursuit of truth should not. My list of the 100 Greatest Baseball Players will not discriminate against or for any class of Players, if I can help it. But it is an indisputable fact that, because of prejudice and/or lack of data (especially statistical information), the Players from Blackball have been under-represented in the past.

Pre-Integration versus Post-Integration Players

Of course, some people may also take issue with the 50-50 split between pre-integration and post-integration Players. It is often argued that the caliber of Major League Baseball being played right now is far superior to the any brand of Baseball that was played many years ago. Modern pitchers boast that they would easily strike out Babe Ruth now. The Modern Players are bigger, faster, stronger…. we can rebuild them. No wait, that’s the introduction to the old TV show The Six Million Dollar Man. I believe that Modern Baseball gets way too much credit for being better than the Baseball played long ago. Baseball is the one sport that does not automatically reward physical size. I don’t believe that the talent level of Baseball rises quite as steeply over time as is claimed by some. In fact, I do not believe that it has always gone up. I do believe that George Ruth, if you could send him through a time warp to the present day, would still be an absolute phenomenon. However, this is my personal opinion and the proof is harder to find than an honest man in politics.

Strangely, the 100 Greatest Baseball Players of All-Time list that I still think is the best ever done was UBJ’s 2000 list. Despite the fact that it is now over 20 years old, UBJ used a consistent methodology to rank all the Major League Players. Then, through applied logic, UBJ estimated just how many Blackball Players should also be included. He proceeded to place them in the list where he felt they fit best. Twenty years plus later, there is a lot more information on the Negro Leagues and those placements can be evaluated. To say the least, UBJ did an amazing job. My list will depart from UBJ’s list in one significant way. I will try to look at the totality of the Player’s career, not just rank them completely by a statistical formula. For instance, I believe that Joe DiMaggio was actually a greater player than Stan Musial (virtually every lists rank Musial over DiMaggio). Perhaps I am wrong. But I will explain why when I rank the Players. In one other way, the delivery of my list will be different from those lists that came before it. Most published lists start at 100 and count up to number one. Joe Posnanski published his list as a countdown from 1 to 100. My list will start at Numero Uno and then count the Players all the way down to 100. And If I ever get to 100, I may just continue.

Just for the Fun of it:

The following are each of the 100 Greatest Baseball Players of All-Time lists discussed in this post [with comments about each one afterwards]:

RITTER & HONIG [1981]: Babe Ruth [183.1], Walter Johnson [164.8], Cy Young [163.6], Willie Mays [156.1], Ty Cobb [151.5], Henry Aaron [143.1], Tris Speaker [134.7], Honus Wagner [130.8], Stan Musial [128.7], Rogers Hornsby [127.3], Eddie Collins [124.4], Ted Williams [122.1], Pete, Alexander [119.0], Lou Gehrig [113.7], Mel Ott [110.9], Mickey Mantle [110.2], Tom Seaver [109.9], Frank Robinson [107.2], Nap Lajoie [106.9], Mike Schmidt [106.9], Lefty Grove [106.8], Christy Mathewson [106.5], Joe Morgan [100.4], Warren Spahn [100.1], Carl Yastrzemski [96.5], Roberto Clemente [94.8], Jimmie Foxx [93.1], Eddie Plank [90.9], Steve Carlton [90.2], Bob Gibson [89.1], George Brett [88.6], Robin Roberts [86.1], Charlie Gehringer [84.7], Rod Carew [81.2], Pete Rose [79.6], Joe DiMaggio [79.2], Brooks Robinson [78.4], Arky Vaughan [78.0], Luke Appling [77.6], Sam Crawford [75.3], Johnny Bench [75.1], Paul Waner [74.7], Harry Heilman [72.5], Johnny Mize [70.6], Ted Lyons [70.5], Carl Hubbell [68.5], Jim Palmer [68.5], Al Simmons [68.1], Ernie Banks [67.7], Goose Goslin [66.4], Duke Snider [65.9], Ed Walsh [65.9], Jackie Robinson [63.9], Bob Feller [63.5], Juan Marichal [62.9], Frank Baker [62.8], Joe Jackson [62.2], Zack Wheat [60.5], Dazzy Vance [60.2], Wes Ferrell [60.1], Yogi Berra [59.6], Joe McGinnity [59.0], Rube Waddell [58.4], George Sisler [57.1], Whitey Ford [57.0], Bill Dickey [56.5], Bill Terry [56.5], Gabby Hartnett [55.9], Luis Aparicio [55.8], Hank Greenberg [55.5], Joe Sewell [54.7], Joe Medwick [54.6], Jimmy Collins [53.3], Burleigh Grimes [52.8], Fred Lynn [50.2], Mickey Cochrane [49.9], Sandy Koufax [48.9], Chief Bender [47.9], Kiki Cuyler [47.9], Jim Rice [47.7], Dizzy Dean [46.2], Herb Pennock [45.6], Edd Roush [45.6], Addie Joss [45.4], George Foster [44.2], Tony Oliva [43.0], Roy Campanella [41.7], Dave Parker [40.1], Joe Wood [40.0], Pie Traynor [38.5], Steve Garvey [38.1], Ernie Lombardi [37.9], Ross Youngs [32.7], Chick Hafey [31.2], Pete Reiser [24.6], Hal Chase [23.0], and Herb Score [13.4].

Ritter & Honig did not rank their players from 1 to 100 in their book. They are listed above by their modern WAR [Wins Above Replacement] statistic.* Despite all the criticism, this is not really a bad list at all. You could even claim that the truly idiosyncratic choices [Score, Chase, Reiser, Garvey, et al] simply give it some extra flavor. All in all, their list certainly serves as a good starting point for the discussion. Although not included in this review, I would like to briefly discuss another list of the Greatest 100 Baseball Players. In 1981, the same year that Ritter & Honig released their book, longtime New York City sportswriter Maury Allen published his book “Baseball’s 100: A Personal Ranking of the Best Players in Baseball History.” Other than verifying the old saying that great ideas often emerge simultaneously, Maury Allen’s book is basically forgotten. But it is an interesting book. It has an unmistakable New York bias. There is no process or methodology used to rank the players other than personal opinion. The hook used to publicize the book was that Babe Ruth was not number one. Allen rates Ruth #3 after Willie Mays and Henry Aaron. Allen explains that he believes that Mays and Aaron, because they played in the integrated Majors faced a greater level of competition than George Herman Ruth. In other words, Allen makes a time line argument. No list of the Greatest 100 Baseball Players of All-Time can get around the problems of measuring the quality of play over time. One of the objectives of my own top 100 list will be to understand, if not wrestle with, the Time line of Baseball.

*WAR [Wins Above Replacement] Statistic from Baseball Reference website.

BILL JAMES [1986]:* 1) Babe Ruth [1], 2) Honus Wagner [2], 3) Lefty Grove [4], 4) Stan Musial [9], 5) Henry Aaron [30], 6) Ty Cobb [11], 7) Lou Gehrig [6], 8) Joe DiMaggio [14], 9) Willie Mays [12], 10) Ted Williams [10], 11) Warren Spahn [NL], 12) Walter Johnson [7], 13) Mike Schmidt [16], 14) Cy Young [NL], 15) Eddie Collins [48], 16) Yogi Berra [40], 17) Christy Mathewson [13], 18) Tris Speaker [21], 19) Mickey Mantle [3], 20) Jimmie Foxx [19], 21) Joe Morgan [8], 22) Pete Rose [97], 23) Frank Robinson [33], 24) Mel Ott [28], 25) Tom Seaver [36], 26) Carl Yastrzemski [35], 27) Pete Alexander [43], 28) Johnny Bench [31], 29) Brooks Robinson [49], 30) Willie McCovey [50], 31) Hank Greenberg [NL], 32) Bob Feller [32], 33) Goose Goslin [64], 34) Luke Appling [83], 35) Jim Palmer [NL], 36) Joe Cronin [66], 37) Harmon Killebrew [37], 38) Rollie Fingers [HM], 39) Steve Carlton [41], 40) Ernie Banks [17], 41) Mickey Cochrane [18], 42) Rogers Hornsby [29], 43) Johnny Mize [56], 44) Al Kaline [100t], 45) Carl Hubbell [27], 46) Juan Marichal [34], 47) Paul Waner [63], 48) Whitey Ford [88], 49) Bob Gibson [57], 50) Charlie Gehringer [80], 51) Zack Wheat [NL], 52) Reggie Jackson [61], 53) Gaylord Perry [NL], 54) Gabby Hartnett [73], 55) Jimmy Collins [82], 56) Hoyt Wilhelm [NL], 57) Robin Roberts [55], 58) Lou Boudreau [74], 59) Rod Carew [68], 60) Bill Terry [99], 61) Mordecai Brown [77], 62) Sam Crawford [NL], 63) Ron Santo [NL], 64) Bill Dickey [100t], 65) Roberto Clemente [58], 66) Goose Gossage [70], 67) Dick Allen [92], 68) Eddie Plank [NL], 69) Early Wynn [NL], 70) Fred Clarke [67], 71) Bobby Wallace [NL], 72) Sandy Koufax [5], 73) Billy Williams [HM], 74) George Sisler [38], 75) Stan Hack [NL], 76) Frankie Frisch [NL], 77) Ernie Lombardi [NL], 78) Don Sutton [NL], 79) Al Simmons [90], 80) Ferguson Jenkins [NL], 81) Luis Aparicio [NL], 82) Roy Campanella [15], 83) Duke Snider [44], 84) Joe Medwick [86], 85) Bruce Sutter [24], 86) Jackie Robinson [20], 87) Jim Kaat [NL], 88) Arky Vaughan [52], 89) Carlton Fisk [94], 90) Ken Boyer [NL], 91) Willie Stargell [89], 92) Phil Niekro [NL], 93) Enos Slaughter [NL], 94) Red Ruffing [NL], 95) Joe Jackson [42], 95) George Brett [47], 97) Lou Brock [NL], 98) Max Carey [NL], 99) Ted Lyons [NL], 100) Bob Johnson [NL].

* Bill James provided two lists, career and peak, of the 100 Greatest Baseball Players of the 20th Century in his book. The career list is provided from 1-100 above. After their name, the Player’s peak rank is given in parentheses []. If the peak rank of the Player is listed as [NL] that means their peak value was [Not Listed]. UBJ listed the 100th peak value as a 3-way tie [100t] between Al Kaline, Dave Winfield, and Bill Dickey. He also listed eight other player’s peak values as Honorable Mention [HM].

There are 31 Players listed on the Bill James top 100 peak values list that are not on his top 100 career value list: 20) Dizzy Dean, 21) Ralph Kiner, 25) Eddie Mathews, 26) Denny McLain, 39) Dazzy Vance, 45) Robin Yount, 46) Charlie Keller, 51) Vida Blue, 53) Gary Carter, 54) Nap Lajoie, 59) Jim Rice, 60) Ron Guidry, 62) Frank Baker, 65) Wes Ferrell, 69) Joe Wood, 71) Al Rosen, 72) Johnny Evers, 75) Frank Chance, 76) Lefty Gomez, 78) Jimmy Collins, 79) Ray Chapman, 81) Thurman Munson, 84) Ed Walsh, 85) Larry Doby, 87) Ted Kluszewski, 91) Chuck Klein, 93) Dan Quisenberry, 95) Jack Coombs, 96) Hal Newhouser, 98) Glenn Wright, plus 100t) Dave Winfield who is tied with Al Kaline (#44 career) and Bill Dickey (#64 career) at number 100 for peak value. UBJ also listed 8 Honorable Mentions for peak value. Two are listed in the top 100 career value list, Rollie Fingers at #38 and Billy Williams at #73. The six players also given Honorable Mention are: Eddie Cicotte, Dick Radatz, Hack Wilson, Harlond Clift, Larry Doyle, and Joe Gordon. The highest rated player on the career list who does not appear on the peak list is Warren Spahn at number 11.

The 1986 Bill James list is, in its own way, as idiosyncratic as Ritter & Honig’s list. Maybe even more so. James values some players highly to make a point (Honus Wagner, Yogi Berra, Joe Morgan). On the other hand, UBJ denigrates and devalues Dick Allen and Rogers Hornsby for having difficult personalities. Some ratings simply make no sense. Hank Greenberg, number 31 on the career list, does not appear on the peak list at all. Nap Lajoie, number 54 on the peak list, does not appear on the career list at all. The reliever Rollie Fingers [#37] is rated above Steve Carlton [#38] and many other starting pitchers. Despite his insistence on analysis by objective evidence, this first attempt by UBJ at a 100 Greatest Baseball Players of All-Time list seems more personal than scientific. To put it frankly, many of the ratings seem strange if not downright sloppy [in one of the oddest anomalies, Eddie Mathews is ranked 26th for peak value but is not even listed on the career list] . The whole section is tacked on at the end of the Player Ratings sections. Perhaps it was simply an afterthought.

SPORTING NEWS [1998]: 1) Babe Ruth, 2) Willie Mays, 3) Ty Cobb, 4) Walter Johnson, 5) Hank Aaron, 6) Lou Gehrig, 7) Christy Mathewson, 8) Ted Williams, 9) Rogers Hornsby, 10) Stan Musial, 11) Joe DiMaggio, 12) Pete Alexander, 13) Honus Wagner, 14) Cy Young, 15) Jimmie Foxx, 16) Johnny Bench, 17) Mickey Mantle, 18) Josh Gibson, 19) Satchel Paige, 20) Roberto Clemente, 21) Warren Spahn, 22) Frank Robinson, 23) Lefty Grove, 24) Eddie Collins, 25) Pete Rose, 26) Sandy Koufax, 27) Tris Speaker, 28) Mike Schmidt, 29) Nap Lajoie, 30) Steve Carlton, 31) Bob Gibson, 32) Tom Seaver, 33) George Sisler, 34) Barry Bonds, 35) Joe Jackson, 36) Bob Feller, 37) Hank Greenberg, 38) Ernie Banks, 39) Greg Maddux, 40) Yogi Berra, 41) Nolan Ryan, 42) Mel Ott, 43) Al Simmons, 44) Jackie Robinson, 45) Carl Hubbell, 46) Charlie Gehringer, 47) Buck Leonard, 48) Reggie Jackson, 49) Tony Gwynn, 50) Roy Campanella, 51) Rickey Henderson, 52) Whitey Ford, 53) Roger Clemens, 54) Harry Heilmann, 55) George Brett, 56) Willie McCovey, 57) Bill Dickey, 58) Lou Brock, 59) Bill Terry, 60) Joe Morgan, 61) Rod Carew, 62) Paul Waner, 63) Eddie Mathews, 64) Jim Palmer, 65) Mickey Cochrane, 66) Cool Papa Bell, 67) Oscar Charleston, 68) Eddie Plank, 69) Harmon Killebrew, 70) Pie Traynor, 71) Juan Marichal, 72) Carl Yastrzemski, 73) Lefty Gomez, 74) Robin Roberts, 75) Willie Keeler, 76) Al Kaline, 77) Eddie Murray, 78) Cal Ripken Jr., 79) Joe Medwick, 80) Brooks Robinson, 81) Willie Stargell, 82) Ed Walsh, 83) Duke Snider, 84) Sam Crawford, 85) Dizzy Dean, 86) Kirby Puckett, 87) Ozzie Smith, 88) Frankie Frisch, 89) Goose Goslin, 90) Ralph Kiner, 91) Mark McGwire, 92) Chuck Klein, 93) Ken Griffey Jr., 94) Dave Winfield, 95) Wade Boggs, 96) Rollie Fingers, 97) Gaylord Perry, 98) Dennis Eckersley, 99) Paul Molitor, 100) Early Wynn.

The Sporting News gave the World a good solid list on their way out the door, exit stage right. Notably, they included five Negro League Stars, placing Josh Gibson at 18 and Satchel Paige at 19 before also including Buck Leonard [47], Cool Papa Bell [66], and Oscar Charleston [67]. The placements are interesting, with 2 sets of pairs and Leonard midway between them. It is obvious that the Blackball Stars were not included in any sort of analytical way; but rather their placements were a gesture to the inescapble fact that the Negro League Players needed some representation on the list. This could be considered a step in the right direction by those inclined to see the glass as half-full or just tokenism by those inclined to see the glass as half-empty.

BILL JAMES [2001]:* 1) Babe Ruth [1], 2) Honus Wagner [2], 3) Willie Mays [9], 4) Oscar Charleson [NL], 5) Ty Cobb [6], 6) Mickey Mantle [19], 7) Ted Williams [10], 8) Walter Johnson [12], 9) Josh Gibson [NL], 10) Stan Musial [4], 11) Tris Speaker [18], 12) Henry Aaron [5], 13) Joe DiMaggio [8], 14) Lou Gehrig [7], 15) Joe Morgan [21], 16) Barry Bonds [NL], 17) Satchel Paige [NL], 18) Eddie Collins [15], 19) Lefty Grove [3], 20) Pete Alexander [27], 21) Mike Schmidt [13], 22) Rogers Hornsby [42], 23) Cy Young [14], 24) Frank Robinson [23], 25) Turkey Stearnes [NL], 26) Rickey Henderson [NL], 27) John Henry Lloyd [NL], 28) Mel Ott [24], 29) Jimmie Foxx [20], 30) George Brett [96], 31) Mark McGwire [NL], 32) Jackie Robinson [86], 33) Pete Rose [22], 34) Eddie Mathews [NL], 35) Craig Biggio [NL], 36) Warren Spahn [11], 37) Carl Yastrzemski [26], 38) Tom Seaver [25], 39) Arky Vaughan [88], 40) Nap Lajoie [NL], 41) Yogi Berra [16], 42) Christy Mathewson [17], 43) Mule Suttles [NL], 44) Johnny Bench [28], 45) Jeff Bagwell [NL], 46) Bob Gibson [49], 47) Kid Nichols [NL], 48) Cal Ripken [NL], 49) Roger Clemens [NL], 50) Duke Snider [83], 51) Sandy Koufax [72], 52) Joe Williams [NL], 53) Roy Campanella [82], 54) Tony Gwynn [NL], 55) Robin Yount [NL], 56) Bob Feller [32], 57) Reggie Jackson [52], 58) Ryne Sandberg [NL], 59) Charlie Gehringer [50], 60) Wade Boggs [NL], 61) Eddie Murray [NL], 62) Johnny Mize [43], 63) Harmon Killebrew [37], 64) Rod Carew [59], 65) Buck Leonard [NL], 66) Joe Jackson [95], 67) Cristobal Torriente [NL], 68) Hank Greenberg [31], 69) Willie McCovey [30], 70) Frank Baker [NL], 71) Al Simmons [79], 72) Mickey Cochrane [41], 73) Ken Griffey Jr. [NL], 74) Roberto Clemente [65], 75) Frank Thomas [NL], 76) Cool Papa Bell [NL], 77) Ernie Banks [40], 78) Steve Carlton [39], 79) Mike Piazza [NL], 80) Roberto Alomar [NL], 81) Tim Raines [NL], 82) Willie Stargell [91], 83) Mordecai Brown [61], 84) Paul Waner [47], 85) Minnie Minoso [NL], 86) Willie Wells [NL], 87) Ron Santo [63], 88) Frankie Frisch [76], 89) Sam Crawford [62], 90) Al Kaline [44], 91) Brooks Robinson [29], 92) Greg Maddux [NL], 93) Barry Larkin [NL], 94) Carl Hubbell [45], 95) Martin Dihigo [NL], 96) Robin Roberts [57], 97) Carlton Fisk [89], 98) Kirby Puckett [NL], 99) Ed Delahanty [NL], and 100) Billy Williams [NL].

*The ranking in parantheses [] following each player’s name corresponds to his ranking on the 1981 Bill James list. The notation [NL] means the Player wasn’t listed on the 1981 list.

Taking his second shot at a 100 Greatest Baseball Players of All-Time list, the Ubiquitous Bill James [UBJ] does, in my opinion, a much improved job of it. UBJ had developed a scientific system called Win Shares. He used this methodology to arrive at more objective conclusions about the rankings. His system seems to have only failed him once again at second base (in 2001, he would overrate the second baseman Craig Biggio badly after wildly underrating both 2B Nap Lajoie and 2B Rogers Hornsby in 1986). Although still pretty much excluding the 19th Century Players, UBJ did not punt this time on the Negro Leaguers. Despite not having anything like the statistical databases now available, UBJ reasoned that, since basically half of all the Greatest Players in the Major Leagues in the years after integration came from the Negro Leagues, the same ratio would have to be applied to those Players who were banned from the Major Leagues before the Color Line was erased. Using this logic, UBJ included twelve Negro League Players in his 100 Greatest Baseball Players list. This was actually probably a bare minimum, but UBJ was actually so far ahead of the times on the issue of including Negro League Players that he admitted it. He should be commended for that.

JOE POSNANSKI [2021]: 1) Willie Mays, 2) Babe Ruth, 3) Barry Bonds, 4) Henry Aaron, 5) Oscar Charleston, 6) Ted Williams, 7) Walter Johnson, 8) Ty Cobb, 9) Stan Musial, 10) Satchel Paige, 11) Mickey Mantle, 12) Honus Wagner, 13) Roger Clemens, 14) Lou Gehrig, 15) Josh Gibson, 16) Alex Rodriguez, 17) Rogers Hornsby, 18) Tris Speaker, 19) [no number 19], 20tie) Mike Schmidt, 20tie) Frank Robinson, 21) Joe Morgan, 22) Lefty Grove, 23) Albert Pujols, 24) Rickey Henderson, 25) John Henry Lloyd, 26) Pete Alexander, 27) Mike Trout, 28) Randy Johnson, 29) Eddie Collins, 30) Johnny Bench, 31) Greg Maddux, 32) Mel Ott, 33) Jimmie Foxx, 34) Cy Young, 35) George Brett, 36) Christy Mathewson, 37) Pedro Martinez, 38) Carl Yastrzemski, 39) Nap Lajoie, 40) Roberto Clemente, 41) Tom Seaver, 42) Jackie Robinson, 43) Yogi Berra, 44) Cal Ripken Jr., 45) Bob Gibson, 46) Eddie Mathews, 47) Wade Boggs, 48) Ken Griffey Jr., 49) Warren Spahn, 50) Nolan Ryan, 51) Al Kaline, 52) Adrian Beltre, 53) Buck Leonard, 54) Chipper Jones, 55) Bob Feller, 56) Joe DiMaggio, 57) Rod Carew, 58) Jeff Bagwell, 59) Reggie Jackson, 60) Pete Rose, 61) Arky Vaughan, 62) Joe Williams, 63) Steve Carlton, 64) Johnny Mize, 65) Ernie Banks, 66) Robin Yount, 67) Hank Greenberg, 68) Gaylord Perry, 69) Monte Irvin, 70) Sandy Koufax, 71) Bert Blyleven, 72) Robin Roberts, 73) Brooks Robinson, 74) Frank Thomas, 75) Justin Verlander, 76) Willie McCovey, 77) Miguel Cabrera, 78) Clayton Kershaw, 79) Derek Jeter, 80) Carlton Fisk, 81) Ferguson Jenkins, 82) Kid Nichols, 83) Phil Niekro, 84) Cool Papa Bell, 85) Sadaharu Oh, 86) Gary Carter, 87) Charlie Gehringer, 88) Curt Schilling, 89) Mike Piazza, 90) Max Scherzer, 91) Mariano Rivera, 92) Bullet Rogan, 93) Ozzie Smith, 94) Roy Campanella, 95) Tony Gwynn, 96) Larry Walker, 97) Roberto Alomar, 98) Carlos Beltran, 99) Mike Mussina, 100) Ichiro Suzuki.

Joe Posnanski’s 2021 list is similar to Bill James 2001 list but with the addition of a whole bunch of modern Players (Pujols, Trout, Beltre, Verlander, Cabrera, Kershaw, Scherzer) who weren’t even eligible in 2001. Even more players from UBJ’s 2001 list have risen up after finishing their careers, led by Barry Bonds in the third slot. Ending the list with Ichiro, who played half his career in Japan, is certainly a good thing. However, the addition of Sadaharu Oh, who played his entire career in the Japanese Leagues, is even better. Oh was undoubtedly one of the 100 Greatest Baseball Players who ever lived. Strangely, Posnanski, who was well-known as the biographer of Negro League legend John ‘Buck’ O’Neil, included just nine Negro Leaguers against the twelve included by Bill James. He kept the order pretty much the same as UBJ, but he switched Paige and Gibson’s places on the list; dropped Stearnes, Suttles, Torrienti, and Wells; added Irvin; and, right at the end, switched out Martin Dihigo for Bullet Rogan. It is pretty evident that Posnanski wasn’t working hard at placing the Negro Leaguers on the list in any proper order. He just followed the lead of UBJ in the placement and then probably just threw the ones he didn’t have a ready story for off of the 100 Greatest Player bus. All and all though, Joe Posnanski’s book is filled with interesting, if usually sentimental, essays and stories about each player. If you like that sort of thing, the book is highly recommended. I highly recommend it.

ESPN [2022]:* 1) Babe Ruth [1], 2) Willie Mays [2], 3) Hank Aaron [5], 4) Ty Cobb [3], 5) Ted Williams [8], 6) Lou Gehrig [6], 7) Mickey Mantle [17], 8) Barry Bonds [34], 9) Walter Johnson [4], 10) Stan Musial [10], 11) Pedro Martinez [NL], 12) Honus Wagner [13], 13) Ken Griffey Jr. [93], 14) Greg Maddux [39], 15) Mike Trout [NL], 16) Joe DiMaggio [11], 17) Roger Clemens [53], 18) Mike Schmidt [28], 19) Frank Robinson [22], 20) Rogers Hornsby [9], 21) Cy Young [14], 22) Tom Seaver [32], 23) Rickey Henderson [51], 24) Randy Johnson [NL], 25) Christy Mathewson [7], 26) Alex Rodriguez [NL], 27) Roberto Clemente [20], 28) Derek Jeter [NL], 29) Johnny Bench [16], 30) Albert Pujols [NL], 31) Mariano Rivera [NL], 32) Sandy Koufax [26], 33) Bob Gibson [31], 34) Pete Rose [25], 35) Josh Gibson [18], 36) Tris Speaker [27], 37) Joe Morgan [60], 38) Jackie Robinson [44], 39) Yogi Berra [40], 40) Jimmie Foxx [15], 41) Satchel Paige [19], 42) Nolan Ryan [41], 43) George Brett [55], 44) Tony Gwynn [49], 45) Wade Boggs [95], 46) Ichiro Suzuki [NL], 47) Warren Spahn [21], 48) Nap Lajoie [29], 49) Frank Thomas [NL], 50) Bob Feller [36], 51) Ernie Banks [38], 52) Clayton Kershaw [NL], 53) Oscar Charleston [67], 54) Lefty Grove [23], 55) Reggie Jackson [48], 56) Dave Winfield [94], 57) Pete Alexander [12], 58) Steve Carlton [30], 59) Miguel Cabrera [NL], 60) Whitey Ford [52], 61) Captain Carl Yastrzemski [72], 62) Mel Ott [42], 63) David Ortiz [NL], 64) Eddie Mathews [63], 65) Max Scherzer [NL], 66) Cal Ripken Jr. [78], 67) Brooks Robinson [80], 68) Manny Ramirez [NL], 69) Ozzie Smith [87], 70) Harmon Killebrew [69], 71) Al Kaline [76], 72) Justin Verlander, 73) Willie McCovey [56], 74) Juan Marichal [71], 75) Rod Carew [61], 76) Cap Anson [NL], 77) Vlad Guerrero [NL], 78) Chipper Jones [NL], 79) Hank Greenberg [37], 80) Robin Yount [NL], 81) Mike Piazza [NL], 82) Eddie Collins [24], 83) Roy Campanella [50], 84) Paul Molitor [99], 85) Jim Palmer [64], 86) Roberto Alomar [NL], 87) Carlton Fisk [NL], 88) Willie Stargell [81], 89) Joe Jackson [35], 90) Ivan Rodriguez [NL], 91) Ryne Sandberg [NL], 92) Roy Halladay [NL], 93) John Smoltz [NL], 94) Byrce Harper [NL], 95) Duke Snider [83], 96) Charlie Gehringer [46], 97) Adrian Beltre [NL], 98) Jim Thome [NL], 99) Phil Niekro [NL], 100) Barry Larkin [NL].

*Numbers in parathenses [] after each Player correspond to that Player’s place on the 1998 Sporting News list. The 1998 TSN list was also a compendium of votes from experts, just like the 2022 ESPN list. In other words, it was basically just a popularity contest. It is very interesting to see how time has changed the perceptions of the Players over the past 24 years. Mickey Mantle moves up from 17 to 7. Mike Schmidt goes from 28 to 18, Rickey Henderson from 51 to 23, Joe Morgan from 60 to 23, Ozzie Smith from 87 to 69 and Wade Boggs from 95 to 45. Even more Players have had their support just collapse. Christy Mathewson falls from 7 to 25. Rogers Hornsby goes from 9 to 20, Johnny Bench from 16 to 29, Jimmie Foxx from 15 to 40, Warren Spahn from 21 to 47, Nap Lajoie from 29 to 48, Lefty Grove from 23 to 54, Pete Alexander ftom 12 to 57, Steve Carlton from 30 to 58, Mel Ott from 42 to 62, and Hank Greenberg from 37 to 79 with his teammate Charlie Gehringer also falling from 46 to 96. The honest Eddie Collins falls all the way from 24 to 82 while his crooked compadre Joe Jackson keeps pace by dropping from 35 to 89. You have to wonder if the Chicago Black Sox stain has overtaken both the virtuous and the fallen there.

Of course the list is also filled with Players who finished their careers after 1998 and have risen up, led by Barry Bonds at #8 up from #34 and Pedro Martinez at #11 up from nowhere, and Players who didn’t even start their careers until after 1998 (led by Mike Trout at #15). Perhaps most interesting are the Players who did not move at all (Ruth & Mays at #1 and #2, of course, but also Gehrig at #6, and Musial at #10) or just a little bit (Bob Gibson 33 from 31, Lawrence “Yogi” Berra 39 from 40, and Nolan Ryan 42 from 41). You could just blame this on the different voting groups for the 1998 and 2022 polls. But there are definite trends going on here. The old-time Baseball Players whose legends are slipping away are sliding fast down the list (Eddie Collins). Those whose mythos are still strong (Nolan Ryan, Mickey Mantle) are holding steady or going up. Strangely, despite much more publicity for and evidence of the greatness of the old Negro League Stars, this list indicates a complete collapse of support for them by the “Establishment” writers. In raw numbers, they go from five to just three players. Josh Gibson falls down from #18 to #35 while Satchel Paige goes from #19 to #41. Interestingly, Oscar Charleston actually rises up to #53 from #67. This is probably not so odd considering his placement on several other lists previous to this as the Greatest Negro League Player of All-Time. But all the other Negro League Stars just disappear.

This ESPN list has a lot of biases. There is a Modern Era bias. The Modern Era Players are, in general, rated higher than the Ancient Era Players. There is a distinct New York City bias. The Players who played for teams in the New York area are, in general, rated much higher than they probably should be. There is a Major League bias. The Players who played in the Major Leagues are rated higher than the Players who played in the Negro Leagues [ignoring the recent fact that the Major Leagues now consider seven of the old Negro Leagues as Major Leagues]. There is a Fame bias. The Players who are most Famous are rated higher than those Players who wish to remain anonymous. There is not a single African-American player on this list whose prime was before the first Major Negro League was founded in 1920. It has all the problems you would associate with a list that was a combination of individual opinions without any real methodology behind it. Other than all that, it’s a pretty good list.

Post #13

The 2022 Lock Out: Update

The hard thing about playing ‘chicken’ is knowing when to flinch. Scott Glenn

February 27, 2022

The Lock Out of the Major League Players’ Union on December 1st, 2021, by the Major League Owners, rolls on with no end in sight. The negotiations for a new Collective Bargaining Agreement [CBA], the agreement under which the Major League Owners and Players operate, actually began in April 2021. The Players quickly made an offer for a new agreement in May 2021. The Owners finally made a counter-offer in August 2021. This counter-offer was basically unworkable. It signaled that the Owners had no actual interest in negotiating. When the previous CBA expired on December 1st, 2021, the Owners promptly locked the Players out rather than keep trying to negotiate. There has been no real progress made since then. The reason for this is actually quite simple. This is not a negotiation. This is a game of ‘chicken.’ The customary game of ‘chicken’ is two testosterone-addled imbeciles in fast cars driving directly at each other while accelerating. If one swerves, he loses and the other wins. If neither idiot swerves, they both lose. The Baseball Owners have decided to play ‘chicken’ with the Players rather than negotiate. The Owners obviously believe that the Players will eventually swerve. In military terms, the Owners have basically declared war. Is this a good business strategy? Unfortunately, we will find out and the baseball season of 2022 will be a casualty.

This is not a negotiation

In the new CBA, the Players wanted to stop what they believed was Owner manipulation of previous Agreements for their own benefit. According to the Players, the Owners ‘gamed’ the previous agreements by using their ability to control younger player salaries, combined with a system of Revenue Sharing between themselves, to markedly enlarge the Owners’ share of the Baseball’s total revenue. In other words, every Owner was able to make sizeable profits by simply deciding not to compete. The non-competitive Owner stripped his team of older highly paid players, filled his roster with cheap young players, and relied on the Revenue Sharing for his money. This strategy proved to be so lucrative that some teams seemed to become permanent doormats. The salaries of players, who were not stars but had accumulated enough service time to reach arbitration, collapsed. This Owner strategy was based on three prongs: the service time required for a player to reach Arbitration, the service time required for a player to reach free agency, and Owner Revenue Sharing. The Owners began their lock out by informing the Players that the following three topics were not subject to negotiation: 1) the Arbitration Threshold, 2) the Free Agency Threshold, and 3) Revenue Sharing between the Owners. In other words, the Owners declared that they would not swerve. Why did they do this?

Show me the Money!

Of course, the answer is money, billions and billions of dollars. In 2015, the Players’ total salaries were published as 3.90 billion dollars. Two years later, in 2017, the Players received a reported 4.25 billion dollars. In 2021, the Players’ total compensation was 4.05 billion dollars. In other words, the Players’ total salaries have remained flat and even receded slightly. In 2015, Baseball’s total revenue was reportedly 8.39 Billion dollars. In 2017, Baseball’s earnings were 9.46 billion dollars. In 2018, the Owners raked in 9.90 billion dollars. In 2019, the Owners supposedly took in 10.37 billion dollars. The 2021 revenue for the Major Leagues has not been reported yet. But it was almost surely more than the 10.37 billion dollars of 2019, possibly a great big deal more. Recently, the Major Leagues have renegotiated virtually all of their Major Television Deals. A conservative estimate from the published increases of these TV deals would push the total Major League revenues over 11 billion for 2021 and probably 12 billion if 2022 was actually played in full. The Owners would dispute these figures. But, in reality, these total revenue figures are almost surely too small (Forbes Magazine also estimates the Major Leagues’ total revenues, and their calculations are almost always 400-500 million greater per year). There is a good reason that the Owners always refuse to open their books.

The Owners’ non-competitive, guaranteed-profits strategy has transferred billions of dollars into their pockets. If these figures are remotely accurate (leaving out the 2020 Co-vid ruined season), there was an extra six to seven billion dollars total profit (at the very least) from 2015 to 2021 because the revenues did not stay flat like the Player’s total salaries did. The Owners got to keep this windfall for themselves. Looked at another way, if the total 2015 Player salaries were 3.90 billion dollars on total 2015 revenues of 8.39 billion, then the total 2021 Player salaries should have been 5.11 billion dollars if the 2021 total revenues were around 11 billion. The Owners would dispute these figures, make a false claim that they lost 3 or 4 billion dollars during the 2020 Co-vid season, and as always refuse to open up their books to prove anything beyond a reasonable doubt. But the fact remains that the obvious trend in Baseball, whatever the actual amount, is a gigantic transfer of the industry’s revenues from the Players to the Owners. Even the most biased of observers should be able to comprehend why the Players believe that they have been cheated. It is actually obvious that the Owners themselves know that they have cheated the Players. Their strategies are defensive. It is very obvious that the Owners would be completely happy to continue under the expired CBA and continue their present strategies. They will not swerve.

Other Owner Strategies

The Lock Out itself is also part of their strategy not to swerve. By locking the Players out, the Owners are actually leveraging one of their major advantages. The players are paid with regular paychecks throughout the season. However, only about 30 percent of the Owners revenue comes from gate receipts. They also receive a good amount from their local TV packages. But the Owners get a huge amount of their revenues from National TV packages televising post-season games. By the end of the season, the Players have received all of their salaries. But the Owners still have a huge pot of gold left over. This National television revenue will remain untouched as long as the season is eventually started. In other words, the Owners lose much less than the Players unless the entire season itself is canceled. Until the post-season is threatened, the Players actually have more incentive to settle than the Owners. How long can the Owners wait until the Lock Out begins to threaten the post season? The Co-vid wrecked season of 2020 certainly gives a clue. That season was limited to just 60 games. In other words, the Owners will only feel the pressure to actually make their best offer after the All Star Game with half the season gone. Of course, this is a defensive strategy somewhat like the “scorched-earth” tactic used by some militaries to fight a winning retreat.

Another part of the Owners’ strategy in this Baseball War is to pit the richer Players against the poorer Players. The Owners non-competitive guaranteed-profits strategy penalizes the star or superstar Players of the game the least of all. After these players make it through the gauntlet of club controlled years and arbitration to Free Agency, they are usually amply rewarded. The Players Union has always represented, first and foremost, the most successful players. The Players Union has never taken up the cause of the Minor League players that have been horribly mistreated by the Major League teams. The Players Union has negotiated again and again for benefits to accrue to their oldest and most successful members. The Owners have wisely used this fact to turn the tables on the Union. The Owners set up a system that rewards the best players on the backs of everyone else. The Executive Board of the Players Union consists of the following 8 players: Zack Britton, Jason Castro, Gerrit Cole, Francisco Lindor, Andrew Miller, James Paxton, Max Scherzer, Marcus Semien. Each and every one of these players has already reached free agency and/or become, at the least, very affluent or super wealthy. How long will the rich players of the Union fight on to reward the members who are not as well-off? The Owners are obviously betting that the rich Players driving the Union will not take it to the limit. This is also a defensive strategy that can only be successful if the Owners do not swerve.

The End Game

Despite the fact that the effectiveness of Owners’ strategy and tactics for re-negotiating the CBA are contingent on delay, many of the writers covering the Lock Out seem to take the small moves on the periphery of the negotiations as signs of progress. It is actually just a sound and a fury signifying nothing. The Owners and the Players can go back and forth on such subjects as raising the minimum salary, instituting a draft lottery, expanded play-offs, changing the number of player options, without ever touching the main issues. Only the Competitive Balance Tax [CBT] is a real matter of contention between the Owners and the Players on the table. The CBT (better know as the Luxury Tax) penalizes teams for spending too much on salaries. Because this is an actual issue, the Owners have been unbending on it. Rather than actually negotiate, the Owners continue to stall for time by asking for Federal Mediation (not for Federal Arbitration which would take the settlement out of their hands) and setting irrelevant deadlines for starting the season. The only reason for these deadlines is to put pressure on the Players. The Owners have also adopted the strategy of making the double-edged offer. The Owners offer to raise the salary ceiling slightly but only with much greater penalties for exceeding it. The Owners offer to raise the minimum salary slightly but only coupled with taking away the option of exceeding it for any player. It goes without saying that every one of these Owner moves is a refusal to swerve.

The Owners were able to chose the battleground for this Baseball War. They instituted the Lock Out. They set the Rules of Engagement by declaring three subjects off-limits. Because they were able to chose the initial field of combat, the actual day that this Lock Out is over will tell you who won. If the Lock Out ends in Spring Training, the Owners will have won an overwhelming victory. If it settles early in the 2022 season, the Owners will still have clearly won. If the Lock Out settles late in the first half of the season, they will still have won but probably with some concessions. The only way the Players can actually tie, or even win, this War is in a bloodbath where the 2022 season finally starts after the mid-season All-Star break. Only then will the pressure begin to mount on the Owners. Time is on the Owner’s side. Their strategy is essentially sound. Let the Bloodbath begin.

COMING UP: [Subjects that I am currently playing around with or researching. Time until posting may vary immensely.]

  1. Baseball’s Top 100: A History of Lists
  2. Roger Clemens and Generational Wealth
  3. What if Barry Bonds hadn’t taken Steroids?
  4. Where’s Winston: Negro Leagues Demographics
  5. The Demographics of the 1871 season.
  6. The Biography of Big Bill Smith
  7. The 1894 season of Grant ‘Home Run’ Johnson
  8. Year in Review, Part B: The Giants and Old Age
  9. Year in Review, Part C: The Braves and the Legacy of the Negro Leagues

Post #12

The 2022 Hall of Fame BBWAA Election, Part B [2022 Hall of Fame Round-Up]

February 1 [That was the day I aimed for…] February 22, 2022

The light of other days is faded, And all their glories past. Alfred Bunn

In this post, I will discuss the results of the 2022 BBWAA Baseball Hall of Fame election for all of the 30 players who were eligible. Each discussion will simply be about whatever struck me the most about each candidate. But first:

Congratulations to David Ortiz and the BBWAA

The 2022 election of David Ortiz to the Baseball Hall of Fame by the BBWAA [Baseball Writer’s Association of America] is a triumph of applied intelligence over knee-jerk stupidity. Due to a slight whiff of steroid scandal, Ortiz barely scraped in, just making it over the 75% of the ballots requirement by eleven votes. But the baseball writers got it right. The election of Ortiz may finally bring a sense of balance to the steroid argument. Murder and jaywalking are both crimes. But they differ greatly in degree and punishment. To keep Ortiz out of the Hall because of his reported positive test in 2003 would be a total injustice. The 2003 test was agreed upon between the Major Leagues and the Player’s Union. The results were supposed to be anonymous and then quickly destroyed. The reason for the 2003 test was to impose steroid testing on the players if the steroid saturation was greater then 5 percent (it was). However, though the samples were quickly discarded, the results were not. The United States Government subpeonaed the results and they were then leaked. Since 2004, the Major League players have played under a regime of steroid rules, regulations and punishments. David Ortiz played the great bulk of his career (from 2004 to 2016) without ever failing a League administered steroid test.

In other words, David Ortiz was accused of a baseball crime that: 1) was not on the books at the time of the violation; and 2) could not even be defended against because the evidence had already been destroyed. In addition to this, Ortiz himself had been wronged by a breach of confidentiality. Did the results indicate that Ortiz took steroids? Would retesting Ortiz prove that the result was a false positive? Was the result from an over-the-counter supplement or did Ortiz inject some Nandrolone or Stanozolol? Was Ortiz simply completely innocent? It is unknown and unknowable. Ortiz himself denied that he had ever knowingly taken any steroids. In a court of law, this case would simply be thrown out. Compare this to the case against Alex Rodriguez. A-Rod also reportedly failed the 2003 test. But it was reported that he failed specifically for Primobolan, an injectible steroid. Unlike David Ortiz, Alex Rodriguez did not deny that he used steroids. In fact, A-Rod admitted that he used steroids from 2001 to 2003. Just on these basic facts, there is quite a bit of difference between Ortiz and Rodriguez. And, as far as I can tell, no one has addressed the fact that A-Rod’s steroid of abuse was identified. Doesn’t that mean that, if Ortiz had taken an injectible steroid, it would have been identified too? If it was not an injectible steriod, David Ortiz must have taken, either knowingly or unknowingly, an over-the-counter supplement. Or the test was just a false positive and Ortiz is totally innocent.

Obviously, there is quite a bit of difference in the evidence just for the failed 2003 test between David Ortiz and Alex Rodriguez. Of course, Alex Rodriguez was later suspended for the entire 2014 season for his part in the Bio-Genesis scandal. The evidence collected from Bio-Genesis showed that Rodriguez had continued to use steroids after 2003. Despite overwhelming evidence against him, Rodriguez fought the accusations to the bitter end, lied constantly about everything, and threw anyone and anybody under the bus to protect himself. Even after he lost, Rodriguez fought against the punishment (and succeeded in getting it reduced). The criminal baseball charges of steroid usuage against Alex Rodiguez are the equivalent of assault most foul. Meanwhile, the crime under baseball law that David Ortiz faced was the equivalent of a dismissed charge for a misdemeanor that wasn’t actually a written law at the time. It was entirely appropriate for the Baseball Writers to let David Ortiz in the Hall of Fame while keeping A-Rod in baseball purgatory. While Ortiz deserves the congratulations that he has received for his well deserved enshrinement into the Baseball Hall of Fame, the Baseball Writers of the BBWAA deserve praise also for doing the right thing.

Player Comments in order of their vote totals and percentage, then followed by years on the ballot with career bWAR totals and their place among the 30 players who were on the 2022 BBWAA ballot.

1) David Ortiz [307 of 394, 77.9%, Ballot 1-ELECTED] 55.3 bWAR/16th

David Ortiz was one of three very similar players on the 2022 BBWAA ballot. The other two guys just like him were Manny Ramirez and Gary Sheffield. Each of these men was primarily a slugger. Each of these men was not known for his defensive value. Each of these players was stained to some extent by the steroid scandal (Ortiz got dirt on his shoes, Sheffield had sludge splashed all over his clothes in a drive-by, and Ramirez fell into the mudhole and ruined his suit). To evaluate their worthiness for the Baseball Hall of Fame, I first use a simple Lowest Common Denominator [LCD] method. There are 235 eligible players in the Hall of Fame. According to the website Baseball Reference, the 235th ranked eligible player has a career Wins Above Replacement value of 52.5 bWAR [the b to indicate the WAR value comes from Baseball Reference]. There are many players in the Hall of Fame who do not meet this 52.5 bWAR standard, and an equal number of unelected who are over it [98 in fact]. The great majority of these 98 unelected players are not eligible for the Hall [still active, not retired for the required five years, Pete Rose, etc]. Of course, this bWAR rating should never be the deciding factor of a player’s exclusion from the Baseball Hall of Fame. But I firmly believe that any player over the 52.5 line should certainly be elected eventually.

There were 30 players on the 2022 BBWAA Ballot. Incredibly, sixteen of these players had more than this 52.5 bWAR lowest common denominator standard for their career. This high number is abnormal. The backlog of fully qualified candidates whose elections have been sidetracked by steroid allegations has clogged the docket. Of these 16 players, Manny Ramirez was 6th with 69.3 bWAR; Gary Sheffield was 9th with 60.5 bWAR; and David Ortiz was 16th and last of those qualified with 55.3 bWAR for his career. Despite this, David Ortiz was the only one of these three hitters (or all 16 that qualified for that matter) who was elected. These three sluggers are ranked by Baseball Reference in the same order if you list them just by the offensive component of their total career bWAR [Ramirez with a 91.0 oWAR, Sheffield with 88.2 oWAR, & Ortiz with 76.2 oWAR]. Defensively, Gary Sheffield takes the iron glove award home with an awful -27.7 dWAR in 2576 games played. Manny Ramirez (with -21.7 in 2302 games) and David Ortiz (-20.9 in 2408 games) were not much better. None of these men are going to the Baseball Hall of Fame for their glovework. However, despite the fact that their career and offensive bWAR statistics rate these three players consistently in a Ramirez-Sheffield-Ortiz order, it is quite clear that David Ortiz was actually the best player of the group.

This deduction does not stem from any intangible addition to David Ortiz’s career value. By reputation, David Ortiz was a far greater team player than either Ramirez or Sheffield. That is not being counted. Neither of the other two players can match Ortiz’ post-season heroics (which are basically pretty much unmatched by anyone except maybe Babe Ruth). That is not added in either. The reason for the conclusion that David Ortiz was better stems from a deeper look at their career bWAR values. From age 30 on, David Ortiz was a better player than either Manny Ramirez or Gary Sheffield. After getting out of his 20s, David Ortiz had 39.9 career bWAR; Sheffield had 36.7 bWAR; and Ramirez had 34.2 bWAR. And it is not even as close as that makes it look. Ramirez and Sheffield both played until they could play no more. David Ortiz retired and called it a career after the 2016 season, a year in which he hit 38 HRs and slashed a .315/.401/.620 line [BA-OPS-SA] with 5.2 bWAR while also leading the American League in doubles [48!], RBIs, and slugging percentage. Obviously, David Ortiz could have continued his career and added to his post-30 bWAR total. The conclusion that Ortiz was a better player than either Gary Sheffield or Manny Ramirez after they turned 30 is hardly controversial.

While David Ortiz was almost surely a greater player from age 30 on, Manny Ramirez and Gary Sheffield make up ground in their 20s. Before he turned 30, Manny Ramirez collected 35.1 career bWAR; Gary Sheffield accumulated 23.8 bWAR; and David Ortiz came in last with just 15.4 bWAR. Was David Ortiz not as good a player as the other two guys in their 20s? I don’t believe so. It was just a question of opportunity. When he reached the Major Leagues, Ramirez was immediately given a full time job and told to thrash. He continued to do so until they took his job away because his bat had died. Sheffield came up, was given a full time job, and also told to mash. He didn’t blast off right away because of his own immaturity and some poor handling by his teams. But Sheffield eventually straightened out and blasted away until his bat expired too. On the other hand, David Ortiz came up with the Minnesota Twins. In an epic case of poor talent management, the Twins would not or could not just commit and give the man a job. The Twins brought Ortiz up, sent him back down to the Minors, tried to change his swing, benched him for other lesser players, and generally bungled his career. This doesn’t make David Ortiz a worse player than Ramirez or Sheffield in his 20s, just a less lucky one. In my opinion, David Ortiz was a greater player than either Manny Ramirez or Gary Sheffield, no matter what the career bWAR statistics seem to indicate.

As mentioned in a prior post, the election of David Ortiz to the Baseball Hall of Fame will be notable for one other aspect. Ortiz is being inducted with two other living players. These three players will stand together on the podium on July 24, 2022. Each will get a chance to make a speech. The two other players being inducted with Ortiz are Jim Kaat and Tony Oliva. Both of these players are identified with the Minnesota Twins organization. In many ways, Kaat and Oliva are part of the heart and soul of the Twins organization (along with Rod Carew, Harmon Killebrew, and perhaps Joe Mauer). David Ortiz came up with the Twins. However, he has written two entire autobiographies that trash the Twins organization. It wouldn’t be hard to make the case that Ortiz hates the Twins and especially their former manager-for-life Tom Kelly. The possibility that David Ortiz trashes the Twins one more time in his Hall of Fame induction speech is not zero. Of course, it is more likely that David Ortiz just does not mention his former club and simply concentrates on his good times with the Boston Red Sox. There may even be a small chance that he says something positive about the Twins. David Ortiz is certainly capable of being the greater man. I can’t wait to see what happens.

2) Barry Bonds [260 of 394, 66.0%, Ballot 10-DONE] 162.7 bWAR/1st

In his tenth and final year on the Baseball Writers’ BBWAA Ballot, Barry Bonds fell 36 votes short. His shot at entering the Baseball Hall of Fame through the front door is finally over. Oddly, his opportunity to sneak in through the back door [as a Veterans Committee pick] begins immediately. Bonds is eligible for selection by the Today’s Game Era Committee [one of the 4 former Veterans Committee zombie sub-committees] in December 2022 for induction in 2023. The obvious question is: Will the lock on the back door be any looser than the chain on the front door? In the past, the former baseball players, executives, historians and writers that usually staff these sub-committees have been even harder in their public statements about actual or suspected steroid abusers than the Baseball Writers that vote in the BBWAA elections. If that continues to hold true, Barry Bonds shift from the BBWAA ballot to the usually much less discriminating Veterans Committee will not help him. Perhaps an even more interesting question would be: Has Barry Bonds already been punished enough for using steroids?

Rather than being elected on the very first ballot, Barry Bonds got the slow American-CIA-waterboarding-torture experience of being denied year after year for 10 straight years by the BBWAA. Is that punishment enough? Does the crime fit the punishment? Or should he continue to suffer? Barry Bonds was, without a doubt, a steroid user. The US government investigation into his steroid supplier, Bay Area Laboratory Co-Op [BALCO], laid bare exactly when Bonds started using steroids, which steroids he took, what schedule he took them on, and even when he stopped. Although he was eventually acquitted of perjury, the evidence that Bonds took steroids is overwhelming. In a way, the steroids evidence against Bonds is as unique as Bonds himself was as a baseball player. Because the government prosecuted (or persecuted) Barry Bonds for perjury, the complete scope of Barry Bonds’ abuse of steroids is known. Compare this to the steroid case against Alex Rodriguez. Because he lied so much about his steroid abuse and only admitted use under duress, the full scope of Alex Rodriguez’ steroid aided and inflated career is unknown and probably unknowable. There are even allegations that Rodriguez was taking steroids in High School. Who really knows? This cannot be said about Bonds. With the full scope of Barry Bonds’ steroid abuse well-known, what should be his punishment? Are there any mitigating circumstances?

By the mid-1990s, Barry Bonds had established himself as the greatest player in the game. Despite this, Bonds had to accept second-place publicity-wise to Ken Griffey, Jr. Bonds made it well-known that he believed he was the better player. Then the steroid wave, which had been building for some time, began to peak. Ken Caminiti, jacked to the max on raw roids, won the 1996 National League MVP. Mark McGwire, a great home run hitter before steroids, became a home run monster through better chemistry. In 1998, McGwire and Sammy Sosa, also probably on steroids, shattered the single season home run record. McGwire was the 1998 NL MVP. Barry Bonds, the best player in Baseball, was forgotten. Most athletes are competitive. The greatest are typically insanely competitve. Bonds, with his competitive juices probably on fire, decided that he needed to juice up to continue to compete. From 1999 until 2003, Bonds showed the game of Baseball what it’s very best player could do when totally roided up. What happened during those five years can only be described as awe-inspiring. While he was jacked up, Bonds turned the game on its head. In Baseball, the pitcher always has the advantage because the batter fails far more times than not. Maximum Bonds reversed that equation. This must have been what it was like to watch Babe Ruth at his peak in the 1920s.

Taking steroids was not illegal by Baseball’s very own rules when Barry Bonds decided to level the playing field for himself with the other steroid monsters. But it was definitely a crime. In 1990, the United States Government passed the Anabolic Steroids Control Act. This law criminalized the possession of anabolic steroids. More importantly, it was a ethical crime. It was well known that taking steroids gave the juiced athlete a competitive edge. Thus, Barry Bonds was guilty in both a criminal and ethical sense. But, once again, it was not technically a crime in according to baseball’s own rules and regulations. This brings up the issue of why steroids proliferated throughout baseball at that time. Who was guilty for allowing steroids to overwhelm the game? The pretty clear answer to this question is the Baseball Owners and their personal representative, the Baseball Commissioner. In a very real sense, the Owners are the stewards of the game. They should have been working hand-in-hand with the Players’ Union to protect the game. Instead, the decades from 1970 to the 1990s saw the Owners at war with the Players. Because the two sides were fighting with each other, no one was steering the ship. The Owners had abandoned their stewardship of the game itself. So the next question should be obvious. Was this war the fault of the Owners or the Players?

Interestingly, the 1990s plague of steroids has some interesting similiarities to the Chicago Black Sox, Baseball’s greatest scandal. During the decade of the 1910s, the Baseball Owners firmly established their control over their players. At that time, the Owners held the players in a type of employment bondage through the application of a ‘reserve clause’ in all players’ contracts. Basically a player was owned by his team. In other words, the Owners conspired with each other to never let any player really bargain for his true value. Normally, this would be totally illegal. Under the law against monolopies, businesses cannot collude with each other to set prices or salaries. However, in one of the strangest decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court’s long history of bizarre opinions, the Baseball Owners got a ruling granting them a monopoly and protecting their enforcement of employment servitude. With the players well aware that they were being cheated of fair compensation, gambling interests were able to begin to corrupt some players. This rot snowballed until finally eight members of the Chicago White Sox team conspired to throw the 1919 World Series. In a way, the 1990s steroids scandal is the flip side of this earlier 1910s gambling scandal. The Baseball war that snowballed from the 1970s to the 1990s was an aftermath of the end of Baseball’s system of employment slavery.

During the 1970s, the Players, through their Union, overturned the ‘reserve clause’ system in Federal Arbitration and won the right to eventually become free agents. The Owners immediately began a long crusade to try to put the expensive genie of free agency back into the bottle. The Owners’ desperate attempts to reinstate some form of employment servitude on the players led to: 1) the cancelation of a good part of the 1981 season; 2) a 1984 conspiracy to set salaries that ended in collusion convictions against the Owners in the late 1980s; and finally 3) an all-out war with the Players Union that ended the 1994 season, canceled the 1994 World Series, and then delayed the start of the 1995 season. The Players’ strike that wrecked the 1994 season and also continued into 1995 only ended when the Owners were convicted of Federal Labor Law violations. The Baseball Owners abandoned their stewardship of the game because of greed. And no single person was more responsible for the Owners abandoning their role as stewards of the game than Bud Selig, the owner of the Milwaukee Brewers who became the Baseball Commissioner. Selig, for reasons of obvious self-interest, was always deeply involved in the Owners’ long struggle against the players. He was the Commissioner when the 1994 World Series was canceled. The 1990s can just as easily be labeled the “Bud Selig Era” as the “Steroids Era.”

Which brings us back to the question of whether there are any mitigating circumstances for Barry Bonds use of steroids. Just like the 1910s when the Owners’ greed allowed gambling to overwhelm baseball, the Owners’ greed allowed steroids to swamp baseball during the 1990s. As already stated, the Federal Government banned steroids in 1990. If they had not been so busy fighting the Players Union, the Owners could have worked out an agreement to monitor and test for steroids right then. The warning signs for the coming deluge were already in place. The Owners abandoned their responsibility to the game. If they had worked out an agreement banning steroids in 1990 or shortly thereafter, Bonds almost certainly does not end up changing into a mutant version of Babe Ruth nine years later. To punish Barry Bonds for the very competitiveness that made him great while giving Selig and all the other Owners a pass for what happened seems unfair. Especially since these same Owners made a fortune from the steroid-aided superhuman assaults on the baseball record books before the house of cards fell apart. Despite all this, Bud Selig was elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame without a dissenting vote in 2017. Is this fair?

Which brings us back to our initial question. Has Barry Bonds already been punished enough for using steroids? The answer that question is undoubtedly yes. If he had retired or hit by a bus in 1998, Bonds would have been elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame on the very first ballot. In a steroid clean Baseball universe, there is no argument for keeping him out. The ten years of public misery inflicted on Bonds is sufficient. One could even claim that there was something majestic about Bonds refusal to go down quietly before the tidal wave of steroids in the game. Bonds may have made the wrong choice by joining the crowd, but one can surely sympathize with why he did it. And the fact that Bud Selig has been already been elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame destroys any argument against the induction of Barry Bonds also. Bud Selig, probably more than any other single person, was responsible for the fact that steroids inundated the game. To put Selig in the Hall while keeping Bonds out is just hypocrisy. The only other argument for keeping Barry Bonds out was that he was not a nice guy, basically a miscreant. With the caveat that no one is ever a total jerk, Bonds certainly had a prickly personality. This certainly didn’t keep Ty Cobb or Ted Williams out of the Hall. As a personal prejudice rather than an actual argument, it should count for nothing. It’s the Baseball Hall of Fame, not the Nice Guy Hall of Fame. In my opinion, Barry Bonds has done his penance and deserves to immediately be elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame without any further delay.

3) Roger Clemens [257 of 394, 65.2%, Ballot 10-DONE] 139.2 bWAR/2nd

The argument for Roger Clemens’ induction into the Baseball Hall of Fame is the mirror of the Barry Bonds debate. While Bonds was the best player in his prime and also arguably of all time, Clemens was the best pitcher in the game at his peak and possibly of all time too. Just like Bonds, Clemens was accused of using steroids and then prosecuted (persecuted) by the U.S. govenment for perjury after denying he did under oath. Like Bonds, he was also acquited by a jury. Both men played their last Major League season in 2007, then became eligible for induction into the Hall of Fame in 2013, and were forced to spend 10 years twisting lockstep in the wind waiting to be elected. Just like Bonds, Clemens would have been overwhelmingly elected to the Hall of Fame on the first ballot without the steroid allegations. All the arguments made that Barry Bonds has already been punished enough, while certain people who bear an even greater burden for the steroid scandal have been rewarded, also apply to Roger Clemens. In one way, the argument for Clemens is actually stronger than the argument for Bonds. The case against Clemens for abusing steroids is much weaker than the case against Bonds.

The evidence against Barry Bonds is basically overwhelming. The evidence against the Rocket just boils down to the word of one man against another. While there is an absolute certainty that Bonds took steroids, there is only an extreme likelihood that Clemens took some sort of steroids or (more likely) Human Growth Hormone. The evidence against Roger Clemens boils down to just three things: 1) the testimony against the Rocket by his former personal trainer Brian McNamee, 2) the evidence presented by McNamee to support his claims [which was basically used needles stored in beer cans for ten years], and 3) the testimony of his former teammate Andy Pettitte that he had a brief discussion with Clemens about using Human Growth Hormone [HGH]. When Clemens went to court, all three pieces of evidence fell short. Brian McNamee was a convicted liar with an obvious grudge against Clemens. There was no chain of custody for McNamee’s supposed used needles (and no evidence of steroids or Clemens DNA on them either). Pettitte confirmed that HGH was mentioned in a conversation with Clemens. But once again confirmed under oath that he could not exactly remember the context. Unlike Bonds, there were no receipts or payments directly linking Clemens to the purchase of steroids. Unless their lawyer was totally incompetent, no one would have or should have been convicted on this evidence.

Unlike Bonds, it is much harder to pinpoint Clemens’ steroid usage simply by looking at his career. Usually three peroids of his career are mentioned when Clemens is accused of steroid usage: 1) his 1997 and 1998 seasons with the New York Yankees when he was 34 and 35 years old; 2) his 2001 season when he had a won-loss record of 20-3 at the age of 38; and 3) his 2004 and 2005 renaissance years with the Houston Astros when he was 41 and 42 years old. The 1997 and 1998 years can actually be explained away without resorting to steroids as a reason. In 1996, Roger Clemens began developing and using a devastating split-finger fastball (which he comically called Mr. Splitty). During the 1996 season, Clemens led the American league with 257 strikeouts. But he also walked 106 men while he struggled to control his new pitch. It was the only year in his whole career when he walked over 100 men in a season. In 1997 and 1998, Clemens had control of the split-finger and had two great seasons. Interestingly, Clemens came down with arm fatigue late in the 1998 season. Of course, this was also the first season that he was accused of using either HGH or steroids. In 1999, he had the highest ERA of his career [4.60]. Did Clemens maybe try steroids or more likely Human Growth Hormone to deal with his fatigued arm in 1998?

In any case, his arm did recover. Clemens was also accused of using steroids during the 2001 season. As stated, his won-loss record was a superb 20 wins versus just 3 losses. But the year was actually not all that different from any of his other seasons from 2000 to 2005. The 20-3 record was the result of great run support, not better pitching. His last two great years, 2004 and 2005, both happened after random steroid testing was instituted throughtout the Major Leagues. If he was using, he didn’t get caught. Sometimes, Roger Clemen’s career longevity is used as indirect evidence that he was taking steroids. But this is an empty argument. Clemens was an outlier, not a normal pitcher. It is well-established that the length of a pitcher’s career depends on how hard he throws and how well he pitchs while avoiding completely disabling injuries. Clemens, one of the greatest and hardest throwing pitchers of all time, should have had an extremely long career. The career of Roger Clemens resembles no one else more than the career of his fellow Texan, Nolan Ryan. In 1987, Ryan won an ERA title at the advanced age of 40. In 2005, Clemens won an ERA title at the advanced age of 42. Ryan continued to be a fantastic pitcher until finally blowing out his elbow when he was 46. Clemens was a fantastic pitcher until partial retirement and a hamstring injury stopped him at 44. The argument that his longevity indicates steroid usage simply doesn’t hold much water. Unlike Bonds, all of Clemens career was possible without steroids.

There is one final odd thing in the ten years Roger Clemens spent in Baseball purgatory being denied induction to the Hall of Fame over and over by the BBWAA. After they both came onto the Baseball Hall of Fame Ballot in 2013, Roger Clemens always did a little bit better than Barry Bonds. That first year Clemens received 37.6% of the vote while Bonds debuted at 36.2%. This 1.4% gap would remain the largest difference for the entire 10 years. The simplest explanation would seem to just be racism. The white player got more support than the black player. It could also be argued that the difference was caused by the fact that Bonds was simply a more disagreeable person. From 2013 to 2020, Clemens always maintained his slight edge over Bonds in the Baseball Hall of Fame voting. Then, in the last two years that they were elligible (2021 and 2022), Bonds finally inched ahead of Clemens. Why did this happen? Did it just happen naturally because some old voters were replaced by newer ones who supported Bonds more than Clemens? Or did it happen because some of the old school moral-majority type voters changed their minds? Over the past few years, Barry Bonds has been noticably absent from the news cycles. But Roger Clemens has had his good name furthered smeared by allegations of marital infidelities. Was this the cause? It proabably really doesn’t matter. In my opinion, Roger Clemens, just like Barry Bonds, has done his penance and deserves to be elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame without any further delay.

4) Scott Rolen [249 of 394, 63.2%, Ballot Year 5] 70.1 bWAR/5th

Scott Rolen, unless tainted by a steroids accusation or some sort of bizarre personal misconduct charge in the next year, will most likely breeze into the Baseball Hall of Fame in 2023. And, if not 2023, then 2024 for sure. Rolen is well qualified already. There is not much else to say about Rolen’s inevitable election to the Hall of Fame other than he can certainly be used as proof that the BBWAA Voters prefer offense to defense. David Ortiz, with an offensive bWAR of +76.2 and a bad defensive bWAR of -20.9 for a total bWAR of +55.3, just sailed into the Hall on the first ballot. Meanwhile, Rolen, with an offensive bWAR of +48.9 and a defensive bWAR of +21.2 for a total bWAR of +70.1, is still waiting in the wings after five ballots. The other two candidates on the 2022 ballot with outstanding defensive statistics, Andruw Jones (+24.4) and Omar Vizquel (+29.5), are also treading water. [Although Vizquel was recently seen attaching an anchor to his career and going down for probably the last time]. The lesson here seems to be, if you want to get into the Baseball Hall of Fame, it is best that you bring a big bat.

5) Curt Schilling [231 of 394, 58.6%, Ballot Year 10-DONE] 79.5 bWAR/4th

After the 2021 Baseball Hall of Fame election, Schilling asked the Hall of Fame to remove his name from the Ballot. At the time, you had to wonder whether his strategy was: 1) to dare or shame the BBWAA Voters into electing him; 2) to give the BBWAA voters the finger first before they gave it to him one more time, or 3) to ensure he was not elected by the BBWAA because that’s what he honestly wanted. Of course, his motivation may have been all of the above or none of the above too. But we now know the result. The BBWAA voters used Schilling’s request to give the finger right back to him. Interestingly, the usual explanation for Schilling’s failure to get voted into the Baseball Hall of Fame is that his career falls just a little short. This is simply foolish. By any objective measurement, Curt Schilling was Hall of Fame worthy, even without the extra credit for his post-season heroics. The reasonable conclusion is that, for the entire 10 year period that Schilling was eligible, some of the Baseball Writers refused to vote for him as punishment for a series of divisive comments that could be characterized as ‘hate’ speech. Whether divisive or hateful, no one has argued that Curt Schilling’s coments were not protected under the First Amendment Right of Free Speech.

The Baseball Writers could evidently not just come right out and say that they were punishing Schilling for saying disagreeable things. Those that live by the First Amendment were not willing to die by the First Amendment. Nowadays, when even the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has given up protecting the Right to Free Speech, this should perhaps not come as a big surprise. The Writers may have had a reasonable fear that Curt Schilling would have used the podium provided by his Hall of Fame election to give a speech spewing hatred. But he could have just as easily decided to not spoil the day honoring himself. But now we will never know. Schilling was denied the opportunity to ennoble or embarrass himself by the BBWAA. One day he may be elected by the Baseball Hall of Fame’s numerous second and third chance committees. But the stain of the BBWAA rejection will remain. The Baseball Writers should have risen above this pettiness in the service of a greater principle. But they did not. Instead, they lowered themselves to the level of what they feared. It was not their finest moment. Schilling certainly deserves to be in the Baseball Hall of Fame and hopefully some day he will be inducted.

6) Todd Helton [205 of 394, 52.0%, Ballot Year 4] 61.8 bWAR/8th

Todd Helton’s raw statistics certainly paint a very convincing portrait for his inevitable induction into the Baseball Hall of Fame. There are three possible reasons for his slow rise up the yearly BBWAA ballots: 1) the Baseball Writers are discounting his career because of the enormous boost given his statistics by playing his entire career in the Denver’s mile high altitude; 2) his arrests in 2013 and 2019 for driving under the influence [DUIs]; and 3) an allegation of steroid abuse. The first reason is surely true. Todd Helton’s home splits [227 HRs-859 RBIs-.345 BA-.607 SA] dwarf his road splits [142 HRs-547 RBIs-.287 BA-.469 SA] to an extreme degree. The second reason certainly doesn’t help but the Baseball Hall of Fame is full of alcoholics. The third reason may be the killer. In 2004, Colorado Rockies broadcaster Wayne Hagin stated on the air that Don Baylor, the Rockies manager from 1993-1998, told him that Todd Helton was on the ‘juice’ earlier in his career. Hagin continued on that Baylor said he told Helton to get off the stuff because he didn’t need it. This caused a media firestorm. All parties immediately backtracked. It was quickly stated that no one was claiming Helton used injectible steroids. They were actually talking about Creatine, an over the counter supplement. Helton then stated that he had never even used Creatine. It was all a little shady.

In 2004, the same year that Todd Helton was accused, the Major Leagues started testing the players for steroids. Helton’s career can be split into two distinct parts. In the first half of his career [1997-2004], Helton was quite a slugger. From 1999 to 2004, he hit at least 30 HRs every year, peaking at 49 in 2001. In the second half of his career [2005-2013], Helton was still a good hitter. But he lost most of his power, never hitting more than 20 HRs again. There were many other possible explanations for this rather than steroids. In 2005, Helton got off to a terrible start and then hurt his left calf. In 2006, his season was ruined by acute ileitis (intestinal inflammation). In 2008, Helton was diagnosed with a degenerative back condition that required surgery. It would bother him for the rest of his career. A torn labrum ruined his 2012 season. Irregardless, the fact remains that Helton was a much more powerful hitter before steroids were driven out of the game than he was afterwards. Of course, This is just a: “Where there’s smoke there’s fire” argument. But it may have hurt Helton’s chances of getting to the magic 75% of the vote. On the other hand, Larry Walker, a teammate, who was a far better player than Todd Helton, received only 10.2% of the vote after his fourth year of eligibility. Walker got into the Hall of Fame in his tenth year. Since Todd Helton is at 52.0% of the vote after just four years, It is probably still inevitable.

7) Billy Wagner [201 of 394, 51.0%, Ballot Year 7] 27.7 bWAR/23rd

Billy Wagner was one of the three top relievers, along with Joe Nathan and John Papelbon, on the 2022 Ballot. During the regular season, Wagner [with 27.7 bWAR] did have a better career than Nathan [26.7] who then had a better career than Papelbon [23.3]. But during the post-season, Wagner was an epic train wreck; Nathan was pretty good; and Papelbon was outstanding. None of these men come even remotely close to the 52.5 bWAR requirement that has been calculated as the minimum to enter the Baseball Hall of Fame. None of these men have any of the usual exceptions to that rule either. In any event, neither Nathan or Papelbon received the five percent minimum necessary to appear on the 2023 ballot. They were just one and done. Perhaps the job of relief pitching requires a special dispensation in the Hall of Fame voting since they can supposedly exert maximum leverage over their team’s victories. But this would require the doubling of Wagner’s bWAR score so he could qualify just by the bare minimum [Joe Nathan would also qualify by doubling while Jon Papelbon would fall slightly short]. But the reasoning behind doubling a relief pitcher’s bWAR score is pretty much just a wish and a prayer.

Despite all this, if he just had a stellar post-season resume, it is possible that Billy Wagner would have already been elected to the Hall. However, I cannot advocate his election. Whenever I scrutinize Wagner’s candidacy, I consider the Hall of Fame careers of Dennis Eckersley and John Smoltz. Both Eckersley and Smoltz were outstanding starting pitchers who became relief pitchers for parts of their careers. Both of them completely dominated as relief pitchers. In my heart, I believe that any decent starting pitcher can dominate as a relief pitcher (and probably extend his career too). On the 2022 Hall of Fame Ballot, Tim Lincecum, who finished with way less votes than Billy Wagner, would have probably had an excellent career as a reliever. Andy Pettitte, Tim Hudson, and Mark Buerhle would have all had great careers as a relief pitcher. Looking at relief pitchers through this lense, it is actually hard to believe any relief pitcher is a Hall of Fame candidate. An argument can be made that relief pitching is a specialized skill like pinch hitting that does not deserve Baseball Hall of Fame recognition. Manny Mota, arguably the greatest pinch hitter of all time, is not in the Hall of Fame. However, there is usually an exception to every rule. The great reliever Mariano Rivera seemed every inch like a Baseball Hall of Famer while he was still active.

8) Andruw Jones [163 of 394, 41.1%, Ballot Year 5] 62.7 bWAR/7th

Andruw Jones may have one of the strangest Baseball Hall of Fame cases of recent memory. As just a hitter, his Hall of Fame case resembles the careers of many other players who fell a little short of the Hall. These players looked like they were going to blast their way into the Hall of Fame in their 20s, but then just faded away in their 30s and never made it. There are plenty of these players littered throughout Baseball history. There are even three on the 2022 Ballot (Prince Fielder, Justin Morneau, and Ryan Howard). But Andruw Jones brings something else to the party. Even though he faded very badly in his 30s [58.0 career bWAR at age 29 and just 4.7 career bWAR from 30 on], Jones combines both good to great hitting statistics with absolutely elite defensive metrics during his 20s. This combination was actually enough to qualify Jones by bWAR even if he had retired after his age 29 season. But his career during his 30s left should a bad afterimage that his election to the Baseball Hall of Fame is no longer guaranteed. Why did Andruw Jones fade so badly that he was virtually useless in his 30s?

Most players fade as they age because of injuries, lack of conditioning, loss of motivation, and/or simply the irresistable tide of time. Sometimes, all four of these factors (injuries, conditioning, motivation, and old age) are all related to each other. Injuries drain a player’s motivation and suppress his conditioning. Lack of conditioning leads to loss of motivation and increases injuries. Every one of these problems are increased just by the process of aging. In the case of Jones, all these factors seemed to contribute to his bad play during his 30s. Andruw Jones has obviously out-of shape and overweight as he aged into his 30s. This led to more injuries and accelerated the aging process. He seemed to demonstrate a lack of motivation too. Andruw Jones may have been under the teen-age baseball player curse too. For some reason, almost all baseball players who debut in the Major Leagues as teenagers have far better careers in their 20s than their 30s. These teen-age players, who are so successful so young, seem to be unable to motivate themselves in their 30s. Andruw Jones came up at the age of 19. Because his Hall of Fame case rests so heavily on the defensive statistics that are the most ambiguous of all Baseball metrics, I cannot find it in my heart to advocate for the election of Andruw Jones. Also I can’t erase the ‘Fat Elvis’ type memories of his later years.

9) Gary Sheffield [160 of 394, 40.6%, Ballot Year 8] 60.5 bWAR/9th

It is pretty clear that Gary Sheffield, because his career was badly tarnished by the steroids scandal, will not be elected by the BBWAA before his maximum ten years on the Ballot runs out. He was identified by the Mitchell Report as receiving a shipment from BALCO. Exactly what the shipment contained was unclear. It was probably steroids but it may have just been vitamins. Sheffield himself admitted that he trained briefly with Barry Bonds. During that time, he had the same steroid cream that Bonds used rubbed on his leg. Sheffield claimed that he had no idea it was a steroid-based cream and it did nothing for him. There is certainly a lot of smoke here but no identifiable fire. Gary Sheffield adamantly denied that he ever knowingly used steroids. Despite this lack of actual conclusive evidence and his denial, Gary Sheffield seems to have been convicted of using steroids anyways. His reputation may have damaged his chances of just shrugging off these accusations. Throughout his career, Sheffield often acted in a very aggressive and confrontational way. In other words, he acted as if he was suffering from stereotypical ‘Roid Rage.’

In his defense, two things should probably be pointed out about Sheffield: 1) he played until 2009 without testing positive for steroids from 2004 to 2009, and his career path and decline does not look suspect; and 2) Sheffield pretty much acted as if he had an anger management problem very similiar to Roid Rage for the entire duration of his career. Unless he always took steroids, his behavior does not add up to an indictment. In all probability, Gary Sheffield did use steroids. But there is also a distinct possibility that he was basically innocent. If his version of his Bonds/Balco interactions are accurate and the damning receipt from BALCO was only for supplements (even if just steroid pre-cursor supplements), there is the real possibility that he has been done a great injustice. This is an inevitable result of the steroids scandal. Sooner or later (and probably already), a steroid abuser will be elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame (looking at you, Mike Piazza). Meanwhile, there will be players who are innocent who will be turned away because of rumor and innuendo. As many if not most things in life, this is hardly fair.

10) Alex Rodriguez [135 of 394, 34.3%, Ballot Year 1] 117.5 bWAR/3rd

Rodriguez is a completely different case than Clemens or Bonds or Sheffield or even Ramirez (or any other player accused or convicted of using steroids except maybe Ryan Braun). His behavior mitigates against any reduction of sentence. Neither Pete Rose nor Joe Jackson has ever been elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame. And neither should be. But they still serve the game of Baseball by providing an example of the dangers of gambling. Rodriguez, because of his extensively dishonest actions during his own steriod scandal, should never be allowed into the Hall of Fame either. Alex Rodriguez should remain outside the Hall of fame as a warning against the pitfalls of steroids. In this way, Rodriguez can still serve the game, just as Rose and Jackson do. No one needs to weep any tears for him either. He very smartly leveraged his steroid-aided career into a total paycheck [$450+ million] of epic proportions. That amount currently dwarfs the cumulative career pay of any other Major League player (though not for long). That should be reward enough for Alex. All that being said, it is a damn shame that his post-career attempt to buy the New York Mets with actress Jennifer Lopez failed. Rodriguez would have fit fight in with the people who populate the Owner’s suites.

11) Jeff Kent [129 of 394, 32.7%, Ballot Year 9] 55.5 bWAR/15th

The candidacy of Jeff Kent seems to be a type of Twilight Zone reverse twist on the strange Baseball Hall of Fame election of Ray Schalk. Schalk was the catcher for the 1919 Chicago White Sox, the team that threw the 1919 World Series and ended up being renamed the Black Sox. Of course, Schalk was not in on the fix. He was a member of the ‘clean’ Sox and not part of the eight man cabal that sold out the Series. Because of this, Ray Schalk was eventually elected to the Hall of Fame despite qualifications which were probably only apparent to his immediate family. Like Schalk, Jeff Kent labored under the shadow of a scandal that affected his team, the San Francisco Giants. He was the second best player on those Giants’ teams after Barry Bonds, the steroid abuser. Kent reportedly never took a steroid in his life. He was a Caucasian versus Bonds African-American heritage. Unlike Schalk, Jeff Kent was actually qualified for the Baseball Hall of Fame. So why hasn’t he been elected? As the anti-Bonds, it seems like the Hall of Fame would have elected Kent simply to snub their nose at Barry Bonds. Just like when Schalk was elected to snub the Black Sox. Even the fact that Kent was a great offensive second baseman, but no great shakes in the field, does not seem to have helped. Usually the big bat trumps the great glove. Why Jeff Kent has not received more support is a mystery. I don’t understand it.

12) Manny Ramirez [114 of 394, 28.9%, Ballot Year 6] 69.3 bWAR/6th

With the bat, Manny Ramirez was the third best of the thirty candidates that were considered by the BBWAA for the 2022 Baseball Hall of Fame Election (after Barry Bonds and A-Rod). In the field, Ramirez was the 29th best of the 30 eligible 2022 players (with only Gary Sheffield worse). Ramirez is obviously statistically over-qualified for the Hall of Fame despite his iron glove. But he was a steroid abuser. In many ways, the case against Manny Ramirez parallels the case against Alex Rodriguez. Like Rodriguez, Ramirez flunked the 2003 test that imposed testing on the players. Also like Rodriguez, Ramirez later tested positive under the new testing regime. But unlike A-Rod, Manny Ramirez did not deny that he took steroids. Ramirez did not lie or blame or try to destroy anyone after he flunked steroid tests in both 2009 and 2011. He simply accepted the suspensions and apologized. The non-election to the Hall of Fame of Barry Bonds, who was way better than Manny Ramirez by any measure and who was never suspended or caught cheating under the current testing protocols, probably nails the coffin shut on Ramirez’ chances. Are there any mitigating circumstances to excuse Ramirez’ transgressions? Well there is actually one.

One gets the sense that Ramirez just lived to hit baseballs and that he was probably willing to try anything to continue to hit baseballs. He continued to play professional baseball for many years after dropping out of the Majors. Back in the early days of Baseball, this was actually an option. Nowadays, not so much. Was it sad or noble? Either way, it actually gains him my sympathy. Who wouldn’t do whatever it took to try to continue doing the thing that they absolutely loved doing? In a way, Ramirez was an throwback to an earlier time. During his playing career, his various odd behaviors and strange antics were dismissed by the sportswriters as an eccentricities. They even came up with a phrase, ‘Manny being Manny,’ to describe it. Although it wasn’t ever spelled out, the gist of this theme was that Ramirez was most probably on the autistic spectrum. In Baseball’s early days, there were many eccentric players. Rube Waddell being probably the most noteworthy. There were even players with serious mental illnesses. The pitcher Ed Doheny slaughtered his entire family with an ax. Being on the autistic spectrum is probably as odd as it can get today. It seems like the current system, Tee Ball to Little League on up, weeds out the intellectually challenged. The last truly crazy big leaguer was probably Danny Thomas in the 1970s. But a little craziness can sure add a lot of color. Manny Ramirez will be missed by anyone who watched him play.

13) Omar Vizquel [94 of 394, 23.9%, Ballot Year 5]

Omar Vizquel became eligible for the Baseball Hall of Fame in 2018. Despite lukewarm support from modern baseball analysts, His eventual election to the Hall of Fame seemed to be inevitable. After just three years on the ballot, his vote percentage had risen to 52.6%. Every player on an similar trajectory had eventually been elected. In December 2020, his wife of the last six years filed for divorce and accused him of domestic abuse. This bad publicity seemed to hurt his chances slightly. In 2021, his vote percentage went down marginally to 49.1%. However, There was also the possibility that Vizquel’s percentage in 2021 went down because some modern analysts had begun writing that he was not worthy. In other words, a slight backlash against his coming election. Then, in August of 2021, Vizquel was charged by a former bat boy of sexual harassment. Like a space shuttle burning up on re-entry, Vizquel’s chances of induction all but evaporated. In 2022 his vote percentage dropped off a cliff to just 23.9%. Although stranger things have happened, it is very unlikely that Vizquel will ever be elected and inducted by the BBWAA now.

In theory, there are two types of Baseball Hall of Fame voters. One end of the spectrum would be the older, very conservative, anti-change writers who are usually newspaper writers (or bitter former newspaper writers) and still believe in old school statistics like the RBI. Murray Chass, formerly of the New York Times, is a great example of this type (the archetype would be the Dick Young, but Young is dead). In general, this group seems to be the most relentless in keeping the players who may have done steroids out of the Hall of Fame. The other end of the spectrum would be the young, liberal, pro-change bloggers who remember newspapers as something their parents read. They worship in the church of WAR. Keith Law, formerly of ESPN, would be an example of this type. They do not necessarily believe that the shame of steroids should ban a player from the Hall of Fame. In reality, it is not so quite cut and dry as this. Murray Chass, the sterotype of the cigar and whiskey old school newspaper writer, can be progressive every blue moon. On the other hand, Keith Law has a surprising amount of moral absolutism like an old school Baptist preacher in him. It seems like the old school voters were those supporting Vizquel’s Hall of Fame case, and the newer analytical voters were the ones giving Vizquel’s case a pass.

If the voters who abandoned him were just the Murray Chass types, Vizquel may have a shot at redemption. It seems that they would be more likely not to forgive a heterosexual abuse claim followed by a homosexual crime claim. Tolerance is usually associated with the young and liberal, not the ancient and conservative. On the other hand, the young liberal baseball analysts are also the ones that have claimed that Vizquel does not qualify statistically. Vizquel is just another data point in the generational divide. It will very interesting to see whether Vizquel’s vote totals go up or down during his last five years of eligibilty on the BBWAA ballot [Omar Vizquel Hall of Fame vote percentages first five years: 2018 37.0%, 2019 42.8%, 2020 52.6%, 2021 49.1%, 2022 23.9%]. If they go up, does this mean that some of the younger voters are forgiving him? If they do down, does that mean more younger voters are coming on-board who do not see him as qualified? Does Vizquel lose votes from both old and young voters as the knowledge that his candidacy is doomed causes them to jump ship? I personally believe the Hall of Fame candidacy of Vizquel is doubly doomed and he will lose even more votes. It will be fascinating to watch as the elections continue down through the years.

14) Sammy Sosa [73 of 394, 18.5%, Ballot Year 10-DONE] 58.6 bWAR/13th

Like Barry Bonds and Roger Clemens, the possibility that the BBWAA would elect Sammy Sosa to the Baseball Hall of Fame has now officially ended. This is probably a good thing because the Hall of Fame candidacy of Sammy Sosa has been pretty odd. Although nowhere near as qualified as either Bonds or Clemens, it seems like Sosa should have had way more support than he did. Of course, the normal explanation for his candidacy capsizing is the steroid scandal. Like David Ortiz, Sosa reportedly flunked the same problematic 2003 PED test that imposed steroid testing on the Major Leagues. Also like Ortiz, it is unknown what substance triggered Sosa’s positive result. There is no way to retest the sample as it was discarded. It might have been a false positive. The confidentiality of the test was illegally broken. Because of this, Sosa could argue that he was the victim. No matter how you slice it up, this reportedly flunked test is really the sum total of the evidence that keeps Sammy Sosa out of the Hall of Fame. Although he is not overwhelming qualified , Sosa does easily clear the 52.5 bWAR standard for the Hall. He also has one other thing that should have put him way over the threshold for induction. Sammy Sosa was really really famous.

With the evidence disqualifying Sosa from the Hall of Fame amounting to a warm bucket of spit, some of the Writers seem to have decided to charge Sosa with an additional crime against Baseball. In 2003, he was caught using a corked bat. Rather than denying he knew anything about it, Sosa confessed that it was his bat. He explained that his corked bat was not a game bat, and it had been accidentally mixed in with his regular bats. No one believed him. But who really cares? Baseball players have been using corked bats forever. A conviction for a corked bat is like a ticket for jaywalking. This doesn’t even compare with steroid accusations in the land of Baseball. Steroid allegations are the baseball equivalent of an assault with intent to kill charge (Gambling accusations would be the death penalty cases). Some writers seem to realize that the corked bat crap is pretty weak. So they usually bring up Sosa’s 2005 performance before a Congressional committee investigating steroid use in Baseball. During this hearing, Sosa denied taking steroids and also bizarrely denied that he could speak the English language. But, realistically, what sane person wouldn’t deflect the questions from the grandstanding amoral idiots that populate Congress?

In my opinion, there are three possible reasons why Sammy Sosa got so much less support than he should have for the Baseball Hall of Fame, even with the rumors and accusations of steroids. The first reason would be that the Hall of Fame voters did not believe that he had the stats to qualify. However, Sammy Sosa surely had the statistics that old school writers love while also qualifying, though not as overwhelmingly, under the modern analytics. Sosa should have gotten votes from both sides of the aisle. The next reason would be that Sosa was the victim of racism. There was always a racist undertone to the coverage of his career. It also hasn’t been helped by Sosa’s weird post-career project of lightening his skin. But racism is a slippery devil and it’s hard to pin this down as the cause of Sosa’s non-support for the Hall the Fame. The third and last reason, and the one I actually believe, would be that Sammy Sosa still labors under the large shadow of his rival Mark McGwire. The careers and personas of McGwire and Sosa are inexorably linked. But Sosa was clearly the second banana. McGwire won their home run duel. He was the better player. During that same 2005 Congressional hearing, McGwire refused to lie while Sammy Sosa pretended not to speak English. Of course, Mark McGwire, unlike Sosa, admitted that he took steroids and the BBWAA writers made an example of him and let him twist in the wind for the full ten years. After doing that, they apparently could not justify treating Sosa any better.

15) Andy Pettitte [42 of 394, 10.7%, Ballot Year 4] 60.2 bWAR/10th (tie)

Why Andy Pettitte doesn’t get a little more support for his induction into the Baseball Hall of Fame is beyond me. Pettitte played his whole career with the New York Yankees. He finished his career with a fantastic 256-153 Won/Loss record. Pettitte was a standout in the post-season with a 19-11 W/L record. He twice finished with 21-8 records. His 60.2 bWAR is comfortably above the Lowest Common Denominator bWAR score of 52.5 bWAR for induction into the Baseball Hall of Fame. Andy Pettitte was quite famous as one of the four Yankee players who formed the backbone of New York’s 1996-2000 dynasty (along with Mariano Rivera, Derek Jeter and Jorge Posada). Against all this, there are two demerits that seem to be keeping Pettitte out of Copperstown. The first is that he was “Don Sutton” good. Like Sutton, Pettite was virtually always good, but never truly great, season after season. Secondly, Pettitte got sideswiped by the performance enhancing drug [PED] scandal. It seems like these two things are crippling his candidacy.

Interestingly, a close look at Andy Pettitte’s role in the PED scandal does not really show any fire or even any smoke, simply some early morning fog. The Baseball Commissioner’s Office hired an outside consultant, former senator George Mitchell, to investigate PEDs usage in the game. Pettite confessed to Mitchell that he had briefly tried Human Growth Hormone [HGH] to speed his recovery from an injury. He said that he felt an obligation, because of his high salary, to get back on the field. Pettitte also stated that he discussed the HGH usage with fellow Yankee pitcher Roger Clemens. In the government’s perjury case against Roger Clemens, Pettitte just repeated these facts. Can Pettitte be forgiven for taking something to speed his recovery? Why is Human Growth Hormone treated exactly the same as steroids?. HGH helps repair the human body and does not have the same exact effects as steroids themselves. The two things that are strangest in the steroid scandal are 1) a complete lack of proportion and 2) an absence of forgiveness. According to Pettitte, he tried HGH briefly which is certainly a negliable offense. Can Any Pettitte not simply be forgiven for this an inducted into the Baseball Hall of Fame?

16) Jimmy Rollins [37 of 394, 9.4%, Ballot Year 1] 47.6 bWAR/19th

Every article I read analyzing the Baseball Hall of Fame case for Jimmy Rollins seems to assert that he is worthy because he may have been the best player on the 2008 Philadelphia Phillies World Series Champions. Is the best player on any World Series Championship team always of Hall of Fame caliber? Was Jimmy Rollins the best player on the 2008 Champs? I think the answer to the first question is probably. The answer to the second question is: no. Chase Utley was pretty obviously the best player on the 2008 Philadelphia Phillies. But Jimmy Rollins was almost surely the second best Phillie in 2008. For their careers, members of the 2008 Phillies probably rank: 1) Utley [64.5 bWAR], 2) Cole Hamels [59.3], 3) Jaime Moyer [49.8], and then Rollins [47.6]. Would the second best player on a World Series Champ, who was also the fourth best player career-wise on the team, necessarily be of Hall of Fame caliber? The answer would probably be no. Jimmy Rollins is close to a lowest common denominator Hall of Famer [bWAR of 52.5], but he just doesn’t quite make it [bWAR of 47.6]. I do not advocate his election.

The recent past of the Philadelphia Phillies franchise has been interesting. After the great Mike Schmidt teams of the late 1970s faded, the Phillies were losers (the team lost more than it won) every season from 1987 to the year 2000, except for 1993. In that one year, the Phillies caught some lightning in a bottle (or perhaps more appropriately Lenny Dykstra in a steroid syringe), won 97 games, and made it to the World Series before losing. From 2001 to 2007, the Phillies won 80 games or more each season [86, 80, 86, 86, 88, 85, 89]. Only in 2007 did they make the playoffs, where the Phillies were quickly eliminated. In 2008, the Phillies won 92 games and went all the way, winning an unexpected World Series. Then it got weird. In 2009, they won 93 games. In 2010, they won 97 games. In 2011, they won 102 games. But each year, they got farther away from the gold. The Phillies lost the World Series badly in 2009, and then were defeated in the National League Championship Series in both 2010 and 2011. Has any team ever won the World Series and then had their total team wins go up for three straight years afterwards without winning another one? After 2011, the Phillies collapsed. It wouldn’t be until 2021 that the Phillies won more than they lost again.

17) Bobby Abreu [34 of 394, 8.6%, Ballot Year 3] 60.2 bWAR/10th (tie)

Is it possible to be too boring a player to be a Baseball Hall of Famer? Bobby Abreu qualifies for the Hall of Fame statistically but not overwhelmingly. He was a very good hitter but never a really great hitter. He was nicknamed the Candy Eater in Spanish (“El Comodulce”) which is certainly cool but it was just a nickname he inherited from his father. He was engaged to Alicia Machado, who was crowned Miss Venezuela and then Miss Universe in 1996, but they called the marriage off. Despite good season after good season, he was only elected to the All Star team twice. He was durable and twice led the League in games played. His only other League leading totals were doubles once and triples once. He twice hit 30 or more Home runs and stole 30 or more bases in a season. He was an all purpose player, hitting 288 homers but with highs of just 30 and 31 HRs. He walked over 100 times a year for eight seasons in a row. He stole 400 bases for his career with a high of 40 in just one year. He passed through Baseball history like an ocean liner running at night with all the lights off.

Bobby Abreu could perhaps be considered the anti-David Ortiz. Both players were great hitters though Ortiz was obviously greater. Abreu was a doubles machine while David Ortiz was a home run slugger. Both often appeared to be slightly pudgy. However, while Ortiz seemed to be built like a stout oak tree, Abreu was still just slightly pudgy. Despite this, Abreu stole an amazing amount of bases considering his frame. The speed also meant that Abreu was a much better defensive player than Ortiz. Unlike Ortiz, Abreu came up to the Majors and was quickly given a job at 23, playing full-time in 1998 at age 24. He stayed in the line-up full-time year after year he was 37, finally retiring at 40 years old. Perhaps most importantly, Bobby Abreu only played 20 games in the post-season, getting just 67 at bats. Abreu never played in the World Series, not even one game. Of course, David Ortiz played in 85 post season games and got 304 at bats. Ortiz hit .455 and slugged .795 in three different World Series and his team won each time. By bWAR, Bobby Abreu is rated as a better player than David Ortiz [60.2 to 55.3]. He wasn’t for the same reasons that Manny Rameriz and Gary Sheffield were not. But Abreu was a hell of a player and, boring or not, deserves to be inducted eventually.

18) Mark Buehrle [23 of 394, 5.8%, Ballot Year 2] 59.1 bWAR/12th

Mark Buehrle could be considered the pitching version of Bobby Abreu. He was not a flashy strikeout pitcher. Instead, he threw strikes and kept the ball on the ground. Although there was no pizzazz, Buerhle was a Hall of Fame caliber hurler. He compiled a career record of 214-160 with 60.0 bWAR from 2000-2015. Retiring at the age of 36 after a 15-8 season, Buehrle could have certainly pitched longer and padded his career stats some more. Instead he walked away from the game. Mark Buehrle was a big chunky guy (listed at 6’2″ and 240 pounds) whose last name always echoed in my head as “Burly.” He also always reminded me of Rick Reuschel, another big chunky guy who played in Chicago and threw strikes and ground balls. Reuschel finished his career with the exact same number of wins as Buehrle but more losses (191) but a better bWAR (68.1). Like Reuschel, I expect Mark Buehrle to fade away on the Hall of Fame BBWAA ballots without getting an actual whiff of the Hall itself. It seems to already be happening as Buehrle debuted with 11.0% of the vote in 2021 but then barely hung on in 2022 with just 5.8% of the vote. Will he last one more year before being designated to the Veteran’s Committee scrap-heap?

19) Torii Hunter [21 of 394, 5.3%, Ballot Year 2] 50.7 bWAR/17th

With Mark Teixeira and Jimmy Rollins, Torii Hunter is one of the three players from the 2022 Baseball Hall of Fame Ballot who are just on the wrong side of the border line for induction. Like Teixeira, Hunter is actually close enough that the standard may eventually dip down low enough to include him. He was an interesting player from a psychological perspective. Torii Hunter was African-American and grew up poor in Arkansas. He was a religuous man and a striver (someone who works hard to improve himself). In 1992 at the age of 16, Hunter reportedly could not come up with the $500 fee to join the United States Junior Olympic baseball team. He wrote to the Arkansas governor (and later U.S. President) Bill Clinton for help. Clinton, to his great credit, paid the fee. From the very beginning, Hunter was persistent. This quality was later reflected in his career. In 1997, Hunter came up to the Major Leagues at the age of 21 for a very small cup of coffee [1 game]. In 1998, he played 6 games. He played part-time in in 1997 and 1998 but really did not hit well enough. In 1998, at the age of 25, Hunter had his first good season. He then essentially had this exact same season, some better and some worse, for fourteen years in a row. In 2015, now 39 years old, Torii Hunter began to fade just a little and called it a day.

Interestingly, Torii Hunter had his best two seasons by bWAR in 2009 [bWAR of 5.3] and 2012 [BWAR if 5.4]. He was 33 and 36 respectively in these two years. Modern baseball analysis postulates that a player quickly gets better until they peak at age 26. The player then declines slightly and plateaus until age 30 or so. Once in their 30s, the player declines much more rapidly. The career path of Torii Hunter is completely at odds with this theorem. His 30s were way more valuable than his 20s. It seems to me that Hunter was an outlier because of his psychological make-up. He was a driven man. He was a competitive man. He was a structured man of strong beliefs. This structure actually caused the only two real controversies of his career. Hunter got in trouble for differentiating African-American players and Afro-Latin players. And he got into trouble for saying that he would have problems playing with a homosexual. These statements were intolerant. But they also indicate a man with a structured belief system. The future of baseball scouting lies in determining what makes a man like Hunter tick. Physical talents are easy to spot. But the drive and determination that makes a player like Hunter strive to continue to improve? If a team could consistently figure this out, that team would have an enormous advantage drafting and scouting players.

OFF THE 2023 BALLOT [Less then 5%]

20) Joe Nathan [17 of 394, 4.3%, Ballot Year 1] 26.4 bWAR/25th

As discussed in the Billy Wagner comment above, it is hard for me to envision Joe Nathan as a Baseball Hall of Fame pitcher. Like most relievers, he failed as a starter first before spending the rest of his career throwing the snot out of the ball in the pen. His career bWAR of 26.4 is just slightly above the halfway point of the 52.5 bWAR threshold that my system uses to designate a Hall of Fame worthy career. The fact that Nathan received 5 more votes than Tim Hudson seems particularly bizarre. If Hudson had spent his entire career as a relief pitcher, there is almost no doubt in my mind that his pitching statistics would be better, probably much better, than those of Nathan.

21) Tim Hudson [12 of 394, 3.0%, Ballot Year 2] 57.9 bWAR/14th

Tim Hudson, who is qualifed to be in the Hall of Fame, seems to have suffered greatly from the continuing and endless BBWAA torture rack treatment of the Clemens and Schilling Hall of Fame cases. Although he qualifies (barely) as a Hall of Fame caliber pitcher, the career of Hudson looks like so much oatmeal compared to the careers of either Clemens or Schilling. In 2021, his first year on the ballot, Tim Hudson received just 5.2% of the vote. By barely clearing the five percent percent minimum to remain on the Ballot, Hudson was able to return for a second chance in 2022. Alas, it did him no good at all. He got just 3.0 percent of the vote in 2022. Hudson now falls off the BBWAA Ballot for good. This seems like an injustice. Oddly, Tim Hudson has a better case superficially than two pitchers who survived the 2022 election, and may still be elected by the Baseball Writers another day. While Tim Hudson finished his career with a fine 222-133 won-loss record, Andy Pettite compiled a 256-153 mark and Mark Buehrle pitched his way to a 214-160 log. Interestingly, Hudson now has a chance to elected quicker than either pitcher who was able to remain on the BBWAA ballot. Tim Hudson is eligible to be elected by the Today’s Era Committee for 2023. It is unlikely but you never know.

22) Tim Lincecum [9 of 394, 2.3%, Ballot Year 1] 19.5 bWAR/29th

Tim Lincecum, like the next player on this list (Ryan Howard), had the peak of a Hall of Famer but not the complete career. The first five years of his career were excellent. He won consecutive National League Cy Young awards as the best pitcher in the National League. He led the National League in strikeouts three years running. Lincecum certainly seemed to be on a Hall of Fame track. But he only pitched in the Majors for ten years total (the minimum number of years you can play and still be qualified for the Hall). The last five years of his career were a sad losing battle to regain the glory of those first five seasons. The fantastic young pitcher who comes up, takes over the League, and then fades out badly before punching his ticket to Cooperstown is a very familiar story (Herb Score, Vida Blue, Mark Fidrych, Dwight Gooden, Kerry Wood, Mark Prior, Rick Ankiel, Dontrelle Willis, etc). But it always leaves a very bittersweet taste of unachieved glory. How would the history of Baseball been changed if any these great young pitchers had been able to fulfill their promise? What was lost when their talent died on the vine before their time?

One of the themes of the 2022 Baseball Hall of Fame candidate class seems to be loose and fluid versus stiff and rigid. All athletes lose their talents as their bodies age. What once came naturally has to be maintained with greater and greater effort. Many athletes simply live lifestyles that eventually rob them of their physical gifts. Sometimes their talent dies a death of a thousand cuts as a cascade of minor injuries overwhelms their skills. Some athletes have their ability to compete at the highest level taken away by a catastrophic or tragic injury. A very lucky few have only time and the aging process itself combining to finish off their career. Tim Lincecum was nicknamed “The Freak” because his limber gymnastic delivery got the maximum out of his undersized and slender frame. As he aged, Lincecum seemed to simultaneously lose both his elastic agility and pitching form over time. As he lost his dexterity, a cascade of minor injuries wiped out the rest of his career. An interesting question is: Was it all inevitable or was there anything TimLincecum could have done to prolong his career? He certainly gave it his all.

Ryan Howard, the next player on this list, also saw his career fade badly as he got stiffer and more rigid. Of course, Howard did not start out anywhere near as limber as Tim Lincecum. Howard was somewhat stiff and immobile from the very beginning. But his home run power came from the ability to create tremendous torque with his body. His torque slowly begin to fade away after his early peak. Then Howard’s career basically collapsed under the strain of his own injury cascade.. Prince Fielder, a little lower on the list, also had his career derailed by getting stiffer and more unbending. Fielder’s career was first derailed and then completely ended by a herniated disc in his neck. But even before this, he was showing signs of losing his home run swing as his swing became stiffer and less fluid. What would be the answer for this? It could be yoga or gymnastics training. In any case, it would seem that career longevity has two components: 1) staying in shape and 2) staying limber.

23) Ryan Howard [8 of 394, 2.0%, Ballot Year 1] 14.7 bWAR/30th and last

Like David Ortiz, Ryan Howard had somewhat of a delayed start to his career. Blocked by Jim Thome from the Philadelphia Phillies first base job, he had to wait for the Phillies to trade Thome before taking over the position. Howard, in a perfect world, should have probably debuted in the Major Leagues at 23 years old in 2003. He should have been playing full-time in 2004 (instead he hit 46 Hrs with 141 RBIs in the Minors). He played half of the 2005 season in the Minors too (16 HR-54 RBI-.371 BA in just 61 Minor League games). Then he played the other half in the Major Leagues (22-63-.288 in 88 Major League games). Howard finally played his first full Major League season in 2006. This brings up an interesting question: How much credit do you give to a player whose Major League career is delayed by the player simply not getting a chance when they deserve it? If all the dominos had fallen perfectly, Howard should have had a year and a half more time in the Majors than he did. And his 2005 season in the Major Leagues may have actually resembled his career year in 2006.

Of all the players on the 2022 Hall of Fame Ballot, Ryan Howard had (by far) the lowest bWAR score. During his career Howard was credited with only 14.7 bWAR, just barely over a third of the wins above replacement needed by my system to qualify for the Hall of Fame. Even the three relief pitchers who have systematically lower WAR scores beat Howard easily. There are three reasons for this. First, Howard lost probably five to possibly eight WAR while blocked in 2004 and 2005. Second, Howard was defensively poor. During his prime seven years from 2005 to 2011, Howard was credited with 19.2 total bWAR. But this included -9.7 defensive bWAR. With just average defensive ability, Ryan Howard would have accumulated 28.9 bWAR during his prime. Finally, Howard had a fade out to his career that was more like a crash and burn with no survivors. From 2012 until his retirement after the 2016 season, Howard is credited with an awful -4.8 bWAR. His 2013 season was the only year in this career wipe-out that did not register as a negative. It’s almost too bad. If he had come up earlier and had a normal fade out to his career, Ryan Howard would have surely hit well over 500 home runs. But he probably wouldn’t have accumulated 52.5 bWAR. His slide into oblivion robbed the world of an old school sportswriter versus new school analyst argument about his Hall of Fame worthiness.

24) Mark Teixeira [6 of 394, 1.5%, Ballot Year 1] 50.6 bWAR/18th

Mark Teixeira seems to have had two different careers: one career before he signed a huge contract and another career after his signature dried upon it. In December of 2008, Teixiera signed his name on an agreement that would guarantee him 180 million dollars over eight years. Before this happened, he regularly hit over .300/.400/.550 [BA-OBP-SA] with personal highs of 43 HRs and 144 RBIs. In 2009, the first year of his contract, Teixiera had one last great year, leading the American League with 39 HRs and 122 RBIs while hitting for a .292 BA. He seemed to be a lock at this point for an eventual election to the Baseball Hall of Fame. But, from 2010 until he retired in 2016, Teixeira never batted over .256 again. He retained his HR power but struggled with constant injuries. In this second half of his career, he appeared not to be in the best of shape, going from a stocky physique to a more doughy one. The minute his eight year contract was up, Teixeira retired. When signing any pro athlete to a guaranteed long term contract, a team takes the risk that the player will just coast. Except for that first year after he was set for life, Mark Teixeira, rightly or wrongly, gave the impression that he was just cruising towards retirement.

Mark Teixeira will always live in my memory with Kevin McReynolds. For one thing, Teixeira and McReynolds looked like they were brothers from another mother. Neither player seemed motivated to get the absolute maximum out of their talent. Both men seemed to have left a Baseball Hall of Fame career on the buffet line. Perhaps this is too hard a judment. Not every man can be Ty Cobb or Jackie Robinson with a burning desire to compete, dominate and win. Mark Teixiera was a better player than McReynolds. Teixeira had much more offensive value than the defensively superior McReynolds. The Hall of Fame system based on Wins Above Replacement [WAR] leaves Teixeira just outside the Baseball Hall of Fame with 50.6 bWAR [with the lowest common denominator being 52.5 bWAR]. That seems to be a perfect summation of Teixeira’s career: a very good player just barely short of the Hall of Fame who would have been in if he had a little more fire in his belly. If this sounds too harsh, it could have been worse. Mark Teixeira coasted into retirement and just barely cost himself a Hall of Fame plaque. His career did not completely collapse after he became rich (see Carl Crawford below).

25a) Justin Morneau [5 of 394, 1.3.%, Ballot Year 1] 27.0 bWAR/24th

There was an old joke that goes: I went to a boxing match and a hockey game broke out. If you looked at Canadian Justin Morneau’s injury history without knowing his actual sport, you would probably guess that he played hockey or football. Off the top of my head, I don’t know of any other baseball player who had a possible Baseball Hall of Fame career totally derailed by multiple concussions. His career first began to go off track in 2009 when his year was ended by a stress fracture in his back. In 2010, when he was 29, Morneau had a MVP caliber season wiped out by a brain concussion (he had already won a undeserved MVP in 2006). Fascinatingly, Morneau played 81 games in 2010, which is exactly half of the 162 game schedule (On July 7th, when he suffered the concussion, Morneau had actually played in 82 of a possible 84 games). By simply doubling his statistics, you get a player who scores 106 runs on 204 hits with 50 doubles, 2 triples, 36 HRs and 112 RBIs. He would have walked exactly 100 times. Morneau slashed .345/.437/.618 and his doubled bWAR of 9.4 would have topped the Majors (Josh Hamilton, the American League MVP, lead the Majors with 8.7 bWAR). Could Morneau kept up the pace for the rest of the season? Was Morneau’s 2010 season the beginning of a series of peak seasons? We will never know.

When he suffered the concussion in 2010, Morneau had amassed 21.5 bWAR during his career (and it would have well over 25.0 bWAR if he had been able to maintain his 2010 pace). He played on from 2011 until 2016 but amassed just 5.5 extra bWAR before retiring. After hitting 30 or more Home Runs in 2006, 2007, and 2009 (and on track for more than 30 in 2010), Morneau never hit as many as 20 in a season again. During his last six years, Morneau really had only one more good season. In 2014, he registered 3.4 bWAR and won a mile-high-altitude assisted batting title for the Colorado Rockies. It seemed like his career might get back on track. But then Morneau lost virtually the entire 2015 season to another concussion. For all intents and purposes, the second concussion ended his career. In some alternative universe, Morneau was never injured in 2010. He had a renaissance from 2011 to maybe 2016, possibly hitting 40 HRs some seasons. A skeptic would point out that these were his early 30s age seasons when most players decline. But Morneau was from Canada and may bloomed late. After that, Morneau would have faded, perhaps retiring in 2021. Instead of just one and done on this year’s BBWAA ballot, Morneau would be waiting for his inevitable induction to the Baseball Hall of Fame by the BBWAA around 2026 or 2027. It’s a damn shame.

25b) Jonathan Papelbon [5 of 394, 1.3%, Ballot Year 1] 23.3 bWAR/28th

Clearly the worst of the three top relievers on the 2022 Baseball Hall of Fame ballot, Jonathan Papelbon was certainly the most colorful of the crew. He had no filter and often seemed not to be playing with a full deck. It is a humorous coincidence that his two former teammates Curt Schilling and Manny Ramirez were still on the ballot for Papelbon’s one and done shot at being elected to the Hall of Fame by the BBWAA. Schilling, no stranger to verbal controversies, famously commented about Papelbon: “He’s not exactly a charter member of Mensa.” And Ramirez may have been the only player in the Major Leagues with a bigger reputation as a flake during Papelbon’s career. Papelbon had much greater success in the post-season than Billy Wagner or Joe Nathan, his 2022 fellow travelers on the Ballot. But there are a lot of other relief pitchers who should be elected before Papelbon. The champion Red Sox teams of the first decade of the 21st century were a lot of fun.

27a) Prince Fielder [2 of 394, 0.5%, Ballot Year 1] 23.8 bWAR/26th (tie)

One of the many interesting results of the 2022 Baseball Hall of Fame Ballot was Ryan Howard finishing with eight votes to Prince Fielder’s measly two. By old school evaluation this seems about right. Ryan Howard whacked 382 HRs during his career while Fielder only banged 319 HRs. Howard’s peak season, 58-149-.313 [HR-RBI-BA], was much more impressive than any Fielder season [Prince peaked at 50-141-.313 but with every statistic in a different season]. Despite all this, Prince Fielder was actually a much better hitter overall than Howard because he got on-base at a much greater rate. Fielder’s on-base-percentage [OBP] was .382 against Ryan Howard’s more pedestrian .343 mark. Because of this Fielder finished his career with 23.8 wins above replacement according to Baseball Reference’s calculations [bWAR] while Howard ended up with only 14.7 bWAR. Both men were huge relatively immobile sluggers. But, if forced to chose, I would take the Prince and do my best to find him a good chiropractor early on in his career.

Although he was actually a better offensive player than Howard, Fielder was not superior defensively. The 2022 Ballot was littered with players who did not make their living with a glove. David Ortiz, who was so good in the field that he spent his career as a DH, cost his teams a win defensively about every 115 games. Manny Ramirez, who fielded as if he had just met his glove, cost his teams a win every 106 games. Gary Sheffield, who incredibly made Manny being Manny look good, cost his teams a victory every 93 games. Not to be outdone, Ryan Howard, who spent his defensive career imitating a statue, cost his teams a win every 91 games. But none of these players could touch Prince Fielder as a defensive liability. By the defensive wins above replacement stat in Baseball Reference [dWAR], Prince Fielder cost his teams a win in the field every 78.5 games. Fielder was incredibly atrocious between the lines. This is somewhat strange because my memories of him in the field are not that bad. Fielder must have been falling all over himself while I wasn’t watching.

Despite his rotten fielding, Prince Fielder would have probably ended up in the Baseball Hall of Fame with good health. Fielder was epically durable at the beginning of his career. In his first full season, he played 157 games in 2005. Fielder then played 158-159-162-161-162-162-162 games from 2006 until 2013. In the five seasons from 2009 to 2013, he missed just one game. However, during the 2013 season, his production fell off quite a bit and it was obvious that he was dealing with a physical problem. In 2014, at the age of 30, Fielder’s season was wrecked by a herniated disk in his neck. He hit only 3 home runs in 42 games. He returned in 2015 and had one last good season. Obviously still bothered by the neck injury, Fielder cut down on his swing and sacrificed power for contact. In 2016, his neck injury returned and once again he had a horrible year (8 HRs with a .212 BA in 89 games). After that season, Fielder had to undergo spinal fusion sugery of his neck vertabrae. His career was over. His last healthy season was apparently the 2012 campaign. At that point of his career, the 28-year-old Fielder had accumulated 21.5 bWAR and a cool 260 career HRs. Without injury, Fielder was a good bet to hit well over 500 HRs and maybe even 600. But his defense was so bad that reaching the 52.5 bWAR threshold was probably iffy. There would have been an interesting debate between the old school voters (500 HRs!) and the new school analysts about his worthiness. Considering his fame and his legacy as the son of Cecil Fielder, my money would have been on his inevitable election.

27b) A. J. Pierzynski [2 of 394, 0.5%, Ballot Year 1] 23.8 bWAR/26th (tie)

A. J. Pierzynski’s inclusion on the 2022 Baseball Hall of Fame Ballot is abit of a mystery. He was certainly a very good player. He was a catcher for his whole career and that position is worth some bonus points. He was an entertaining player, although some would say that adjective should be infuriating. He was certainly not boring. All that being said, I never once thought that Pierzynski was on a track to the Baseball Hall of Fame while he was active. Now that his career is over, no eureka moment or epiphany changes that conclusion even one iota. He was a good but not great player. The statistic that I use to sort Hall of Fame candidates certainly agrees. Pierzynski accrued only 23.8 bWAR, far short of the 52.5 bWAR that I believe is the threshold for the Hall. In other words, A. J. Pierzynski not even half as good as a normal Hall of Famer. For a baseball player, that is still very good. But unlike any of the other 29 players on the 2022 Ballot, I cannot even imagine a scenario in which AJ Pierzynski ends up having a Hall of Fame career. Perhaps Pierzynski got on the Hall of Fame Ballot because he was someone’s favorite player. If that person voted in the actual election, they found someone else who agreed that A. J. Pierzynski was worthy of a vote. Strangely enough, those two ultimately wasted votes seem just about right to me too.

29a) Carl Crawford [0 of 394, 0.0%, Ballot Year 1] 39.1 bWAR/22nd

Carl Crawford, like Prince Fielder and Justin Morneau on the 2022 Ballot, was on a Baseball Hall of Fame track in his 20s. But he had a completely different skill set than either of those players. Crawford’s game was primarily based on speed rather than power. By the end of the 2010 season, the 28-year-old Carl Crawford had already amassed 35.6 bWAR. He was coming off his very best year [110 runs scored, a league leading 13 3B, 19 HR, 90 RBIs, .307 BA, 47 SB, a career high 7.0 bWAR]. He was an excellent defensive player though limited to left field by a weak arm. It seemed inevitable that he would easily surpass the 52.5 bWAR lowest common denominator standard for the Baseball Hall of Fame. But, after his great 2010 season, Crawford signed a free agent contract for 142 million dollars over 7 years. He was never really worth a warm bucket of spit after that. Like Fielder and Morneau, his career was derailed by injuries that took him off the field. From 2011 until he retired after the 2016 season, Crawford’s cascade of injuries included: left wrist, left elbow, hamstring, left ankle, and oblique. He needed ‘Tommy John’ surgery on the left elbow. But, unlike Fielder or Morneau, injuries do not seem to tell the whole story.

As soon as he signed his enormous contract, Crawford certainly seemed to lose all motivation. He stopped keeping himself in shape and was obviously overweight for the entire fadeout of his career. How much this contributed to him being injury-prone from 2011 to 2016 is debatable. It surely didn’t help. Crawford got engaged to a woman who almost surely was not interested in supporting his career. He was released in June of 2016 with a year and a half left on his contract. Crawford didn’t try to catch on with another team. He admitted that he had always planned on retiring at the end of his enormous contract. In other words, Crawford was simply playing out the string for the money. It is hard to judge another person’s motivations without access to their actual thoughts. But the evidence points to a conclusion that, once he signed his massive contract, Carl Crawford lost all interest in delivering on his contractual obligations. Perhaps this is too harsh. Maybe the injuries were so dispiriting that he simply gave up. Nevertheless, if he had just duplicated his career value amassed before age 29, Carl Crawford would have slid into the Baseball Hall of Fame without a tag. Zero votes seems about right.

29b) Jake Peavy [0 of 394, 0.0%, Ballot Year 1] 39.2 bWAR/21st

Jake Peavy twice lead the National League in both earned run average and strikeouts and once in games won. He won the National League Cy Young award and pitching Triple Crown (Wins, ERA, and Strikeouts) in 2007, his best season. From his first season in 2002 until 2007, Jake Peavy was certainly on a Hall of Fame track. But, from 2008 until his retirement after the 2016 season, Peavy’s career was derailed and then finished by injuries. During that time, he was only able to pitch full seasons in 2012 and 2014. Despite that, Peavy had a pretty good career, finishing with a 152-126 record and being credited with 37.2 bWAR. However, by most reasonable evaluations, it falls short of a Hall of Fame career [LCD=52.5 bWAR] and his chance at election to the Baseball Hall of Fame is now one and done without receiving a single vote.

It’s interesting to compare the vote totals of Jake Peavy with Tim Lincecum, who also was one and done in 2022. Lincecum got 9 votes to Peavy’s zero. Lincecum finished his career with a 110-89 record. He was credited with just 19.9 bWAR despite winning back to back National League Cy Young awards in 2008 and 2009 and also leading the League in strikeouts three years running (2008-2010). By any measure, Lincecum had a higher peak. Lincecum’s best two years (the Cy Young award years) are both much better than any season of Peavy’s career, even his own Cy Young Award season. But, by any measure, Peavy had the greater career. Lincecum’s much superior showing in the vote can only be explaining by valuing peak value far over career. In a way, it does not really matter. Neither man was Baseball Hall of Fame worthy.

Final Thoughts – The Baseball Hall of Fame Tracker

The results of the 2022 Baseball Writer’s Association of America [BBWAA] election for the Baseball Hall of Fame were announced on January 25, 2022. Before the announcement, one thing was completely clear: the only player with any chance of actually being admitted in 2022 by the BBWA was David Ortiz. A week before the election was final, the Hall of Fame tracker compiled by Ryan Thibodaux had counted 162 of the published BBWAA ballots. David Ortiz had been included on 144 of these ballots. In other words, Ortiz was, at that time, polling 83.7% of the ballots cast. As the requirement for induction is 75% of the ballots, it was obvious that Ortiz had a good chance. But he was the only player with a shot. With 394 ballots being cast, David Ortiz needed to simply hang on to get elected. Previous years of the Baseball Hall of Fame Tracker [BHOFT] indicated that Ortiz’s percentage would shrink as more and more ballots were counted (because the real reactionary voters who send in empty ballots or with the baseball equivalents of Elmer Fudd included usually do not publish their ballots). Is it a good thing that the results of the election were all but certain before it was even over?

Because Ryan Thibodaux’ BHOFT has pretty much ruined the possibility of a surprise induction, some baseball writers have posed the question of whether the BHOFT is ruining the process of the Baseball Hall of Fame vote. The clear answer to that question is pretty much no. The Baseball Writers are just using the question to write a column and fill empty space. If anything, the BHOFT has brought needed scrutiny to the whole voting process. It is apparent that some of the BBWAA members should not be allowed to vote for the Baseball Hall of Fame at all. Because the BHOFT keeps track of individual votes, it is possible to see which writers take their responsibility seriously. The Baseball Hall of Fame should not take the vote away from the BBWAA. The BBWAA has certainly done a better job than any of the Committees appointed by the Hall of Fame. But it is obvious that all votes should be published. It is also obvious that the Baseball Hall of Fame should have some process to eliminate the writers who vote for reasons that are basically stupid. The Baseball Hall of Fame tracker could be used to improve the process immensely. Which means that it will probably never happen.

Post #11

The 2022 Hall of Fame BBWAA Election, Part A

Status is about numbering, counting, ranking and ultimately about excluding. Andy Crouch

January 15, 2022

In earlier posts, I discussed the twenty candidates under consideration by the Early Baseball Era and Golden Days Era Committees [10 players each] for their possible 2022 induction into the Baseball Hall of Fame. For my evaluation of whether these old time players were worthy, I used an analysis based on the WAR [wins above replacement] statistic from the Baseball Reference website. Now I will use the same procedure to analyze the 30 candidates being voted on by the Baseball Writers Association of America [BBWAA]. These results will be announced on January 25, 2022. Basically my method was simple. Starting with the assumption that the Hall of Fame only wants to honor the very best players, I asked this question: “How many eligible players have already been inducted into the Hall of Fame before 2022?” Unfortunately, I had to exclude the players from the Negro Leagues. But I also had to include some players elected as either Executives or Managers (that would have been elected as Players too). With those two qualifications, the answer to the question of how many eligible players have already been elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame before 2021 turned out to be 235.

My Rating System

My second assumption was that the Baseball Hall of Fame always meant to honor the best 235 eligible players. Using that assumption, I then asked who was the 235th best eligible player in the history of Baseball according to the Career WAR calculation on Baseball Reference [bWAR]. The answer to that question turned out to be Bid McPhee with 52.5 bWAR. The career WAR total of this 235th best player then established the lowest common denominator for entry into the Hall of Fame. In other words, if a player has more than 52.5 bWAR, that player should be inducted. If not, then they should be barred. A nice simple clean objective system. However, as is usual with all supposedly nice simple clean objective systems, there is still the possibility of an error or even an injustice if the player does not amass the requisite 52.5 bWAR. One obvious injustice would be: “Was the player a victim of discrimination (such as the Negro League players)?” Another example of a possible error would be: “Was the player primarily a catcher (a position that wears players out faster)?” Yet another problem would be: “Does the player’s career bWAR number fall short because their career was interrupted by Military Service?” The lowest common bWAR denominator is the beginning of the conversation, not the end of the debate.

These three exceptions are the obvious major problems with using Baseball Reference’s bWAR calculation as a bright shining line. The bWAR calculation also does not give any extra credit for a player’s post-season heroics. Not giving David Ortiz, a first time candidate for induction in 2022, bonus points for his incredible performances in the post season seems to miss the essence of the Baseball Hall of Fame. On the other hand, a debit should be made for any player who constantly underperformed when the lights were brightest (Billy Wagner, on the current ballot, and his post-season ERA of 10.03 would certainly qualify). On top of all this, there is the essential question of: “How good is all the information going into the bWAR calculation itself?” Like any system built to spit out ratings, the end result will only be as good as the data going in the front door. There are other systems that attempt to rate the total career value of baseball players: Total Value, Win Shares, and several different versions of Wins Above Replacement. Although I currently believe that bWAR is the best current system, I could be wrong.

One Glitch in the System

The biggest flaw in any of these systems is simply the fact that all baseball statistics are not created equal. There are basically three types of statistics to measure a baseball player’s career: Batting, Pitching, and Fielding. The Batting metric is relatively straight forward and all measurements of this value highly correlate to the player’s worth. The Pitching metric is a bit more complicated. There are problems separating the value of the Pitching from the last metric, Fielding. To complicate matters, this problem has a Time Line component. In other words, the farther back in time that you go, more and more value that is attributed to Pitching is actually Fielding. The last metric, Fielding, is the great unknown. A good example of this would be the current baseball enthusiasm for shifts. A player could play for a team that uses fielding analytics well and maximizes his defensive positioning. Because of this, the player looks like a great fielder. Meanwhile, with another team that is poorly run with little or no defensive analytics, the same player could seem to be a bad fielder because his positioning is bad. In other words, the value is not intrinsic to the player. It is simply caused by his situation (like the difference between two exactly equivalent pitchers, but one backed by a great defense while the other is supported by a team full glove-less wonders). For this reason, I take Fielding statistics with a much greater grain of salt.

The Ratings Themselves

Without further ado, I will list the 30 Candidates eligible for induction into the Baseball Hall of Fame on July 24, 2022, by the BBWAA. They have been listed in the order of their career bWAR rating. After their name, their career bWAR value is listed, followed by their defensive WAR rating [also from the Baseball Reference website]. By my system, sixteen [16] of the 2022 candidates qualify for induction and fourteen [14] do not. It does occur to me that 16 qualified candidates for election seems very high. My next post will discuss these thirty players in a more detail after the election results are announced. Once again, my system concludes that any player with 52.5 career bWAR (or more) should be inducted into the Baseball Hall of Fame.

Hall of Famers on the 2022 Ballot [Player/Career WAR/Defensive WAR]

  1. Barry Bonds [162.7 ~ 7.6]
  2. Roger Clemens [138.7]
  3. Alex Rodriguez [117.5 ~ 10.4]
  4. Curt Schilling [80.5]
  5. Scott Rolen [70.1 ~ 21.2]
  6. Manny Ramirez [69.3 ~ -21.7]
  7. Andruw Jones [62.7 ~ 24.4]
  8. Todd Helton [61.8 ~ -5.0]
  9. Andy Pettitte [60.7]
  10. Gary Sheffield [60.5 ~ -27.7]
  11. Bobby Abreu [60.2 ~ -10.9]
  12. Mark Buehrle [60.0]
  13. Sammy Sosa [58.6 ~ -0.3]
  14. Tim Hudson [56.5]
  15. Jeff Kent [55.5 ~ -0.1]
  16. David Ortiz [55.3 ~ -20.9]

Non-Hall of Famers on the 2022 Ballot

  1. Torii Hunter [50.7 ~ 4.0]
  2. Mark Teixeira [50.6 ~ -0.9]
  3. Jimmy Rollins [47.6 ~ 15.9]
  4. Omar Vizquel [45.6 ~ 29.5]
  5. Carl Crawford [39.1 ~ 1.5]
  6. Jake Peavy [37.2]
  7. Billy Wagner [27.8]
  8. Justin Morneau [27.0 ~ -6.6]
  9. Joe Nathan [26.4]
  10. Prince Fielder [23.8 ~ -20.5]
  11. A.J. Pierzynski [23.8 ~ 8.4]
  12. Jonathan Papelbon [23.3]
  13. Tim Lincecum [19.9]
  14. Ryan Howard [14.7 ~ -17.3]

Notes: Negative defensive WAR listed in red type. If players are tied, player with better offensive WAR listed first.

The above lists of the current 2022 candidates should probably generate a little sympathy for the BBWAA members who are voting this year. There are sixteen fully qualified Hall of Famer players eligible on the 2022 BBWAA Ballot. A Ballot which is limited to just ten spots. With this many qualified Baseball Hall of Famers on the Ballot, the candidates are bound to cannibalize votes from each other. This will make it much harder, if not almost impossible, for any single player to meet the 75% requirement of votes cast to be inducted. On the other hand, one could easily argue that the BBWA itself is completely responsible for this predicament by riding the moral high horse and refusing to elect any players who used or were suspected of using steroids, so perhaps no sympathy is warranted.

Interestingly, this problem will be significantly reduced by the time that the 2023 Baseball Hall of Fame election rolls around. Four of the fully qualified players [Bonds, Clemens, Schilling, and Sosa] are in their tenth and final year on the Ballot. Yet another qualified player [Hudson] does not appear to be on track to get the minimum 5% requirement of the 2022 Ballots to get relisted on the 2023 Ballot. Lastly, David Ortiz (strangely enough the least qualified of the sixteen players certified by my system as Hall of Famers) is on track to be elected this year. With all these players removed, the 2023 Hall of Fame Ballot should only have 10 candidates who deserve election returning from 2022. These ten will be joined by only one player [Carlos Beltran] who is eligible for the first time in 2023 that also qualifies under my system.

Next:

In my next post [Part B], I will discuss these thirty candidates in a little more detail and also talk about the Baseball Hall of Fame tracking metrics that have been developed by Ryan Thibodaux. This system lets anyone know whether a candidate actually has a chance to be elected way before the vote has actually been announced. Basically, because of Thibodaux’ tracking system, the only real question right now is whether David Ortiz will be elected or not. No one else has a snowball’s chance in hell of being elected.

Post #10

2021: The Year in Review, Part A

History is a myth agreed upon. Napoleon Bonaparte

January 1, 2022

For the Baseball fan, the year of 2021 was probably far more interesting than usual. After the Co-vid pandemic wiped out most of the 2020 season, Major League Baseball played the 2021 season under the threat that this contagion would wipe out another year too. Fortunately, the 2021 Baseball season was finished without any interruptions. The year was filled with interesting stories and unforgettable moments, everything from Shohei Ohtani turning into the modern day Babe Ruth to Trea Turner’s strangely graceful pop-up slide across home plate. The year in Major League Baseball ended with the Atlanta Braves winning the World Series in 6 games over the Houston Astros. After finishing a grueling season against all odds, the final coda to the 2021 season was even harsher. The Major League Baseball Owners locked the Major League Players out on December 1st of 2021, threatening the beginning of the 2022 season. It certainly felt like Deja Vu; or perhaps just a bad feeling of “the more things change, the more things stay the same.” But none of these things are the first thing that comes to mind when I think about the 2021 season. I believe that the year 2021 marked a major milestone in the Baseball Time Line. I maintain that 2021 was the first year of Baseball’s “Third Age.” The future of Baseball has arrived. Or perhaps I just read too many books about History.

The Time Line of Baseball History

Historians love to cut up time into Ages and Eras, Epochs and Generations. Then they divide these units like quadratic equations. The long Time Line of Baseball History is treated no differently by those who chronicle it. Even the casual Baseball fan has probably heard of the Dead Ball Era or the Lively Ball Era or the Golden Age of Baseball. Before the internet site Baseball Reference became the go-to-place for Baseball statistics, many fans got their stats from published encyclopedias. One of these old encyclopedias (Neft’s: The Sports Encyclopedia Baseball) even arranged its statistics by Eras. These arbitrary periods of time often make no sense. The “Dead Ball Era” is usually listed as lasting from 1901 to 1919. But this is simply not correct. The defining line of the Dead Ball Era should be the adoption of the cork-centered baseball. This “lively” baseball” was adopted late in the 1909 season and first fully used in 1910. The true Dead Ball Era was from 1871 until 1909. From 1910 to 1919, baseball players were damaging, defacing, deforming, vandalizing or dirtying up the new lively baseball until it acted like a non-cork-centered “Dead” ball. It is odd that no baseball historian has ever nicknamed this transitional time period the “Dirty Ball Era.”

The First Age of Baseball

In any event, during the entire history of Professional Baseball from 1871 to the present, there are only really two distinct “Ages” in the Baseball Time Line. Of course, these “Ages” can be endlessly sub-divided into many smaller Eras. But the true “First Age” of Baseball lasted from the initial professional season of 1871 until 1945 (before 1871 would be the equivalent of the prehistory or “Dark Ages” of professional baseball). This First Age could also be called the “Age of Segregation.” This Age’s chief characteristic was the establishment of two completely different systems of Professional Baseball. One system was called “Organized Baseball.” This structure was comprised of the White Major Leagues and its affiliated minor leagues. Alongside Organized Baseball grew a completely different and separate system which offered baseball players of African American heritage opportunities to pursue their careers. This other structure is now usually referred to as the “Negro Leagues.” In its broadest sense, the “Negro Leagues” included not only the teams and leagues of the actual Negro Leagues but also the entire structure, from the summer fields of Latin America to the wind swept plains of Canada, under its umbrella.

In this First Age, the sport of Baseball was truly the “National Pastime” of the United States of America. Virtually every village or town had its own baseball team. Every small city had multiple teams. Larger cities were awash in both professional and amateur teams and leagues. There were many professional traveling teams. If you grew up in the United States from 1871 until 1945, it is very unlikely that you did not participate in the game of baseball in some way. Baseball had no real competition from other sports for its talent; and, because Baseball was so widespread, this talent could come from anywhere. Both the best white player and black pitcher of this Age (Babe Ruth and Satchel Paige) came from reform schools. Although the White Major Leagues represented the pinnacle of Baseball in the United States, the Minor Leagues were mostly independent teams and leagues. A good professional ballplayer could play in this system until his late 40s or even early 50s and then manage or coach until he was ready to retire. During this First Age, Baseball grew outside the United States in places as far apart as Canada and Japan. But mostly it grew in Cuba and other Latin America countries, reaching all the way down to Venezuela in South America.

The Second Age of Baseball

In 1946, the “Second Age” of Baseball began when the White Major League’s Brooklyn Dodgers club signed Jackie Robinson of the Negro League’s Kansas City Monarchs to a Minor League contract. This Age could also be called the “Age of Integration.” As the walls of segregation came tumbling down, it was at the complete expense of the parallel Baseball system operating behind the “Color Line.” By the 1960s, the Negro Leagues had completely crumbled and disappeared. All of the Latin American teams and leagues that had been part of the Negro League system became affiliated and subservient to Organized Baseball. Simultaneously, the Major Leagues extinguished the final traces of Minor League independence. All Minor League teams became part of a Major League “farm system.” By moving teams around and adding new franchises, the Major Leagues covered the entire country. At the end of the 20th century, the Major Leagues even began signing the greatest players from the Japanese Major Leagues. By the dawn of the 21st century, the Major Leagues reigned supreme at the pinnacle of the Baseball pyramid. All of the remaining talent in the Baseball world flowed towards the lucrative paychecks from the Major Leagues.

However, during this “Second Age” of Baseball, the sport lost its status as the “National Pastime” of the United States of America. At the very least, Football surpassed Baseball as the most popular sport in the country (and, it could be argued, probably Basketball too). The blanket of baseball teams that covered the country down to the smallest hamlet evaporated. Baseball talent began to be funneled up from organized youth leagues or colleges. Players who fell off a career path to the Major Leagues were unable to continue their careers for very long. Other professional sports were able to drain away some of the best talent. Vincent “Bo” Jackson, possibly the most physically gifted player of the 1980s, played Baseball as a “hobby” during Football’s off-season. At the beginning of this Second Age, the very greatest players (Henry Aaron, Mickey Mantle, Willie Mays) were all the sons of fathers whose love of baseball had never been consummated with a Major League career. Later, the best players (Ken Griffey Jr., Barry Bonds) were the sons of former Major League players. As the Age wore on, players from Latin America Countries that loved Baseball poured into the Major Leagues in ever greater numbers. Baseball became just another competitive sport played by the talented few for the entertainment of the many.

The Third Age of Baseball?

I believe that the “Second Age of Baseball” ended in the pandemic wrecked season of 2020. Of course, the symmetry of the First Age of Baseball lasting exactly 75 years from 1871 to 1945 and then the Second Age lasting exactly 75 years from 1946 to 2020 seems too proportionately pat to be true. But what better year to call the end of the Second Age than 2020? The Baseball year of 2021 saw the final and absolute subjugation of the Minor League system by the Major Leagues. And, for the first time, the very best player in the Major Leagues (Shohei Ohtani) was not even raised in the United States. A new Age has dawned. The first question should probably be: what should we call this Age? One candidate would simply be the “International Age” of Baseball in honor of the great Ohtani. Yet another candidate would be the “Corporate Age” of Baseball in honor of the “Money Ball” tactics of modern front offices. Baseball, which spent most of its history governed like a old school southern plantation, is now managed like a modern business. The baseball season of 2021 ended in a lock out of the Major League Players. The Baseball Owners are prepared to fight and possibly wreck the game so that their new found business skills can continue to be leveraged to increase their profits at the expense of the players.

One notable feature of this new Baseball Age is the degree that the sport has become a game of birthright. The game is definitely no longer the National Pastime, played by all. You could also call this part of the Baseball Time Line the “Legacy Age.” Ken Griffey Junior could be the poster child for this name. Long ago, baseball players would come from just about anywhere. There is no evidence that the father of either Babe Ruth or Satchel Paige ever played the game. Now many of the best players (Vlad Junior, Tatis Junior, etc) have fathers who played in the Major Leagues. The future of Baseball may be ruled by the sons of former Major Leaguers. Of course, right now many of the best players are still the sons of frustrated former baseball fathers who didn’t make it (Mike Trout, whose father played in the Minor Leagues, and even the great Shohei Ohtani, whose father played in the Japanese Industrial Leagues, would be examples). In this “Third Age” of Baseball, the game will probably begin to more and more resemble the Hollywood Film Industry. Hopefully, the game of Baseball will never have to have a player change his last name (like Nick “Cage” Coppola) to short circuit charges of nepotism rather than talent.*

*Update [3/13/2022]: Oddly enough, something like this has already happened. Only the last names were not changed to protect the guilty. Marc Sullivan, the son of the Boston Red Sox co-owner Haywood Sullivan, played for the BoSox in 1982 and 1984-1987, getting into 137 Major League games. The sum total of the reasons why Sullivan was given a Major League job are contained by this sentence: He was the son of the Boston Red Sox co-owner Haywood Sullivan.

Conclusion

What does all this mean? The human mind loves to organize information. So, in a sense, these historical markers in the “Time Line” of Baseball are just man-made constructs that separate what is really just gradual changes with various exclamation marks. But there is also always the chance that organization will result in insight.

NEXT:

  1. Another Hall of Fame Post: the BBWA Ballot for 2022
  2. The Year in Review, Part B: The Giants and Old Age
  3. The Year in Review, Part C: The Braves and the Legacy of the Negro Leagues

Post #9

Lock Out: Creative Accounting

There’s no Business like Show Business; but there are several Businesses like Accounting. David Letterman

December 30, 2021

In May of 2020, with the Co-vid pandemic threatening to wipe out the entire season, Major League Baseball Commissioner Rob Manfred (aka the Baseball Owners’ mouthpiece) estimated that Major League Owners could collectively lose 4 billion dollars for the year. In October of 2020, after the abbreviated season finished, Manfred claimed that Major League Baseball had operational losses of 2.8 to 3.0 billion dollars for the 2020 season and was loaded with 8.3 billion dollars in debt. In other words, the thirty [30] Major League clubs were averaging 100 million dollars of losses a year and deeply in debt. With that amount of yearly losses and outstanding debt, a normal business would be contemplating bankruptcy [restructuring if not liquidation]. In December of 2020, player agent Scott Boras responded to Rob Manfred’s claims. In a press conference that sounded like he was channeling boxing promoter Don King, Boras stated: “There’s no team in baseball that lost money last year.” Snidely, Boras pointed out that lost profits are not exactly the same thing as actual losses. Rob Manfred dismissed Boras’ claim, saying that the 3.0 billion dollars were actual losses, not just lost profits. With the Lock Out putting a damper on actual baseball news, I thought that I would look back at this bit of creative accounting. Who was telling the truth, Rob Manfred or Scott Boras?

Creative Accounting 101

Starting out the analysis by just shooting at the already dead fish in the barrel, let’s look at Manfred’s claim that Major League Baseball was an astounding 8.3 billion dollars in debt. That statement could very well be true. Of course, almost all of this 8.3 million dollars of debt is long term player contracts. But just simply looking at this debt without also looking at any offsetting income would be ridiculous. Currently, Major League Baseball has three long-term contracts for national TV broadcasting rights with 1) Disney [ESPN] FOR 3.85 Billion, 2) Fox for 5.10 billion, and 3) Warner [TBS] for 3.70 billion. With the caveat that these contracts were recently re-negotiated, that’s 12.45 billion dollars in guaranteed future income which can offset that supposed 8.3 billion dollars of future debt. It would certainly seem that Major League Baseball is not tottering on the edge of bankruptcy but is actually completely financially solvent and almost surely profitable. In other words, Manfred’s claim about Major League Baseball being 8.3 billion in debt, even if true, is just a bunch of baloney, signifying absolutely nothing. That would be strike one against the belief that Rob Manfred was truthful source.

Rob Manfred may be Pinocchio’s Cousin

What about Rob Manfred’s claim that Major League Baseball lost 3.0 billion dollars in 2020? If that statement was literally true, the 2021 baseball season should have been an exercise in industry wide belt tightening. However, in November of 2021, the Baseball Owners handed out a staggering 1.7 billion dollars in player contracts after the season ended. This wild spending spree demolished the previous monthly record. Of course, if the intervening 2021 season had produced record profits, the Baseball Owners would have had a good explanation for this behavior. But it was stated by Rob Manfred, their Commissioner, that profits for 2021 were down substantially. From all this, one can only assume that Manfred’s claim that Major League Baseball had actually lost 3.0 billion dollars in 2020 and his subsequent denial that it was just lost profits, is almost surely untrue. On the other hand, the assertion by Scott Boras that not a single baseball team lost money in 2020 and that the 3.0 billion dollars in losses claimed by Manfred are actually just lost profits is almost certainly a truthful statement. That would be strike two against any belief in Rob Manfred telling the truth.

But let’s do some actual math. In 2019, the Revenue of Major League Baseball was reported by Forbes Magazine as 10.70 billion [other sources report it as between 9.9 and 10.37 billion]. All this income reportedly came from: 1) Gate Receipts of about 4 billion; 2) Local TV revenue of reportedly 2.5 billion; 3) National TV revenue of about 1.8 billion; 4) Licensing of about 1.0 billion; 5) Sponsorships of about 800 million; 6) Concessions of around 500 million; and 7) other sources of 100 million. Of course, all of these numbers are estimates and are not being double checked by any reputable accounting firm [not that scandals such as Enron would give anyone much faith in so-called reputable accounting firms]. But the estimates are basically reasonable from all that is known and Major League Baseball has not disputed them. Forbes estimated that Major League Baseball made a profit of 2.5 million in 2019. Manfred and the Baseball Owners did dispute this. They responded that their actual profit in 2019 was exactly zero dollars. This deserves to be re-stated. The Owners claimed, with a straight face, that they made no money at all in 2019. It has to be presumed that, if asked, the Owners would also claim that their profits in 2021 were zero also. So the next question would be: was Forbes Magazine or the Baseball Owners telling the truth about whether Major League Baseball made any profit at all in 2019?

Steve Cohen is probably a very good businessman

On Friday, October 30, 2020, Billionaire Steve Cohen completed his purchase of the New York Mets for 2.475 billion dollars. The previous record price for a Major League Baseball team had been the Los Angeles Dodgers, sold for 2.00 billion dollars in 2012. Right before Cohen bought the Mets, the Kansas City Royals sold for exactly one billion dollars during the 2019 season. The Royals are always listed as one of the least valuable Major League franchises (usually with the two Florida teams). The New York Yankees are usually appraised as the most valuable Major League franchise. The estimate of the purchase price of the Yankees ranges anywhere from 5.0 to 7.0 billion dollars. So the current range in values for a Major League franchise goes from 1.0 billion on the low end to 5.0 (maybe even 7.0) billion at the high end. The median value would then probably be about 2.0 to 3.0 billion. From these numbers, it should be easy to estimate how much each team makes per year simply by using a cap rate formula. Cap rate [or capitalization rate] uses the annual Net Operating Income [NOI] of any business to determine its property asset value [PAV]. In other words, if a business being sold makes this much money per year, cap rate answers the question of how much you should pay for it.

The reverse of this equation is that you can also use the purchase price of a business to figure out approximately how much income a business generates. For instance, if a business is purchased for 2.0 billion dollars and the cap rate is 5.0, the business probably generates about 100 million in revenue annually. When Steve Cohen purchased the New York Mets, a 5.0 cap rate would have been a good, but not outstanding, return. Using a 5.0 cap rate, the purchase price of 2.475 billion would seem to indicate that the Mets generated more than 100 million per year. However, if you believe Rob Manfred that Major League Baseball teams just broke even in 2019 and lost money in 2020, this purchase price makes absolutely no sense at all. Of course, there is always the possibility that Cohen, who made a fortune investing in hedge funds, is a bad businessman. Or that he wildly overpaid for the Mets because owning a Major League Baseball team is all about prestige, not profits. But the truth of the matter is almost surely that Cohen bought the Mets from the previous owners as an investment and he probably paid a good, but not outstanding, cap rate for it.

Assuming that the cap rate of about 5.0 is correct and Steve Cohen is actually a good businessman, the New York Mets almost surely generated somewhere around 125 million dollars of income in 2020. The Kansas City Royals would have made about 50 million a year and the New York Yankees (provided the estimated franchise values are correct) somewhere between 250-350 million dollars. Interestingly, if all these figures are correct, Steve Cohen is certainly a pretty good businessman. He purchased the Mets from the Wilpons (who, as victims of the Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme, were not known for being all that financially astute) for basically the average purchase price of a Major League Baseball team. But the New York Mets, located in the largest media market in the country, are hardly a mid-market team. Only the mismanagement by the Wilpons had been keeping the team down. The Mets have more in common with the Yankees than the ordinary Major League club. So the question boils down to: do you believe Steve Cohen is a good businessman or that Manfred was lying about the profits of Major League baseball being zero? That would have to be strike three against Rob Manfred.

Lock Out Blues

Even more interestingly, if you try to estimate the net operating income of Major League Baseball with a currently normal cap rate of 5.0 and an average franchise price of 2 billion dollars (i.e. all 30 Major League teams together are worth a cumulative 60 billion dollars), the profits of the whole League come out to 3 billion dollars annually. In other words, the same exact amount that Rob Manfred claimed baseball lost in 2020. The most likely conclusion is that Scott Boras was correct: the Owners lost profits were 3 billion dollars in 2020. If the Owners did actually make 3.0 billion dollars of profits out of 10.7 billion dollars in revenue in 2019, Baseball has to be an incredibly lucrative business for the Owners. But, if that is true, then why in God’s name have the Owners locked out the Major League players and threatened the pig that lays golden eggs? The answer to that is simple. It is the most basic reason any billionaire becomes a billionaire: greed. As the player’s salaries have stagnated recently, the overall revenue of Major League Baseball has soared. Virtually every cent of that recent increase has gone into the Owner’s pockets.

Conclusion

There will almost certainly be more than just a bit of blood on the floor at the end of the current labor dispute. This post has argued (and concluded) that Rob Manfred was either dissembling, stretching the truth, or simply outright lying about the finances of Major League Baseball. Of course, just the simple fact that they will do almost anything rather than open their financial records to outside scrutiny, tells you all you really need to know about the finances of Major League Baseball. So this post could simply be considered superfluous. As for Manfred, it is literally his job to dissemble or lie for the Major League Baseball Owners. For the money he gets paid, I would probably dissemble or lie with a straight face too. One of constants of Major League history is that the Baseball Owners always lie about their finances. But, if you lie constantly in a negotiation, you can hardly be surprised when the other side reaches the point where they don’t believe a single word you say. My current prediction for this lockout would be: a quarter or the season [40 games] goes down in flames before the negotiations even get serious.

Post #8

The Once and Future Lock Out

Reggie Dunlop: Let ’em know you’re there! Get that stick in their side, let ’em know you’re there! Put some lumber in their teeth, let ’em know you’re there! Ned Braden: Bleed all over ’em, let ’em know you’re there. Slapshot (a 1977 Hockey Movie)

December 16, 2021

Many authors have used the game of Baseball as a metaphor for the United States of America as a whole. Often the metaphor is stretched so thin that it breaks. Hopefully, this post will not be one of those times. One of the central problems in this country right now is supposedly wealth inequality. The rich get richer and richer, the once prosperous middle class watches their money and their spending power and then their very jobs slip away, and the poor live to be exploited by the rich. Or, to quote an acquaintance, the billionaires just get richer and richer without ever giving anything back, the middle class makes less and less and pays more and more for goods and services every year, and the poor work themselves to death in Amazon warehouses while wasting the rest of their lives on Facebook. The current economic situation in baseball certainly resembles this financial spiral, though it would be hard to argue that anyone in Baseball is working themselves to death.

In baseball, the rich (the owners and the star players) get richer and richer. The middle class (the fans and the regular players) watch their respective spending power and jobs slip away. And the poor (minor league players not on the Major League 40 man roster and those potential players subject to a player draft) are exploited like cattle. With the expiration of the 2016 contract between the Major League Owners and Players at the stroke of midnight on December 1st of 2021, these trends (or at least the trend in which the owners get richer and richer at the expense of everyone else) is once again up for negotiation. The Baseball Owners, who are quite happy with the status quo, immediately locked the Players out and brought the business of Major League Baseball to a complete halt. This pre-emptive “Lock Out” will continue until some agreement on these economic issues gets forged. Thus the question of the day is: “When will this Lock Out end?” To even attempt to answer this question, first we should look at the history.

Quick Baseball Labor History Recap

The greatest expanse of Major League Baseball History, from 1871 to 1965, is simply one long tale of the Baseball Club Owners enriching themselves off the labor of their underpaid and exploited Players. In the year 1922, the Baseball Owners even received an anti-trust exemption from the U.S. Supreme Court in a bizarre decision that suggests the Owners bought the Court off. The Players started to organize (not for the first time) in 1953; but the Players Union really began in 1966 when they hired Marvin Miller, a professional labor organizer. With Miller in charge until his retirement in 1983, the Baseball Players Union won victory after victory over the Owners. By 1983, Players simply had to play for two seasons under Owner control and could become free agents after six seasons. Their salaries for seasons three to five were set by arbitration which was based on the free agent salaries. This economic set-up was basically an engine that drove player salaries ever higher. The Major League clubs in small markets began to reportedly struggle.

From 1984 to 1995, the Owners fought an economic war against the Players Union to roll back salaries. In 1984, they fired their long term Commissioner and stooge, Bowie Kuhn, whose main claim to fame was losing every round to Miller. The Owners hired Peter Ueberroth to be their new Commissioner. In the 1985 CBA negotiations, the Players Union agreed to let the Owners push back arbitration to three, rather than two, years of service. After that victory (and with Ueberroth’s urging), the Owners continued their war by cheating from 1985 until 1987. The Owners illegally colluded with each other to set the players’ salaries. Federal Courts would punish the Owners to the tune of $280 million dollars for this tactic. After this defeat, Ueberroth was replaced by Bart Giamatti as the Commissioner in 1988. Before he had any real chance to lead the Owners, Giamatti died in 1989. He was replaced by his friend and Deputy Commissioner, Faye Vincent, who decided to act as if Commissioner was an independent party, not a hireling of the Owners.

Like most employers, the Owners were not happy about an employee acting like he ran the show. In 1992, Faye Vincent was replaced by the Owners with one of their own, Bud Selig (the owner of the very small market Milwaukee Brewers). Selig led the Baseball Owners into the apocalypse, a baseball strike by the Players that wiped out not only the rest of the 1994 season, but also the 1994 World Series and the beginning of the 1995 season.

The Genius of the Bud Selig

With the advantage of hindsight, it is now apparent that Bud Selig defeated the Players Union in the 1994/95 conflict. A kind reading of this history would credit Selig with establishing a labor peace that lasted until the current day. A more unkind interpretation would accuse him of negotiating to enrich himself above all else and accidentally hitting upon the correct formula to enrich all of the Owners. Selfish or not, Selig basically made it impossible for the owner of a Major League Baseball club to lose money. As part of the 1995 Settlement Agreement with the Players, Bud Selig also got his fellow Owners to agree to redistribute income from the Large Market Teams to the Small Market Teams [i.e himself and others like him]. This Redistribution Plan funneled the money through the office of the Baseball Commissioner. This redistribution, coupled with ever increasing national broadcast money that was shared by the owners equally, made any Baseball Owner bulletproof. By not fielding a competitive team and cutting expenses, any Owner could easily turn a profit by just raking in the redistribution and National TV money.

The fact that any Owner could make a bundle of money by not even trying to field a competitive team was immediately apparent. The Florida [now Miami] Marlins led the way in both directions by spending a ton of money on players to win the 1997 World Series and then immediately dismantling their team to take advantage of Bud Selig’s safety net. The Marlins reportedly made even more money in 1998 than they did in 1997.* Wayne Huizenga, the owner of the Marlins, was at the forefront of another revolution. Huizenga, the founder of companies (such as Blockbuster Video and Waste Management Inc.) was a businessman through and through. He treated his team simply as a vehicle to maximize profits in whichever way possible. The old school Baseball Owners, who usually ran their teams like southern plantations, would become baseball dinosaurs shambling toward extinction. Bud Selig, who would be the Baseball Commissioner from 1992 to 2014, was also deeply involved with changing the very type of baseball owners involved in the game.

* Ironically, the owners added 4 teams in 1993, using their entry fees to pay off the $280 million dollar collusion debt. The Marlins were one of the new teams].

From the 1995 Collective Bargaining Agreement [CBA] that ended the Strike until the most recent 2016 CBA that just expired on December 1, 2021, the Owners’ Negotiators with the Union followed a simple two-pronged strategy. First, they worked to limit how much money any of the Large Market teams could spend on players (with a “Luxury Tax”); and, second, reduce any money going to Non-Union talent. In other words, the Owners strategy was to limit the amount of money being spent at the top and the bottom. The Owners won every round. In each and every CBA negotiation, the owners either 1) made it more onerous for Large Market teams to spend unlimited funds, or 2) reduced any leverage that amateur players had to negotiate for their actual market worth. The 2011 and 2016 CBAs with the Union were the culmination of this long string of victories. At the same time, the so-called “Money Ball” revolution resulted in more and more Major League front offices applying normal business strategies to running the teams. The combination of the downward pressure on expenses at both ends and the change from basically amateur to professional business management accelerated the transfer of more and more of the profits generated by the teams from the Players to the Owners.

The Parties to the Negotiation

With the labor history summarized, we will now discuss the different parties that each have a stake in the negotiations. Understanding their motivations will then help us try to answer the question: “When will this Lock Out end?” There are actually six distinct parties in this labor negotiation. The first party would be the Small Market Team Owners [SMTO]. The second party would be the Large Market Team Owners [LMTO]. In the negotiations, these two parties are represented by the Commissioner’s Office [CO]. The third party would be the Star Major League Players [SMLP]. The fourth party would be the Normal (or Non-Star) Major League Players [NMLP]. The third and fourth parties have the Major League Player’s union [PU] as their representative. The fifth party would be the drafted and non-unionized minor league players. This party can be collectively called the Cannon Fodder. And, of course, the sixth and last party would be the Fans. Neither the fifth or the sixth party are represented in this negotiation at all. And, for all intents and purposes, the Commissioner’s Office really represents the Small Market Team Owners and the Player’s Union represents the Star Major League Players. In other words, the Lock Out will end when the fully represented parties (SMTO and SMLP) are able to placate the partially represented parties (LMTO and NMLP) at the complete expense of the unrepresented parties. We will discuss each party in reverse order.

Party #6: The Fans

The Fans are irrelevant to the negotiation itself. The CBA negotiation is about how the players and owners will split up the baseball pie (i.e. money). No one will be offering a piece of this pie to the Fans. Tickets or concession prices will not be reduced. Still there will be a vocal subset of fans insisting that they are being cheated somehow. The Players Union usual tactic is to ignore the Fans. But the Owners strategy often includes stated sympathy for the Fans. This is mostly just a bid to keep the Fans on their side and ready to come back when the issue is settled. But it is actually just a bunch of hot air. The Owners and their representatives have even been claiming that their concern for the Fans is responsible for the long period of labor peace from 1995 to 2021. In 1995, the Fans were initially slow to come back. Owners and their reps have stated that they do not want this to happen again. But the actual fact of the matter is that, aided by Ripkin’s consecutive game streak and the steroids-induced destruction of the single season home run record, the 1994-95 Strike had no real lasting effect. The real reason for the long period of labor peace from 1995 to 2021 is that the Owners have basically won every CBA since the Strike, not any actual concern for the Fans.

The real way that Fans get to participate in Baseball Labor Negotiations is simply as an audience for propaganda from both sides (but usually from the Owners). Interestingly, the Owners, a group of billionaires, like to characterize the Players, mostly millionaires, as being greedy. And there are always some Fans who cannot simply see that every dollar taken from the Players will just go right into the Owners’ pockets. The reasons the Owners use this tactic is actually unclear (other then just sheer spite). By angering the players, it does little to help the negotiations; and the Owners are also simply denigrating their own product. It does help that the Owners are a very much smaller group than the Players Union (30 owners versus 1200 players). This makes it much easier for the Owners to stay on message. But this particular message is just counter-productive. And the ironic aspect of this message is that many (if not most) of the Owners are very rich because they engaged in fraudulent, unethical, greedy business practices. Despite whatever in the Good Lord’s name is wrong with Trevor Bauer, usually the worst personal trait of any of the players is simply immaturity. On the other hand, the Baseball Owners, usually drenched in avarice, are (on the average) a far more reprehensible group of reprobates than the Players.

Party #5: Non-Union Baseball Players

The Major League Baseball Players Union represents all the Players on each team’s 40 man roster. In other words, the Players Union does represent some Minor League players. Despite this, the Union has never advocated for the Minor Leaguers or any players being drafted into the Minor Leagues or any players signed as undrafted free agents. This seems strange since everyone in the Union originally comes from these groups. In reality, the Players Union only really represents the interests of those Players who have lasted over two years in the Major Leagues and reached arbitration. If anything, this is the greatest failing of the Players Union: a complete indifference to those aspiring to join it. The Owners have exploited this flaw. From the very beginning, the economic strategy of the Union has been to transfer wealth from the younger players to the veteran players. Eventually, this led to the Owners adopting the strategy of hiring younger novice players to replace the more fungible Union players on their rosters. Over the last 25 years, the Owners cabal has done everything that they can think of to artificially depress the payments to or compensation for any and all players who do not belong to the Union.

The exploitation of employees beginning their careers is a common strategy of both Employers and Unions. Law Firms demand that their associates work minimum 80 hour weeks. The American Medical Association allows interns to be worked to the point of exhaustion. Many fraternities in Colleges haze their pledges unmercifully. Baseball has been no different. Low pay and long bus rides for Minor League players are celebrated as bonding experiences. The really interesting question is: why? By ignoring the Minor Leaguers, the Union has allowed the Owners to use them against the Major League players. Why doesn’t the Players Union organize the Minor Leaguers? Or why do they not simply advocate for the players in the Minor Leagues? Stories abound of the Owners “Simon Legree” like tactics against them. The Union could easily win a publicity battle against the Owners simply by pointing out how terribly they treat the Minor League players and demanding change. Especially since it is probably fair to say that, until the Players Union finally begin to advocate for (or simply take an interest in) the well-being of the Players who are not in the union, the Owners will have a natural advantage over the Union itself.

Party #4: Normal Major League Players

The normal, or non-star, baseball players have been watching their earning power evaporate under the current CBA. The average Major League baseball salary has reportedly gone done 5% since 2017. But the median salary has reportedly fallen a much more impressive 30%. The rate of decrease must be even larger than that for the players who are on the bottom half of the pay scale. It is obvious that the salaries of normal Major Leaguers will continue to fall unless changes are made. What is causing this decimation of the salaries of the non-star baseball players? These Players are caught in between. Their salaries are controlled by the clubs until they have been in the Major Leagues for the first three years (for all intents and purposes). Then, rather than go to arbitration with these players, the clubs simply release them. The engine that used to drive salaries upwards has gone silent for these unfortunate middle and lower-middle class of baseball players. Significantly, the Owners have characterized even modest modifications to the arbitration system (such as arbitration at 2 years and free agency at 5 years) as “extreme” and not up for discussion, much less negotiation.

The relevant question here is: can this even be remedied? The owners and their front offices, influenced by the “Moneyball” generation executives, have become much more skilled at putting the dollar sign on the muscle for non-star players. Why should the Major League front offices bid or drive up the salaries of the more fungible Major League players when it is much cheaper to simply replace them with cost-controlled pre-arbitration players? There would obviously be some degradation of level of talent playing. But would it even be noticeable to the average Fan? The only way the Players Union can really protect the non-star Players is by raising the cost to the Owners of the Minor League and non-arbitration qualified Major Leaguers. There are several ways that the Union can do this: 1) raising the minimum salary of the players who are not yet eligible for arbitration; 2) lowering the minimum amount of player service time to be eligible for arbitration; or 3) penalizing the teams for releasing players once they have qualified for arbitration. All of this could be done. But it will have to be fought for by the players who are not affected by it: the Star Players.

Party #3: Star Major League Players

The Major League Stars, as shown by the spending frenzy by Major League teams right before the Lock Out, will always get paid. Whether the long term drag on all the other player’s salaries will eventually affect them in turn is an open question. As Jim Bouton pointed out long ago in his book Ball Four, the baseball player hierarchy is completely star oriented. Your production on the field directly reflects your influence among the Players for the most part. This is a two-edged sword. For instance, Player Union Representatives (if they are star players) are basically immune to any type of retribution for their Union activities. But they are also farther removed from the concerns of the rank and file. Star Players, whose careers may span 20 years or more and include multiple contracts for their services, have a different outlook than the normal player who will wash out of the Major Leagues in five years and may only get one shot at selling their services to the highest bidder. In many ways, the key question for how strong the Players Union stands is just how committed these Star Players are to less fortunate members. On the other hand, the Owners, who are basically making the star players very rich men, have a tightrope to walk. They must give just enough to seem to be reasonable without insulting or awakening the competitive instincts of the Star Players

Party #2: Large Market Team Owners

Years ago in 1992, the Large Market Team Owners ceded their power to the Small Market Owners by electing Bud Selig, the consummate Small Market Owner, as Acting and later Full Commissioner of Baseball. At the time, this decision certainly seemed to be contrary to the best interests of these Large Market teams. But the decision was rewarded by sky-rocketing team values, ever-increasing profits, often times publicly subsidized Stadiums, and actual victories over the Players Union. So at this point, there is little to no hope that the Large Market Teams will do anything but continue to follow the lead of present Commissioner Rob Manfred, the protegee of Bud Selig and a Small Market Team protector. And, to be fair, why shouldn’t they? When the Lock Out is over, the Big Markets will go back to minting money under whatever system is agreed to. There is no real reason for them to act right now.

Party #1: Small Market Team Owners

Of course, the Small Market Team Owners are the actual power behind the empty throne of the Baseball Commissioner.* Rob Manfred is their man and Bud Selig is their patron saint. Their objective in these negotiations, as it has been since 1995, is to retain and protect their right to make an enormous profit no matter how poorly they run their teams or how little they actually try to compete. To return to the initial question of: “How long will the Lock Out last?” It all depends on how intransient the Small Market Team Owners are. So far, the signs of their intransience are immense. Through Manfred, they have informed the Players Union that they will not negotiate on: 1) changing the revenue sharing between Small and Large Market Teams, 2) allowing any Players to reach free agency earlier; 3) shortening the period that it takes for players to qualify for arbitration; or 4) bringing a multitude of other issues to the table. If the messaging signals the intent, the Small Market Owners are prepared to fight a Second Baseball World War to protect their right to make a profit regardless of their own incompetence.

* An empty throne in the sense that the Commissioner supposedly was hired to rule in the best interests of Baseball, not just the Owners themselves.

Parameters of the Negotiation

For the first time in a long time, the Major League Owners are beginning the negotiations for a new CBA on the defensive. If they were given the chance to resign the previous CBA, they would probably leap quickly for the pen. So far, their counter-proposals have been somewhat ludicrous, such as: 1) tying arbitration awards to the Wins Above Replacement statistic, 2) Lowering the Luxury Cap to 180 million per year while putting in a soft salary floor of 100 million per year per team , 3) installing a basic lottery for draft picks. etc. If the Player Union’s reports that the Owners are not actually negotiating at all yet are true, the 2022 Lock Out will basically become a blinking contest. As blinking contests are inherently stupid, the outlook for this Lock Out is not good, not good at all.

Lock Out Prediction

The Major League Baseball Owners did not have to institute the Lock Out at midnight on December 1st, 2021. But it was clearly in their best interest to do so. The negotiations for the new Collective Bargaining Agreement [CBA] with the Players were inevitably going to be extremely difficult. The Owners had not only clearly won both the preceding 2011 and 2016 negotiations; but they had also, according to the Players themselves, violated the “spirit” of their past agreements. There is palpable anger amongst the Players. Negotiations with another party that feels tricked or lied to are exceeding difficult. And, in the 1994-95 Strike, the Owners did not lock out the Players. The Players then went on Strike at the time of maximum benefit to themselves, deep into the season and threatening the World Series. By striking when they had received most of their paychecks for the season but before the Owners most lucrative event, the Players exerted maximum leverage. By locking the Players out now, the Owners maximize the time to negotiate before the Players can threaten the World Series again. You cannot blame the Owners for having institutional memory.

We believe that the Lock Out will last, at the very least, deep into the 2022 Spring Training and that there is a more than 50/50 chance that some actual early season games will be canceled. The Owners have defeated the Players again and again since 1995. At some point, the Players will settle for what is being offered. Most likely, the settlement will include mostly superficial issues such as: 1) Adopting the universal DH, 2) Some type of lottery for draft pick order, 3) Elimination of the draft pick compensation for teams that lose free agents, and 4) Raising the Luxury Tax Threshold. But the core issue, the fact that Baseball teams can win by losing, will be untouched. The Owners will almost surely not give more than an inch on their exploitation of non-Union players too. And the Owner’s will probably insist on some things simply by claiming that they need to get something too (for instance: expanded play offs, even greater penalties for exceeding the Luxury Tax Threshold, and/or advertising patches on uniforms). The basic fact is that, while the Players are fighting for things that indirectly harm them, the more cohesive Owners are struggling with issues that directly benefit them.

Our prediction, the Players Union will end up with some concessions. But the Owners will win this round too, simply by giving up very little and still getting a lot back.

Post #7

The 2022 Baseball Hall of Fame Election, Part 5.  Results from the Early Baseball & Golden Age Era Committees

One knows so little. When one knows more, it is too late. Agatha Christie

December 7, 2022

The two Baseball Hall of Fame’s Veterans Committee’s Sub-Committees that were voting on possible 2022 inductees released their results on December 5, 2021. The new inductees were as expected [Minnie Minoso and John “Buck” O’Neil], somewhat unexpected [Gil Hodges, Jim Kaat, and Tony Oliva], and out of left field [Bud Fowler]. Buck O’Neil was elected as an Executive/Pioneer. All five of the other candidates were apparently simply elected as players.* Most importantly, two of the six men elected are still alive [Kaat and Oliva]. As both men played primarily for the Minnesota Twins, their induction day at 1:30 p.m. on July 24, 2022 will obviously be a very good day for the Twins franchise and its fans. In this post, I will examine all six of these elections as best I can.

*[Update 12/31/2021: Bud Fowler was apparently elected as a Executive (slash Pioneer) rather than as a Player also.]

Jim Kaat & Tony Oliva

In retrospect, there is one interesting aspect of this election that I certainly should have considered more thoroughly, but did not. Entrance to the Hall of Fame has two doors. The front door is completely controlled by the Baseball Writer’s Association of America [BBWA]. The back door is controlled by the Baseball Hall of Fame itself. By allowing the BBWA to control the front door, the Baseball Hall of Fame has always created a serious problem for itself. At various times, the BBWA has not elected any players at all. For instance, they did not elect anyone in 2013. They also did not elect anyone in 2021. The baseball writers’ guild then invariably congratulates themselves on preserving the purity of the Hall or maintaining the high standards of the Hall or simply pulls some explanation out of thin air that justifies their inaction. It is all the same to them. No matter what happens, the baseball writers get a story to pontificate about.

However, if the BBWA does not let anyone in the front door, the Baseball Hall of Fame can be left with their hat in their hand. For the most part, the players elected by the BBWA are still among the living. Conversely, the players being invited by the Hall of Fame to join the party through the back door are quite often dead. The last thing that the Baseball Hall of Fame wants is to not have a living inductee at their Hall of Fame ceremony. A party is usually more fun than a wake. Of the 20 players being considered by the the Early Baseball Era and Golden Days Era Committees, only three of the candidates were alive: Jim Kaat, Tony Oliva, and Maury Wills. In retrospect, the election and induction of one or two (or even all 3) of these living candidates was probably inevitable. Especially since there is a very good chance that the BBWA will keep the front door locked shut once again in 2022.

Some members of the baseball writers’ fraternity have what they feel to be perfectly good reasons to slam the door right in the face of almost every main candidate returning for another shot at being elected by them in 2022. These candidates include Curt Schilling, who wore a shirt advocating that journalists should be killed; Barry Bonds, who took enough steroids to turn himself into Babe Ruth; and Roger Clemens, who also almost surely took steroids and has some other disturbing scandals attached. These three players finished 1-2-3 on the 2021 ballot. And all three are actually completely overqualified for the Hall of Fame. In addition to them, the 2022 ballot is also littered with a whole bunch of other returning steroid or possible steroid abusers: Manny Ramirez, Gary Sheffield, and Sammy Sosa. Each of these players would also already be elected if they had just been clean. And the cherry on the top would have to be Omar Vizquel. He also returns for another opportunity to be elected, but his Hall of Fame chances have probably been destroyed by recent revelations of both domestic abuse and sexual harrassment accusations.

Joining all these damned candidates this year are: 1) David Ortiz, who may or may not have flunked a supposedly totally confidential steroid test way back at the beginning of his career but then never ever flunked another one, and 2) Alex Rodriguez, who apparently took so many steroids that he had dreams of being a centaur. By accomplishment, the best clean and untainted candidate in 2022 would probably be Scott Rolen. At the very least, five of these dirty candidates have better credentials than Rolen. But it could easily be argued that there are eight who had better careers. But all 5 to 8 of these candidates are unlikely to be elected. And the mere presence of all these over-qualified but tainted candidates on the ballot will crowd many other possible untainted candidates right off the ten player maximum ballot.

In 1994, the baseball analyst and historian Bill James wrote a book about the Hall of Fame entitled: “The Politics of Glory.” That is a fabulous title. Despite being a great title, it was changed when the book was later reissued. It was probably deemed not specific enough (Whose politics? What glory?) for the casual reader. However, the 2022 election of Jim Kaat and Tony Oliva to the Baseball Hall of Fame surely shows those politics of glory in action. One has to wonder if either would have been elected if the Hall did not desperately need to ensure that there was a living player at the podium. On the other hand, both Kaat and Oliva are currently over 80 years old. They would not have been eligible to be elected for another five years. Better to honor them now then after they have passed away. I sincerely congratulate Jim Katt and Tony Oliva.

One final thought: it will be very interesting if David Ortiz is also elected this year. Kaat and Oliva are Minnesota Twins idols through and through. Ortiz started his career with the Twins too. But Ortiz, who goes down in history as a Boston Red Sox player, has been quite outspoken about his, shall we say, low opinion of the Twins organization. If all three are on the podium at the same time, the baseball world can be sure that irony is not dead.

Gil Hodges & Minnie Minoso

I also congratulate both Minnie Minoso and Gil Hodges on their election. Of course, it would have been far better for the overqualified Minnie Minoso to have been honored during his lifetime. And Gil Hodges, also deceased, is finally allowed to join his teammates (Jackie, Pee Wee, and the Duke) in the shrine. In the discussion about their election, one very interesting fact was mentioned. Minoso and Hodges (and Kaat and Oliva) were all elected by the Golden Days Era Committee. This Committee consisted of 16 members and 12 votes were needed for election. The ballot consisted of 10 players. What I did not know was that each member could only vote for 4 players. This, of course, means that the maximum number of votes was 64 (if each voter cast all four ballots with no blanks); and it also means that an absolute maximum of five players could be elected (5×12=60 ballots). It was stated that Minoso got 14 votes while Hodges, Kaat and Oliva all got 12 each. This, of course is 50 votes. But then it was also reported that Dick Allen got 11 votes and that Maury Wills got the other three. This would account for all 64 votes with just 5 players accounting for 61 of those votes.

This is actually quite interesting. It seems like the Golden Days Era Committee focused on exactly five candidates (the max they could elect). The other five candidates (Ken Boyer, Roger Maris, Danny Murtaugh, Billy Pierce, and Maury Wills) were then for the most part discarded. The Committee certainly did not seem to rely much on modern baseball analysis. Ken Boyer, who has the most wins above replacement [WAR being the most commonly used stat currently to sum up career value] of any of the players, does not seem to have gotten a single vote. Like politicians rigging an election, the members of the Golden Days Era Committee must have horse traded until almost all of their favorite candidates got elected. The one exception was Dick Allen who fell just one vote short. Was the Committee afraid that it would look odd if they ran the table and elected the max of 5 players? In any event, the family and friends of Dick Allen can probaly begin preparing for his almost inevitable election to the Baseball Hall of Fame in 2026 (induction in 2027) when the Golden Days Era Committee gets its next chance to kick in the back door.

Buck O’Neil & Bud Fowler

Unlike the Golden Days Era Committee, the 16 members of the Early Baseball Era Committee could not get their act together and try to ensure that as many of their candidates as humanly possible got into the Hall of Fame. Reportedly, Buck O’Neil got 13 votes and Bud Fowler got 12. This means that two of the inductees got 25 votes and then 39 votes were spread among the other eight candidates. As we have already noted, the Early Baseball Era Committee has become the de facto Negro Leagues Committee (seven of the ten candidates being considered by the Committee played behind the Color Line). Of course, Major League Baseball has spent a lot of time recently celebrating the Negro Leagues. In December of 2020, the Major Leagues even recognized seven of the old Negro Leagues as also being ‘Major Leagues.’ But, when it comes to the Baseball Hall of Fame, the Negro League players are once again getting treated like an uninvited party crasher.

[Update 12/31/2021: It has been reported that John Donaldson got eight (8) votes for election. Whether this is actually true is unknown.]

Of course, it could be pointed out that, not only did Buck O’Neil and Bud Fowler get elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame class of 1922, Minnie Minoso also got in. But Buck O’Neil was basically elected for the life he led after the Negro Leagues folded. Bud Fowler died just short of a decade before the first real Negro Major League formed in 1920. And Minnie Minoso was rightfully elected for his career in the traditional Major Leagues. No one was elected primarily for his career in the actual Negro Leagues. Dozens of Negro League players who would have easily had Hall of Fame careers if they had just been able to play out their careers absent discrimination were again left outside looking in. If you use the loosest definition of a Hall of Fame caliber player (we are looking at you Tommy McCarthy), that number is in the hundreds. Despite this, the Early Baseball Era Committee, i.e. the de facto Negro Leagues Committee, will not meet again for ten years. This is something between an outrage and a shame.

Wrapping it all up with a List (or two)

The two Veteran Committee fragments (the Early Baseball Era and the Golden Days Era Committees) got to consider 20 different men to be included into the Baseball Hall of Fame during its 2022 ceremony. Three of these potential Hall of Famers were considered for their contributions to Baseball rather than just their playing careers. One other (Danny Murtaugh) was considered only his career as a field manager. I would have placed these four [4] men in the following order to be elected:

  1. John “Buck” O’Neil [Elected 2022]
  2. Frank “Lefty” O’Doul
  3. John “Bud” Fowler [Elected 2022]
  4. Daniel (Danny) Murtaugh

I believed that O’Neil and O’Doul should have been elected. The fact that Bud Fowler was elected certainly does not bother me. Murtaugh was not elected and his family has my sympathies.

Of the 16 men who were being considered only for their playing careers, they would have been ranked in the following order for election:

  1. Grant “Home Run” Johnson
  2. Richard “Dick” Redding
  3. John Donaldson
  4. George “Tubby” Scales
  5. William “Bill” Dahlen
  6. Richard “Dick” Allen
  7. Orestes “Minnie” Minoso [Elected 2022]
  8. Kenton “Ken” Boyer
  9. Walter “Billy” Pierce
  10. James “Jim” Kaat [Elected 2022]
  11. Pedro “Tony” Oliva [Elected 2022]
  12. Gilbert “Gil” Hodges [Elected 2022]
  13. Roger Maris
  14. Victor “Vic” Harris
  15. Maurice “Maury” Wells
  16. Allie Reynolds

We are fairly sure that Grant Johnson is the clear Number 1 on this list. The only other option would be John Donaldson. But, even with 20-20 vision on his career, it is unlikely that Donaldson was greater than Johnson. Donaldson is the hardest player to place. He could be anywhere from #1 to #5. If all the data was properly understood, we believe that he would actually be #2. But #3 seems a reasonable compromise. George Scales and Bill Dahlen could be flipped at places #4 or #5. However, the closer you look at Scales, the better he looks and this gives him no credit as a manager. Allen is over Minoso and Boyer because he concentrated his value into fewer seasons. In other words, he would have been more valuable in a pennant race. Pierce remains over Kaat for the same reason and there is certainly an argument that Oliva could be placed over Kaat also. Roger Maris also moves up to #13 because of the pennant race effect and also because the number 13 seems fitting for his bad luck career. Although Allie Reynolds finishes last at #16, this position cannot be considered a disgrace on this list. Reynolds was a great pitcher.

I support the election of #1 through #9 to the Hall of Fame (congratulations to Minoso at #7 who was elected). But I do not support the elections of any players from #10 through #16. Of course, I don’t have a vote. The Baseball Hall of Fame decided that #10 through #12 were worthy. Who am I to argue?

NEXT:

A (hopefully brief) look at the current Lock Out.

Post #6

The 2022 Baseball Hall of Fame Election, Part 4Golden Age Era Candidates #1 through 10

I am easily satisfied with the very best. Winston Churchill

December 5, 2022

After finishing an analysis of the 10 Early Baseball Era candidates for the 2022 Baseball Hall of Fame election, I will move on quickly to the 10 candidates that are being considered by the Hall’s Golden Age Era Baseball Committee. Very quickly because it appears that they will announce the new inductees tonight. These ten candidates, listed below in order of their career bWAR [wins above replacement total from Baseball Reference], are:

  1. Kenton (Ken) Boyer [1955-1969] 62.8
  2. Richard (Dick) Allen [1963-1977] 58.7
  3. Orestes (Minnie) Minoso [1949-1964] 53.8 [also 1946-48, 76, 80]
  4. Walter (Billy) Pierce [1945-1964] 53.4
  5. James (Jim) Kaat [1959-1983] 50.5
  6. Gilbert (Gil) Hodges [1943-1963] 43.9
  7. Pedro (Tony) Oliva [1962-1976] 43.0
  8. Maurice (Maury) Wills [1959-1972] 39.6
  9. Roger Maris [1956-1968] 38.3
  10. Daniel (Danny) Murtaugh [1941-1951] 6.6 [Manager: 1957-1976]

All 10 of these candidates have already had multiple chances to be elected. But, for whatever reasons, they have not been considered up to the standards required in the past. But, as many other commentators have already noted, the Baseball Hall of Fame standards for election have always been anything but standard. So the first question that must be considered is: “What exactly are the standards of the Hall of Fame?” Answering this question will hopefully provide the answer to the next question: “What should the standards be?” And, to be clear, when I mention the Baseball Hall of Fame standard, it is the absolute lowest common denominator, not the median. In other words, how bad can a player/pitcher be and still be worthy. To answer this question, I am going to assume that the Hall of Fame has always had a baseline standard of only electing the very best. So how shall we measure this?

My Baseball Hall of Fame Selection Formula

I am also going to assume that the Baseball Hall of Fame wants to reward accomplishment, not actual fame. In other words, merely being famous without the statistics to back it up is not enough. In one way, the Hall of Fame is already self-defining. To date (through the 2021 induction), the Hall of Fame has elected 333 people (332 men and 1 woman) to its ranks. Those people who are already elected fall into four different categories: 1) Players (including Pitchers), 2) Executives, 3) Managers, and 4) Umpires. So a basic answer to the question about the Hall of Fame standards would be: “Right before the 2022 induction, the standard is the best 333 baseball executives, managers, players and umpires of all time. But that doesn’t actually help us analyze the Baseball Hall of Fame cases of the 10 Players listed above. To do that properly, we need to eliminate categories two through four (executives, managers, and umpires) to get to the actual number of players and pitchers elected. But this is further complicated by the fact that a few executives and managers (no umpires) are also qualified as players.

Of the 333 people elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame, there have been 264 players, 36 executives (also called pioneers in the beginning of the Hall), 23 managers, and 10 umpires. But 264 players is not the correct baseline either. The Hall of Fame has elected 29 players from the Negro Leagues. As we are trying to establish the Hall of Fame baseline for the traditional Major League players, the Negro League players must be (with all due respect) removed from consideration. That leaves 235 players and/or pitchers. In other words, a player (or pitcher) from the traditional Major Leagues should be at least the equal of or better than the 235th ranked player (including pitchers) in the history of the traditional Majors to be elected into the Baseball Hall of Fame. If you use the bWAR statistic from Baseball Reference as a source, the 235th best player in Major League history would be a four-way-tie at 55.8 WAR [Wins Above Replacement] between Hall of Famers Luis Aparicio and Joe Gordon with non-Hall of Famers Bob Johnson and Jim Wynn. But this is still not the correct baseline for this evaluation.

In the top 235 players (by Baseball Reference bWAR) are a lot of players that need to be excluded to actually discover the 235th best player eligible for the Baseball Hall of Fame. The exclusions fall under the following five categories: 1) Players who have qualified under one of the other categories [including the Negro Leaguers]; 2) Players who are not eligible because they are still active; 3) Players who have retired and will be eligible five years after the end of their career; 4) Players who are ineligible or suspended or disqualified for whatever official or unofficial reason (such as the steroid abusers); and 5) Players who have not yet spent their entire 10 years on the Baseball Writers Association of America [BWAA] ballot. This ballot is the initial gateway into the Hall of Fame. All 235 players in the Baseball Hall of Fame have had to get through this initial gateway. Due to the steroids controversy, quite a few players on the current BBWA ballot will soon be considered to be disqualified for the Baseball Hall of Fameas as they slip into the BBWA version of Baseball purgatory. How long this disqualification will last is an open question.

Of the 235 best players by bWAR, 158 have already been elected to the Hall of Fame. Of course, 235 minus 158 equals 77. Three (3) of these unelected 77 players have been elected in other categories. Five (5) more of these players are ineligible for various reasons. Fourteen (14) players are currently on the BBWA ballot. Five (5) more players have recently retired. Ten (10) players are still active. One player (Rogan) actually would qualify from the Negro Leagues but he has not included in the initial 235. In other words, there are 37 players of the 235 best players by BWAR who are not actually eligible for election. So we need to continue to weed through the list to find the actual 235th eligible player. To make an already long story a little shorter, the eligible 235th player on Baseball reference’s bWAR career list is actually #276, also known as John “Bid” McPhee [#277 is Hall of Famer Waite Hoyt and #278 is Hall of Famer Jim O’Rourke]. The career bWAR statistic for McPhee is 52.5 bWAR [wins above replacement]. Thus, 52.5 bWAR [career wins above replacement] should be the actual lowest common denominator (or threshold or standard) for entry into the Baseball Hall of Fame by this method.

Of the current 235 players eligible and elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame, 172 of them meet this minimum standard of 52.5 career bWAR. Of course, this also means that 63 of them do not. Some of them are not even close. Like a drunk at a bar searching desperately for a date, the Hall of Fame has occasionally brought someone home who should have been left outside. Three of these Hall of Fame players (George Kelly, Bruce Sutter, and Tommy McCarthy) are not even listed in the top 1000 players by career bWAR on Baseball Reference [Not uncoincidentally, these three players are also often mentioned as the worst players in the Hall of Fame]. However, since players can only enter into the Baseball Hall of Fame and never be thrown out, this knowledge does little good. An argument could be made that this method (requiring Hall of Famers to meet a 52.5 bWAR standard) is imperfect because it doesn’t match the actual results. But the counter-argument would be that the actual results, not this method, are and have always been deeply flawed. In any event, because you need to at least start with a system, I will use this bWAR lowest common denominator method to evaluate the current crop of candidates for the Baseball Hall of Fame.

Do any or all of the 10 current candidates for the Baseball Hall of Fame being considered for election by the Golden Age Era Committee meet the minimum requirement of 52.5 wins above replacement [bWAR] for their careers? In the alternative, do any of these players have a persuasive or compelling argument that some force beyond their control, such as war or racism or the stupidity of baseball owners or executives, kept them from getting to this standard?

#1 Kenton (Ken) Boyer [3B], 1955-1969, 62.8 WAR

With 62.8 career WAR, Ken Boyer is actually overqualified for the Hall of Fame. It is odd that Boyer has not already been elected. Baseball sportswriters have often pointed out that third base, Boyer’s main position, is under-represented in the Hall of Fame. Playing a great third base, Ken Boyer won the National League MVP for the 1964 World Champion St. Louis Cardinals. At that point in his career, he seemed like a shoo-in for eventual enshrinement. But that was his last good year. Back problems unraveled the rest of his career and did not allow Boyer to amass the batting statistics that would have ensured an uncontested election to the Hall. I advocate that Ken Boyer be elected.

#2 Richard (Dick) Allen [1B-3B], 1963-1977, 58.7 WAR

Dick Allen has to be the odd’s on favorite to be elected by the Golden Days Era Committee. Almost elected several years ago, Allen passed away recently. Beset by racism during his career, this one last snubbing of Dick Allen by the baseball establishment now seems like just another added injustice. Allen was quite similar to two recent players, Albert Belle and Gary Sheffield. But he was better than either of them. An absolute whale of a hitter, it would have been interesting to see what would have happened if Dick Allen had played ball in a supportive rather than destructive setting. As it was, Dick Allen seemed to have simply given up on the game at the age of 32. If he had had any type of career into his later 30s, Dick Allen would have been elected long ago. I also advocate that Dick Allen be elected.

#3 Orestes (Minnie) Minoso [LF] 1946-1948 [Negro Leagues], 1949-1964, 1976, 1980, 53.8 WAR

Minnie Minoso is yet another player whom the Hall of Fame simply refused to honor while he was still alive. Using 52.5 bWAR as the gateway/threshold for the Hall of Fame, Minoso ( with his career 53.8 WAR total) clears this minimum with little room to spare. But Minoso is missing the first couple of years of his career (in the tradional Major Leagues) to the racism of that time. He should have been in the Major Leagues by 1947 and become a regular by 1948 at the least. Instead, Minoso played his first full season in 1951. He is missing 10-12 WAR (at least) from the front end of his career. This missing value would put Minnie Minoso well over the 52.5 WAR threshold and at the top of this list. I strongly advocate that Minnie Minoso be elected.

#4 Walter (Billy) Pierce [P] 1945-1964, 53.4

Billy Pierce was a great pitcher and, by all reports, a very nice man. But the tides of Baseball History have washed over him and swept the remains of his career away. He does just make it over the 52.5 WAR threshold for entrance to the Hall of Fame. Although not strongly advocating that Pierce be elected, we certainly do not oppose it. Despite what Leo Durocher said, nice guys do not always have to finish last. I advocate that Billy Pierce be elected.

#5 James (Jim) Kaat [P] 1959-1983, 50.5

Like Billy Pierce, Jim Kaat was also a very good pitcher and a really nice man. His career makes an interesting matched set with the career of Pierce. While Pierce has quality to recommend his career, Kaat has one thing to sell to the Hall of Fame and that is bulk. His pitching career was as endless as his 283-237 won-loss record indicates. Personally, I have always believed that Kaat (and his unindicted co-conspirator Tommy John) belonged in the Hall. But by this present statistical analysis, he just barely misses the 52.5 WAR threshold. I regretfully do not advocate that Jim Kaat be elected.

#6 Gilbert (Gil) Hodges [1B] 1943-1963, 43.9

Gil Hodges was a very good first baseman and, by all reports, (does anyone see a theme here) a very nice man. In 1966, the baseball book “The Glory of Their Times” was published. As a direct consequence of that book, several players with very underwhelming qualifications were elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame. We believe that Hodges is the tip of the spear for the baseball book “The Boys of Summer” (published 1972). We need to stop this band wagon here before Preacher Roe, Carl Erskine, Carl Furillo, and Billy Cox all march together into the Hall. In all seriousness, Gil Hodges, member of the Boys of Summer and also manager of the famed 1969 Miracle Mets, is a good represention of the flip side of the accomplishment theory to the Hall of Fame. This flip side is Fame. If your threshold for the Hall is based on Fame, Hodges belongs all day long. But, using the 52.5 WAR threshold, Hodges does not belong at all. I do not advocate that Gil Hodges be elected.

#7 Pedro (Tony) Oliva [RF] 1962-1976, 43.0

Pedro (Tony) Oliva has the same story to sell to the Hall of Fame as so many other unfortunate players and pitchers. A Hall of Fame career derailed before it was ever completed. His career also has a somewhat odd shape. Oliva was at his greatest before and after the late 1960s dead ball era which co-incided with his peak years. He was still one hell of a hitter in the middle of his career, but he was better both earlier and then later before the knee injury wrecked his glide path to immortality. Most career paths are peaks. Oliva’s was like a plateau with a dip in the middle. Dick Allen has a similar trough through the dead ball years. One just has to wonder if modern medicine could have saved Tony Oliva’s knee. Like so many people, Oliva was probably just born at the wrong time. I regretfully do not advocate that Tony Oliva be elected.

#8 Maurice (Maury) Wills [SS] 1959-1972, 39.6

Maury Wills can be considered the antidote to Pierce, Kaat, and Hodges (and even Oliva). He was not a very nice man. But he was certainly an interesting one. Like Gil Hodges, Maury Wills has fame in abundance to punch his ticket to Cooperstown. As the initial breaker of Ty Cobb’s single season stolen base record, one of the great stars of the 1960s Dodgers, and the strange love thief of Doris Day’s heart, Maury has enough fame for two players. Unfortunately, his actual total accomplishments on the Baseball field does not really add up to a Hall of Fame career. I do not advocate that Maury Wills be elected.

#9 Roger Maris [RF] 1957-1968, 38.3

Roger Maris, the initial breaker of Babe Ruth’s single season home run record, has probably more fame to sell than Hodges and Wills put together. But he also has the same type of injury story as Tony Oliva, only perhaps sadder. An injury in 1963 derailed yet another great season. Then, in July of 1965, Maris fractured his hand sliding into second base. He proceeded to play the entire 1966 season with a still broken hand. There is evidence that that the Yankees did not bother to inform Maris of his injury because they wanted his presence in the line-up to sell tickets. With his hand ruined, Maris’ career slipped away from 1965 to 1968. One has to wonder how his career would have played out today. Maris, who famously did not like the bright lights of New York, would have been able to eventually pick where he played through free agency. The current medical treatments for player injuries makes the 1960s seem like the dark ages. His hand would have probably been salvaged. But instead, Maris is what he was. Like Tony Oliva, an obvious Hall of Fame career derailed by injury (and probably stress). I regretfully do not advocate that Roger Maris be elected.

#10 Danny Murtaugh [MGR] player 1941-1951, manager 1957-1976, 6.6

As I have not studied the Hall of Fame qualifications for Major League field managers at any length, my opinion about Danny Murtaugh’s Hall of Fame chances will hardly be meaningful. He did manage the Pittsburgh Pirates to five pennants. His Pirates won both World Series that they appeared in [1960 and 1971]. Murtaugh seems to be receiving a lot of credit for fielding the first completely non-white baseball line-up in traditional Major League history. He died early in 1976, ending his successful managerial career pre-maturely. But my impression of him, when he was alive, was that Murtaugh was a nice guy who managed like someone trying to drive an automobile from the back seat. Whether this impression is fair or unfair, I do not really know. In any case, I do not advocate his election to the Baseball Hall of Fame.

But, to be quite clear, I don’t really give a hot damn about the election to the Baseball Hall of Fame in the categories of commissioners, owners, executives, managers, coaches or batboys. So I may be missing something here.

NEXT:

Examining the actual inductees of the Early Baseball Era and Golden Days Era Baseball Committees.

Post #5

The 2022 Baseball Hall of Fame Election, Part 3Early Baseball Era Candidates #6 through 10

The only guarantee for failure is to stop trying. John C. Maxwell

December 1, 2021

In this post, I continue my analysis of the 10 men eligible to be elected by the Hall of Fame’s Early Baseball Era Committe for induction into the Baseball Hall of Fame in 2022 by profiling the second five players [#6-10].

6) Victor “Vic” Harris [LF], b. 1905 [1922-1947], OPS+ 114 [SH]

Vic Harris is an interesting choice by the Committee that chose the potential candidates active before 1950 for the Early Baseball Committee. A very good outfielder in the Negro Leagues, Vic Harris forged a long career in the Negro Leagues as a player. If he had not been a victim of discrimination, Vic Harris would have probably been in the Major Leagues by 1926 and a regular shortly thereafter. Harris, a temperamental but extremely competitive man, would have almost certainly been a favorite of his Major League managers. Harris would have probably lasted as a regular until 1939 or 1940. At that point, his fading skills would have made him replaceable by younger and better players. Like many Major League players of that time, Vic Harris may have added on to his career by playing during the World War 2 years from 1942-1945 while the Major Leagues were decimated by the draft.

[Note on analyzing the Seamheads’ Negro League statistics: it is my belief that the quality of the Major Negro Leagues fluctuated between the quality of the highest classification of the Minor Leagues and the Major Leagues itself. The quality of the Negro Leagues was roughly equal to the highest Minor League classification when the Leagues began in the 1920s and then rose steadily. In the early 1930s, it is quite possible that the Negro Leagues were equal or close to equal to the caliber of the Major Leagues. In 1937, because of the founding of the Negro American League and sustained player raids by Latin American teams, the quality once again went down to highest Minor League classification standards. With this in mind, Negro League statistics need to sometimes be reduced by up to 90 percent, sometimes 95 percent, and sometimes not at all. To use the career of Vic Harris as an example: Harris becomes viable as a major league player 1923 when his Negro League OPS+ went past 100. His years playing in the 1930s are against better competition than in the 1920s and must be adjusted upwards. In the late 1930s, his OPS+ slips back below 100 and his career as a Major League regular would have come to an end. Player shortages during World War 2 could have possibly prolonged his career.]

But a careful analysis of career indicates that, if he had played in the Majors, it is very unlikely that Vic Harris would have been elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame simply as a player. Harris was a good hitter but not an outstanding one. He does not elevate his status by being a defensive wizard either. Vic Harris spent his career basically as a left fielder, the least important defensively of the three outfield positions. Not only are there many White outfielders of this era with better qualifications, Vic Harris does not measure up to some of his Black contemporaries such as Fats Jenkins, Clint Thomas, Neil Robinson or Herbert “Rap” Dixon as an potential Hall of Famer as an outfielder. All four of these Negro League outfielders are far more deserving of the Hall of Fame than Harris simply for their playing careers. But, like George Scales below, Vic Harris is a combination candidate. Harris had a long and successful career as a field manager.

Vic Harris managed the Homestead Grays from 1936 to 1942 and then again from 1945 to 1948. The Grays dominated the Negro National League [NNL] from 1937 to 1945, finishing first or winning the pennant every year while also winning the Negro World Series multiple times. The Grays then capped off this incredible run by winning both the 1948 pennant and the Negro World Series one final time during the last season of the NNL. It does seem like the field manager of such a formidable Baseball dynasty deserves to be in the Hall of Fame. And this, rather than his playing career (or perhaps in combination with his playing career), is the true basis for Harris’ candidacy for admittance to the Baseball Hall of Fame. So the actual question of Vic Harris’ Hall of Fame candidacy should perhaps be: “Is the combination of both his playing career and his managerial career enough to justify his election to the Baseball Hall of Fame?”

One could argue that the true “manager” and architect of the Homestead Grays dynasty that lasted from 1937 to 1945 teams was Cumberland “Cum” Posey, the team owner. Posey, of course, has already been inducted to the Baseball Hall of Fame for this role. Posey had actually been the team’s field manager in 1935 but turned the title over to Harris. And this becomes the crux of the issue. Due to the free flowing nature of the Negro Leagues, field managers in these Leagues did not exactly have the same job responsibilities as their Major League counterparts. What exactly were Harris’ duties as a field manager? How much credit should he get for how great the team was at that time? Or did Harris simply do the menial stuff that Cum Posey did not want to waste his time doing? Interestingly, Harris took a war time job for the 1943 and 1944 seasons and the Grays did not miss a beat. One thing that cannot be disputed is that Cum Posey was definitely the man in charge. Was Vic Harris a great field manager or just Posey’s factotum? It is hard to tell.

After Cum Posey’s 1946 death, Vic Harris did lead the Homestead Grays to one last pennant in 1948. And under his leadership, the Grays won the last Negro World Series in the final season of the NNL. However, one could easily argue that the credit for this last victorious season actually goes to Seward Posey and Rufus Jackson, the two men who ran the Homestead Grays after Cum Posey passed away. In the last year of a dying league, they spent the money for one last shot at glory. But Harris was still there and that should certainly count for something. You cannot simply take away all of the credit. And it is a truism that a bad manager can do much more to wreck a situation than a good manager can do to improve it. But until a better understanding of exactly how much credit is apportioned to Vic Harris for his managerial talents, I cannot advocate his election to the Hall of Fame.

7) George “Tubby” Scales [2B-3B], b. 1900 [1921-1946], OPS+ 141 [SH]

The last of the seven Negro League players on this list. George Scales is yet another combination candidate like Vic Harris. George Scales played in the Negro Leagues for well over 20 years; and was also, later in his career, a very well regarded manager. But, unlike Harris, George Scales does not need the extra credit of being a good (or great) manager to make his Hall of Fame case complete. In the field, he played every position but catcher during his career. However, Scales’ appearances in the outfield and especially as a pitcher were minimal. He was was basically an infielder. He played mostly 2B and 3B but also some SS and 1B. His career path around the infield was somewhat odd. Beginning at 3B [1921-23], Scales then played 2B [1924] before shifting over to primarily SS [1926-28]. He returned to 2B [1929-32] before returning to 3B [1933-41]. From 1942 on, he played primarily 1B. Scales’ fielding statistics are actually better at 2B and SS rather than 3B. This would seem to indicate that his strength in the field was range rather than his arm. But it was with his bat that George Scales would truly make his mark.

If he had been allowed to play in the Major Leagues, George Scales would have had an extremely long career. He would have probably made his first appearance in the Majors in 1923. George Scales would have quickly become a regular and stayed a regular until 1940. He would have probably also had an extended World War 2 coda to his career with his last significant playing time in 1943 and perhaps even limited appearances in 1944 and 1945. His career plateau OPS+ in the Major Leagues would have probably been from 140 to 150. Depending on his home park, he would have averaged .350-.375 with 20-25 home runs during his absolute peak seasons. Because he would have played for 20 years in the Majors, there is a good chance that his career hits total would have approached or exceeded 3000. The sheer length of George Scales’ career would have provided him with the counting stats that would have made his election to the Baseball Hall of Fame inevitable.

It is interesting to compare Scales to his Major League contemporaries at 2B [Rogers Hornsby, Frankie Frisch, and Tony Lazzeri] and 3B [Pie Traynor, Fred Lindstrom, and Jimmy Dykes]. Scales does not really compare to Hornsby at all [the comp for Hornsby would be John Beckwith]. His career path was very similar to that of Frankie Frisch or Jimmy Dykes. But he was obviously a much greater player than Dykes. During their peak years, Tony Lazzeri and Freddie Lindstrom were comparable to Scales as hitters. But Scales’ career and peak were much longer than theirs. George Scales was a much greater hitter than Pie Traynor, though probably not his match as a third baseman. In value, the best comparison for George Scales is surely Frankie Frisch. Frisch was almost surely faster and a better fielder, but Scales was a greater and more powerful hitter. It seems clear that, after Rogers Hornsby, the contest for the best 2B of that time period would be between Frankie Frisch or George Scales.

Of course, this says nothing about his managerial career. George Scales was a well regarded field manager for mostly the New York Black Yankees and the Baltimore Elite Giants at various times from 1932 to 1947. He also managed in the Puerto Rican Winter League for 12 seasons, finishing first a reported 6 times. After the 1958 winter season, George Scales retired from baseball and became a stockbroker until he passed away in 1976. Interestingly, one other player that George Scales somewhat resembles is Jackie Robinson. Robinson also played all over the field and was a smart and mobile player. Later on in his playing career, Robinson also had trouble keeping the weight off although he fortunately never picked up a disparaging nickname like ‘Tubby’ as Scales did. If George Scales had been allowed to play in the Major Leagues without discrimination, he would have long since been elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame. For that very reason, I advocate his election to the Hall of Fame now.

8) Allie Reynolds [P], b. 1917 [1942-1954], ERA+ 109, WAR 25.7 [BR]

Allie Reynolds is somewhat of an oddity on this list. Unlike the first seven Negro League candidates, Reynolds played in the Major Leagues. His career straddles the 1950 cut-off for the Early Baseball Era Committee (Reynolds actually had his best seasons in the 1950s). Allie Reynolds, unlike the Negro Leagues candidates, has had an enormously long time to be considered by various electorates for induction into the Hall of Fame. Despite this, Reynolds has never been seriously considered. Probably his best qualification for the Hall of Fame is his impeccable won-lost record of 182 wins against only 107 losses. Normally, this would be the sign of a great pitcher. But, in this case, the record also reflects the quality of the two teams that Reynolds played for: the Cleveland Indians and the New York Yankees. Both of these teams were well run and very successful while employing Reynolds to pitch.

Other than his winning percentage, Allie Reynolds does not have any of the other earmarks of a Baseball Hall of Fame pitcher. Strangely, Reynolds does not even have the argument that many of his contemporaries do (that their careers were impacted negatively by the Second World War). The war actually allowed Reynolds to reach the Major Leagues and begin his career earlier than his talent dictated. Reynolds, outside of his one great season in 1952, was usually a barely-above-average innings-eater with command issues. Of course, there is great value to a team from a pitcher who can give it bulk innings of above average production. But it does not end up fashioning a Baseball Hall of Fame career. Allie Reynolds’ 25.7 wins above replacement from Baseball Reference does not even place him among the 1000 greatest players of all time. For this reason, I cannot advocate his election to the Hall of Fame.

9) William “Bill” Dahlen [SS], b. 1870 [1891-1911, OPS+ 110, WAR 75.2 [BR]

William “Bad Bill” Dahlen has basically two good arguments supporting his possible election to the Baseball Hall of Fame. The first argument is simply Dahlen’s contemporary George Davis. In 1998, Davis, who had played from 1890 to 1909 was elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame. Davis, who had been basically forgotten by the tides of baseball history, owed his late induction to modern baseball analysis. This analysis had concluded that George Davis was the greatest player in the history of the Major Leagues who was not already in the Hall. In fact, this analysis showed that he was significantly better qualified than the average Major League Hall of Famer. Thus began a campaign to get him elected. And Davis got in. His election then kickstarted the case for Bill Dahlen to also get elected. Davis and Dahlen are directly comparable. Both played great shortstop and were very good hitters for a very long time. Both had been equally forgotten. Although it is pretty clear that Davis was better than Dahlen, his advantage is slight. Dahlen, like Davis, is also pretty clearly significantly over-qualified statistically. In other words, the first argument to put Dahlen into the Hall is simply: “If Davis is in, why not Dahlen too?”

The second good argument for Bill Dahlen being inducted into the Baseball Hall of Fame is closely related to the first argument. Once George Davis was elected, Bill Dahlen became, by modern baseball analysis, the best player still on the board, waiting to get into the Hall. But there is a caveat. Dahlen is the best ‘player’ unelected but there is actually a pitcher even more qualified. By Baseball Reference’s WAR stat [wins above replacement], Jim McCormick, who pitched from 1878 to 1887 [won-loss record of 265-214], is tied for the 73rd greatest career in Major League history [WAR of 76.2]. All 72 players above him (and Bobby Wallace who he is tied with) are already in the Baseball Hall of Fame. Bill Dahlen is second on this list of unelected players, all alone as the 79th best player of all time with 75.2 WAR [George Davis, for reference, is #53 with 84.5 WAR]. Considering that the Baseball Hall of Fame currently has 333 members with 235 elected from the Major Leagues, Jim McCormick and Bill Dahlen would both seem to be over-qualified. Of course, this is a completely dry statistical analysis. But it is the core of Dahlen’s second good argument for election and induction into the Baseball Hall of Fame.

One of the oddest things about the possible election of Bill Dahlen to the Hall of Fame is that he is not actually famous. For all intents and purposes, Dahlen has been pretty much forgotten by all but the baseball statistics aficionados. Interestingly, one of the arguments often used to try to promote the election of some players is that they are famous (Roger Maris and Maury Wills are two examples currently on the 2022 Ballot). Especially if their statistics fall a little short. Should not this argument be applicable in reverse? Dahlen’s statistics do not fall short. He is fully qualified. But Bill Dahlen is basically forgotten and not famous at all. This seems an injustice. An injustice that could be partially righted by simply inducting Dahlen into the Baseball Hall of Fame. For this somewhat convoluted reason, I advocate his election to the Hall of Fame.

10) Frank “Lefty” O’Doul [LF-P], b. 1897 [1919-1934], 143 OPS+, WAR 27.1 [BR]

The last man on this list has quite a bit in common with the first man on this list [#1 Buck O’Neil]. Other than just the initial ‘O’ in their last name, both men were a type of Baseball Renaissance Man. Frank “Lefty” O’Doul is a candidate for the Baseball Hall of Fame as a player, manager, executive, and promoter. As a player, Lefty O’Doul was a fantastic hitter but not much of a fielder. As a hitter, he was very clearly Hall of Fame caliber but his career path took some detours that blocked his road to immortality. As a manager and executive, he won over 2000 games primarily for the San Francisco club of the Pacific Coast League; but, at that time, the city of San Francisco was not yet a Major League town. As a promoter, O’Doul was involved in the formation of the Japanese Baseball Leagues and then their rejuvenation after the Second World War. He was inducted into the Japanese Hall of Fame for his efforts. It can certainly be argued that Lefty O’Doul is not qualified for the Baseball Hall of Fame under any one of these categories. But O’Doul’s combination of qualifications for the Baseball Hall of Fame is actually pretty compelling.

To say that Lefty O’Doul had a somewhat odd career would be understating it. In 1917, O’Doul began his career as a pitcher for the San Francisco Seals (his hometown team). From 1917 to 1923, his primary position would be pitcher. For the season of 1919, he was drafted by the New York Yankees. Oddly, the Yankees kept O’Doul on their pitching staff for the next two years [1919 and 1920] principally as a batting practice pitcher. In 1921, the Yanks returned the now 24 year old O’Doul to San Francisco. Lefty proceeded to go 25-9 as a pitcher while also batting .338 and slugging .529 [in just 136 at bats] for the Seals. Strangely, this did not kickstart his career. In 1922, Lefty O’Doul went back to the New York Yankees to pitch some more batting practice. In 1923, the sore-armed O’Doul finished his pitching career with the Boston Red Sox. At a career crossroads, O’Doul converted to the outfield and returned to the Pacific Coast League with the Salt Lake City team for 1924. At the age of 27, O’Doul clouted .392 for the Utah team. From 1924 to 1927, O’Doul would pound Pacific Coast League pitching. In retrospect, it seems obvious that he should have converted from pitcher to slugger quite a bit earlier.

In 1927, Lefty O’Doul won the inaugaral Most Valuable Player [MVP] award of the Pacific Coast League. He slugged 33 home runs while batting .378 for the 1927 season. In 1928, now 31 years old, O’Doul rejoined the Major League as a hitter. Despite injuries, he hit .319 his first year. Then in 1928, he slugged 32 home runs and won the National League batting championship with a .398 average. He won a second batting championship in 1932 with a .368 average. A slow start in 1933 cost O’Doul his position as a starter but he could still hit. Playing part-time in 1934, Lefty averaged .316 and slugged a robust .525 for the year. In 1935, Lefty O’Doul returned to the Pacific Coast League [PCL] as a manager and part-time player. O’Doul would manage in the PCL until 1957. In his aborted seven year career [1928-1934] as a Major league slugger, Lefty O’Doul pretty much demonstrated that, if he had just started a little earlier, he would already be in the Baseball Hall of Fame. Considering the bizarre glut of non-qualified 1920s and 1930s players thrown into the Baseball Hall of Fame by the Veterans Committee during the 1960s and 1970s, his election as part of this crew would have been inevitable.

Does the fact that Lefty O’Doul was a Baseball Hall of Fame caliber hitter who just did not play long enough in the Major Leagues due to factors out of his control matter? Does the fact that, with just a little better luck, Lefty O’Doul would already be in the Hall of Fame carry any weight? Does the fact that he could be given some extra credit for promoting, or at least encouraging, the cross cultural connections between the White and Japanese Major Leagues count? Does his long and very successful career as a minor league manager, mostly in a future Major League city, add to his Hall of Fame case? It seems to me that this total package of accomplishments is worthy of election. For that reason, I do advocate the election of Lefty O’Doul to the Baseball Hall of Fame.

However, my advocacy for the election of Frank “Lefty” O’Doul to the Baseball Hall of Fame comes with the caveat that it should probably come (just like the election of John “Buck” O’Neil) under some other category than player, pioneer, executive, manager or umpire.

NEXT:

A quick round-up of the players on the Golden Age Era ballot before the election announcement tomorrow.